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Abstract
Th is s tu d y , aim ing to  exp lain  th e synchron isation  o f  th e  national 
trade  c y c le s  in  pre-W WI yea rs , beg in s  w ith a rev iew  o f  trade  cycle 
th eories . T h e  pattern  o f  in terna tion al trade c yc le s  in  1870-1914 are 
then exam ined and th eir  s tru c tu res  d iscussed : th e US and German 
home in ves tm en t and B ritish  ove rseas  lend ing  a re  fou n d  to  form 
major in it ia l cyc lica l shocks. The sh o rt term  flu c tu ation s  in the US 
and German dom estic cap ita l form ation  in  pre-1914 p e rio d  are  shown 
to be c lo s e ly  rela ted to  techn olog ica l developm ent such as railways 
and e le c t r ic ity ;  the sh ifts  in  both the push o f  B ritish  home 
investm ent and savings con d itions and the pu ll o f  ca p ita l importing 
reg ion s  a r e  held respon sib le  fo r  th e  cyc lica l v a r ia tion s  in  British 
fo re ign  in vestm en t. C yclica l p a ttern s  id en tified  in  m oney stocks o f  
variou s  cou n tr ies  are a rgu ed  to  resu lt mainly from  p ro cyc lic a l sh ifts 
in  demand f o r  money. Focusing th en  ou r atten tion  upon the course 
o f  one in tern a tion a l trade c y c le  in 1885-1896 in  th e U S , Germany, 
Britain an d  Argen tina , we fin d  th a t th e in ternational u psw in g  in the 
la tter  h a lf o f  the 1880s was in itia ted  b y  th e s ta r t o f  ra ilw a y  building 
boom in  th e  US as a con sequ en ce o f  the im provem ent in railway 
p ro fita b ility  due to  a g ricu ltu ra l developm ent around th e ra ilw ays  built 
du rin g  th e  p rev iou s  boom in  w estern  states  such as  Kansas and 
Nebraska; th e term ination o f  la rge ly  B ritish -fin an ced  Argentine 
railw ay con stru ction  boom due to  o verbu ild in g  p layed  an  important 
ro le  in  t r ig g e r in g  the w o rld -w id e  depression  in  th e e a r ly  1890s. 
These in it ia l d istu rbances seemed to  be d iffu sed  th ro u gh ou t the world 
mainly v ia  tra d e  and psych o log ica l channels. In  c on tra st, it  is  
dem onstrated  th at in ternational go ld  flow s w ere  not tran s la ted  into 
s ign ifica n t m onetary shocks, s in ce  banking system s w ere  ab le  to va ry  
in a f le x ib le  manner supply  o f  depos its  accord in g  to  demand; nor did 
financial c r is e s ,  tend in g to  break  ou t a fte r  the dow n turn  in  the leve l 
o f  a c t iv ity ,  aeem to con stitu te  m ajor channels o f  transm ission o f  
cyc lica l shocks . As to  th e re le van ce  o f  variou s  ty p es  o f  trade cyc le  
th eories  to  th e  explanation o f  th e  cyc lica l experien ces  in  th e ten-odd 
yea rs  con ce rn ed , i t  is  th e re fo r e  concluded  th a t the fluctuations in 
cyc lica l o r ig in s ,  e .g . US and A rgen tin a , can la rg e ly  be understood  in 
th e con tex t o f  Schumpeterian th eo ry  o f  innovation ; th a t a lthough the 
sh ifts  in  expectations w ere  not so p u re ly  autonomous as Keynes 
th ou gh t, th e y  p layed  im portant p arts  in  th e transm ission  o f  cyclical 
shocks fro m  the o r ig in s  to  Germany and B rita in ; th a t Hicksian fu ll 
em ploym ent c e ilin g  did not seem to  deve lop  in  any o f  the fou r 
cou n tr ies , w h ich  was p robab ly  to  a g re a t  ex ten t due to r e la t iv e ly  fre e  
in tern a tion a l trade and fa c to r  m obility ; th a t weak m ultip lier- 
a cce lera to r model kept a liv e  b y  random shocks cap tu re s  essential 
aspects  o f  th e  pre-1914 B ritish  trade  cyc les ; f in a lly  th a t  monetary 
d is tu rba n ces, such ss  go ld  flo w s  and financial c r is es , d id  not sppaar 
im portant in  e ith e r  c rea tin g  o r  transm ittin g  cyc lica l fo r c e s .
INTRODUCTION
Economic flu ctu ations as a regu la r  and re c u r ren t  phenomenon 
are  known to  be p ro p er  to  in du str ia l econom ies, w h ils t varia tion s  in 
the le v e l o f  economic a c t iv ity ,  those rela ted  w ith  h a rv e s t and war in 
particu lar, w ere  not absen t in  p re -in du str ia l soc ie ties . Thus cyc lica l 
fluctuations in  the modern sense seemed to  d e ve lo p  f i r s t  in Brita in o f 
the la te  18th o r  e a r ly  19th cen tu ry , th e e ra  o f  th e  ' f i r s t  In du str ia l 
Revolution ’ .1 S ince from  th e in it ia l s tage  o f  industria lisation
external economic rela tion s f ig u re d  in  th e B ritish  economy1, it  is  to 
be expected  th at th e m ovements o f  th e e a r ly  19th cen tu ry  British 
economy, th e ’w orkshop  o f  the w o rld ’ , had international
repercussions: sp ec ifica lly , th e varia tion s  in  B ritish im ports
re fle c tin g  chan gin g  le v e ls  o f  a c tiv ity  in B rita in * would have 
transm itted cyc lica l shocks to  economies a roun d  her. The
in terdepen den ce among th e cyc lica l movements o f  variou s  economies, 
how ever, seemed to become prom inent in  th e second ha lf o f  th e 19th 
cen tu ry , when indu str ia lisa tion  was in p ro g re s s  in  w id e r  parts  o f  the 
world and as a con sequ en ce d iffe ren t reg ion s  w e re  be ing connected 
more c lose ly  th rou gh  trade  and capital flow s : w e hear o f  the ’f ir s t  
w orld -w ide commercial c r is is ’  in  1857*, and o f  th e tendency  o f  cyc lica l
1 P. Deane(1965) ch ap te r  14.
2 In  Brita in  g ro ss  dom estic investm ent was c on s is ten tly  exceeded  by 
both im ports and dom estic exp o r ts  in th e  la te  18th cen tu ry  and 
th roughou t th e 19th cen tu ry  in  terms o f  decade a v e ra g e . B. R. 
M itchell 4  P. Deane(1962), R. Davis(1979), C. H. Feinstein (1978)
3 On th e r e la tiv e  im portance o f  exports  and in ves tm en t in the e a r ly  
19th cen tu ry  B ritish  trade  c yc le s , opin ions d iv e r g e .  See A. D.
Gayer, W. W. Roe tow 4  A. J. S ch w artz( 1953), R. C. O.
M atthews! 1964a)4( 1954b), H. M. Boot(l984) J. R. T . Hughes(1956), P. 
Deane(1965) Chapter 14, P . Mathias(1983) C hapter 7.
4 J. R. T . Hughes! 1956) p.194
flu ctuations in major cou n tr ies  to  syn ch ron ise  in  pre-W WI years .* 
As is w e ll-kn ow n , in th e  in ter-w a r  y ea rs  the parallelism  in  the
cyc lica l va r ia tio n s  o f  econom ic a c tiv ity  among cou n tr ies  was d isp la yed  
in a d ram atic  way. I f  in  1945-70 -  w ith  the business cyc le
ou tw eigh ed  b y  s tron g  g ro w th  trend  -  cyc lica l con vergen ce  among 
cou n tr ies  was less d istinct*, both 'c la ss ica l cyc le s ' an a  th e ir  
in tern a tion a l syn chron isation  w ere 'r e d is c o v e re d ' in the fo llo w in g  
decades.7
Th is  a tu dy  in tends to  th row  some l ig h t  upon th e w ays in  which
the tra d e  c y c le s  o f  m ajor coun tries  o f  th e  la te  19th cen tu ry  w ere
in tercon n ec ted . The explanation o f  th e  in ter lock in g  o f  the key 
national tr a d e  c yc les  would, i t  is  hoped, p ro v id e  substantia l c lues to 
the u n ders tan d in g  o f  th e in ternational trade  c yc les  in  1870-1914
period. T h e  fo llow ing problem s w ill th e re fo re  concern  us: the
sources o f  in ternation al econom ic flu ctu ations; th e d irec tion  o f  the 
transm ission  o f  the trad e  cyc le s  among cou n tr ies , the na tu re o f  the 
channels o f  transm ission; f in a lly  the ex ten t to o r  the sense in  which 
the 'w o r ld  trade  c y c le ’  can  be spoken o f .  T o  settle  th ese  poin ts  
adequ a te ly , i t  would be n ecessa ry , as a  f i r s t  s tep , to  determ ine the 
causes u n d e r ly in g  the tra d e  c yc les  in  each o f  the key  c ou n tr ies  
under con sid era tion : w e a t least need  to  know w h eth er the
flu c tu ation s  o f  each o f  th ese econom ies o r ig in a ted  exogen ou s ly  or 
en d ogen o u s ly , and fu r th e r  questions on  th e nature o f  the fa c to rs  
resp on s ib le  fo r  p rodu cing  fluctuations w ill follow . In  seek in g
answ ers f o r  these questions, we in ev ita b ly  have recourse to  ex is tin g  
th eories  o f  th e  trade c y c le , and pass ju dgem en t on th eir  realism .
S W . A s h  w o rth  (1975) p.220
6 In  poet-1945  period , syn chron isation  o f  econom ic fluctuations tended 
to  be o b s e rv a b le  w ith in, ra th e r  than among g re a t  reg ion al tra d in g  
blocs. H. v a n  der Wee(1987) p. 78,79
7 OECD(1987) chapter 2 4 13, P. A. Volcker(1978)
\To ach ieve th es e  aims, a detailed  an alys is  o f  th e cou rse  o f  the 
trade c yc le  ex ten d in g  from  the mid-1880s to th e  mid-1890s in  some 
economies o f  cen tra l im portance is  made in  th is  s tu dy . As em erges 
in  th e discussion in  th e  fo llow in g  ch ap ters , it  was in  th is  particu la r 
trade  c yc le  that th e  w o rk in g  o f  major d r iv in g  fo r c e s  beh ind  th e  p re -  
WWI international econom ic fluctuations was most d is t in c tly  v is ib le .
I f  we delim it th e  a rea  o f  s tu d y  to  the ten  odd yea rs  betw een  
the mid-1880s and m id-1890s, ou r ’ k e y ’  cou n tr ies  con sis t bas ica lly  o f 
th e US, Germany, B rita in  and A rgen tin a , while fo u r  more cou n tr ies  -  
Prance, Australia, Canada and Ind ia  -  w ill en te r  on the s ta g e  and 
make ex it as occasion  demands. Th e  form er fo u r  cou n tr ies  include 
the th ree  g rea te s t in d u s tr ia l p ow ers (th e  US, Germany and B rita in ), 
one nation dom inating international tra d e  and fin an ce (B r ita in ), and 
one o f  the fas tes t g ro w in g  prim ary p ro d u cers (A rgen t in a ) in  th e  yea rs  
concerned . The e ig h t  cou n tr ies  accounted  fo r  more than h a lf o f  the 
to tal world  trade, an d  the fou r in d u str ia l cou n tr ies  around th ree - 
qu arters  o f  w orld  in d u str ia l p rodu ction  in the pre-W W I years . 
Th erefo re , i t  does n o t appear unreasonab le to  d raw  some in feren ces  
about th e flu c tu ation s  o f  th e  w orld  economy on  th e basis o f  ou r 
fin d in gs  on the in te r re la tio n s  among th e  cyc lica l movements o f  these 
economies.
We are  in te r e s te d  h ere  mainly in  the business c y c le s  w ith  a 
period  o f  7-10 y ea rs ,  i.e . Juglar c y c le s , ra th er than in  c y c le s  w ith 
shorter(K itchen  c y c le s )  o r  lon ger(K u zn ets  and K on dra tie ff c yc le s ) 
periods. In  th is  s tu d y , a trade c y c le  w ill be d e fin ed  from  trough  
to  trou gh , rather th an  from  peak to  peak ; to  in d icate  the phase from 
a trou gh  to  the fo llo w in g  peak, upsw ing , boom and expansion w ill be
used as synonym s, while dow nsw ing, depress ion  and con tractions w ill 
d escrib e  the state o f  a ffa irs  from  th e  peak to  the su bsequ en t trough . 
A lthough the business cyc les  a re  th e  main o b je c t o f  th is  study, i t  is  
im portant to s tress  that long sw in g s , Kuznets c yc le s  in  particu lar, 
form  an ind ispensable context in  w h ich  the trade  c y c le s  a re  to  be 
understood.
The p resence o f  upward tr en d s  p oses the prob lem  o f  separation 
o f  sh o rt-ru n  c yc les  from  trend . In  th is  s tu dy , w h ere mostly annual 
data a re  used, a 9 -year m oving a v e ra g e  d ev ice  is  p re fe rred  to 
ca lcu latin g ra tes  o f  change o r  f i t t in g  mathematical tren d  lines, as a 
method o f  isola ting cycles. A ll th r e e  techn iques h a ve  m erits and 
dem erits. Although b y  app ly in g  a  9 -y e a r  m oving a v e ra g e  method we 
lose data fo r  fou r  years  at both e n d s  o f  a se r ie s , th e  other tw o 
p rocedu res  w ere  re jec ted  since th ey  in trodu ce  more seriou s  problem s: 
in  the varia tion s o f  rate o f  ch a n ge , one ob se rves  h igh -freq u en cy  
noise, ra ther than th e s tron g ly  au toco rre la ted  movements trad ition a lly  
associated  w ith th e business cyc le ; b y  d e r iv in g  smooth trend lines 
from  raw data by regress ion  a n a lys is , we run the r isk  o f  'im posing a 
tren d  on the series  and thus g iv in g  the im pression o f  smooth 
u n der ly in g  grow th  even  though th e  basic u n d er ly in g  process o f  
econom ic g row th  and developm ent m igh t be u n even ’.*
T o  p rev iew  the follow ing ch a p te rs : in  Chapter I ,  a  b r ie f su rvey  
o f  th e  th eories  o f  the trade c y c le  i s  made. Pour main typ es  o f  
th eo ries  a re  id en tified  and exam ined, a s  the va rian ts  o f  which most o f  
o th e r  th eories  o f  the business c y c le  seemed to d eve lop . The 
subsequent tw o chapters make a p re lim inary  examination o f  the 
in ternational economic fluctuations in  pre-W W I yea rs . In  Chapter I I ,  8
8 A. O. Ford (1961) p.29
we f ir s t  o f  a ll id en tify  trade c yc les  in  ou r  e ig h t  cou n tr ies  du rin g
1870-1914, and examine the d egree  o f  syn ch ron iza tion  among these 
national trade  cyc les ; then , we d ecide w h eth er  each o f  these 
coun tries  was a trade cyc le  exporter o r  im porter, which would enable 
us to su g ges t the mechanism o f  in ternational transm ission o f  cyc lica l 
fo rces . Chapter I I I  takes a cloae look a t th e movements o f
investm ent and money, the two va r iab les  re g a rd ed  by tw o main 
d iv e rg in g  v iew poin ts  as key cyc lica l sources.
On th e basis o f  the o ve rv iew  o f  th e in tern a tion a l trade c y c le s  in 
1870-1914, in Chapters IV -V II we make a d e ta iled  examination o f  the 
course o f  one particu lar trade  cyc le  -  from  th e  mid-1880s to  th e  m id- 
1890s -  in  ou r fou r key countries. Bach o f  these ch a p te rs  is  
devo ted ' jo  th e discussion o f  the national tr a d e  cyc le  in on e  o f  the 
fou r cou n tr ies , and d iv ided  into sectiona d ea lin g  w ith  major sectors  
o f  an economy, such as home investm ent, o v e r se a s  trad e , cap ita l 
flows, consumption, govern m ent and money. C hapter V III  in teg ra te s  
the resu lts  o f  the analyses in the p reced in g  fo u r  ch ap ters  in to  an 
ov e ra ll p ic tu re  o f  the international tra d e  c y c le  in  1885-1896. In 
Chapter IX , fin a lly , we d iscu ss the re le va n ce  o f  the trad e  cyc le  
th eories  rev iew ed  in Chapter I to  th e u n ders tan d in g  o f  the v a r ie ty  o f  
cyc lica l experien ces in  the ten-odd yea rs .
6THEORIES OF THE TRADE CYCLE: A SURVEY
P rio r  to  en te r in g  upon the examination o f  th e  r e a lity  o f  the 
tra d e  c yc les  in  pre-1914 yea rs , in  th is  chap ter we make a b rie f 
s u rv e y  o f  some th eoretica l fram eworks aiming to  exp la in  economic 
flu c tu ation s  in  genera l. Since th ere  is  a v as t lite ra tu re  on  the 
su b je c t , a  selection  is  inev itab le  and in ev itab ly  more o r  less 
a rb itra ry .  Here on ly  fou r modelB are  rev iew ed : th e  th eories
con sid er in g  th e ro le  o f  technolog ical developm ent as o f  paramount 
im portance; those emphasizing the changes in  th e expecta tion s  on 
th e  fu tu re  y ie ld s  o f  capital; those depending upon th e  m u ltip lie r- 
a cce le ra to r  mechanism; and fin a lly  those s tress in g  th e  ro le  o f  
m onetary  shocks. We, how ever, b e lieve  the choice made h e re  to  be 
reasonab ly  rep resen ta tive : th e theories to be d iscu ssed  below
em body the fou r  major con tribu tions to  the u n ders tan d in g  o f  the 
bu siness cyc le .1
I f  in  th e 19th cen tu ry  economic fluctuations w e re  w idely  
b e lie v ed  in the fram ework o f  Say 's  Law to be a predom inantly
1 In  h is  com prehensive and u p -to -da te  su rvey  o f  business c y c le  
th eo rie s , V. Zarnow its(1985) id en tifies  seven  major ty p e s  o f  th eo ry (p . 
548,549): m onetary d isequilibrium  th eo ry (H aw trey ), m onetary 
over in vestm en t th eo ry (H ayek ), the or ig in a l m onetarist th eo ry  (Friedm an 
It S ch w arts ), market c learin g  w ith  rational expectations th eo ry (L u ca s ), 
c y c lic a l real g row th  th eory (Sch um peter), impulse and p ro p aga tion  in a 
rea l m odel(Frisch ), and fin a lly  d isequilibrium  th eo ry  o f  inves tm en t 
and financial in s ta b ility (llin sk y ). I f  i t  is  allowed to  g ro u p  th e  f ir s t  
fo u r  typ es  o f  th eo ry  to ge th er  in  v iew  o f  th e fa c t th a t th ey  a ll s tress  
m onetary factors , we have fou r main ca tegories , which co rrespon d  
w ith  the models dea lt w ith in th is  chapter.
7m onetary phenomenon, ’T ra de  cyc le  th eo ry  grew  ou t o f  ... d iscontent 
w ith  th e  basic p rem ises in classical econom ics.'* Thus, le t  us s ta rt 
w ith  th e two major ch a llen gers  o f  th e trad itiona l understand ing o f  
th e trad e  cycles. 2
2 J. R. Presley(1978) p.13
8
1. R obertson  è. Schum peter
In  1915, D. H. Robertson  expounded a th eo ry  o f  ’ industria l 
flu ctuations ’ in  wh ich rea l fo r c e s  predom inate, while m onetary and 
psycho log ica l causes p lay  th e  p a r t  o f  e xaggera tin g  the cyc lica l 
fluctuations set in  m otion b y  rea l fo rces .*
T h ree  major fa c to rs , R obertson  says, can account fo r  the 
beg in n ing  o f  an upsw ing: i )  g ro w th  o f  p ro d u c tiv ity  b y  th e adoption 
o f  ’ im proved  organ iza tion  and equ ipm en t o f  man in  his f ig h t  aga inst 
natural obstac les ’* under th e  stim ulus o f  depression ; i i )  good 
h a rves ts ; i i i )  fin a lly , ’ the in c reased  a ttrac tiv en ess  o f  investm ent’ . Of 
these th re e  fac tors , a cco rd in g  to  Robertson, to  the f i r s t  neither a 
sole nor a predom inant p lace can  b e  allowed in  r e v iv in g  in d u stry  as 
a whole, whereas th e  e f fe c t  o f  good  crop  on in d u stry  is  not a lways 
clear and can be weakened b y  va r iou s  factors . T h e re fo re  the th ird  
fac tor could sa fe ly  be held to  be most c r it ica l in  the s ta rt o f  an 
expansion.*
A ttrac tiven ess  o f  inves tm en t o r  ’m arginal u tility  o f  constructional 
goods ’ can  be increased  i )  b y  th e  con fidence in fluen ced  b y  ha rves t 
condition  o r  i i) by  ’th e  w ea r in g  o u t o f  an unusually la rg e  number o f  
the instrum ents o f  p rod u ction  in  some im portant trade  o r  g ro u p  o f  
trades ’  o r  i i i )  fin a lly  b y  'th e  oc cu rren ce  o f  in ven tion ’.* In  v iew  o f 
the rese rva tion  exp ressed  b y  R obertson  on th e w ork ing  and e f fe c t  o f  3456
3 A ccord in g  to  J. R. P re s le y (1978) p.30, Robertson is  ’th e f i r s t  British 
econom ist to s tress  th e ro le  o f  r ea l fa c tors  and not m onetary fac tors  
in the tra d e  c yc les ’ .
4 D. H. Robertson (1915) p.126
5 D. H. Robertson (1915) pp.125-164
6 D. H. R ob erteo n (lB lS ) p.157
9d eprec ia tion 7, he appears  to  have th ou gh t h a rv e s t and invention  to 
be tw o  major fa c to rs  a ffe c t in g  con fid en ce  an d  th ereby  the 
a ttra c tiv en ess  o f  investm ent. I t  is  im portant to  note that as an 
exam ple o f  the ’psych o log ica l in flu en ce  o f  c ro p  volum es’ Robertson 
p re s en ts  us the case o f  th e B ritish  cap ita l exp o rts  to  Argen tina  and 
Canada in the pre-W W I yea rs  -  e sp ec ia lly  the la g g in g  o f  the changes 
in  th e  A rgen tine im ports o f  s tee l beh ind  those in  h e r  wheat exports  -  
r a th e r  than a case o f  any domestic rela tion sh ip  betw een  agricu ltu re  
and in du stry ; on th e  oth er hand, dom estic in d u str ies  such as 
ra ilw ay , stee l, e le c t r ic ity  a re  g iv e n  as in s ta n ces  o f  inventions 
stim ulating investm ent.
Th e  ’essential cause ’ which b r in g s  the boom to  an end, is  ’o v e r ­
investm ent*, while th e  ro le  o f  a g r icu ltu re  a t the u p p e r  turn ing point 
is  red u ced  to  a ’ supp lem entary ’ fa c to r . Robertson  elaborates on his 
con cep t o f  ’ove r- in ves tm en t’ in  th e fo llo w in g  way:
The check to  investm ent a r is e s  from  th e  recogn ition  not 
necessarily  th at to  maintain it  upon  the same o r  an increased 
scale would be p h ys ica lly  im possib le, but th a t i t  would in vo lve  
a sacrifice  o f  p resen t en joym ent d isprop o rtion a te  to  the resu lt. 
Consumable goods  may be abundant, but i f  i t  is  known that 
w ith  th e c lose o f  the period  o f  ges ta tion  th ey  a re  abou t to 
become fa r  more abundant s t ill, a  w ise community w ill devo te  
them to e lic it in g  th e  immediate p rodu ction  o f  oth er consumable 
ra th er than o f  con structiona l good s . The fundam ental meaning 
o f  o ver-in vestm en t is  fa ilu re  to  a tta in  the id ea l d istribu tion  o f  
the community's income o f  consumable g o o d s  through time. 
A lthough th e re fo re  a cou n try  may be a c tu a lly  increasing both 
its  cu rren t consumption and e v en  it s  accumulation o f  
consumable goods , it  may s till b e  en gaged  in  over-investm ent.*
Accord ing to  Robertson, i t  is  the ’ s t r e s s  o f  competition, 
a g g ra va ted  by  the len g th  o f  time w h ich  must e lap se  befo re  the new
7 D. H. Robertson(1915) p.37 ’as an explanation o f  gen era l 
flu ctu ation , it  is  open  to  obviou s ob je c tio n  ... N everth e less, th ere  is 
con sid erab le  ev iden ce  in  support o f  cm raful app lica tion  o f  the 
p r in c ip le  to particu la r trad es.’ S tre s s  added.
8 D. H. Robertson(1915) p.180
instrum ents p ro je c ted  can be b ro u gh t in to  w o rk in g  order* that 
explains w hy inves tm en t is  ca rr ied  ou t beyond  th e  p o in t 'beyond 
which any fu r th e r  investm ent would in v o lve  a s a c r if ic e  o f  present 
en joym ent d ispropo rtion ate  to  th e en joym en t wh ich w ill be a ffo rd ed  
b y  th e  new consum able goods which i t  is  p roposed  to  create.**
In  sum, in  R obertson ’s model o f  th e  trade c y c le  th e  increase in 
investm ent a c t iv ity  mainly due both to  inven tion , a f fe c t in g  domestic 
investm ent in  p a rticu la r, and to a good  h a rves t, stim ulating the 
fo re ign  investm en t in  prim ary p rod u c in g  reg ion s  s p ec if ic a lly , is  o f 
c en tra l im portance in  accounting fo r  th e b eg in n in g  o f  an upswing, 
w h ile o v e r - in v e s tm en t as defined  ab ove  exp lains w h y  th e  upsw ing iB 
u ltim ately r e v e rs e d . Thus in Robertson , sh o rt term  in s ta b ility  is  an 
in ev itab le  fea tu re  o f  the g row th  path  o f  an in du str ia l econom y.1*
S ide b y  s id e  w ith  Robertson, J. A. Schum peter con stru cted  a 
model o f  econom ic fluctuations, p lac in g  p erh aps g r e a te r  emphasis 
upon th e ro le  o f  techn olog ica l advance in  a broad sen se .11 I t  would 
be b est to  b eg in  w ith  hiB concepts o f  equ ilibrium  o r  's ta tio n a ry  flow ', 
and o f  'in n ova tio n ', which d is tu rbs  equ ilibrium  and th us causes an 
economy to  flu c tu ate .
For Schum peter, equilibrium  va lu es  a re  d e fin ed  as  'th e  values o f  
p rices  and q u a n titie s  which a re  th e  o n ly  ones, th e  data  be in g  what 
th ey  a re  in  each case, to  sa tis fy ’ ... 'th e  rela tion s know n to  subsist 
between th e e lem ents o f  the system ', and equ ilib rium  as 'th e  state o f  910
9 D. H. Robertson (1915) p.240
10 'ou t o f  th e w e lte r  o f  industria l d is to r t ion  th e g r e a t  perm anent 
r ich es  o f  the fu tu re  a re  gen era ted ’ . D. H. R obertaon (19 l5 ) p.254
11 His v iew  was f i r s t  formalised in  T h e o r ie  d s r  W irta ch a ftlichen  
Entw ick lung, pu b lished  in 1912, snd fu r th e r  d eve lo ped  in  Buainemm 
Cyclem, pu b lished  in  1939.
Il
the system  which ob ta ins i f  a ll p rices  and qu a n tities  take th e ir  
equ ilibrium  va lu es '.u Thu s, i t  cou ld  be said th at equ ilib rium  va lu es  
w ill not ch an ge , unless th ere  a r e  varia tion s  in 'd a ta ';  and th a t th e  
'time fa c to r ' can be ab s trac ted  from , since flow s  a re  con stan t in 
equ ilibrium : 'we may thus v isu a liz e  an economic p rocess  wh ich
m erely rep rod u ces  its e lf  a t con stan t ra tes ’ .1* Schum peter ca lls  such 
a p ro cess  's ta tionary  flow '.
Such a  v iew  o f  equ ilib r iu m , accord in g  to Schum peter, is  one o f  
g en era l o r  Walrasian equ ilib r iu m , and he un derlines  th e d iffe r e n c e  
between h is  equilibrium  on  th e  one hand and p a r tia l o r  M arshallian 
equ ilib rium  and Keynesian a g g r e g a t iv e  equilibrium  on  the o th e r  hand. 
Partia l equ ilibrium , he th ou gh t, is  su itab le fo r  M arshallian ty p e  o f  
an a lys is , and has the a d van tage  o f  's im p lic ity  and handiness ’ ; bu t it 
is  n e ith e r  a 's tr ic t ly  c o r r e c t ’  c on cep t o f  equ ilibrium , nor con sid ered  
to be im portant in th e an a lys is  o f  th e trade  c y c le . On th e  o th e r  
hand, in  sp ite  o f  'it s  u se fu ln ess  fo r  some p u rpo ses ', a g g re g a t iv e  
equ ilib rium  is  un sa tis fa ctory  fo r  th e reasons g iv e n  in  the fo llo w in g
i t  is  obvious th a t th is  k ind  o f  equilibrium  [i.e . a g g r e g a t iv e  
equ ilib rium ] is com patib le w ith  most v io len t d iseq u ilib ria  in 
e v e r y  other sense. And these d iseq u ilib ria  w ill a s s e rt
them selves by ch an g in g  th e  g iv e n  s ituation , inc lud in g th e 
a g g re g a t iv e  qu an tities  them selves. I t  is , th e re fo r e , m isleading 
to  reason  on a g g r e g a t iv e  equilibrium  as i f  i t  d isp layed  the 
fa c to r s  which in it ia te  ch an ges  and as i f  d is tu rban ce  in  th e 
econom ic system  as a w h ole  could a r ise  o n ly  from  those
a g g re ga te s  .....  I t  k eeps an a lys is  on  the su r fa ce  o f  th in g s  and
p re v e n ts  it  from  p en e tra tin g  in to  the in d u s tr ia l p ro cesses  
below , which a re  w hat r e a lly  m atters.1*
In  Schumpeter’ s model, th e  a lternation  o f  boom and d epress ion  
can be crea ted  ou t o f  th e  s ta te  o f  equilibrium  o n ly  by  ’ in n ova tio n ’ , 1234
12 J. A. Schum peter! 1939) p.41, 42
13 J. A. Schum peter! 1939) p.38
14 J. A. Schum peter! 1939) p.43,44
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which is  defin ed  as sim ply as ’any "d o in g  th in g s  d iffe r e n t ly "  in  the 
realm o f  economic life .*1* I t  can inc lude th e  fo llow ing : in trodu ction  
o f  new commodities, technolog ical ch an ge  in  the p roduction  o f  
commodities a lready  in  use, the open in g  up o f  new  markets o r  o f  new 
sources o f  supp ly, Tay lo r iza tion  o f  w o rk , im proved  handling o f  
material, and th e s e tt in g  up o f  new bu s in ess  organ iza tion  such as 
departm ent s to res .1* In  oth er w ords, in n ova tio n  is  ’setting  up o f  a 
new production  fu n c tio n .’ 1* ’Actions w h ich  con sis ts  in c a r ry in g  ou t 
inn ovations ’ a re  ca lled  Enterprise , and th e  ind iv iduals  who c a rry  
them ou t a re  ’E n trep ren eu rs ’ .1* P ro f i t ,  which m otivates
E n trepreneurs to  in n ova te , in cap ita lis t s o c ie ty  or ig ina tes  u ltim ately 
from  innovation1*; in te re s t as w e ll as p r o f i t  cannot ex is t w ithout 
innovation , since p ro f it  is  both ’the sou rce  and cause’ o f  in teres t; 
th ere fo re  in the s ta te  o f  stationary  equ ilib r iu m  both the in te re s t rate  
and p ro f it  would be zero.**
On the basis o f  such ideas o f  equ ilib rium  and innovation , 
Schum peter d eve lo ps  h is  model o f  th e  bu s in ess  cyc le  th rou gh  th ree  
stages, which he ca lls  th e f ir s t ,  second  and th ird  approxim ation. 
The F irs t  Approxim ation o r  Pure M odel show s us the basic p ro cess  o f  
economic fluctuations caused b y  th e  d is ru p tio n  o f  the s ta te  o f  
equilibrium  b y  th e  a c t o f  innovation , w h ereas  in  the Second and 
Th ird  Approxim ation fle sh  is  pu t on  th e  ’ sk eleton ’ , and thus the 
p ic tu re  is  made more rea listic  b y  tak in g  variou s  less fundam ental 
fa c to rs  into con sideration .
15 J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.84
16 J. A. Schumpeter (1939) p.84
17 J. A. Schum peter( 1939) p.87
18 J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.102
19 J. A. Schum peter( 1939) p.106
20 J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.124
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In  th e Pure Model, upsw ing is  in itia ted  b y  th e  f ir s t  
en trep ren eu r who decides to  produce a new consum ers’ g o o d , and 
maintained b y  th e ’fo llow in g  o f  th e o th e r  en trep ren eu rs  in  th e  path 
o f  inn ova tion ’ ; th is is  lik e ly  to happen in  the same o r  re la ted  fie ld . 
The period  o f  upsw ing is  ch a racter ized  b y  'n e t su rp lu s ’ , r is e  in 
p ric es  o f  fa c to rs  o f  production  and in teres t ra te  an d  c red it  
expansion. D uring the ea r lie r  p a r t o f  upsw ing, h o w ever , th ere  
would be ’ no net increase in  to ta l ou tp u t ’ , but th e com poaition o f 
ou tpu t w ill chan ge: more o f  p ro d u cers ’ goods and le ss  o f  consu m ers ’ 
goods w ill be produced  r e la tiv e ly  to  the s ta te  o f  p re c ed in g  
equ ilibrium . For in  the p reced in g  s ta te  o f  equ ilibrium  a ll in d u s tr ie s  
w ere  p ro d u c in g  th eir optimum ou tput, an d  the a c tiv it ie s  o f  inn ova tion  
im plies more investm ent than b e fo re , which in v o lve s  a ges ta tion  
period . On th e  o th e r  hand, w ith  th e p ro g re s s  o f  upsw ing, th e  new 
p lants es tab lished  and run b y  the en trep ren eu rs  g e t  in to  w ork ing  
o rd e r  and b eg in  to pour new commodities o r  old  com modities made by  
new techn iqu e into th e market, and th us th e p oss ib ility  is  g iv e n  that 
in th e la te r  p a r t o f  upsw ing to ta l ou tp u t increases.*1
As lon g  as in n ovatin g  a c tiv it ie s  con tinue, th e u psw ing , desp ite  
th e d iseq u ilib ria  c reated  in the p rocess , can be maintained, an d  the 
u pper tu rn in g  poin t w ill not be reach ed. H ow ever, en trep ren eu r ia l 
a c tiv it ie s  a r e  bound to  slacken , and thus upsw ing g iv e s  way to 
dow nsw ing, Schumpeter says, fo r  th e fo llow ing  tw o reasons: in the 
f i r s t  p lace, ’ since en trep ren eu ria l a c t iv ity  ch a racter ist ica lly  s ta r ts  o f f  
in  a  d e fin ite  d irection  and does not d is tr ib u te  i ts e l f  equ a lly  a ll  o v e r
the in d u s tr ia l fie ld  .....  its  p oss ib ilities  a re , in e v e r y  ins tan ce  and in
e v e r y  g iv e n  state o f  th e econom ic body, d e fin ite ly  lim ited.’  
S econ d ly, s ince th e the en te rp ris e  c rea tes  d iseq u ilib ria  an d  thus *
21 J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.130-134
causes the 're v is io n  o f  va lu es  o f  a ll th e elements o f  th e  system ’ , it 
becomes d if fic u lt  to ca lcu late c o s ts  and rece ip ts  in a s a tis fa c to ry  way, 
and th ere fo re  'd iff ic u lty  o f  p lann ing* and 'r is k  o f  fa ilu re ’  a re  g rea tly  
increased.
In  downsw ing, p rices , th e  in teres t ra te  and th e volum e o f  c red it  
decline; and th e economy rec ed es  to  a new equ ilib r iu m , which is 
character ized  b y  'a  g rea te r  soc ia l p rodu ct o f  a d i f fe r e n t  pattern , new 
production  functions, equ a l sum total o f  money incom es, a minimum 
(s tr ic t ly  ze ro ) ra te  o f  in te r e s t , z e ro  p ro fits , a  d i f fe r e n t  system  o f  
p rices  and a low er le v e l o f  p rices ’ . What happens du rin g
downsw ing, Schum peter says,
con stitu tes  th e resp on se  b y  the system  to  th e  resu lts  o f  th e 
en trep ren eu r ia l a c t iv ity  -  adaptation to  th e new  th in gs  crea ted , 
inc lud in g the elim ination o f  what is  incapable o f  adaptation, 
reso rp tion  o f  the re s u lts  o f  inn ovation  in to  th e system , 
reorgan iza tion  o f  econom ic li fe  so as to  make i t  con firm  to  the 
data as a lte red  b y  en te rp ris e , rem odeling o f  th e  system  o f  
va lu es, liqu idation  o f  indeb tedness.*1
Thus, th e  f ir s t  approxim ation g iv e s  us a p ic tu re  o f  a trade c yc le  
con sistin g  o f  tw o phases -  p ro sp e r ity  and recess ion  -  and the 
rela tion  o f  th e  cyc lica l p ro c es s  w ith po in ts  o f  equ ilib rium  could be 
summarized by F igu re  1-1.
In  th e  Second Approxim ation, Schum peter in trodu ces  fa c tors  o f  
su perfic ia l im portance, such as  speculation and e r r o r s  in  fo re s ig h t -  
th e Secondary Wave -  in to  th e  p ictu re. These fa c to r s  p lay  mainly 
the ro le  o f  e xaggera tin g  an d  in ten s ify in g  the u p - and downward 
movements o f  th e economy. Thus, w ith  the S econ d ary  Wave, the 
economy w ill expand beyond  th e  le v e l w h ere  it  would h ave stopped in 
th e Pure Model, w h ile in  th e  case o f  dow nsw ing th e  economy w ill not *
22 J. A . Schum peter (1939) p.137
Fig 1-1 Schumpeter's First &  Second Approximation to the Business Cycle
frpproxiTX*».’«»»!
Second ftpproximq+ion
Source: J. A . Schumpeter(1939)
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land s o ft ly  on, but p lu n ge  below th e equ ilib rium  le v e l wh ich it  would 
have reached w ithout th e w ork ing  o f  th e  Secon dary W ave. How ever, 
th e  downward movement does no t con tin u e  fo r e v e r ; w hen the fo rces  
wh ich d rew  th e economy down aw ay from  th e equ ilib rium  spend 
them selves, i t  w ill s top  con tra ctin g  and b eg in  to  m ove upw ards to  the 
new equilibrium  le v e l, which does no t need  to  be the same as the 
equ ilib rium  which would have been  atta ined  in  th e  absence o f  
oversh oo tin g . T h e re fo re , when we take th ese secon dary  fa c tors  in to  
con sideration , we h ave a schema o f  the tra d e  c y c le  w ith  fou r , instead  
o f  two, phases -  p ro sp e r ity , recess ion , depression  and reco ve ry  -  
wh ich a re  describ ed  a lso  in F igu re  1-1.** I t  may be added  th a t in  
th e  Second Approxim ation, while th e  upper tu rn in g  poin t is  
determ ined basically  in  the same w ay as  in  the Pu re  Model, i.e. b y  
th e Blackening o f  innovation , it  is  m ainly th e Secon dary  W ave th at is  
respon sib le  fo r  f ix in g  the low er tu rn in g  point.*4
Accord ing  to Schum peter, no t o n ly  can th e th eo re tica l scheme 
deve loped  so fa r  accommodate th e  coex isten ce o f  s e ve ra l cyc lica l 
movements, but also th ere  a re  some reasons to  th ink  th a t c yc les  w ith  
d if fe r e n t  periods  and am plitudes may p roceed  sim ultaneously. F irs t  
o f  all, ’th e  period  o f  gesta tion  and o f  absorp tion  o f  e f fe c ts  b y  the 
econom ic system  is  d if fe r e n t  fo r  a ll t l  in n ovations.’  Second ly, in 
some cases, ’ inn ovation  ia  ca rr ied  ou t in  s tep s  each  o f  which 
con stitu tes  a cyc le . But th ese c y c le s  may d isp la y  a fam ily likeness 
and a rela tion  to one an oth er which is  ea sy  to  un derstand  and which 
ten d s  to  w eld them in to  a h igh er  u n it that w ill s tand ou t as a 
h is to rica l in d iv idu a l.' As examples o f  such cases, Schumpeter lis ts  
ra ilroad ization , e le c tr ifica tio n  and m otoriza tion  o f  the w orld . F inally ,
23 In  th is  f igu re  is  re fle c te d  Sch um peter's  idea th a t c yc lic a l units 
should be defin ed  not from  trou gh  to  trou gh  o r  from  peak to  peak, 
but from  one to  an oth er po in t o f  equ ilibrium .
24 J. A. Schumpeter(1939) p.145-157
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’a  sequence o f  c yc les , w hether indepen den t o f  one an oth er o r  not, 
m ay be the re s u lt  o f  p rocesses which h ave also e f fe c ts  o th e r  than
th ose  which show  in  the c yc le s  th em se lves .' Th e  In du str ia l
R evo lu tion  and railroad ization  could s e rv e  as exam ples o f  such 
processes .*5 *
While th e  number o f  c yc le s  may be g rea te r  o r  smaller than 
th re e ,  Schum peter finds i t  'u se fu l' and 'con ven ien t' to  adopt the 
th re e  cyc les  schema o f  K on dra tie ffs (w ith  a period  o f  abou t 50 y ea rs ), 
Ju g la rs (w ith  a p eriod  o f  9-10 y ea rs ), and K itchens(w ith  a p eriod  o f  
ab ou t 40 months)**; the T h ird  Approxim ation con sis ts  mainly in 
a ccep t in g  th e simultaneous ex istence o f  th ese  th ree  d if fe r e n t  cyc les . 
Simon Kuznets summarized th e ch ron o logy  o f  the K on dra tie ff c yc les  
g iv e n  in  Schum peter's Business C ycles  in  a tabu lar form , which is  
rep rod u ced  h e re  as Table I - l . * 7
In  sum, in  Schum peter’ s th eo ry  o f  the tra d e  cyc le , the 
fluctuations in  the le ve l o f  economic a c tiv it ie s  a re  determ ined 
bas ica lly  b y  th e  le ve l o f  innovation , w h ile  a t the same time it  is  
adm itted  th at secondary fa c to rs  such as im perfec t fo re s ig h t  and 
specu la tion  transform  the u n der ly in g  p ro cess  to  a ce rta in  exten t. In  
th e  words o f  A. Hansen, ' I t  is  an endogenous p rocess  determ ined  by  
th e  inner na tu re o f  a  dynam ic economy; bu t i t  is  exogenous in  the 
sense that inn ovation  is  a chan ge in  th e  basic data.’** I t  is  w orth  
m entioning th a t Schumpeter’ s  notion o f  'in n ova tion ' appears broad
25 J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.161-169
26 J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.169,170
27 I t  should b e  noted here th at Schum peter th ough t in  h is  Buaineaa 
C yclea  that inn ovations a re  th e common cause o f  a ll th ese  th ree  major 
c yc les (J . A. Schum peter(1939) p.172); he is , how ever, said to have 
adm itted th at th e  Kitchen cyc le s  w ere  c lo s e ly  connected  w ith  the 
chan ges in in v en to ry  investm ent ra th e r  than  w ith inn ovation  sh o rtly  
b e fo re  his d ea th . R. A. G ordon (1961) p.367
28 A. H. Hansen; 1951) p.130
Table 1-1 C h ron o logy  o f  K on dra tie ff Cycles
p ro s p e r ity  recess ion  d epression  rev iv a l
In d u s tr ia l R evo lu tion  K on dra tie ff, 1787-1842: 
cotton , te x t ile , iron , steam power
1787-1800 1801-1813 1814-1827 1828-1842
B ourgeo is K o n d ra tie ff ,  1842-1897: ra ilroad ization
1843-1857 1858-1869 1870-1884/5 1886-1897
N eo -M ercan tilis t K on dra tie ff, 1897- : e le c t r ic ity  
1898-1911 1912-1924/5 1925/6-1939
Source: S. Kuznets(1940)
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enough to  include R o b e rts o n ’ s ’ in ven tion ’ and ’h a rves ts ’ , in so fa r  as 
Robertson emphasizes th e  agricu ltu ra l chan ge in p rim ary  p rod u c in g  
countries as a fa c to r  in flu en c in g  cap ita l exports  in to  th ese reg ion s . 
For, as we have s e e , b y  ’ innovation ’ Schum peter meant no t on ly  
technological advance, b u t  a lso 'the op en in g  up o f  new m arkets o r  o f  
new sources o f  su p p ly ’ .
A fte r  the S econ d  World War, th e  lin e  o f  exp la in ing econom ic 
fluctuations mainly in  te rm s  o f  techn olog ica l changes appears to  have 
been succeeded and d e ve lo p e d  by R. A. Gordon and T. W ilson.*• 
Th ey  cast doubt u p on  th e  realism and usefu lness o f  th e usual 
d istinction between autonom ous and indu ced  investm ent, and tr ie d  to 
d eve lop  an inves tm en t function  which could exp lain  the ’com plex 
rea lity ’  more a d eq u a te ly  b y  tak ing va r iou s  fac tors  o th e r  than th e 
le ve l o f  output and p r o f i t  also into consideration : th e acce lera to r 
and p ro fit  p rin c ip les  a r e  treated  as ’ sp ec ia l cases ’ , and inc luded  in 
the investm ent fu n c tio n  as  among the k ey  fac tors  a ffe c t in g  th e le v e l 
o f  investm ent a c tiv it ie s .
A ccord ing to  G ord on , ’the volume o f  cu rren t investm en t is  a 
function  o f  the (c h a n g in g ) state o f  investm en t opportu n ities , o f  o th e r  
variab les  which also in flu e n ce  p ro fit  and sales expectations, and o f  
the variab les  in flu en c in g  liqu id ity  a tt itu d es .’** In  o th e r  w ords , th e 
two main determ inants o f  the le v e l o f  investm ent are : 'u n d e r ly in g  
investm ent o p p o r tu n it ie s ',  the stock o f  which at an y  moment is  
defin ed  as ’the d if fe r e n c e  between th e ex is tin g  cap ita l stock  and th at 
which businessmen w o u ld  fin d  it  most p ro fitab le  to  have i f  th ey  w ere  
well inform ed r e g a rd in g  a ll cu rren t co s t and demand re la tion sh ips
29 R. A. Gordon(1955), T .  Wilson(1953)
30 R. A. Gordon (1955) p .27
and a lso the fo rces  making f o r  lo n g -ru n  g row th  in  the economy'*1; 
and 'inducements to exp lo it th es e  op p ortu n ities ', which chan ge 
cyc lica lly .
2 0
Variations in  investm ent op p or tu n it ie s  can be b rou gh t about b y  
fa c to rs  wholly o r  partia lly  e x o gen o u s , such as techn olog ica l change, 
population grow th , govern m ent in te rv en tio n , ch an ges  in  taste etc ., as 
w e ll as by cyc lica l fa c to rs  l ik e  the le v e l o f  ou tpu t. Thus, fo r  
Gordon , the changes not o n ly  in  the le v e l, bu t also in th e 
'com position ' o f  output th ro u gh  th e  in trodu ction  o f  both  new p rodu cts  
and new techn ique fo r  p ro d u c in g  ex is tin g  commodities, are c r it ica l in 
determ in ing the le v e l o f  in v e s tm en t a c tiv ities . T h is  is exactly  what 
is  meant by T. Wilson's 's tru c tu ra l e f fe c t ’ : 'w hat m atters is  not on ly  
th e  le v e l o f  to ta l output bu t th e  k inds o f  goods o f  which th is  v as t 
a g g re ga te  is  composed and th e  su itab ility  o f  ex is tin g  cap ita l fo r  
p rodu cing  them.' T h e re fo re , in  sp ite  o f  th e ex istence o f  excess 
capac ity , th ere  can occur a s t r o n g  investm en t boom, since 'm otor-care  
cannot be manufactured s a t is fa c to r ily  in  b lacksm iths' shops'.** 
Thus, in both Gordon and W ilson  technolog ical p ro gress  in fluen ces 
s ign ifica n tly  the le v e l o f  in ves tm en t th rou gh  's tru ctu ra l e f fe c t ' o r  by  
ch an gin g  the 's ta te  o f  in v e s tm en t opp ortu n ities ', and th ere fo re  the 
le v e l o f  a c tiv ity , as in R ob ertso n  an d  Schumpeter.
31 R . A. Gordon! 1955) p.25
32 T . Wilson (1953) p.82
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2. Keynes
While Keynes is  said to  have made a  're v o lu t io n a ry ' con tribu tion  
to  ou r un derstand in g o f  the laws o f  m otion o f  modern industria l 
econom ies, he d id  not appear to say much abou t th e  trad e  cyc le  
phenomenon its e lf .1 Most o f  h is d iscu ss ion  on th e  tra d e  c y c le  is  to 
b e  found in  a b r ie f  chap ter, 'Notes o n  th e  T ra d e  C yc le ’ , in  The  
G enera l T h eo ry  o f  Employm ent, In te re s t  a n d  Money.
Accord ing  to  Keynes, i f  a se rie s  o f  phenomena is  to  be called 
th e  trade  cyc le , i t  has to show the fo llo w in g  th ree  ch aracteristics : 
'upw ard  and downward tendencies  [w h ich  , on ce s ta rted , do not 
p e rs is t fo r  e v e r  in  th e same d irec tion  b u t a re  u ltim ately rev e rse d ’ ; 
'some recogn izab le  d egree  o f  reg u la r ity  in  th e tim e-sequ en ce and 
duration  o f  th e upward and downward m ovem ents; and fin a lly  the 
phenomenon o f  c ris is .* While the tra d e  c y c le  d e fin ed  as such is  a 
'h ig h ly  complex’ phenomenon, and in v o lv e s  fluctuations in  almost 
e v e r y  economic va r iab le , it  is , he th ou gh t, m ainly th e  fluctuations in 
investm en t th at matter.
Whereas in  Keyn es ’ system  it  is  b o th  th e ra te  o f  in te re s t and 
th e  m arginal e ffic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l th a t  determ ine th e le v e l o f  
investm en t a c tiv itie s , he con siders  th e m arg ina l e ffic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l 
ra th e r  than the ra te  o f  in teres t as th e  c ru c ia l fa c to r  exp la in ing the 
cyc lica l fluctuations in  investm ent, and con seq u en tly  th e trade  cyc le  
itse lf.*  123
1 'K eynesian  economics, in  sp ite  o f  a ll th a t  i t  has done fo r  our 
u n derstand in g  o f  business fluctuations, h a s  beyond  doubt le f t  a t 
leas t one major th in g  qu ite unexplained; an d  th a t th in g  is  nothing 
less  than th e business c yc le  its e lf . ’  J. R . Hicks(1950) p .l
2 J. M. Keynes< 1936) p.314
3 J. M. Keyn es(1936) p.313
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The trade  c yc le  ie  best rega rd ed , I  think, as b e in g  occasioned 
by a cyc lica l change in the m arginal e f f ic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l 
though com plicated and o ften  ag grava ted  by a ssoc ia ted  changes 
in the oth er s ign ifica n t sh o rt-p eriod  variab les  o f  th e  economic 
system .4 567
What th en  determ ines th e varia tion s in the m arg ina l e ffic ie n c y  o f  
cap ita l?  As is  well known, Keynes defin es  the m arg ina l e ffic ie n c y  o f  
cap ita l 'as be ing equal to  th at ra te  o f  d iscount which w o u ld  stake the 
p resen t va lu e  o f  the series  o f  annuities g iv en  b y  th e  retu rn s 
expected  from  the cap ita l asset du rin g  its  life  ju s t  equ a l to its  
su pp ly  p r ic e . '1 The m arginal e ffic ien cy  o f  capita l o f  a  c e rta in  type 
o f  cap ita l, he thought, w ill decline w ith th e increase o f  in ves tm en t in  
th at typ e  o f  cap ita l fo r  the fo llow ing tw o reasons: 'p a r t ly  because o f  
the p ro spec tiv e  y ie ld  w ill fa ll as the supply  o f  th at t y p e  o f  capita l is 
increased , and p a rtly  because, as a ru le , p ressure w ill  cause its  
su pp ly  p rice  to  increase: the second o f  these tw o fa c to r s  being
usually the more im portant in producing equilibrium  in  th e  sh o rt run, 
bu t th e lon ge r  the period  in  v iew  the more does the f i r s t  fa c to r  take 
its  p lace.’4
Besides th ese o b je c tiv e  rela tions, Keynes p o in ts  to  the 
u n certa in ties  un derly in g  lon g-ru n  expectations, and o f  'anim al sp ir its ' 
as s ign ifica n t fa c tors  a ffe c t in g  the marginal e f f ic ie n c y  o f  capital, 
though he hastens to  add that 'w e should not conclu de fro m  th is that 
e v e ry th in g  depends on w aves o f  irrationa l p s ych o log y . On the
con tra ry , th e state  o f  lon g-term  expectation is o ften  s te a d y , and even  
when it  is  not, the oth er fa c tors  exert th e ir  com pensating effects .**
4 J. M. Keyn es( 1936) p.313
5 J. M. Keynes(1936) p.135
6 J. 14. Key nes ( 1936) p.136
7 J. M. Keynes(1936) p.162
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Thus, th e  m arginal e ffic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l is  made to depend 'no t 
o n ly  on the e x is t in g  abundance o r  s ca rc ity  o f  cap ita l goods and the 
c u rren t cos t o f  p roduction  o f  cap ita l goods, b u t also on cu rren t 
expectations as  to  the fu tu re y ie ld s  o f  cap ita l goods.'* How ever, o f  
th ese  th ree  fa c to r s  in fluen cin g th e m arginal e ffic ien cy  o f  capital, 
'expectation s o f  th e  fu tu re  ... p la y  a dominant p a rt in determ ining th e 
scale on which new  investm ent is  deemed advisab le '* , consequently in  
th e  process o f  th e  trade cyc le . So, as to th e boom, Keynes says:
the la te r  s tages  o f  the boom are character ized  by optim istic 
exp ecta tion s  as to the fu tu re  y ie ld  o f  cap ita l-goods su ffic ien tly  
s tron g  to  o f f s e t  th eir g ro w in g  abundance and th e ir  r is in g  cos t 
o f  p ro d u c tion  and, p rob ab ly , a r ise  in  th e rate o f  in teres t 
also.8 910 1
And as to th e  dow nsw ing:
I t  is  o f  th e  nature o f  o rga n ized  investm ent m arkets, under the 
in flu en ce  o f  purchasers la rg e ly  ign oran t o f  what th ey  a re  
bu y in g  an d  o f  specu la tors  who are  more concerned w ith  
fo re ca s t in g  th e next s h ift  o f  m arket sentim ent than with a 
reasonab le  estimate o f  th e  fu tu re  y ie ld  o f  cap ita l assets, th at 
when d is illu s ion  fa lls  upon an over-op tim istic  and ov e r -b o u g h t 
m arket, i t  should fa ll w ith  sudden and catastroph ic fo r c e .1*
A lthough i t  is  obvious th a t in  K eyn es ' explanation o f  th e trade 
c y c le  exp ecta tion s  dominate th e  scene, he does not appear v e r y  
sp ec if ic  on w h y  th ere  should occu r  such fluctuations in expectations: 
fo r  example, o n  th e  em ergence o f  th e aforem entioned d isillusion at th e 
u pper tu rn in g  p o in t, he says,
The d is illu s ion  comes because doubts sudden ly  arise con cern in g 
the r e lia b il it y  o f  the p ro sp ec tiv e  y ie ld , perhaps because the 
cu rren t y ie ld  shows s ign s  o f  fa llin g  o f f ,  as th e stock o f  new ly  
p rodu ced  durab le  goods stead ily  increases. I f  cu rren t costs  
o f  p ro d u c tion  are  th ou gh t to  be h igh er  than th ey  w ill be la te r
8 J. M. K eyn es (1936) p.31S
9 J. M. K eyn es ( 1936) p.315
10 J. M. K eyn es ( 1936) p.315,316
11 J. M. K eyn es ( 1936) p.316, 317
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In  th is passage, a ll K eyn es  does is  to  l is t  again th e above 
mentioned th ree  fa c to rs  a f fe c t in g  the m arginal e ffic ien cy  o f  capital, 
and he does not exp lain  w h y  the dominant fa c to r , expectations, 
chan ges : 'd is illu s ion ' is  exp la in ed  by  'd ou b ts ', and th ey  sound
synonym ous.
On the o th e r  hand, aa  to  th e b eg in n in g  o f  r ev iv a l, Keynes 
d iscu sses  'absorption  o f  su rp lu s  stocks ' and 'a  su ffic ien tly  obvious 
s c a rc ity  to  increase th e m arg in a l e ffic ie n c y  o f  capital* due to  'the 
sh o rta ge  o f  cap ita l th rou gh  u se , decay and obso lescence '. But these 
o b je c t iv e  fa c tors  appear to  p la y  on ly  the ro le  o f  exp lain ing 'w hy  the 
du ra tion  o f  the downward movement should have an o rd e r  o f  
m agn itude which is  no t fo r tu ito u s , which does no t fluctuate  between, 
say , one yea r th is  time and ten  yea rs  next time, but wh ich shows 
some regu la r ity  o f  habit b e tw een , le t  us say, th ree  and f iv e  y ea rs ’ 1*. 
I t  is  'th e  uncontrollable and d isob ed ien t p sych o logy  o f  th e business 
w o r ld ' th at fundam entally determ in es  th e r e v iv a l o f  the marginal 
e ffic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l and th e  u p tu rn  o f  an  economy; bu t Keynes 
th ro w s  no fu r th e r  lig h t  upon th e  reasons behind th e favou rab le  turn 
o f  expectations e ith e r .12 34
on, that will be a fu rth er reason for a fall in the marginal
efficiency o f capital.1*
12 J. M. Key nee (1936) p.317
13 J. 14. Keynes( 1936) p.317
14 R. A. Gordon(1961) p.349 s a y s ,  ’ th is [K eyn es ’ th eo ry  o f  th e trade 
c y c le ]  is  a  p sycho log ica l th e o ry  th at cen tres  on  the in fluence o f  
e r r o r s  o f  optimism and pessim ism  on th e volume o f  investm ent, to 
w h ich  ... Keynes ass ign s th e k e y  ro le  in  h is th eo ry  o f  employment.
A s  w ith  oth er p sycho log ica l th eo r ie s , th is  exp lanation is  weak in  its  
con sid era tion  o f  th e "r e a l fa c to r s "  that u n derlie  th e changes in 
bu siness expectation. A t b e s t , Keynes o f fe r s  on ly  a few  ten ta tive  
su ggestion s  as to  w hy th e optim ism  o f  th e boom must even tu s lly  end, 
an d  h is  explanation o f  w hy th e  pessimism o f  the downsw ing ends is  
c e r ta in ly  incom plete.’
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To summarize, in  Keynes, th e trade  c y c le  ia  mainly a phenomenon 
o f  investm ent, whose varia tion s  a re  d eterm ined  la rg e ly  by  th e  sh ifts  
in  the m arginal e f fic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l schedu le , ra th e r  than those in 
the in teres t ra te ; th e m arginal e ffic ie n c y  o f  cap ita l is a ffe c ted  by 
both ob je c t iv e  fa c to rs , such as the amount o f  ca p ita l stock and price  
o f  investm ent goods , and su b je c t ive  fa c to rs , su ch  as expectations and 
'spontaneous u rge  to  action ra th e r  than inaction *; the la tter  seems to 
him o f  more s ign ifica n ce  than the form er. In  K eyn es, the varia tion s 
in  th e  state o f  fu tu re  expectations, h o w ever , rem ain unexplained or, 
in  th e  w ords o f  a modern rational exp ec ta tio n s  th eorist, a re  treated  
'as exogenous in  th e  sh o rt term ’15 16: fu tu re  expectations a re  merely
said to  have a 'v e r y  p recarious basis ' and to  b e  su b ject to  sudden 
and v io len t chan ges. I t  may fin a lly  be ad d ed  th a t recen t ly  market 
p sych o logy  was aga in  b rou gh t to  th e c en tr e  o f  th e exp lanation o f 
economic flu ctu ations b y  the business c y c le  th eo ris ts , such as H. 
M insky, who s tres s  financia l in s ta b ility  o f  c a p ita lis t  economies.1*
15 D. K. H. B sgg (1962) p.19
16 H. M insky(1982) For th e s u rvey  on th e th eo r ie s  o f  finan cia l 
in s ta b ility , see V. Zarnowitz(1985) p.562-564.
3. Hicks
H icks’ trade c y c le  th eo ry  m igh t be con sidered  to  r e p r e s e n t  one 
o f  th e  most im portant developm ents in  business c y c le  m ode llin g  a fte r  
K eyn es, developm ents which la y  m ainly in  in trodu cin g  th e m u ltip lie r-  
a cce lera to r  mechanism in to  th eo re tica l fram ew orks to g e th e r  with 
va r iou s  d ev ices  to  account fo r  tu rn in g  points. T o  b egin  w ith , two 
basic fea tu res  o f  the Hicksian model o f  the trade  cyc le  may be 
po in ted  ou t: in c on tra st w ith Schum peter’s model a dom inant position  
is  occup ied  by  demand w ith su p p ly  la rge ly  b e in g  d e term in ed  by 
demand; and rea l ra th e r  than m onetary fac tors  p lay  a c en tra l ro le  in 
th e  explanation o f  economic fluctuations. O f many rea l fa c to r s ,  fo r  
H icks, as fo r  Keynes and Schum peter, i t  is  investm en t t o  which 
a tten tion  should be draw n in o rd e r  to understand th e  cyc lica l 
flu ctu ations o f  an economy. H ow ever, he d if fe r s  from  * nem in  that 
he rega rd s  the d is tinction  betw een  autonomous and induced  
investm en t as essen tia l, and th a t in  h is system  i t  is  the m ovem ent o f 
th e  la tte r  that accounts fo r  th e fluctuations o f  th e  whole econom y. 
W hereas the induced investm ent can be defined  as th e in ves tm en t 
’ca lled  fo r th , d ire c tly  o r  in d ire c t ly , b y  past ch an ges in th e  le v e l  o f  
ou tp u t’ , autonomous investm ent is  the ’ investm ent fo r  w h ich  this 
e f fe c t  is  so small as to  be in s ign ifica n t ’ , such as ’pub lic in ves tm en t, 
investm en t which occu rs  in  d ire c t  response to  inven tions , a n d  much 
o f  th e  lon g-ran ge  investm ent ... which is  on ly  expected  to  p a y  fo r  
i ts e l f  o v e r  a long p e rio d .’1 In  H icks’ th eo ry  o f  th e  trade c y c le ,  the 
ro le  o f  autonomous investm ent is  lim ited to accounting fo r  lo n g  run 
g ro w th , which is  separab le  from  sh o rt term  fluctuations.1 
m :  H icks(1950) p.59
2 In  con trast, in Schumpeter th e tra d e  cyc les  a re  an in teg ra l p a r t  o f 
lon g  run grow th : ’an a lyz in g  business c yc les  means n eith er m ore  nor 
less  than an alyz ing the economic p rocess  o f  the cap ita lis t e ra  ...
H icks' such a v iew  expresses i ts e l f  when he decla res th at 'th e  
th eo ry  o f  th e M ultip lier o f fe rs  in  its e lf  no explanation o f  th e 
tendency to  fluctuate '*, and that 'th e  main cause o f  fluctuations is  to  
be found in  th e e f fe c t  o f  ch an ces  in  ou tpu t (o r  income) on 
investm ent'*, Le. in  the acceleration  p rin c ip le . I t  is  because 'la c s  in  
consumption tend to  damp down th e  fluctuations in  income which 
resu lt from  g iven  fluctuations in investm en t’* th a t Hicks con sid ers  
the m ultip lier mechanism as 's ta b i l iz in g  ra th e r  than g en era tin g  
fluctuations.
Th is  how ever does not im ply th a t cyc lica l fluctuations can  be 
explained so le ly  in  terms o f  the acce lera tion  p rin c ip le  at the expense 
o f  th e m ultip lier; on the c on tra ry , i t  is 'th e  in teraction  o f  th e 
acce lera to r and m u ltip lier ’  that n eeds to  be b ro u gh t to  the c en tre  o f  
d iscussion. Now, to  show th is  in  d eta il, he assumes a 're g u la r ly  
p ro g re s s iv e  econom y' in which ou tpu t and autonomous investm ent a re  
g row in g  a t a con stan t rate, d esp ite  both th e  m ultiplier and 
acce lera to r b e in g  in operation .
In  th e  're g u la r ly  p ro g re s s iv e  econom y’ , th e  fo llow ing equation  
w ill hold:
Ea = Aa 4 (1 -  a)Ea-i ♦  v (E «- i -  Ea-t)
w here Ea is  the cu rren t equ ilibrium  ou tpu t o f  the above assumed
economy, s th e m arginal p ro p en s ity  to save , Aa autonomous
cyc les  a re  not, lik e  toneils, sepa rab le  th in gs  th a t m igh t be trea ted  by  
them eelves, but a re , lik e  the beat o f  th e heart, o f  the essence o f  the 
organism  th at d isp la ys  them.' J. A. Schum peter(1939) p.v
3 J. R. Hicks(1950) p.56
4 J. R. Hicke(1950) p.37
5 J. R. Hicks(1950) Chapter I I  A I I I
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investm ent, and v  th e  investm en t c o e ffic ien t, i.e ., th e ra tio  o f  the 
induced investm en t to  th e  chan ge in ou tpu t. On th e o th e r  hand, i f  
th ere  is  an exogenous d istu rbance, th e  actua l ou tpu t path  w ill 
d iv e rg e  from  th e equ ilib rium  ou tpu t path ; in  th is  case th e fo llow in g  
equation  w ill hold:
Ys s As + (1 -  s )Y . - i  ♦  v (Y . - i  -  Y .-* )
w here Y » is  cu rren t actua l ou tput. S u btrac tin g  th e f i r s t  equation 
from  th e second, and w r it in g  y »  fo r  Y » -  Em, we have,
y .  = (1 -  s )y « - i ♦  v (y a - i -  y «-t).
I f  we ca ll y> absolu te  d evia tion  o f  actua l from  equ ilibrium  
ou tput, r e la t iv e  dev ia tion  ra is  d e fin ed  as ra = ya/Ea, w h ich  could 
be transform ed  in th e fo llo w in g  way: ya s ra Ba = ra E a (l ♦  g )* , 
since Ea = Eo(l ♦ g ) “ (w h ere  g  is th e  constant ra te  o f  g ro w th  o f 
equ ilibrium  ou tput).
S u bstitu tin g  th is  fo r  ya in  the th ird  equation , we get*
ra = ra-» ( l - s + v )/ ( l+ g )  -  ra-* v/ (l+ g> *
Th is  seco n d -ord e r  d iffe r e n c e  equation  g iv e s  us th e time path o f  
ra, and con sequ en tly  o f  Ya fo r  g iv en  va lu es  o f  s, v  and g . Though 
we shall have a d if fe r e n t  time path o f  Ya fo r  e v e r y  d iffe r e n t  
com bination o f  values fo r  s, v  and g , it  can be shown that fo u r  major 
pa ttern s  a re  id en tifiab le  in  th ese va r ia n t time paths: in  th e  f ir s t  
case, a fte r  increasing  fo r  a few  periods , ou tpu t d eclin es s tead ily  only 6
6 J. R. Hicks(1950) p.84-87
to reach th e equ ilibrium  le v e l  (th e case w hen v  < (1 -  / a )* );  in the 
second pattern , ou tpu t d isp la ys  dim in ishing flu ctu ations approach ing 
the equilibrium  le v e l (th e  case when (1 -  /a )*  < v  < (1 + g )* );  in 
the case o f  th e th ird  p a tte rn , ou tpu t f lu c tu a tes  abou t th e  equilibrium  
position w ith in creas in g  am plitude and w ith ou t an y  ten d en cy  to  settle  
at the equilibrium  pos ition  (th e  case w hen (1 + g )*  < v  < (1 ♦  / a )1); 
in the rem aining case, ou tp u t moves e xp los ive ly  away from  equilibrium  
(the case w hen v  > (1  ♦  / s )* ).»
Of th ese fou r  p a tte rn s , Hicks con sid ers , on th e basis o f  the 
statistica l e v id en ce  con ce rn in g  the US investm en t and economic 
grow th du rin g  1869-1938, th e  th ird  and fou rth  cases, Le ., exp los ive  
cases, to be th e more rea lis t ic . S ince th is , h ow ever, is  a t variance 
with norm ally ob se rva b le  m oderate flu c tu ation s  a lon g  a g row th  trend, 
it  becomes u sefu l to  in tro du ce  here th e d e v ic e  o f  th e fu ll employment 
ce iling  and th e asym m etry  in  the acce lera tion  p rin c ip le .
By fu ll em ploym ent ce ilin g  is  meant th a t 'th e re  is  a d irec t 
res tra in t upon upward expansion in  th e  form  o f  a  s ca rc ity  o f  
employable resou rces ...!,w h ich  m akes] i t  ... im possib le fo r  ou tpu t to 
expand w ithout lim it'.* On th e oth er hand, a ccord in g  to  H icks, 'fa lls  
in ou tput...do not induce d is investm ent in  th e same way as r ises  in 
output induce investm en t, ... [s in ce ] d is investm ent in  f ix ed  capita l 
can on ly  take p lace b y  a cessation  o f  g ro s s  investm en t ... [a n d ] thus 
the adjustm ent o f  f ix ed  cap ita l to a dec lin e  in th e  le v e l o f  ou tpu t can 
on ly  take p lace by a  slow  p rocess o f  w ea r in g -ou t, wh ich must take a 
considerable time.'*; th is  is  the meaning o f  the 'asym m etry '.
7 J. R. Hicks(1960) p.69-72
8 J. R. H ick s ( 1950) p .95
9 J. R. Hicks(1950) p.101
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Equipped w ith the ce ilin g , the in d ir e c t  check to  d is investm ent 
and th e tendency to move e xp los ive ly  aw a y  from equ ilib r iu m , Hicks 
exp la in s the process o f  cyc lica l flu c tu a tion s  in  the fo llo w in g  w ay .(P ig
1- 2)
L e t us s ta rt from a poin t(Po) on  th e  equilibrium  g ro w th  line(EE ), 
and assume th at there  is  a d is tu rba n ce  which causes an upward 
d ev ia tion  o f  actual from equilibrium  ou tp u t. Since we a re  supposing 
a d iv e rg en t system , actual ou tpu t w ill expan d  through th e  in teraction  
o f  th e  m ultip lier and acce lera to r, tak in g  th e form o f  e ith e r  simple 
exp los ion  o r  d iverg en t osc illa tion . A c tu a l output, h o w ever , cannot 
in crease  beyond the lim it o f  fu ll em ploym ent ce iling  (F F ); bu t, when it  
reach es th e ce ilin g , it  b eg in s  to c o n tra c t a fte r  'c re e p in g  a long the 
c e ilin g ' ' fo r  ... a  v e ry  lim ited tim e'. Downturn is in e v ita b le , Hicks 
says, because th e rate o f  g row th  o f  o u tp u t a long the c e ilin g , which is 
in deed  the maximum possib le  rate o f  g ro w th  at th e  s ta te  o f  fu ll 
employment, is  insu ffic ien t to  induce th e  amount o f  th e  induced 
investm en t requ ired  fo r  th e maintenance o f  the g ro w th  o f  output 
a lon g  the ce ilin g .10
The acceleration p rin c ip le  would im ply  that the d ec lin e  in  ou tput 
b r in g s  about negative  investm ent. Due to the a b o ve  explained 
'asym m etry ', th is nega tive  investm en t can  occur on ly  th rou gh  the 
cessa tion  o f  g ro ss  investm ent, which is  equ iva len t to  s a y in g  that the 
amount o f  nega tive  investm en t is  lim ited  to  the d ep rec ia tion  o f  
ex is t in g  capita l stock. Thus, in  F ig  1-2, the actu a l course o f  
dow nsw ing(P tQ t) is  slow er than th e  pa th  which would h ave been 
fo llow ed  had th ere  been no such lim it to  negative in ves tm en t(P iq ).
10 J. R. Hicks(1950) p.98,99. I t  should b e  pointed ou t h e re  th at the 
assumption is necessary  that the c e ll in g (F F ) does not g ro w  fa s te r  
than  the equilibrium  grow th  line (EE).
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The process o f  downswing becomes in fac t ’ the case o f  th e simple 
m ultip lier th eo ry  w ithout an acce lera to r ’ .11 A t  th e same time, th e 
lim it to d is investm ent also im plies th at as th ere  was a ce ilin g  fo r  the 
upward movement, we now h ave a flo o r  fo r  th e  downsw ing, beyond  
which ou tpu t cann ot fall, and wh ich is  g iven  b y  a p p ly in g  the simple 
m ultip lier11 to  th e  course o f  autonomous investm en t ad ju sted  fo r  
deprec iation  b y  deducting a constant amount from  th e o r ig in a l 
autonomous in vestm en t.11
As th e dow nturn  was in ev itab le , upturn is  a lso bound to  come. 
Once ou tput has reached th e  floo r, it  moves along th e low er 
equilibrium  l in e (L L ).  S ince the lower equ ilib rium  line is, as
aforem entioned , th e product o f  the simple m ultip lier and the 
autonomous investm en t ad justed  fo r  depreciation , it  must lie  below 
th e  equilibrium  output path (EB ), obtained b y  ap p ly in g  th e su p e r-  
m ultip lier to  th e  course o f  th e or ig in a l autonomous investm ent, bu t 
s t ill has a p o s it iv e  slope. Thu s, i f  ou tput has reached and begun to 
move along th e  low er equ ilibrium  line, th is  im plies that ou tpu t is  
g row in g  aga in , which ’should b rin g  the old acce lera to r back in to  
action ’ . I t  depen ds upon th e amount o f  ex is tin g  excess cap ita l 
exactly  when th e  increase in  ou tpu t can b rin g  th e acce lera tor in to  
operation , th us sta rtin g  the upw ard  movement in  ou tput tow ards th e 
equilibrium  ou tpu t line(BB), w h ere  we began, and u ltim ately tow ards 
th e  fu ll em ploym ent ce ilin g (FF ).
11 J. R. Hicks(19S0) p.102
12 The simple m ultiplier is  d e fin ed  as the m ultip lier which can be 
obtained when o n ly  the m ultip lier p rin c ip le  is  in  operation ; th is 
compares w ith  super-m ultip lier rep resen tin g  th e rela tionsh ip  between 
investm ent and income when both th e m ultip lier and acceleration  
mechanisms a re  working.
13 J. R. Hicks( 1950) p.102
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In  sum, in th e  H icksian model, th e acce lera to r-m u ltip lie r  
mechanism its e l f  does n o t g en era te  flu c tu ation s , but on ly  b rin gs  
instability  in to  the system ; i t  is  the fu ll em ploym ent c e ilin g  and non­
linearity  in  th e  w ork in g  o f  th e  acce lera to r p rin c ip le  th at transform  
the innate tendency o f  the system  toward cum ulative expansion in to  
fluctuations around a g ro w th  tren d , w ith  the form er and th e  la tter  
accounting fo r  upper an d  lo w er  tu rn in g  po in ts  resp ec tiv e ly .
In  con tra st w ith  H icks, R. Frisch, J. T in b erg en  and M. Kalecki 
considered damped c y c le s  a s  more rea lis t ic14: in  th e absence o f
fu rth er exogenous d is tu rba n ces, fluctuations in  th e le v e l o f  ou tput 
diminish un til the equ ilib r iu m  position is  reached, ra th e r  than 
grow ing exp los ive ly . In  th e ir  models, th e re fo re , e r ra tic  shocks are 
essentia l to  k eep  flu ctu ations a live .
14 R. Friach(1933), J. T in bergen (1951) C hapter V I I I ,  ftl. Kalecki(1954) 
Chap. 11 & 13 See a lso  I  k  F. L . Adelman(1959) k  (1960)
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4. Friedm an & Lucas
In  th e models o f  economic flu c tu ation s  dea lt w ith in the p rev iou s  
sec t ion s , th e  prim e m over in  th e c yc lic a l p ro cess  was sough t in  rea l 
fa c to r s  -  sp ec ific a lly , in investm en t. H ow ever there  remains a typ e  
o f  th eo rie s  con s id e r in g  the ultim ate cause o f  the business c yc le  to  be 
fou n d  in  th e  varia tion s  o f  th e  qu an tity  o f  money. Indeed , money 
has been  reg a rd ed  as a m ajor source o f  cyc lica l fluctuations e v e r  
s in c e  th e  in s ta b ility  in the g ro w th  path o f  cap ita lis t economies f i r s t  
a ttra c ted  econom ists ' a tten tion : a ccord in g  to  the Currency School the 
c r is e s  in  th e  e a r ly  19th cen tu ry  w e re  close ly  rela ted  th e 
ove rab u n d an ce  o f  cu rren cy1; Hawtrey in  1913 and the p roponen ts o f  
th e  ’m on eta ry ’ th eo ry  o f  th e  trade  c y c le  in  th e in terw ar yea rs , such 
as  Hayek, con sid ered  the va r ia tion s  in  c re d it  supp ly  to  be a t the 
bottom  o f  th e  business c yc le .*  H ere, w e examine th e p o s t -1945 
v e rs io n s  o f  th e  monetary trad ition  in  th e  developm ent o f  trade  c y c le  
th eo ry .
A cco rd in g  to  Friedman*, ’money is  a  p e rvas ive  element in  the 
econom y ’ , and ’th e stock  o f  money is  s izab le  compared w ith  o th er  
a g g r e g a te  econom ic m agn itudes’ , w h ile  th e  phenomenon called the 
bu s in ess  c y c le  occu rred  o n ly  in  m onetary economies1 234; th ese seem to 
b e  th e  p re lim in ary  ob serva tion s  which led  Friedman to  look fo r  the 
fundam enta l causes o f  c yc lic a l flu c tu ation s  in  the m onetary sp h ere  o f  
an econom y. Since these can  h a rd ly  b e  said to  be su ffic ien t c lues 
fo r  su sp ectin g  th e cen tra l and in d ep en d en t ro le  o f  money in  the
1 J. V iner(1937 ) p.221
2 V . Zarn ow itz (1985) p.553
3 T o  be m ore p rec ise , M. Friedm an and A. J. Schwartz; in th is 
s ection , Friedm an ind icates th e  tw o scholars .
4 M. Friedman A A. J. S ch w artz ( 1963a) p.49
trade cyc les , Friedm an goes  on to  estimate th e money stock  in the 
United States s in c e  1867, and to  obse rve  th e fo llo w in g  facts : the 
money stock  d is p la y s  cyc lica l movements; the flu c tu a tion s  in  the rate 
o f  change in  th e  money stock  precede th e flu c tu ation s  in  general 
business con d it ion s8; ’ th e amplitude o f  th e  c yc lic a l movement in 
money is  c lo s e ly  c orre la ted  w ith  the am plitude o f  the cyclical 
movement in  g e n e ra l business ’ ; ’ the stock o f  money is  much more 
close ly  and sys tem atica lly  re la ted  to income o v e r  business c yc les  than 
is investm ent o r  autonomous expend itu res ’.*
Friedm an, how ever, s till con siders  th ese f in d in g s  to be 
in su ffic ien t fo r  m ainta in ing th e m onetarist th eo ry  o f  th e  trade cycle, 
that is , fo r  a r g u in g  th at th e causal rela tion  ru n s  from  money to 
business. T o  determ ine th e d irection  o f  cau sa lity , accord ing to
Friedman, th e e v id en ce  ’ g a rn ered  from  stu dy  o f  th e  h istorical 
circum stances u n d e r ly in g  th e changes that o ccu rred  in  th e stock o f 
money’ is  needed  in  add ition ; ev iden ce  w h ich shows us more than 
anyth ing e lse  th a t:
The ch an ges  in  th e stock  o f  money cann ot con sis ten tly  be 
explained b y  th e con tem porary  chan ges in  money income and 
prices . T h e  ch an ges in  the stock  o f  m oney can  gen era lly  be 
a ttrib u ted  to  sp ec ific  h isto rica l c ircum stances th a t a re  not in 
tu rn  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  con tem porary  chan ges in  money income and 
prices . Hence, i f  th e consisten t rela tion  betw een  money and 
income is  n o t pure coincidence, it  must r e f le c t  an influence 
runn ing fro m  money to  business.5 67
5 Attention is  d ra w n  to  the fa c t that the flu ctu ations in  th e  ra te  o f  
changes  in  m oney stock  on  th e one hand and th ose in  th e  absolute 
le ve l o f  in d ica to rs  o f  g en era l business conditions on th e o th e r  hand 
are  being com pared . I t  is , how ever, ’a  mathematical fa c t  that, g iven  
any time seriea  A which osc illa tes  in  a reg u la r ( ’ s inuso ida l’  to  be 
p rec ise ) fash ion , th e  ra te  o f  chan ges o f  A w ill lead  A  its e lf  by  a 
qu arter o f  a  c y c le . ’ N. Rau(1974) p.75
6 M. Friedman A A. J. S ch w arts ( 1963a) p.63
7 M. Friedman A A . J. Sch w artz ( 1963a) p.SO
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The ev iden ce  con vin ces Friedm an that th e  ’apprec iab le  changes 
in  th e rate  o f  g row th  o f  the s to ck  o f  m oney a re  a necessa ry  and 
su ffic ien t condition  fo r  ap p rec iab le  changes in  the rate o f  g ro w th  o f  
money income; th is  is  true b o th  fo r  lon g  secu lar changes and also 
fo r  changes o v e r  periods  r o u g h ly  the len g th  o f  business c y c le s . ’* 
Thus, in Friedman’ s  model o f  th e  business c y c le ,  th e  chan ges in  the 
money stock is  g iv e n  exo gen o u s ly , and th es e  changes cau se  the 
economy to  fluctuate.
How do th e changes in  th e  quan tity  o f  m oney induce th ose in 
nominal income? In  an sw erin g  to  th is qu estion , Friedman b eg in s  by 
assuming an ’E lysian state o f  m ov in g  equ ilib rium  in  which rea l income 
p e r  capita, th e stock  o f  m oney, and the p r ic e  le v e l are a ll changing 
a t constant annual ra tes ’ ; in  th is  state, i t  is  fu rth e r  assum ed, ’all 
in teres t rate  in  rea l terms ... a n d  also th e ra tio  o f  wealth to  income 
a re  constant, so th at the w ea lth  e las tic ity  o f  demand fo r  m oney can 
be approximated b y  th e e la s t ic ity  o f  demand fo r  money w ith  respect 
to  permanent income.’*
Now, le t  us suppose an u n expected  r ise  in  th e  rate o f  chan ge in 
th e  money stock  th rough op en  m arket o p e ra tion s  b y  a c en tra l bank, 
and that the new h igher r a te  o f  chan ge is  maintained. The
immediate e f fe c t  o f  th is  a d d ition a l su pp ly  o f  money would be to 
d istu rb  the equilibrium  in  th e  p ortfo lio s  o f  th e se lle rs  o f  the 
secu rities  purchased  by  the c e n tra l bank: e v e n  though in  response 
to  the good p ric e  o ffe re d  b y  th e  cen tra l bank  th ey  sold secu rities  
and rece ived  money in re tu rn , th ey  came to  hold more m oney than 
th ey  actually want, and th e r e fo r e  th ey  now w an t to  rea rra n ge  their 
portfo lios. The h o lders  o f  th e  redundant ba lan ces would ’ tu rn  f ir s t
8 M. Friedman à  A. J. S ch w artz< 1963a) p.53
9 M. Friedman k  A. J. Schwartz(1963a) p.59
37
to  securities com parable to those th ey  h a ve  sold, say , f ix e d - in te re s t  
coupon, low r isk  ob liga tion s '10, and b y  d o in g  so th ey  w ill ra ise the 
p ric es  o f these assets. Th e  in c rea se  in th e p r ic e s  o f  these
secu rities  w ill induce those t r y in g  to  a d ju s t p o r tfo lio s  to  'look 
fa r th e r  a fie ld ', that is  to say, to  tran s form  th eir  redu n dan t money 
in to  assets less  similar to  what th ey  h a ve  sold to  th e c en tra l bank, 
e .g . ’h igh er-r isk  fixed -coupon  ob liga tio n s , equ ities , rea l p ro p e r ty ,  and 
so fo r th .' Th is p rocess im plies the w id en in g  o f  th e in it ia l impacts:
firs t, th e range o f  a ssets  a f fe c ted  widens; second , potential 
c reators  o f  a ssets  now more in  dem and are induced  to  rea ct to 
the b e tte r  term s on  which th ey  can  be sold, in c lu d in g  business 
en terp rises  w ish ing to  en gage  in  capita l expan sion , house 
bu ilders o r  p ro spective  hom eowners, consum ers who are 
potential purchasers o f  durab le  consum er goods  -  and so on 
and on; th ird , the in it ia lly  redundant m oney balances 
concentrated in  the hands o f  th ose  f i r s t  a ffe c ted  b y  the open 
market purchases become sp read  th rou gh ou t th e  econom y.11
While the in itia l m onetary im pacts w ill  be f ir s t  f e l t  in  financial 
markets, it w ill be spread  to  th e  m arkets  fo r  non financial a ssets  and 
fin a lly  to the markets fo r  goods and s e rv ic e s ,  which im plies the rise 
in  money income. Th is p ro cess  o f  in fla tion  is , f o r  Friedman,
basically a p rocess o f  adapting to  the n ew  and h igh er  r a te  o f  change 
o f  the money stock. The adaptation  p ro cess  is  no t a smooth one, 
bu t oversh ooting tends to  occu r in  th e  p rocess. T h is  is  because 
under adap tive  expectations peop le u nderestim ate th e  r is e  in  p rice 
le ve l, thus overestim ate th e ir  rea l ba lan ce in the sh o rt term , which 
implies that th ey  w ill t r y  to  p a rt w ith  more o f  th e ir  ’ redundant’ 
money than is  app rop ria te  u n der th e c u rren t ra te  o f  p r ic e  rise, 
ra is ing p rices  and nominal income a b o ve  th e  h ypoth etica l and smooth 
path o f adaptation.10 The 'ten d en cy  to  oversh oo t means th a t the 
dynamic p rocess o f  transition  from  on e  equ ilibrium  path  to another
10 M. Friedman It A. J. Sch w artz( 1963a) p.60
11 M. Friedman k  A. J. Schw arts( 1963a) p.60
12 M. Friedman k  A. J. Sch w artz! 1963a) p.62
in v o lv e s  a cyc lica l adjustm ent p ro cess .'11 S in c e  th e cyc lica l
ad ju stm en t thus gen era ted  is  presumed to be dam ped , Friedman is  in  
need o f  'add itional d istu rbances from  time to  tim e ', which 'p re v en t
38
the f lu c tu a tion s  from  d y in g  ou t’ .14 Thus, while in  th e  lon g-run  the 
ch an ges  in  th e money stock produce c o r re s p o n d in g  changes in 
nominal income by a f fe c t in g  the p ric e  le v e l on ly  r a th e r  than ou tput 
g ro w th  (th e  "natu ra l ra te "  h ypoth esis ), in  the s h o r t - ru n  monetary 
shocks a r e  'capable o f  exertin g  a s izab le in flu en ce  on  the rate o f  
g ro w th  o f  ou tput’  as w ell as on p rices .18
In  th e mid-1970s, w ith the on set o f  d e p re s s io n  a fte r  the lon g  
boom in  th e 1960s, in tere s t in the business c yc le  r e v iv e d ,  a r e v iv a l 
w h ich  ap peared  to  be c lose ly  rela ted  w ith th e em ergen ce  o f  'th e  
ra tion a l expectations school*. R. E. Lucas d e ve lo p e d  a model o f  the 
tra d e  c y c le  under th e hypothesis o f  rational, r a th e r  than adap tive , 
exp ec ta tio n s14; h is model is  basically  a Walrasian g e n e ra l  equilibrium  
model w ith  the on ly  d iffe ren ce  con sistin g  in th e  assumption th at 
a g en ts  have im perfect inform ation in  c on tra st t o  the p e r fe c t  
in fo rm ation  held b y  th e agen ts  in  th e classica l g e n e ra l  equilibrium  
m odel.17 I t  is  th is  im perfection  in inform ation w h ich  enab les  Lucas to  
make an  economy in  equilibrium  d isplay  flu c tu a t ion s , whereas the 
W a lras ian  gen era l equilibrium  economy shows o n ly  fric tion less  
m ovem ents. In  a situation o f  'gen era l' p r ic e  increase, agen ts
p e rc e iv e ,  due to  th e im perfection  in inform ation, th e  increase in th e ir  
ow n p r ic e s  not as a pa rt o f  th e changes in th e g e n e ra l p rice le v e l,
13 M. Friedm an k  A. J. Schwartz(1963a) p.62
14 M. Friedm an II A. J. Schw artz( 1963a) p.64
15 M. Friedm an & A. J. Schw artz( 1963a) p.53
16 R. E. Lucas(1975), (1977), (1980) These a rt ic le s  rea ppeared  as 
p a r ts  o f  R. E. Lucas(1981), page^ numbers o f  w h ich  a r e  used in the 
fo llo w in g .
17 F o r  th e  details o f  th e im perfections in  in fo rm ation , see  R. E.
Lucas (1975) p.188-190.
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but as re la tiv e  p r ic e  changes; such m isperception leads to  the 
increase in  the s u p p ly  o f  labou r and in the le v e l o f  ou tpu t. But 
th is  would not h a ve  occu rred  i f  agen ts  in the system  had p e rc e iv e d  
the chan ges in  th e ir  own p ric es  c o r re c tly  as r e fle c tin g  g en e ra l p ric e  
chan ges1*; fo r  th e  proportion a l changes in  nominal p r ic es  le a v in g  
re la tiv e  p ric es  u n a ffe c ted , w hen co r re c t ly  d iagnosed , would n o t be 
able to  induce th e  're a l response on the p rodu cer ’ s p a rt’ . U n der 
com petition, th e a g en ts  cannot a ffo rd  to  wait and c o lle c t more 
inform ation on th e  nature o f  th e  p ric e  changes, s ince ’the am biguous, 
unanticipated op p or tu n it ie s  ... cannot be expected  to stay  f ix e d ’1*, 
and th ey  w ill h a v e  fa iled  to  catch p ro fitab le  opportu n ities , th ere  
b e in g  o th er  a g e n ts  ac tin g  more qu ick ly . Thus, it  is  the c h a n ge s  in 
p rices  ra th e r  th a n  those in  demand o r  supply  th at a re  c r it ic a l  in 
Lucas’ exp lan ation  o f  economic fluctuations. Then, what ca u ses  the 
gen era l p r ic e  m ovem ents? The answ er g iven  b y  Lucas is  the
’changes in th e  quan tity  o f  money’ ; th ere fo re , he c o n s id e rs  'a 
m onetary shock a s  th e  fo rce  t r ig g e r in g  the rea l business c y c le . ’ *0
In  sum, b o th  Friedman and Lucas rega rd  m onetary shocks as  the 
prin c ipa l and u ltim ate cause o f  economic fluctuations, w h ile  th ey  
d i f fe r  in e xp la in in g  how m onetary changes a re  transm itted  to  th e 
economy as a w h o le : u p tu rn  and downturn are  re la ted  to  the
increase and d e c re a s e  in money supp ly, resp ec tiv e ly . Both F riedm an 
and Lucas pay p a rticu la r  a tten tion  to  govern m ent po licy  as a  sou rce  
o f  m onetary sh o ck s , but, u n der th e go ld  standard , ch an ges  in  go ld  
supp ly  would h a ve  been at leas t as im portant a source o f  m onetary  
shocks. R ecen tly , W. B. Huffmann k J. R. Lothian d e v e lo p e d  a 
m onetarist m odel o f  international transm ission o f  th e bu siness c yc le s  18920
18 R. B. Lucas (1977 ) p.229-232
19 R. B. Lucas (1975) p.212
20 R. B. Lucas(1977) p.233
under the gold  standard, in  w h ich  in ternation al gold flow s  play a 
cen tra l ro le11. We shall exam ine th eir model in  Chapter I I I  in the 
l ig h t  o f  empirical ev iden ce o f  in tern a tion a l go ld  movements.
We have so fa r  id en tified  fo u r  major ty p es  o f  the th eo ry  o f  the 
trade  cyc le , which b rin g  in to  r e l ie f  d if fe r e n t  aspects o f  a  modern 
in du str ia l economy to  exp lain  i t s  short run movements: technological 
developm ent, expectations on  fu tu r e  y ield s , th e  acce lerator-m u ltip lier 
mechanism with c e ilin g  and f lo o r ,  and fin a lly  money.
In  Robertson and Sch um peter, the b eg in n in g  o f  upsw ing is 
accounted fo r  by  the increase  in  investm ent due mainly to innovation 
and inventions, while the dow n tu rn  s ta rts  w ith  the decrease in 
investm ent or ig in a tin g  e ith e r  fro m  the lim it o f  innovation possib ilities 
coupled  w ith increased  r isk  a n d  u n certa in ty  (Schum peter) o r  from 
'overinvestm ent* (Robertson ).
In  Keynes' explanation o f  th e trade c y c le , ths expectations on 
th e  fu tu re  y ie ld s  o f  cap ita l a s  a fa c to r  in flu en cin g  the marginal 
e ffic ie n c y  o f  capita l p lay  a  dominant ro le : tu rn ing poin ts are
exp lained  ch ie fly  in  terms o f  th e  changes in  expectations, which brin g 
abou t varia tions in  th e le v e l  o f  investm ent. Keynes treated  the 
ch an ges in the state  o f  fu tu r e  expectations as  exogenous.
It  is  th e m u ltip lie r-a cce le ra tor  mechanism th at introduces 
in s tab ility  into Hicks’ sys tem : in h is model an economy w ith the 
m u ltip lier-acce lerator mechanism  tends to  g ro w  exp los ive ly , ra ther 
than to  fluctuate. But th e  fu l l  employment ce ilin g  and th e obvious
2 1  W .  ¿ 7  H u f f m a n i T i T .  R .  L o t h i a n  ( 1 9 8 4 )
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im possib ility  fo r  g ro ss  investm ent to  b e  nega tive  transform  the 
u n d e r ly in g  ten den cy  into regu la r  flu c tu a t ion s : an econom y cannot 
g ro w  in fin ite ly  th rou gh  the mechanism o f  m u ltip lier-acce lerator 
b eyo n d  the resou rce lim it o f  the econom y; h itting  th is  ce ilin g , the 
econom y rebounds, i.e. begins to  c o n tra c t ; the dow nsw ing cannot 
con tin u e  fo r e v e r , bu t r e v iv a l is  bound to  com e because o f  th e limit in 
d is investm ent.
Models d eve loped  b y  Friedman and L u ca s  fin d  th e ultimate cause 
o f  economic fluctuations in m onetary sh o ck s . To be more spec ific , 
th e  changes in  th e  quan tity  o f  m oney b rin g  abou t sh o rt term  
econom ic fluctuations. Accord ing  to  F riedm an , the ch an ges in the 
q u a n tity  o f  money a re  transm itted to  th e  econom y as a whole through 
th e  p rocess o f  rearrangem en t o f  p o r t fo lio s  b y  asse t-h o lders ; in  
L u ca s ' model, i t  is  th e im perfection  in  in form ation th a t enables 
m onetary  shocks to cause the whole econ om y to  fluctuate  b y  inducing 
g en e ra l p ric e  chan ges, which are  p e rc e iv ed  b y  agents , in co rrec t ly , as 
ch an ges  in re la tiv e  p rices , thus in du c in g  chan ges in  th e  supply  o f  
labou r and output.
Now, equ ipped  w ith these v a r iou s  th eoretica l fram ew orks, we 
m ove on to make a prelim inary  exam ination o f  the trade  c yc le s  in the
1870-1914 era.
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I I
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS, 1870-1914
A lth ough  th e fo r ty  odd yea rs  p re c ed in g  th e  outbreak o f  the 
F irst World War is  usually treated  as a p eriod  h is to rica lly  
homogeneous and d istinct from  both the p re -1 8 7 0  and in terw ar 
periods, from  th e  point o f  v iew  o f  techn olog ica l developm ent d iv id in g  
thus the p ro cess  o f  industria l g row th  does n o t seem particu lar ly  
useful. F or  i f  the earlier  y ea rs  o f  th e 1870-1914 era could be 
character ized  as the fina l s tage  in the d eve lo pm en t o f  the ’o ld ’ 
industries  born  in the e a r ly  19th cen tu ry , in  th e  la tter  yea rs  there  
em erged 'new* industries , such as e le c tr ic ity  an d  automobiles, which 
were to dom inate the industria l scene o f  th e in te rw a r  years. In 
other w ords , th e  years  yea rs  b e fo re  World War I saw the climax o f 
one w ave o f  technolog ical p ro g re s s  c en te r in g  a rou n d  railways, and 
subsequently  th e sta rt o f  another.
Since such developm ent in p rodu ctive  fo r c e s  d u r in g  the pre-W WI
years was ca rr ied  out to a g rea te r  ex ten t b y  youn ger cap ita lis t
economies such as Germany and the US than b y  cou n tr ies  like Britain
and F rance, i t  was accompanied b y  the ch an ges in  ..he world economic
order: w h ereas in the pre-1870 yea rs  B rita in  occu p ied  a dominant
position in th e  world economy, in  the p eriod  con cerned  here the
youn ger econom ies came to be at least as im portan t as Britain.1
1 In 1840 B rita in  accounted fo r  21X o f  w orld  in d u s tr ia l production 
and 25X o f  w orld  trade, while the corresp on d in g  f ig u r e s  fo r  Germany 
w ere 17X and 8X, and those fo r  th e US 5X and 7X; in 1913 B rita in ’ s 
share in w orld  industria l p roduction  and w orld  t r a d e  were reduced  to
With the in du str ia l developm ent in these advanced  econom ies, 
more o f  the less d eve loped  areas  evo lved  economic re la tion sh ip s  with 
the industria l cou n tr ies ; the ex istin g  links betw een  d e ve lo p e d  and 
prim ary producing areas w ere  stren gthened ; and in d u str ia l 
economies came to  be more c lo se ly  connected w ith  each o th e r .  This 
is  reflec ted  in th e increase  in  th e volume o f  w orld  trade, an d  in  the 
international movement o f  cap ita l and labour. T h e  volum e in dex o f 
world trade increased  from  23.8 in 1870 to 96 in  1911-13*; the 
fo re ign  investm ent stock  o f  m ajor capita l exp ortin g  c ou n tr ies , which 
was around £1600m in  1870, reached almost £8000m in 1915*; and 
approxim ately 3 m illion people em igrated from 19 c ou n tr ies  on  the 
European and Asian con tinen t du rin g  the decade 1861-70, w h ile  the 
f ir s t  decade o f  the 20th cen tu ry  recorded  a peak o f  12 m illion flow in g 
out o f  the same areas*. The trade among va r iou s  r e g io n s  o f  the 
world was settled  in  a m ultilateral way, as d esc r ib ed  b y  P r o f .  S. B. 
Saul*; i t  was in  th is  m ultilateral context that the c la ss ica l gold 
standard worked. Thus an international economy o f  a m ore mature 
form emerged.
One o f  the in tere s tin g  fea tu res  o f  the w orld  econom y o f  this 
period is the broad syn chron ization  among the national tr a d e  cyc les , 
some s tructu ra l aspects  o f  which w ill be in ves tiga ted  in  th is  and the
14% and 16% resp ec tiv e ly , w h ereas Germany came to  secu re  16% and 
12%, and the US 36% and 11% o f  world  industria l p rod u ction  an d  
world trade resp ec tiv e ly . W. W. Rostow( 1978) p.52,71,72
2 W. W. Rostow(1978) p.669
3 W. Wood r u ff  (1966) p.150,151. I t  needs to be no ted  th a t in  th e  
presence o f  long sw in gs  in in ternational capita l m ovements such  
comparison o f  poin t estim ates can  con vey m isleading im pression : fo r  
example, i f  1870 was a trou gh  and 1915 a peak y ea r, th e an nual 
average  grow th  ra te  calcu lated  from  the estimates fo r  th ese  tw o  years  
would be g rea te r  than that which could be d e riv ed  from  tren d  
values.
4 W. S. fc E. S. W oytinsky (1953) p.75
5 S. B. Saul(1960)
fo llo w in g  chapters. This chap ter beg in s  w ith  ob serv in g  variou s  
in d ica to rs  express ing the varia tion s in a g g re ga te  economic a c t iv ity  in 
e igh t  m ajor economies: the US, Germany, B rita in , France, A rgen tin a ,
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Austra lia , Canada and India. Th is leads us to  a rgu e th a t th ey  
flu c tu a ted  to  a s ign ifican t d egree  in  agreem ent, and that as a resu lt 
f iv e  common cyc les  a re  id en tified . Then , as a f ir s t  s tep  to
u n derstand  the mechanism o f  the para lle l movements, an attem pt is  
made to  locate the main d riv in g  fo rc es  behind each o f  the f iv e  trade 
c y c le s  o f  the e igh t countries. In  the fina l section  o f  th is  ch ap ter, 
w ith  th e  inform ation on the nature o f  in d iv idu a l national trade  cyc les , 
an attem pt is made to  dem onstrate how national c yc les  w ere  
in ter lo ck ed  in  each o f  the f iv e  cases o f  in terna tion al cyc les . Th is
ch ap ter deals mainly w ith rea l fo rces  and abs trac ts  com pletely from  
the ro le  o f  monetary fo rces , which w ill be taken  up in the fo llow in g  
chap ter.
1. Iden tifica tion  o f  the T rade  Cycles
Th e  trade cyc les , d e fin ed  broad ly as th e cyc lica l fluctuations in 
a g g re g a te  business a c tiv ity , in vo lve  the sho rt-term  varia tion s in a 
la rge  m ajority  o f  economic variab les  includ ing p rices , employment, 
p rodu ction  and money stock.* However, i f  one is  fo rced  to  work 
w ith  a s in g le  series  fo r  th e sake o f  con ven ien ce and s im p lic ity  in 
determ in in g the cyc lica l tim ing o f  the sh ifts  in  th e le v e l o f  a c t iv ity , a 
log ica l cho ice  would be national product, g ro ss  dom estic product(G D P) 
in  particu la r. Since, as w e shall see sh o rtly , p r ic es  tended to  move 
in  p ara lle l with the volum e o f  output in the course o f  th e trade 
cyc le , national product a t constant p rices  should be p re fe rr e d  to 
c u rren t national product series . U n fo rtu n ately  annual national
p rodu ct data fo r  the 1870-1914 period , w hether a t c u rren t or 
con stan t p rices , are not ava ilab le  fo r  a ll o f  ou r e igh t  countries. For 
in d u str ia l countries, we have national p rodu ct se rie s  a t both constant 
and cu r re n t  p rices  fo r  B rita in , Germany and th e US’ , while annual 
estim ates o f  French GDP a t cu rren t p rices  a re  available.* As fo r  
u n derdeve loped  countries, Australian GDP and Canadian GNP a t both 
c u rren t and constant p ric es  a re  available fo r  the whole p eriod  under 
con sideration , whereas constant p rice national p rodu ct data fo r  India 
and A rgen tin a  begin in 1884/5 and 1900 resp ec tiv e ly .*
6 A. F. Burns observed  th at ’Almost n in e-ten th s o f  M itchell’s  basic 
sample o f  approxim ately 800 time series  fluctuate  in sym pathy w ith 
the t id e s  in  aggrega te  a c t iv ity . ’  W. C. M itchell(1951) p.xiii
7 C. H. Feinstein(1976) and W. G. Hoffmann(1965) a re  th e sources o f  
the B ritish  and German national product s ta tis tics  used in th is study ; 
we r e ly  upon the unpublished estimates by  R. E. Gallman and 
w orksheets  un derly in g S. Kuznets(1961), p resen ted  in M. Friedman k  
A. J. Schwartz(1982), fo r  th e period  1869-1913, and upon T. S.
B e r ry (1968) fo r  pre-1869 years .
8 M. L 6 vy -L eb o ye r  k F. Bourgu ignon( 1985)
9 Sources a re  N. G. Butlin(1962) fo r  Australia; B. R. M itchell(1983) fo r  
A rgen tin a ; M. C. Urquhart(1986) fo r  Canada; and D. Kumar k  M. 
Desai(1983) fo r  India.
Since the p resen ce  o f  d is tin c t upward tren d s  makes it  d ifficu lt  
to id en tify  short-term  cy c le s  c lea rly , h ere  a 9 -year m oving ave ra ge  
method is  used to  sepa ra te  th e la tter  from  th e form er.10 In  F ig  l i ­
lt  2 & 3 a re  shown th e  fluctuations, isola ted  from tren ds , in  the
cu rren t and con stan t national p rodu cts  and in the industria l 
production ind ices o f  ou r  in du str ia l econom ies.11 Even th ough the 
human e y e  is  known to  be un reliab le, it  seems d ifficu lt  to  fa il to 
recogn ize  f iv e  cyc lica l un its, d e fin ed  from  trou gh  to trou gh , in  each 
o f  the fo u r  d eve loped  cou n tr ies  in th e 1870-1914 p eriod , and the 
tendency fo r  the fo u r  economies to  expand and con tract
simultaneously. A cco rd in g  to  F ig  I I - l ,  show ing the fluctuations in 
national income at cu r re n t  p ric es , and Tab le  I I - l ,  no tw o coun tries  
w ere more than th ree  y ea rs  apart at any o f  th e  nine tu rn in g  points,
while th e fou r cou n tr ies  passed  a tu rn in g  poin t in the same yea r
on ly  once. Calculating th e a ve ra ge  o f  d ispers ion  at each o f  the nine 
turning poin ts  on th e basis o f  cu rren t national product data, we get 
1.8 yea rs , which com pares w ith  the a v e ra ge  period  o f  c yc les  o f  
around 8 yea rs . Such b e in g  the case, it  seems possib le to  defin e 
f iv e  cyc lica l units, w h ich  a re  o b se rved  in  a ll fou r cou n tr ies  in 
common: C ycle I  s ta r t in g  from  the trou gh  in  the lace 1860s and
ending in  the trough  in  1878-79; C ycle I I  from  the trough  in 1878-79 
to the trou gh  in 1885-7; C ycle I I I  from  th e  trough  1885-7 to the 
trough  in  1893-6; C yc le  IV  from  the trou gh  in  1893-6 to  th e trough  
in 1902-4; and fin a lly  C yc le  V from  th e trou gh  in  1902-4 to  the 
trough  in  around 1908. I t  could be added th at w ithout the loss o f  
data due to  th e app lica tion  o f  a 9 -yea r  m oving ave ra ge  method, we
10 For reasons fo r  o p tin g  fo r  th is  a t th e expense o f  other devices , 
see Introduction .
11 I t  may be noted th a t GDP and industria l p roduction  index w ere the 
two major cyc lica l in d ica to rs  in  th e OECD research  on the post-1945 
business cyc les . OECD(1987)
aFig II-1 Fluctuations o f National Product at Current Prices, Absolute Deviations from 9-year 
Moving Averages
R g  n-2 Fluctuations o f Industrial Production Index. Absolute Deviations fiorn 9-vear 
Moving Averages
Source: W, A  Lew i* 1978)

T a b le  I I - 1 Tu rn ing  Po in t Y ears: In d u s tr ia l C oun tries
P T P T P T P T
N ation a l P roduct at C u rren t P ric es
USA 1873 1878 1882 1885 1892 1896 1901 1904
G erm any 1874 1879 1884 1887 1890 1895 1898 1902
UK 1873 1879 1882 1886 1890 1893 1900 1904
F ra n c e 1874 1879 1882 1886 1892 1896 1900 1902
In d u s tr ia l
USA
Production Index 
1872 1876 1882 1885 1892 1894 1902 1904
G erm any 1873 1877 1883 1886 1890 1893 1899 1902
UK 1873 1879 1882 1886 1889 1893 1899 1903
P ra n ce 1874 1879 1882 1885 1892 1895 1899 1904
N ation a l P roduct at Constant P r ic e s
USA 1873 1876 1880 1885 1892 1894 1901 1904
G erm any 1874 1880 1884 1887 1890 1891 1898 1902
UK 1871 1879 1882 1886 1889 1893 1899 1904
P
1907
1907
1907
1907
1906
1907
1907
1905
1906
1905
1907
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m ight be ab le  to  id en tify  an add ition a l tra d e  cyc le , the dow n sw in g  o f  
which began  in  around 1913 an d  was stop p ed  in the m iddle b y  the 
ou tbreak o f  th e  F irs t World War.
We o b s e rv e  sim ilar p a ttern s  o f  fluctuations in  in d u s tr ia l 
p roduction  in d ic e s  o f  the fo u r  coun tries  (F ig  I I -2 ) ,  a lth ou gh  the 
d egree  o f  a g reem en t declines somewhat: w h ile  maximum d isp e rs ion  at 
tu rn in g  p o in ts  remain the same, i.e. th ree  yea rs , minimum d ispe rs ion  
is  increased  fro m  0 to  1 y ea r; th e a ve ra ge  o f  d ispers ion  a t th e  nine 
tu rn in g  p o in ts  is  now 2.1 y ea rs . On th e o th e r  hand, in  th e c a s e  o f 
national p ro d u c t  a t con stan t p ric es , minimum and maximum d ispe rs ion  
at tu rn in g  p o in ts  is in creased  to  2 and 4 yea rs , r esp ec tiv e ly ; th is 
a ffe c ts  the a v e ra g e  o f  d ispe rs ion , 2.9 y ea rs . Such d e te r io ra t ion  in 
the d egree  o f  agreem ent a t tu rn in g  poin ts occu rs  in  sp ite  o f  th e  fac t 
th at the nu m ber o f  cou n tr ies  b e in g  com pared is  reduced from  fo u r  to 
th ree; th is  appears to  be re la ted  both to  the poss ib ility  o f  the 
in trodu ction  o f  fu rth e r  e r r o r s  in  co r re c tin g  the estimates o f  cu r re n t  
national p ro d u c t  series  w ith  those o f  p r ic e  defla tors , and to  the 
c loser syn ch ron iza tion  among p ric e  se r ie s  o f  the fou r  cou n tr ies , 
which we sh a ll see shortly .
Exam ining the flu c tu a tion s  in na tional product a t cu r re n t  
p ric es (F ig  I I - 1, Table I I - l ) ,  o n e  finds th at th e  fou r  cou n tr ies  w e r e  in 
the same p h a se  in 23 o f  the to ta l 40 years (57 .5X ); th is com pares with 
O. M orgen stern ’ s f igu re  53.5X, which was ob ta ined  on the basis o f  the 
tu rn in g  p o in ts  determ ined b y  th e NBER's re fe ren ce  cyc le  m ethod.11 
Accord ing to  M orgenstern , th e  d egree  o f  synchron ization  w as  fa r  
h igh er am ong the th ree  European  economies than when th e US was 
a lso taken in to  account: exclusion  o f  US raises the d e g r e e  o f
12 Th is m ethod g iv e s  not o n ly  tu rn in g  p o in t y ea rs , but a lso months.
syn chron ization  from 53.5% to  83.IX .1* N either F ig  I I — 1 nor F ig  II-2 , 
how ever, does seem to  s u g g e s t  that the US was ou t o f  s tep  w ith the 
th ree  European econom ies to such an ex ten t: in ou r case, exclusion 
o f  the US resu lts  in  th e  increase from  57.5X to  on ly  65X. M oreover, 
when Germany is  exc lu d ed , the degree  o f  parallelism  in creases  to 70X, 
w h ilst the th ree  cou n tr ie s  oth er than e ith e r  Brita in o r  F ran ce w ere in 
the same phase in 62.5X and 57.5X o f  th e  40 years, resp ec tiv e ly .
Such a d if fe r e n c e  between us and M orgen stern  appears to 
o r ig in a te  from the d is t in c t  methods em ployed  to  id e n t ify  cyc lica l 
units. The r e fe r en c e  cyc le  method used b y  th e  NBER f ir s t
determ ines th e tu rn in g  po in ts  in variou s  time s e r ie s (s p e c if ic  cyc les ); 
then id en tifies  the c lu s te r s  o f  tu rn ing po in ts , on the basis o f  which 
are  determ ined the r e fe r e n c e  cyc le  tu rn in g  poin ts.13 4 A ccord ing  to 
the NBER, the cyc les  in  th e  US determ ined by  th is  tech n iqu e  are  o f  a 
d iffe r e n t  kind to th ose in  the European countries: th e fo rm er has a 
sh o rter p eriod  o f  a rou n d  40 m onths(K itchen cyc le s ), w h ile  th e la tter 
shows a lon ger p eriod  o f  7-10 yea rs (J u g la r  cyc le s ).  On the other 
hand, as can be seen  in  F ig  I I —1 o r  2, th e c yc le s  separated  from 
tren ds  on the basis o f  a g g re g a te  series , such as national product or 
industria l production in d ex , do not s u g g e s t  any major d iffe ren ce  in 
th e cyc lica l pattern  b e tw een  the US and the European countries. 
Th is appears to  be re la ted  to the fa c t  that the re fe ren ce  cyc le  
method, dealing w ith a  co llec tion  o f  u n detrended  se rie s  and concerned 
mainly with tu rn in g  p o in ts  rather than am plitude, is  not capable o f  
d ecid in g, under the con d it ion  o f  the co -ex is ten ce  o f  K itchen(m inor) 
and Juglar(m ajor) c y c le s ,  whether tw o o r  th ree K itchen c yc les  are 
in terre la ted  as parts o f  a  Juglar cyc le .
13 0. M orgen stern (1959) p.45,48
14 On the re fe ren ce  c y c le  method, see W. C. M itchell(1951) chap ter 3
Our figu re  o f  57.5%, in d ica tin g  th e  degree  o f  syn chron iza tion  o f  
the trade cyc les  o f  th e fou r d e v e lo p e d  countries, could be com pared 
w ith 12.5%, which is  th e p robab ility  th a t  a ll fou r cou n tr ies  a re  in  th e 
same phase under the assumption th a t  the fou r  cou n tr ies  flu c tu ate  
independently  o f  each o ther, an d  th a t the len g th s  o f  u p - and 
downsw ing are  equal.1* I t  is  a lso  poss ib le  to d e r iv e  a p ro b ab ility  
d istribu tion  function fo r  variou s d e g r e e s  o f  syn chron ization  u n der 
th e same assumptions as stated  a b o v e ,  and u n der an add itional 
condition o f  e igh t yea r period : accord ing to  th is  p ro b ab ility
d istribu tion  function1*, the p ro b a b ility  that th e p ercen ta ge  o f  
synchron ization  is g rea te r  than 57.5% under th ese con d itions is  on ly  
2.9%, w h ilst the p robab ility  fo r  th e  opposite  case to  happen is  as 
g rea t as 97.1%. Th is would im p ly  that it  is  more reasonab le to 
conclude that the ob se rved  b road  parallelism  among th e cyc lica l 
fluctuations o f  the fou r in d u s tr ia l coun tries is  not a chance 
occurren ce, with the fou r  m oving w ith o u t having a n yth in g  to  do w ith  
each o th er; and that th ere fo re  a mechanism ex is ted  ensu rin g  th e 
synchronisation o f  the fou r na tion a l trade c yc les  to  th e o b se rved  
extent.
As fu rth e r  ev iden ce  on th e  f iv e  trade c y c le s  in th e fou r  
countries, the variations in p r ic e s 1’  and unemployment ra tes1* a re
15 In  a  y ea r, the p robab ility  that th e  fo u r  countries a re  in  upsw ing 
is  g iv en  by (1/2)*, which is equal t o  1/16; equally th e  p robab ility  
that th ey  a re  in downswing is  1/16; th e re fo re  the p ro b ab ility  th at 
th e fou r countries a re  in the same p h a se  is 1/16 + 1/16 = 1/8 = 12.5%
16 The shape o f  the p robab ility  d is tr ib u t io n  function  is  as follows:
0 25 50 75 100
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A: degrees  o f  syn ch ron iza tion (X ), B: p ro b ab ility (%)
17 National product d e fla to r was u sed  fo r  the US, B rita in  and 
Germany; and domestic p rice  index f o r  France. M. Friedman A A. J. 
Schw artz( 1982), C. H. Feinstein (1976), M. L evy-Leb oyer(1 9 7 0 ), W. G. 
Hoffmann (1965)
p rodu ced  as F ig  I I-4  k 5. I t  is  not d i f f ic u l t  to  reco gn ize  the 
p re v io u s ly  id en tified  cyc lica l patterns in both s e r ie s ,  and in th e  case 
o f  p r ic e  fluctuations we ob se rv e  a similar d e g r e e  o f  syn chron ization  
to  th at in national p rodu ct in cu rren t p r ic e s :  the a v e ra g e  o f
d ispers ion  at tu rn in g  poin ts is  1.88 yea rs , w h ich  is com parable w ith 
1.78 yea rs  in the case o f  national product a t c u r re n t  p ric es  series , 
an d  the percentage o f  yea rs  in  which all fou r  cou n tr ies  w ere  in  the 
same phase is  now 52.8%. Accord ing to  th e  above p ro b ab ility
d is trib u tion  function , under the assumption o f  the in dependen t 
flu ctu ations o f  fou r coun tries  the p robab ility  th a t  the p e rcen ta ge  o f  
syn chron iza tion  is g re a te r  than 52.8% is still o n ly  2.9%.
In  F ig  I I-6  a re  shown the cyc lica l flu c tu a t ion s  in o u r  fou r 
u n developed  coun tries : Argen tina , Australia, Canada and In d ia . In  
Auatra lia  and Canada, cyc les  w ere  id en tified  on  th e  basis o f  national 
p ro d u c t at cu rren t p rices . On the oth er hand , since the A rgen tin e  
an d  Indian national ou tpu t series , besides th e ir  inadequate c o ve ra ge , 
d isp la y  serious inconsistencies w ith oth er in d ica to rs  o f  the va r ia tion s  
in  th e  le ve l o f  a c t iv ity ,  im ports and railw ay r e c e ip ts  are su bstitu ted . 
I t  shou ld , how ever, b e  born in  mind that in th e  case o f  un developed  
econom ies the two p rox ies  s u ffe r  from s ig n if ic a n t drawbacks: i f  an 
econom y is borrow in g  abroad on an e x te n s iv e  scale, its  le v e l o f  
im ports  is a ffected  con sid erab ly  by  the ch an ges  in  cap ita l in flow , as 
w e ll as by  the le ve l o f  a c tiv ity ; although ra ilw a y  tra ff ic  and rece ip ts  
a r e  in  gen era l c lo se ly  rela ted  to  the state  o f  an  economy1*, in  an
18 Unemployment in  trade  union fo r  Britain and Germany. C. H. 
Feinstein (1976), B. R. M itchell( 1981)
19 'Im provem ent in business has always been accom panied by  an 
in c rease  in railway fr e ig h t  t ra ff ic ; declines in bu s in ess  have almost 
a lw a ys  been accompanied by  declines in f r e ig h t  t r a f f ic  o r  low er ra tes  
o f  increase  ... cyc lica l changes in  tra ff ic  a re  n e ith e r  among th e most 
no r among the least v io len t o f  changes in the m a jor  aspects o f  
econom ic ac tiv ity .' T. H u ltgren , Railway F re ig h t  T ra ff ic  in 
P ro sp e r ity  and Depression, NBER Occasional P a p e r  No.5, Feb 1942, p.5, 
qu o ted  in  C. A. E. Good hart( 1972) p.74
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Fig n-4 Price Fluctuations, Absolute Deviations from 9-year Moving Averages
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Source: C. H. Feiiiilem(1976). B. R. MilcheU(19«l)*(1983)
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Fig 11-6 Fluctuations in the Undeveloped World, Absolute Deviations from 9-year Moving 
Averages
Source: A. G. Ford(1962). B. R. MitcheU(1983). N. G. Butlin(1962). M. C Urquhart(1986). 
Railway Board. Government of India(1908).(1909)4(1913/4)
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agricu ltu ra l economy th ey  w ill a lso re fle c t  h a rves t flu c tu ation s , whilst 
in  a fro n t ie r - ty p e  economy, w here ra ilw ays  tend to  b e  constructed 
ahead o f  settlem ent, ra ilw ay earn ings w ill be in flu en ced  by the 
agricu ltu ra l developm ent around n ew ly -b u ilt ra ilw ay lin es . Anyway, 
ou r  p rin c ip le  here is to reso rt f ir s t  to  ra ilw ay ea rn in gs  data, and to 
complement th is  with im ports series  when th e form er does  not cover 
th e  whole 1870-1914 period.
I t  is not d ifficu lt  to  reco gn ize  in  th e  f i r s t  ch a rt o f  F ig  II-6  the 
f iv e  A rgen tine trade c yc les  similar to  th ose o f  th e fo u r  industria l 
coun tries; in  the Australian GDP and Canadian GNP(second and th ird  
ch arts ) cyc lica l patterns are even  more c lear. The ava ilab le  indices 
o f  Indian fluctuations, on the oth er hand, appear to  su gges t that 
In d ia  p robab ly  did not u n dergo a ll th e f iv e  trade c y c le s . Instead, 
in  India cyc lica l movements appeared  to  deve lop  g rad u a lly  in the 
course o f  th e period  concerned . A lth ough  we can  h a rd ly  speak o f 
th e  Indian C ycle  I  in  th e fou rth  ch a rt o f  F ig  I I-6 , th e  th ird , fou rth  
and fi fth  c yc le s  are c lea rly  recogn izab le ; on th e o th e r  hand the 
pattern  o f  th e Indian Cycle I I  is  somewhat ind is tin ct. In  sum, the 
prelim inary im pression con veyed  from  F ig  I I-6  is  th a t the th ree 
prim ary producing economies exc lud ing In d ia  flu c tu ated  in a parallel 
way from around 1870, producing f iv e  common c y c le s : Cycle I
s ta rtin g  from  the trou gh  in th e late 1860s and en d in g  in  the trough 
in  1876-9; C ycle  I I  from  the trou gh  in  1876-9 to  the trou gh  in 1886; 
C yc le  I I I  from  the trou gh  in  1886 to  the trough  in 1895-7; C ycle IV 
from  the trou gh  in 1895-7 to th e trou gh  in  1902-4; an d  fin a lly  Cycle 
V from  the trou gh  in  1902-4 to  the trou gh  in  around 1908-9(Table I I -  
2 ). In  Ind ia, Cycles I I -V  a re  id en tifiab le . The tim ing o f  these f iv e  
trade  cyc les  experien ced  by  the th ree  un developed  c ou n tr ies  is thus
Tab le  I I-2  T u rn in g  Poin t Y ears: 8 Countries
P T P T P T P T P
USA 1873 1878 1882 1885 1892 1896 1901 1904 1907
Germany 1874 1879 1884 1887 1890 1895 1898 1902 1907
UK 1873 1879 1882 1886 1890 1893 1900 1904 1907
France 1874 1879 1882 1886 1892 1896 1900 1902 1907
A rgen tin a 1873 1876 1884 1886 1890 1897 1899 1902 1908
A u stra lia 1873 1879 1883 188b 1889 1895 1898 1903 1907
Canada ? 1878 1882 1886 1891 1896 1902 1904 1907
Ind ia ? 1880 1883 1887 1891 1897 1901 1903 1907
Source: F ig  I I - l  4 6
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basica lly  th e same as th a t found in th e flu ctu ations o f  th e fou r 
in d u s tr ia l economies.
In  com parison w ith  th e cyc lica l fluctuations o f  the fou r 
in d u str ia l econom ies, the d e g re e  o f  parallelism  among those o f  the 
fo u r  prim ary p ro d u cers  was somewhat low er. C onsid erin g  the period  
a f t e r  1880, w h en cyc lica l m ovements a re  to be found in  Ind ian  railway 
rec e ip ts  o r  im port va lue as w ell, we o b s e rv e  th a t th e maximum 
d ispers ion  and th e  a ve ra ge  o f  d ispers ion  a t tu rn in g  po in ts  a re  now 4 
an d  2 yea rs , res p e c t iv e ly , whereas 3 and 1.8 y ea rs  w ere  the 
corresp on d in g  f igu re s  fo r  the fou r  in du str ia l econom ies. In  the 
th ir ty  yea r p eriod  o f  1880-1909, the fou r  p e r ip h e ry  cou n tr ies  w ere in 
th e  same phase in  15 y ea rs , i.e . 50X o f  th e period , wh ich compares 
w ith  57.5X in th e  core  cou n tr ies . Due to  th e d iscre ten ess  o f  the 
p ro b ab ility  d is tribu tion  fu n ction , d e riv ed  above , th e p ro b ab ility  that 
th e  percen tage  o f  syn chron ization  is g rea te r  than 50X remains 2.9X.*0 
T h is  d e terio ra tion  in the d eg re e  o f  agreem ent may be exp licab le  both 
b y  the w eaker economic links among un developed  than among 
in du str ia l c ou n tr ies11 and b y  the d iffe ren ce  in  the qu a lity  o f  data 
used .
In  Tab le  I I-2  a re  shown th e tu rn in g  p e in ts  in  the cyc lica l 
fluctuations o f  ou r  e igh t cou n tr ies . Now, it  is  poss ib le  to  de fin e  one 
in ternation al tra d e  c yc le  experien ced  b y  the s even  countries 
exc lud ing  Ind ia , namely C yc le  I  from  the trou gh  in  th e  late 1860s to 
th e  trough in  1876-9, and fou r  international trade  c y c le s  experienced  
b y  a ll o f  ou r e ig h t  economies: C ycle I I  from  1876-9 to  1885-7; cyc le
20 See foo tnote  14, th is section .
21 Accord ing to  P. L. Yates , in 1913 the w orld  trade was compesed in 
th e  fo llow ing w ay : the tra d e  among d eve loped  cou n tr ies  accounted 
fo r  43X, th at betw een  deve loped  and u n developed  c ou n tr ies  52X, and 
th a t among un developed  cou n tr ies  5X o f  th e w orld  trad e . P. L. 
Yates(1959) p.58
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I I I  from 1885-7 to  1893-7; c y c le  IV  from  1893-7 to  1902-4; fin a lly , 
Cycle V from  1902-4 to 1908-9. As may be expected , the a ve ra ge  o f  
maximum d if fe r e n c e s  at the 7 tu rn in g  poin ts in  1880-1909 is  now 
increased to  2.6 years, w h ereas the percen tage  o f  the yea rs  o f 
syn chron iza tion  is  reduced to  36.7%. The p robab ility  th at all the
e igh t cou n tr ie s  a re  in the same phase under th e assumption o f  
independent flu ctu ations and o f  equal length  o f  expansion and 
contraction, h o w ever , is also reduced  from  12.5% to less  than 0.8%. 
A t the same tim e, accord ing to  th e p ro b ab ility  d is tribu tion  function 
fo r  variou s d e g r e e s  o f  synchron ization  o f  e igh t coun tries  u n dergo ing  
8 year tra d e  c y c le s ,  consisting  o f  4 yea r u p - and downsw ing, w ithout 
th eir b e in g  in terrela ted**, th e  p robab ility  th at the d egree  o f  
parallelism  is  g re a te r  than 36.7% is  on ly  0.3%. Th is obv iou sly  implies 
that it  is  v e r y  un likely that th e  fluctuations o f  the e igh t economies, 
syn chron ized  to  th is  extent, w e re  neverth e less  in dependen t o f  each 
other. S in ce  ou r eigh t cou n tr ies  accounted fo r  more than half o f 
total w o rld  tra d e  and the fo u r  in dustria l economies about th ree 
quarters o f  w o r ld  industria l production , th is  also appears to su ggest 
the v a lid ity  o f  speaking o f  th e  ’world trade  c yc le s ’  in the pre-WWI 
years. 2
22 The p ro b a b ility  d istribu tion  function  is  as follows:
A 0 25 50
B 97.2 2.5 0.3
A: d e g r e e  o f  s yn ch ron iza tion ^ ), B: p ro b ab ility (%)
2. Investm ent, E xport an d  Lend ing  Economies
In  an era when th e  ro le  o f  govern m en t in an economy was not 
s ign ifican t, the le ve l o f  a g g r e g a te  a c t iv ity  could be said  to  have been  
determ ined la rge ly  by  th e  tw o autonomous spen d ing item s, investm ent 
and exports .1 A cco rd in g  to  which o f  the tw o exerc ised  dominant 
in fluen ces upon the ch a n ges  in  th e  a g g re ga te  income o f  an
economy, it  would th en  b e  poss ib le  to  ch a racter ize  th e  economy as an 
investm ent o r  an exp o rt econom y. An investm ent economy could be 
con sid ered  to be capab le  o f  flu c tu atin g  fo r  reasons which a re  
predom inantly in terna l o r  dom estic; on th e  oth er hand, an export 
economy is defined  as an  econom y in wh ich varia tion s  in th e le v e l o f  
a g g re ga te  p roduct a re  fundam enta lly  regu la ted  b y  the sh ifts  in 
exports , which are la r g e ly  beyond  the con tro l o f  the economy. Such 
be in g  th e case, in a w o rld  economy con sis tin g  o f  tw o coun tries  
m oving in a parallel w ay  -  an investm ent econom y(A ) and an exp ort 
econom y(B ) -  one cou ld  p lausib ly  a rgu e  that th e  fluctuations 
or ig in a ted  in A and w e re  transm itted to  B( F igu re  I I - 7 ) .  In  th is  
world  economy, it  w ou ld  be im possible to  th ink o f  the opposite  
d irec tion  o f  propagation  w ith ou t con tra d ic tin g  the ab ove  defin ition  o f  
investm ent and export econom y.
While in  fact by  'in v e s tm en t’ so fa r  'home investm en t’ was meant,
we need to  take fo r e ig n  investm en t into con sid era tion  as w ell. Now
le t  us suppose an oth er w o rld  economy con sis tin g  o f  tw o economies:
one w ith  abundant s a v in g s  but re la t iv e ly  lack in g  in domestic
1 We adopt here a s tan da rd  Keynesian macroeconomic fram ework, 
w here emphasis is p laced  upon rea l va r iab les , and w h ere  consumption 
and im ports are trea ted  as  depen den t upon the le ve l o f  income. I t  
is  a lso assumed that th e  e f fe c t  o f  a un it chan ge in th e  two 
autonomous spending item s upon the le v e l o f  income is  same, i.e . 
dY/d l = dY/dX.
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investm ent ou tle ts (C ) and the o th e r  in th e opposite p os ition (D ). We 
presume that th e m arg ina l product o f  cap ita l in D e x c e ed s  that in C, 
and that the d if fe r e n t ia l in re tu rn  has a lready in du ced  capital 
movements from  C to D, as a resu lt o f  which the w ea lth  o f  coun try C 
is  d is tribu ted  betw een  home and fo r e ig n  assets in an optim al way in 
accordance w ith  th e r isk  d iffe ren tia l betw een  the tw o ty p e s  o f  assets. 
Now, i f  fo r  w h a tever  reasons th ere  occurs in  D an opening o f 
investm ent op p ortu n itie s , w iden ing th e gap  in m arg ina l retu rn  fo r 
capita l between th e  tw o coun tries , i t  could be exp ected  th at in the 
absence o f  b a r r ie r  to  in ternational movements o f  ca p ita l the savings 
in  C flow  in to  D; th e  cap ita l len t to  D fo r  investm ent w ill  have to be 
at least p a rtly  used to  purchase cap ita l goods from  industria l C, 
w h ile the r e s t  w ill be spen t in D, mainly to pay w ages  on  investm ent 
p ro jects , thus causing income and im ports to r is e . Hence, the 
m ultiplier e f fe c t  o f  investm en t w ill p a r tly  leak away to  C, and partly  
stimulate dom estic demand, which im plies that th e  investment 
a c tiv itie s  in D lead to  the expansion o f  both C and D. In  other 
w ords, the increase  in  investm ent demand in D b r in g s  about the 
expansion o f  the w orld  econom y(F ig  I I - 8 ) .  External su rp lu s fo r  C 
which makes poss ib le  th e cap ita l ou tflow  is c rea ted  th rough the 
increase in  the exp o r ts  from C in to  D: f ir s t ly  b y  th e  imports o f
capita l goods purch ased  w ith th e borrow ed  funds, an d  secondly by 
the increase in  im ports th rough th e income e ffe c t. D’ s  exports  to C 
w ill also increase  as a consequence o f  the expansion o f  C ow ing to 
the increased  exp orts  to  D; th is, how ever, would be c e rta in ly  smaller 
than the r ise  o f  exp o rts  from  C to  D.
Let us now con sid er a th ird  w orld  economy con s is tin g  o f  A, B, 
C, and D (F ig  I I -9 ) .  I t  would no t be unreasonable to  assume that A 
and C form  the in d u str ia l and deve loped  part o f  th e  w orld  economy,
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w hilst B an d  D a prim ary p rod u c in g  and u n developed  part. In  th is 
world  econom y the increase  in  investm ent a c t iv ity  in A w ill send 
expansionary  shocks to  econom ies B, C and D th ro u gh  the increase in 
im ports b y  th e  form er from  th e la tter . A lte rn a t iv e ly , th e open in g o f  
investm ent opportu n ities  in  D w ill in flu en ce th e o th e r  th ree  economies 
th rou gh  tra d e  channels. Th e  d irec t im pact o f  th e boom in D is 
lik e ly  to  b e  fe l t  most s tr o n g ly  in C. For in  A  the ro le  o f  exp orts  is 
supposed to  b e  re la tiv e ly  w eak b y  d e fin ition , w h ile  th e expansion o f 
B, a p rim ary  producer w ith  weak trade  links  w ith  D due to  the 
sim ilarity in  economic s tru c tu re , is lik e ly  to be b ro u gh t abou t in  an 
in d irec t w ay , that is , m ainly th rough th e increased  exp orts  to 
in du str ia l econom ies (C in  pa rticu la r ) wh ich are  u n dergo in g  expansion 
as a con sequ en ce o f th e inves tm en t boom in  D. Thus, in  th is  w orld 
economy w e  have two poss ib le  sources o f  flu ctu ations: investm ent 
a c tiv ity  in  A and D. In  oth er w ords, in th is  w orld  cyc lica l
fluctuations can start e ith e r  in  th e deve loped  o r  in  th e undeveloped  
part, and subsequen tly  a r e  spread  to th e res t o f  th e  w orld .
T h ese  simple models su gges t the im portance o f  locating the 
dominant fo r c e s  which fundam enta lly  determ ine th e  movements o f  
major na tional economies as a means to  u n ders tan d in g  th e mechanism 
o f  in terna tion al economic fluctuations. L e t us b eg in  w ith the fou r  
industria l economies. In  Tab le  I I-3  s ize  o f  national income and o f 
the two autonomous sp en d in g  items are  com pared in  each o f  the fou r 
countries. Th e  con trast b etw een  the US and B rita in  is  s tr ik in g : in 
e ither g ro s s  o r  net term s home investm en t was o f  predom inant 
im portance and exports accounted  fo r  a minor p ortion  o f  national 
product in  th e US, w h ilst the opposite was th e case in Britain. 
Germany an d  France could be located betw een  the tw o  extrem es, with 
Germany c lo s e r  to the US and France to  B rita in.
&7
Table I I -3 Investm ent and E xport Ratios, 1885-1894,%
USA UK France
21.2 6.0 13.2
X 6.2 16.4 15.5
, where I: GDFCF/GNP(or G D P), X: exports/G N P(or GDP)
USA Germany UK
I 12.7 11.6 1.6
X 6.9 14.1 17.2
, w here I: NDFCF/NNP(or N D P), X: exports/N N P (or NDP)
Source: S. Kuznets(1961), T . S. B erry (1968), US Department o f  
Commerce(1961), W. G. Hoffm ann(1965), B. R. M itchell(1981), C. H. 
Feins te in ( 1976), B. R. Mite h e ll (1962), M. L e v y -L e b o y e r  k  F.
B ourgu ignon (1985)
What rea lly  m atters fo r  ou r purpose, how ever, w ou ld  no t be
a ve ra ge  size, bu t the d e g re e  o f  con tribu tion  to the s h o r t  term
fluctuations in the le v e l o f  a c tiv ity . F or instance, i f  one spen d in g
item, say, home in ves tm en t, ha rd ly  moved in  the short ru n  a lon g  a
h igher trend , w h ile th e  o th e r  item, say, exports , d isp la yed  wide
devia tions from  a low er tren d , it  would b e  reasonable to  conclude
that the fluctuations o f  th e  economy con cern ed  w ere la r g e ly  due to
exp ort variations. In  F ig  11-10 are  p lo tted  the absolu te devia tion s
from  9 -year m oving a v e ra g e s  o f  exports  and home in ves tm en t o f  the
fou r  countries. S ince f o r  th e US an annual series  fo r  th e  cu rren t
va lue o f  domestic in ves tm en t is  availab le o n ly  from 1889, w e compare
f ir s t ly  the absolute d ev ia tion s  o f  investm ent and exports  in  1893-1909,
and fin d  that the am plitude o f  the flu c tu ation s  in home investm en t
was fa r  g rea te r  than th a t  in export v a r ia t io n s (fir s t  chart, F ig  11-10).
On th e other hand, th e  US g ross  fixed  non-resid en tia l investm en t
s e rie s  at 1929 p rices  is  ava ilab le  fo r  1870-1913*. I t  is  o f  course
meaningless to com pare th e absolute dev ia tion s  d e riv ed  from  this
se ries  with those from  e x p o r ts  data, w h ich a re  measured a t  cu rren t
prices ; but, b y  using th is  constant p ric e  data in  con ju n ction  with
th e above home investm en t se ries  a t cu r re n t  p rices , ava ilab le  on ly  fo r
1889-1913, we can form  some ideas on th e  am plitude o f  th e varia tion s
in th e cu rren t va lue o f  th e US dom estic investm ent in th e  pre-1893
period . A ccord ing to  th e  second chart in  F ig  11-10, i t  ap p ea rs  that
th e  amplitude o f  the flu ctu ations in  investm en t at con stan t prices
remained rou gh ly  the same th roughou t th e  period  1870-1914, while
th a t o f  export va lue va r ia tion s  in creased  in the c o u rse  o f  the
period  ( f ir s t  ch a rt). On the oth er hand, the amplitude o f  the US
p ric e  fluctuations d ec lin ed  du rin g  the p e r io d  (F ig  I I -4 ) ,  w h ich  would
2 Th is  series  was com piled  and k ind ly  made availab le to me b y  
P ro fessor A. Maddison o f  U n ive rs ity  o f  G roningen .

im ply  that the r ise  in the amplitude o f  exp ort v a lu e  fluctuations in  
th e  later cyc les  is  un like ly  to be exp licab le b y  p rice  variations. 
T h e re fo re , it  appears reasonable to  in fe r  that in  pre-1893 yea rs  th e 
am plitude in home investm ent fluctuations e x ceed ed  that in exports  
varia tion s , since th is was shown to have been  th e  case in th e tw o 
c y c le s  in post-1893 years, when exp orts  d isp la yed  w ider fluctuations.
R egress in g  the leve l o f  th e US national income at cu rren t 
p ric e s (Y t ) on those o f  home in ves tm en t(Ii) an d  exp ort value(X t) -  
in c lu d in g  Y*-», I*-», and Xt-i a lso on  th e r ig h t  hand side o f  the 
equ ation  to take d istinct upward tren ds  in  th e  th re e  variab les  into 
accou n t -  one obta ins th e fo llow ing:
Yt = -538.8 + 0.9Yt-i + 2.31* -  2.21*-» -  0.3X* + 2.IX*-»
Cat) (fO (4-.S) (2.8) <*••> 0-0
Adjusted  R* = 0.99, LM = 10.32»
(t -ra t io s  in paren theses )
The g rea te r  coe ffic ien t associated w ith  th e  cu rren t va lue o f  
home investm ent, 2.3, than th e n ega tive  and in s ign ific a n t coe ffic ien t 
associated  w ith cu rren t m erchandise exports  a p p ea rs  to confirm  the 
dominant role o f  domestic cap ita l form ation in  th e  US trade cycles.
The th ird  ch a rt in 11-10 shows that in 1884-1909 the amplitude
o f  th e cyc les  in  the German net dom estic in ves tm en t exceeded b y  fa r
th a t o f  export fluctuations. Since the German ex p o r t series  begin s
from  1880, fo r  th e period  1870-84 absolu te d e v ia tion s  o f  the German
exp orts  are unavailable. In  v iew  o f  the fa c t th a t  (as in the US) the
3 T h is  stands fo r  the L agran ge  M ultip lier te s t s ta tis t ic  fo r  the f i r s t  
o rd e r  autocorrelation. Since the 5% c rit ica l p o in t o f  the ch i-squ are 
d is tribu tion  with one d egree  o f  freedom  is  3.84, w e re je c t  the null 
h ypoth esis  o f  seria l independence.
am plitude o f  the German export varia tion s  was g ro w in g  th rough ou t 
the pre-W WI period , it  appears p robab le  th at in  C ycle I ,  i .e .  1870-79,
71
investm ent d isplayed  w ider fluctuations than exports . In  C ycle II, 
i.e . 1879-87, German home investm ent d isp layed  unusual s ta b il ity ,  and 
i t  is  not un likely th at th is c yc le  was led  b y  exp ort fluctuations. 
Thus, Germany seemed to d i f fe r  from  th e US in  th a t domestic 
investm ent was not a consisten t cyc lica l leader in Germ any: in  Cycle 
I ,  I I I ,  IV  & V investm ent predom inated, while in  C ycle I I  Germany 
seemed to  behave as an export economy.
Estimating fo r  Germany th e same equation aa in  th e  US, we 
obta in  sim ilar resu lts, showing the cen tra l ro le  o f  home in ves tm en t in 
the German trade cycles:
Y* = -57.3 + l.OYt-i + 1.31. -  1.11m  -  0.2X. + 0.2X»-i
( .0 .2 ) < m )  (12.3) (3 .9 ) (a-
A d justed  R* = 1.00, LM = 0.08 
(t-ra tio s  in  paren theses )
Tu rn ing  to the fou rth  ch art in  F ig  11-10, on e  ga ins the 
im pression th at in  B rita in, in  c on tra st w ith US and Germ any, exports 
ra th er than domestic investm ent tended to  lead the tra d e  cyc les  o f  
th e pre-1914 period : 'the absolu te d evia tion s in exp o rts  w ere  some 
two and a ha lf times those in  investm ent ... and th eir  tu rn in g  points 
accorded  more c lose ly  w ith fluctuations in  ou tpu t and employment 
than did  those o f  investm ent’4. Furtherm ore, i t  is  c le a r ly  shown in 
th e th ird  chart o f  F ig  11-10 th a t in C ycles I ,  I I  and I I I  th e  turning 
poin ts in  g ro ss  home investm ent lagged  behind those in  exp o rts .
4 A. G. Ford (1981) p.35-37
As in  Germany, h ow ever, an exceptional cyc le  is found: C yc le  
IV. In  con trast w ith o th e r  c yc les , in  th is  cyc le  home investm en t 
seemed to  be more im portant than exports . The r ec o ve ry  from  th e  
depression  o f  Cycle I I I  was in itia ted  by domestic investm ent in 1895, 
whereas r e v iv a l in  exp orts  came th ree  yea rs  la ter, and the absolu te 
deviation  fo r  investm ent exceeds that in exports  a t the peak yea r o f  
Cycle IV(1900).*
The predom inant p a r t p layed  by  exports  in th e B ritish  tra d e  
cyc les  is  a lso revea led  in  th e fo llow in g  equation:
Y . = 25.1 ♦ l.OYi-i ♦ 0.7It -  1.21,-i + 1.8X, -  1.9X,-,
O .ftf ( 25. «  Cl.8)  13.1)  l lS )  (T .l)
A d ju s ted  R* = 0.99, LM = 0.11 
(t - ra t io s  in  paren theses)
In  the 1870-1914 period  about a th ird  o f  B ritish  annual 
accumulations is said to  have been invested  abroad in net terms*, 
and the cap ita l exports  o f  th is  magnitude made Brita in the la rge s t 
international lender in  th is  e ra 5 67. Thus, Britain was not on ly  an 
export, bu t also a len d in g  economy. I f  the tu rn in g  poin ts in B ritish  
m erchandise exports  flu ctu ations tended to  lead those in  the B ritish  
home investm ent varia tion s, the cyc lica l movements in  B ritish  ove rseas  
lend ing a re  said to have p receded  those in B ritish exp orts  by  1-2
5 'The on ly  boom in  which th e r is e  in home investm ent was much 
more pronounced than th e  r ise  in  fo re ign  investm ent was that o f  1900 
... All o th e r  booms from  1870 onwards seem to  have been 
communicated th rough th e  export trades from  America and other 
centres  o f  investm ent.' A. K. Cairncross(1953) p.196
6 M. Bdelste in (1981) p.70
7 Accord ing to W. W oodru ff(1966) p.150 between 1870-1900 the stock 
o f  the UK fo r e ign  investm ent increased  by  almost £1500m, while 
correspon d in g  f igu re  fo r  F rance, the second la rges t cap ita l exporter, 
was less than £600m.
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years*. Accord ing  to  P ro fes so r  A. G. Ford(1965), th is su gges ts  that 
the increase in  B ritish  ove rseas  len d in g  stim ulated British 
merchandise exports  th rou gh  both  b ila tera l and m ultilateral channels, 
and v ice  ve rsa . We shall come back to  th is  poin t in  th e fo llow ing 
chapter.
In  th e f ifth  ch a rt o f  F ig  11-10 a re  compared th e sh o rt term 
fluctuations o f  the c u rren t va lu e  o f  F rench  home investm ent and 
merchandise exports. I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  o b se rve  th a t in the p re -  
WWI France one cyc le  dom inated by e x p o r t varia tion s  was follow ed by 
another dominated b y  home investm en t fluctuations, which was 
succeeded b y  an exp ort cyc le , and so on . Thus i f  th e F rench  Cycle 
1(1870-79), 111(1886-96) and V ( 1902-1908/9) could be characterized  as 
export c yc les , the F rench  C yc les  11(1879-86) and IV(1896-1902) w ere 
investm ent cyc les .
Such having been th e case, in c on tra st w ith th e o th e r  th ree 
industria l coun tries, in  th e fo llow in g  equ ation  fo r  F rance both home 
investm ent and exports  em erge as s ign ifica n t determ inants o f  the 
le v e l o f  a c t iv ity , th e form er b e in g  p erh ap s  more im portant than the 
latter:
Yt = 1566.1 + 0.5Y«-i + 1.9It -  0.7It-. + 1.3X* + O.lXt-i
Cl.*) ».*) oa> C*.l) (to) (0.2)
A d ju sted  R* = 0.98, LM = 1.74 
(t - ra t io s  in  paren theses )
8 A. G. F o rd (1965) Best resu lt is  ob ta ined  in terms o f  coe ffic ien t, t -  
statistics, and ad justed  R*, w hen the f i r s t  d iffe ren ces  o f  B ritish 
m erchandise exports  w ere  reg res s ed  upon those o f  B ritish  overseas 
len d in g (d irec t estimates b y  M. Simon(1968)) lead ing by tw o years:
X. = 5.41 + 0.38 OL*-* R*=0.14
Cl.7 ) )  <1.16) D w M . l l
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F ran ce  was the second la rges t cap ita l exp orte r  in  1870-1914 
behind B rita in*. A ccord ing  to  L e v y -L e b o y e r 's  estimates o f  French 
home and fo re ign  investm ent, more than 15% o f  French  sav in gs  flowed 
ou t an nu ally  to be in vested  abroad du rin g  1865-19131*. As we shall 
see in th e  second section  o f  the fo llow in g  ch ap ter, F rench  exports 
tended to  fluctuate cyc lic a lly  th rough ou t the 1884-1909 period, 
w h ereas o v e rsea s  lending va r ied  in a cyc lica l w ay on ly  du r in g  Cycles 
I I I  and V , L e . export c yc les ; furtherm ore in the tw o exp o rt cyc les  
th e c y c lic a l pattern  o f  o ve rseas  lend ing p receded  that o f  merchandise 
exp orts  b y  one o r  two y ea rs (F ig  III-1 3 ). We shall also see in  the 
fo llow in g  ch ap ter  w hether, as in B rita in, th is  may be in terp re ted  as 
French  cap ita l exports g en era tin g  c yc les  in m erchandise exports  in 
th e y ea rs  o f  weak domestic demand fo r  funds.
B e fo re  turn ing to  undeveloped  economies, le t  us make a b rie f 
summary o f  th e resu lts o f  ou r in ves tiga tion  on  th e nature o f  the 
trade c y c le s  o f  our fou r industria l economies. In  th e US, domestic 
inves tm en t dominated the scene o f  cyc lica l fluctuations in  the p re - 
WWI era , and the same was the case in Germany excep t fo r  Cycle I I ,  
which ap p ea red  to be led  b y  exports. B rita in  tended to  undergo 
exp ort c y c le s , while in  France exp ort and investm ent cyc les  
a lte rn a ted ; in  the export c yc les  o f  th e two countries, varia tion s  in 
exp orts  w e re  preceded  b y  those in ove rseas  lend ing  which suggests  
the a n teced en t in fluence o f  the la tter upon the form er.
In  th e f ir s t  chart o f  F ig  11-11 are  compared the short-term  
flu c tu ation s  in  A rgen tine exports  and those in  B ritish  portfo lio  
inves tm en t in Argentina. In  the absence o f  annual Argen tine
9 See foo tn o te  7, th is section.
10 M. L evy-L eb oye r(1 9 7 8 ) p.287
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dom estic investm en t series , th e la tter  m igh t se rve  as a rou gh  gu id e 
to  th e  sh o rt run  movements in A rgen tin e  g ross  dom estic capita l
form ation , in v iew  o f  the fa c t th at ’ d u r in g  1880-1914 fo r e ig n  sav in gs
fin an ced  betw een  on e -th ird  and on e -h a lf o f  n e t physica l 
investm en t’ 11: th is  is  borne ou t b y  the ob se rva t ion  that the
va r ia tion s  in  th e UK issues fo r  A rgen tin a , when la g g ed  by  2-3
y ea rs 1*, b road ly  coin cide w ith  th ose in  th e add ition to  th e  len g th  o f  
ra ilw ays, a m ajor form  o f  A rgen tin e  dom estic
cap ita l form ation in  the y ea rs  con cern ed . I f  the absolu te  d evia tion s 
from  9 -yea r  m oving a v e ra ges  o f  the UK issu es  fo r  A rgen tin a  could be 
reg a rd ed  as c o r re c t ly  re fle c t in g  th e d irec tion  o f  th e sh o rt term
flu ctu ation s  o f  to ta l A rgen tin e  in vestm en t, the am plitude o f  to tal 
A rgen tin e  home investm en t va r ia tion s  would have been  g re a te r  than 
th a t o f  the flu ctu ations in B ritish  in ves tm en t in  A rgen tin a . For it  
w ou ld  be rea lis t ic  to expect that th e  ind igenous cap ita l in ves ted  
d isp la yed  sim ilar fluctuations.
Even  under such con jec tu ra l c ircum stances, one cou ld  fe e l qu ite  
sa fe  in  ju d g in g  th e A rgen tin e  C ycle I I I  to  be an inves tm en t cyc le , 
s in ce  even  th e UK issues fo r  A rgen tin a  d isplayed  w id e r  varia tion s 
than  exports . In  d ec id in g  th e  re la t iv e  importance o f  exp o rts  and 
inves tm en t in  o th e r  c yc les  we are  on  a  less  secure g ro u n d , bu t it  
ap p ea rs  th at th e A rgen tin e  C yc les  I I  A IV  w ere led  b y  exports , in 
v iew  o f  the fa c t  th a t the yea rs  o f  th e tw o  cyc les  corresp on d  to la ter 
phase o f  lon g  dow nsw ing and ea r ly  phase o f  lon g  upsw ing, when 
investm en t was a t a r e la t iv e ly  low le v e l1*. In  C yc les  I  A V
investm en t p layed  a more im portant ro le  than in C yc les  I I  A IV , but 123
11 C. F. D iaz-A le jandro(~l970) p.31
12 A ccord in g  to  H. S. Ferns(1960) p.443, ’th e  acts o f  inves tm en t ... 
p reced ed  by  som ething like tw o y ea rs  th e  physica l g ro w th  o f  the 
ra ilw ays  them selves ’ .
13 Section 1, C hapter I II .
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in Cycle I  exp o rts  still maintained dominance o v e r  investm ent, 
whereas in  C ycle  V investm ent p robab ly  ou tw eigh ed  exports .1* I t  
should not be fo rg o tte n  that fo r e ig n  borrow ing  fo rm ed  an essential 
basis o f  th e two investm ent cyc les .
Tu rn in g  to Australia , in  the Sftind chart o f  F ig  I I —11 we observe  
f i r e t  o f  a ll th at in  th e absolute d evia tion s from  th e 9— year moving 
a vera ges  o f  Austra lian  exports  th e  f iv e  trade c yc le s  id en tified  earlier 
a re  c lea rly  d iscern ib le , w h ilst th e Australian dom estic investm ent 
moved ra th er indepen den tly  o f  the cyc lica l p a tte rn . Thus the 
prelim inary im pression  con veyed  is  th at in pre-1914 A ustra lia  exports 
tended to  p lay  a g rea te r  cyc lica l ro le  than in vestm en t. A closer 
look at th e th ird  ch a rt o f  F ig  I I —11, how ever, shows th a t in con trast 
w ith oth er fou r  c yc le s , in C ycle I I I  Australian home investm ent, to a 
g rea t exten t B ritish  finan ced1*, moved in broad agreem en t with the 
cyc lica l pa ttern , as d id  Australian exports , a t the same time showing 
g rea te r  am plitude than exports . Th erefo re , th e Austra lian  Cycle I I I  
would appear an investm en t cyc le , whereas in th e o th e r  fou r cyc les  
exports  figu red . Th is p ecu lia rity  o f  the Au stra lian  Cycle I I I  is  
connected w ith  th e fa c t that th e Australian C ycle I I I  peak coincided 
w ith  the end o f  th e long upsw ing  sta rtin g  from  around 1870 in 
Australia .1*
Thus the fo llow in g  equation shows that w h ile (as  in  France) both 
home investm ent and exports  s ign ifica n tly  a ffe c ted  the leve l o f
14 This judgem ent is  based upon the fa c t that in C yc les  I  k V upper 
tu rn in g  poin ts  w ere  determ ined b y  exports  and B ritish  investm ent, 
resp ec tiv e ly ; and a lso  that as shall be seen in th e fo llo w in g  chapter 
the f ir s t  A rgen tin e  lon gsw in g, the peak o f  which corresp on ded  with 
C ycle I  peak was fa r  weaker than th e fo llow ing tw o lon g  sw ings, 
whose peaks correspon ded  w ith  C ycle  I I I  k  V peaks.
15 Im ported B ritish  capita l accounted fo r  51.IX  o f  th e Australian 
domestic cap ita l form ation in 1885-90. N. G. Butlin(1962)
16 Section 1, C hapter I II .
a c tiv ity  in  Australia  in the s h o rt  run , th e ro le  o f  exports  
im portant than investment:
more
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Y« = 1.1 + 0.6Y.-1 + 1.41* -  0.11m  + 1.5X* -  0.4X*-i
(03 )  (♦*>  (5.4)  (a i )  (♦.?> 0-0
A d justed  R* = 0.99, LM = 0.36 
(t-ra tio a  in  paren theses )
A ccord in g  to th e third ch a rt o f  F ig  11—11, in  th e Canadian 
C ycles I ,  I I  and V home inves tm en t varia tion s  overwhelm ed th e  
fluctuations in  merchandise ex p o r ts , w hereas in  C ycle IV the op p os ite  
was c le a r ly  th e case. On th e  o th e r  hand, home investm ent and 
exporta  appeared  to con trib u te , to a b road ly  equal exten t, to  th e  
cyc lica l movements o f  the Canadian economy in  C ycle I I I  years : i f  in  
absolute term s the increase in  exp orts  exceeded  that in  home 
investm ent in  the late 1880s, th e  oppos ite  happened in  the con traction  
in the e a r ly  1890s. In  th e th re e  Canadian investm en t cyc les , fo r e ig n  
capita l occup ied  an im portant position : in  C ycle 1(1870-78) ov e rsea s  
borrow in g  amounted to 38.2X o f  to ta l Canadian g ro ss  investm ent, w h ile  
in C ycle  11(1878-86) and V (1905-9 ) y ea rs , th e  correspon din g  ra tios  
w ere 33.IX  and 3S.7X. The fo llo w in g  resu lt o f  reg ress ion  shows th e 
re la tiv e  im portance o f  home inves tm en t in  th e  pre-1914 Canadian 
trade c yc les :
Y* = 7.0 + O.8Y.-1 ♦ 1.61» -  1.31m  + 0.9X* -  O.IXm
(0 .3 ) 0 *O ) t t »  ( 3 D  (0-3)
A d justed  R* = 1.00, LM = 0.65 
(t-ra tio a  in  paren theses )
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T h e  final chart o f  F ig  11-11 shows that In d ian  exports  v a r ied  in 
a c y c lic a l way du rin g  1870-1914 excep t fo r  th e  yea rs  o f  C ycle  IV, 
w h ereas the annual cap ita l ou tlay  on Ind ian  ra ilw ay , used h ere  as an 
in d ica to r  o f  Indian dom estic capital form ation , b ega n  to  show cyc lica l 
m ovem ents from C ycle I I .  The absence o f  c y c lic a l elements in the 
m ovem ents o f  Indian im ports  and ra ilw ay  rec e ip ts  d u r in g  C ycle  I  
y e a rs (F ig  II-6 , fou rth  ch a r t ) im plies that th e  cyc lica l in fluen ces 
d e liv e r e d  from  the r e s t  o f  the world  to  In d ia  th ro u gh  trade  channel 
w ere  n o t s tron g  enough to  resu lt in  th e flu c tu ation s  o f  the whole 
econom y. In  Cycle I I ,  a lthough both inves tm en t and exp orts  seemed 
to  v a r y  cyc lica lly , i t  ap p ea rs  lik e ly  th at exp o r ts  were a s tron ge r  
cyc lica l fo rc e  than in ves tm en t in  term s o f  bo th  am plitudes and 
determ ination  o f  tu rn in g  poin ts. While dom estic investm ent seemed 
to  ga in  con siderab ly  in  im portance as a cyc lica l sou rce  in  C ycle  I I I ,  it  
is  not c le a r  whether th e  movements o f  exp orts  w e re  overw helm ed by  
those in  home investm ent: the Ind ian  ra ilw ay  r e c e ip ts (F ig  I I-6 )
moved in  closer agreem en t w ith exp orts  than w ith  th e cap ita l ou tlay 
on ra ilw ays . We could be sure on th e o th e r  hand that investm ent 
form ed a dominant fo r c e  in C ycle IV, s in ce  exp orts  showed 
c on tra cyc lica l varia tion s. The ’overw h e lm in g  bu lk ’ o f  cap ita l
in v e s ted  in Indian ra ilw a ys  was B ritish .1* In  C ycle V, w here
exp orts  d isp layed  w ider fluctuations, tu rn in g  p o in ts  w ere more c lose ly  
a ssocia ted  with the m ovem ents o f  the cap ita l o u tlay  on ra ilw ays; in 
the ab sen ce  o f  fu rth e r  inform ation it  seems d if f ic u lt  to determ ine the 
ch a ra c te r  o f  the Indian C yc le  V.
Aa a summary o f  th e  resu lts  o f  ou r attem pt to  id en tify  dominant 
fo rc es  in  ind ividual c y c le s  in each o f  ou r e igh t  cou n tr ies , Tab le  II-4  
ia p resen ted . 17
17 D.~fhorner(19Sl) p.391
Tab le  I I -4  Lead ing  Forces in the F iv e  T rade  C yc les
I I I I I I IV V
US I I I I I
Germany I X I I I
UK X/L X/L X/L I X/L
France X/L I X/L I X/L
A rgen tin a X X I X I
Australia X X I X X
Canada I I X X I
Ind ia X X X I 9
, w h ere I: home investm ent, X: e x p o r ts , L: ov e rsea s  lend ing
3. Mechanism of the International Trade Cycles
Having iden tified  th e dom inant fo rces  in flu en c in g  the course o f  
th e cyc lica l fluctuations in  each o f  ou r e igh t econom ies, we now 
proceed  to the question o f  w h ere  cyc lica l d is tu rban ces  or ig ina ted , 
and how th ey  w ere transm itted to  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  w orld , resu lting  in 
such broad parallelism  among th e  national trade c y c le s  o f  the e igh t  
cou n tr ies  as was seen in th e  f i r s t  section . A c co rd in g  to  the simple 
models p resented  at the b eg in n in g  o f  the p re c ed in g  section, the 
cyc lica l fluctuations o f  a  w orld  econom y, com pris ing one investm ent, 
one export, one lend ing and one b o rro w in g  econom y, can be in itia ted  
e ith e r  b y  the sh ifts  in  dom estic investm ent a c tiv it ie s  in  th e 
investm ent economy o r  by  those in  the export o f  funds from the 
lend ing  to  the borrow ing econom y, o r  by  both. I t  could thus be
expected  that countries u n d ergo in g  pu re  exp ort c yc le s1, such as 
Germany and Argen tina  in  C ycle  I I ,  a lone  did not in it ia te  the tu rn in g  
poin ts  in  the correspon d in g  in tern a tion a l trade c y c le s . Table I I-5 , 
lis t in g  the leaders at the 9 tu rn in g  poin ts, is con sis ten t w ith such a 
p red iction , excep t fo r  the trou gh  in  th e late 1870s, when A rgen tina , 
un dergo ing  export cyc les , is  show n to  have led  the beginn ing o f  
C ycle  I I .  However, one may not need  to take th e  la tte r  p roposition  
com pletely  seriously, in  v iew  o f  th e  fa c t that th e  tu rn in g  poin t in 
question in Argen tina  was determ ined  on the basis  o f  import va lue 
data, which are  su b ject to  in flu en ces  oth er than th e  le ve l o f  a c t iv ity  
such as capital inflow  and im port p r ic e  variations.
I t  is  a lso seen in the Tab le th a t cases in  w h ich  turn ing poin ts
w ere  in itiated by lend ing o r  b o rro w in g  econom ies alone to the
1 ’P u re ’ in  th e sense th at the e x p o r t  cyc les  are no t rela ted  to 
lend ing  abroad.
Tab le  I I-5  Leaders  at Tu rn in g  Poin ts
p T P T P T P T P
1873 1878 1882 1885 1889 1893 1898 1902 1907
US US US US Au UK Ge Ge US
UK Ca UK Au Fr Ge
At —  . Fr At UK
Au 1876 Ca Fr
At Au
Ca
In
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exclusion o f  th e two major in du str ia l investm en t econom ies, th e  US 
and Germ any, w ere  v e ry  ra re : indeed , on ly  one such case, th e  peak 
o f  C ycle I I I ,  is  ob served , w h ich  was led by  Australia .1 On th e  other 
hand, it  is  notab le that a t no tu rn in g  poin t excep t the 1907 peak  are 
the tw o deve lo ped  investm en t economies lis ted  as co - in it ia to rs . I t  
seems that in  ea r lie r  c yc les , C ycles  I & I I ,  th e  US led tu rn in g  points, 
while Germany tended to pass tu rn in g  poin ts ea r lie r  than th e  US in 
Cycle IV and V. As we sha ll see below, how ever, it ra re ly  appeared  
the case th a t the investm en t boom, say, in  the US in d u ced  an 
investm en t boom, say, in  Germ any, o r  th e opposite.
A lth ough  a t seven  o f  th e nine tu rn in g  points a t le a s t one 
prim ary p rod u cer is  lis ted  among cyc le  leaders , th is  does  not 
necessa rily  im ply that a t a ll th e seven  tu rn in g  points in it ia l cyc lica l 
shocks or ig in a ted  from th e  undeveloped  w orld . As we sha ll see 
sh o rtly , th is  indeed  was th e  case in  Cycle I I I ;  on the o th e r  hand, in 
oth er c y c le s  th e fac t th a t some u n developed  econom ies passed 
th rou gh  tu rn in g  points in  th e same yea r as the US o r  Germany 
appeared  to  be rela ted  to  th e ir  c loser trade  rela tionsh ip  w ith  these 
investm ent economies, which ensured  that the varia tion s  in  th e  level 
o f  a c t iv ity  in  the in du str ia l coun tries w ere  passed on  to  these 
prim ary p ro d u cers  with a s h o rt  in terva l, i.e . in  less than o n e  year. 
For example Canada, most o f  whose export decline in th e  C ycle I 
downsw ing and export increase  in  the C ycle I I  u p sw in g  were 
accountable b y  th e fluctuations in  her exports  to  the US*, passed  the 
1878 trou gh  in  th e same y ea r  as the US. I t  is  a lso fou n d  in  Table
2 A lthough th e  1893 trough was led by B rita in , th is  had n o th in g  to 
do w ith  B rita in 's  ro le  as an in ternational len der: as was a lre a d y  
seen (Tab le  I I - 4 ) ,  the B ritish  C yc le  IV  was an investm ent c y c le .
3 In  1873-78 total Canadian m erchandise exp orts  declined b y  $16m, 
w h ereas the fa ll in  the Canadian exports  to  th e US was $17m. On 
the o th er  hand, during the upsw ing o f  1878-81 Canadian e x p o r ts  rose 
by  831m, which compares w ith  the 823 increase in  Canadian e x p o r ts  to 
the US in  1878-82. B. R. M ite hell (1983)
I I—5 that A rgen tina  was associated w ith  the US a t the 1873 peak, 
whereas at the tro u g h  in 1902 she w as accompanied b y  Germany. 
Th is is  consisten t w ith  the changes in  th e geograph ica l pattern  o f  
the Argen tine exp o rt trad e , which con sis ted  mainly in  th e decline o f  
the importance o f  th e  US and the ra p id  expansion o f  the German 
market.* F inally , F ran ce and B rita in a re  o b se rved  to  appear as 
tu rn in g  poin t le a d e rs  at th e 1882 peak  and th e 1893 trough  
resp ec tiv e ly , which may be rela ted  to th e  fa c t that th e F rench  Cycle 
I I  and the British C yc le  IV  w ere  led b y  home in ves tm en t(Tab le  I I-4 ).
Let us now tak e  a c loser  look a t each  o f  the f iv e  international 
trade cyc les , p s y in g  particu la r a tten tion  to  the o r ig in  o f  cyc lica l 
shocks and the d ire c tio n s  o f  th e ir  transm ission. In  doing so,
monetary in fluen ces a re  ignored  bu t w ill be d iscu ssed  in the 
fo llow ing chapter.
Accord ing to  T ab le  I I-4 , during th e  Cycle I  y ea rs , from  around 
1870 to  1876-9, th e  US, Germany and Canada u n derw en t investm ent 
cyc les , while the f lu c tu a tion s  in  th e r e s t  o f  ou r e igh t economies w ere 
led  by exports. I f  Germany seem ed capable o f  finan cing  her
domestic capital form ation  in terna lly*, th e US and Canada w ere 
dependent upon fo r e ig n  sav ings. T h e  d egree  o f  dependence,
how ever, d iffe red  con s id e rab ly : w hile B r it is h  p o rtfo lio  investm ent in
4 In  1870-79 the sh a res  o f  th e US and German m arket in  th e total 
A rgen tine exports  w e re  8% and 2% res p e c t iv e ly ; in 1900-09 they 
changed to 5% and 12%. In  the 1872-79 exp o rts  dow nsw ing, the 
decline in the A rgen tin e  exp orts  to th e US accounted fo r  18% o f  the 
contraction in total A rgen tin e  m erchandise exports , w h ilst the exports 
from  Argen tina  to Germ any continued to  r is e  during th e downswing.
In  con trast, in 1900-05 exp orts  upsw ing th e  r ise  in th e exp orts  to the 
US explained on ly  5.4% o f  th e to tal g ro w th  o f  A rgen tin e  exports , 
whereas the con tribu tion  o f  the German m arket was 11.3%. B.R.
Mite hell (1983)
5 Although it  is  tru e  th a t in  the ea r ly  1870s la rge  amount o f  French 
capita l flowed into Germ any in  th e form  o f  indem nity payments, 
accord ing to  H. Feis(1930) p.68 th is p ro v id e d  the basis fo r  fo re ign  
investm ent boom in  Germany.
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the US in 1870-79 amounted to  o n ly  3.5% o f  the US g ro s s  domestic 
cap ita l formation*, fo re ig n  con tr ib u t ion  to  Canadian investm ent 
a c tiv ity  was as high as 37.1% in  th e  same yea rs.6 7 89 In  o th e r  words, 
th e role o f  fo re ign  cap ita l in  the US was supplem entary  and 
re in fo rc in g , but fo re ign  cap ita l in flow  seemed to  form  an essen tia l 
condition fo r  Canadian cap ita l form a tion  in the 1870s. Th u s  C ycle I 
could be said to  have been led  b y  the la rge ly  s e lf- fin a n ced  home 
investm ent a c t iv ity  in the US an d  Germany and b y  Canadian domestic 
cap ita l formation, which was to  a con siderab le  exten t fo r e ig n  financed 
and mostly British*.
As we shall see in  Section  1, Chapter I I I ,  th e inves tm en t cyc les  
in  th e US and Germany did  not appear c lose ly  con nected  w ith  each 
oth er but exp licab le la rg e ly  in  term s o f  dom estic fa c to rs . In  
con trast, it  is  possib le and e v e n  probab le  th a t th e  Canadian 
investm ent fluctuations w ere  in d ire c t ly  connected  w ith  the 
fluctuations o f  the two in d u s tr ia l coun tries, th e US in  particu lar, 
which a ffected  both the w illin gn ess  and ab ility  o f  B ritish  in ves to rs  to 
lend abroad.
The cyc lica l fluctuation  in  the US and, p robab ly*, Germany 
seemed to b rin g  about c o r resp on d in g  sh ifts  in th e ir  im ports, thus 
transm itting cyc lica l shocks to  va r io u s  parts .o f  th e w orld : US
6 Th e  data on the B ritish p o r t fo lio  investm ent in  th e US w ere  k indly 
p rov ided  in the form  o f  5 -yea r  summary by P ro fessor  I. S tone o f  the 
C ity  U n ive rs ity  o f  New York , and th is  source is ind icated  in  this 
stu dy  by  I. S tone(1986); th e US GDCP figu re s  a re  from  S.
Kuznets( 1961).
7 A. I. B loom field(1968a), M. C. U rquhart(1986 )
8 B ritish new portfo lio  investm ent in  Canada alone accounted  fo r  
62.1% o f  total fo re ign  capita l flow  in to  Canada in  1870-79. A. I. 
Bloomfield(1968a), M. Simon(1968)
9 German overseas  trade s ta tis t ic s  a re  unavailable b e fo re  1880.
im ports from  prim ary p rodu cers10 1 increased  b y  £29m and declined  by 
£12m du rin g  the C ycle I  u p - and downsw ing; th e  cyc lica l ch an ges in 
US im ports from  Brita in and France accounted f o r  25.2% and 40.3% o f  
th e cyc lica l r ise  and fa ll in B ritish  m erchan d ise  exports  and 19.2% 
and 18.1% o f  those in  French m erchandise e x p o r ts ; s im ilarly the 
cyc lica l changes in  German im ports from  B rita in  and France amounted 
to  14.6% and 22.7% o f  the cyc lica l increase a n d  decrease in  B ritish 
m erchandise exp orts  and 33.3% and 17.3% o f  those in  French  
m erchandise exports . On the oth er hand, th e  Canadian investm ent 
c yc le  a ffe c ted  ch ie fly  B rita in, th e main su p p lie r  o f  funds to  Canada: 
Canadian im ports from  Britain declined  du r in g  th e  C ycle I  downswing 
by £7.8m, which accounted fo r  69.0% o f  to tal f a l l  in  Canadian im ports 
and 12.0% o f  th e declin e in B ritish  m erchandise ex p o r ts .11
Thus th e cyc lica l varia tion s in th e le v e l o f  a c tiv ity  in  th e US, 
Germany and Canada seemed to  p lay  a cru cia l r o le  in  in itia ting  export 
c yc le s  in  both B rita in  and France. The expan sion  and con traction  o f 
the B ritish  and F rench  economies both re in fo r c e d  the in itia l cyc lica l 
in fluen ces upon th e undeveloped  w orld  and d i f fu s e d  cyc lica l shocks 
to  p rim ary p rodu cers  not c lose ly  linked  w ith  th e  US and Germany: 
B rita in  increased  her imports from  the u n deve lop ed  world by  £57m 
d u r in g  the Cycle I upsw ing and decreased  b y  £28m du rin g  the 
subsequent downsw ing; a £17m rise  and a £4m fa ll w ere ob se rved  in 
F rench  im ports from  prim ary producers . T h e  resu lting  cyc lica l 
varia tion s  in th e le v e l o f  a c tiv ity  in the u n deve lop ed  w orld w ere  fed 
back into B rita in  and France v ia  trade  ch an n e ls  as fu rth e r  cyc lica l
10 In  th is  s tu dy , prim ary producing o r  u n deve lop ed  world is  defined  
as the world  minus ou r fou r industria l cou n tr ies  fo r  the sake o f  
sim plic ity.
11 Th e  data on the geograph ica l d istribu tion  o f  Canadian im ports 
b eg in  from 1872.
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stim uli. P ig  11—12 summarizes the stru ctu re  o f  in tern a tion a l trade 
c y c le  between the late 1860s and the late 1870s.1*
In  Cycle I I ,  ex ten d in g  from 1876-9 to 1886, m a jor cyc lica l 
d is tu rban ce  seemed to o r ig in a te  from  US, France and C anada(Tab le  I I -  
4 ). Whereas the investm ent a c tiv ity  in the US and P ra n ce  was
c a r r ie d  out la rge ly  w ith  dom estic funds, Canada continued to  import 
su bstan tia l amount o f  cap ita l in  these years. France w as  a major 
in terna tion a l lender th rou gh ou t the period  1870-1914; an d  w h ile  in 
1880-84 British new p o rtfo lio  investm ent in the US accounted  fo r  on ly 
3.4X o f  the US g ro ss  domestic cap ita l formation, during th e  C ycle  I I  
y e a rs ,  1878-86, fo re ign  cap ita l in flow  amounted to 33.IX  o f  Canadian 
home investm ent.1*
The broad syn chron ization  between the sh ifts  in US a n d  French 
home investm ent d id  not seem to  resu lt from the in terac tio n  o f  the 
tw o  economies, but as a m atter o f  chance.1* On the o th e r  hand, it 
is  lik e ly  that the investm ent fluctuations in the US an d  France
a ffe c te d  the le ve l o f  Canadian investm ent by  in flu en c in g  the
p ro sp ec ts  and wealth o f  fo re ign , mainly British, investors .
The cyc lica l fo rc es  o r ig in a tin g  from the US and F ra n ce  were 
transm itted  to the undeveloped  w orld through trade lin k s : the
e x p o r ts  from the un developed  world  to  the form er rose b y  £28m and 
fe l l  b y  £13m during th e C ycle I I  expansion and con traction , whereas 
F ran ce  recorded a £38m increase and a £16m decrease in h e r  im ports 
from  the p eriphery . On th e oth er hand, Britain a lso rece ived  1234
12 In  F ig  11—12, as in th e fo llow in g  fou r figu res , on ly  major in it ia l 
sh o ck s  are shown fo r  th e sake o f  sim plicity.
13 S. Kuznets(1961), I . Stone(1986), A. I . Bloomfield(1968a), M. C. 
U rquhart(1986)
14 S ee  Section 1, Chapter I II .
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cyc lica l shocks from  th e tw o cou n tr ie s  th rou gh  trade flow s: the
cyc lica l sh ifts  in  B ritish  e x p o r ts  to  the US and France explained 
32.8X and 6.8% o f  the to tal in c re a s e  in B ritish m erchandise exp orts  in 
the Cycle I I  upsw ing, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  and 31.3X and 13.9% o f  th e  decline 
in  British exp o rts  in the fo llo w in g  downswing, resp ec tiv e ly . The 
e ffe c ts  o f  th e  Canadian in v e s tm en t cyc le  w ere m ostly fe lt  in  Britain 
and the US: Canadian im ports fro m  Britain and th e  US increased  by 
£4.5m and £5.5m d u r in g  th e u p sw in g  and declin ed  by £2.9m and 
£4.5m du r in g  th e dow n sw ing15; the cyc lica l chan ges in Canadian 
im ports from  Brita in  accounted  f o r  9X and 10X o f  the cyc lica l rise 
and fa ll in  B ritish  m erchandise exp o rts . The B ritish  exp ort cycle, 
thus induced , not on ly  g a v e  fu r th e r  cyc lica l stimuli to  prim ary 
p roducers  th ro u gh  the £50m in c re a s e  and £51m decrease in B rita in ’s 
im ports from  th e un developed  cou n tr ie s  du rin g  th e trade cyc le , but 
a lso con tribu ted , to ge th er  w ith  th e  US and F rench  investm ent cyc les , 
to the crea tion  o f  the German e x p o r t  cyc le . Th e  export cycleB  in 
Brita in and Germany w ere  am p lified  by the cyc lica l changes in the 
demand fo r  th e ir  p rodu cts  from  prim ary  p rodu cers . F ig  11-13 shows 
how th e flu ctu ations in  m ajor cou n tr ie s  w ere in ter locked  betw een  the 
late 1870s and the mid-1880s.
The US, Germany, A rg e n t in a  and Australia w ere  major cen tres  o f 
d isturbance in  C ycle I I I ,  from  1886 to 1895-7.(T ab le  I I-4 ) I t  was in 
the A rgen tin e  and Australian  in ves tm en t c yc le s  th a t fo re ign , mostly 
British , cap ita l occup ied  an e s s e n t ia l position; th e  US and German 
investm ent was financed  b y  a n d  la rge  from dom estic sources. In 
pre-1914 A rgen tin a  fo r e ign  c a p ita l is  said to have financed between 
on e -th ird  and on e -h a lf o f  n e t p h ys ica l investm en t1*; B ritish capital
15 Compare th ese f igu re s  w ith  th e  £ llm  increase and £5m decrease in 
to tal Canadian imports.
16 C. F. D iaz A lejandro(1970) p.31
accounted  fo r  41.2% o f  Australian g ross  dom estic  capital formation 
1885-9417. On the other hand, Germany rem ained  a capital exporter 
in  1880-1914, and the ratio  o f  B ritish  new  p o r t fo lio  investm ent in the 
US to  th e US g ross domestic cap ita l form a tion  was reduced to  2.7% in 
1885-94.u
The changes in the le v e l o f  the US home investm ent a ffected  
German dom estic cap ita l form ation m ainly th rough psycho log ica l 
channels1*, whereas the A rgen tin e  in v e s tm en t ac tiv ity  seemed 
in d ir e c t ly  re la ted  to the state  o f  th e US econom y v ia  fo re ign , mainly 
B ritish , in ves to rs .10 Australian in v e s tm en t fluctuations appear
in s ign if ic a n t ly  in fluenced b y  externa l fa c to r s *1, nor were th ey  wide 
enough to  h ave major impact upon the r e s t  o f  th e world. T h ere fo re , 
we shall ab s trac t from Australia  in  th e fo llo w in g  discussion o f  Cycle 
I II .
T h e  g rea te r  part o f  th e cyc lica l c h a n ges  in US and German 
im ports, r e fle c tin g  cyc lica l sh ifts  in  th e l e v e l  o f  activ ity , was due to 
th e v a r ia tion s  in  imports from  the p e r ip h e r y :  the US expanded her 
im ports from  prim ary p rodu cers  b y  £40.7m in  the upsw ing and 
con tra cted  then by  £27.9m in  th e dow n sw in g , chan ges which compare 
w ith  th e £66.0m increase and £12.5m d ec lin e  in  the German im ports 
from  th e undeveloped  world. The US t r a d e  c y c le  made its e lf  fe lt  not
on ly  in  th e  p eriph ery  but a lso in  B rita in  in  a sign ificant way: the 
cyc lica l ch an ges  in B ritish exp orts  to  th e  U S w ere  equal to  19.9% o f  178920
17 N. G. Butlin(1962)
18 S. Kuznets(1961), I. Stone(1986)
19 See S ection  1, Chapter V.
20 See Section  1, Chapter V I. A ccord in g  to  M. Edelstein(1982) p.329, 
’ In  both le v e l  and fluctuation  the y ie ld  on  U K -h e ld  US investm ent 
was c lo s e ly  rela ted to that on Latin Am erican  assets , and to  a lesser 
exten t, th ose on Western and Eastern E u ropean  assets.’
21 See C hapter V III.
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th e r ise  in to tal B ritish  exp o r ts  during the upsw ing and 36.6% o f  the 
d ec lin e  during the dow nsw ing.
To a substantia l d e g re e  th e trade flow  e f fe c ts  con n ec ted  with 
th e  A rgen tine investm en t c y c le  w ere transm itted  to  B rita in , a  major 
len d e r  to A rgen tina , w h ich  con stitu ted  the oth er m ajor in fluen ce 
in it ia t in g  the B ritish  e x p o r t cyc le : the changes in  B ritish  e x p o r ts  to 
A rgen tin a  w ere resp on s ib le  fo r  11.8% o f  the to tal expansion  o f  British 
exp o r ts  during the u p sw in g  and 13.7% o f  the to tal co n tra c t io n  during 
th e  downswing.** The flu ctu ations o f  th e B ritish econom y, togeth er 
w ith  the sh ifts  in  th e  US and A rgen tin e  le v e l o f  a c tiv ity , g o  v e r y  far 
to  exp la in  the exp o rt c y c le  in  France.** As in th e p re c e d in g  two 
tra d e  cyc les , the flu c tu a tion s  in  B rita in  and France m eant fu rth er 
c y c lic a l shocks fo r  th e un developed  w orld  in add ition to  th os e  from 
th e  US and Germany: B rita in  and F rance increased  th e ir  imports
fro m  the p e rip h ery  b y  £49m and £17m du r in g  th e  upswing, 
r esp ec tiv e ly , and d ecreased  b y  £16m and £28m du rin g  th e  dow nsw ing, 
resp ec tiv e ly . And th e flu ctu ations in prim ary p rodu c in g  r e g io n s  had 
th e  e f fe c t  o f  am p lify in g  B ritish  and F rench  export c yc les . F ig  11-14 
summarizes C ycle I I I .
Cycle IV(1895/7-1902/4) is  pecu liar in that a ll o f  ou r  four 
in d u str ia l economies u n derw en t investm ent cyc les . I n  addition,
investm en t fluctuations dom inated the Ind ian  C ycle IV (T a b le  I I—4). 
S in ce  the US was transform ed  into a net cap ita l e x p o r te r  a fter  
1896**, the investm ent a c tiv it ie s  in the fou r  cou n tr ies  could be
22 I I  should also be no ted  th at i f  the exp ort r e v iv a l in  th e  mid-1880s 
w as led by the US, th e  fo llo w in g  export downturn was in it ia te d  by 
A rgen tina .
23 See Chapter V III.
24 I t  is  in teres tin g  to  note th a t a fte r  C ycle  I I I  B ritish new  p ortfo lio  
investm ent in the US, approxim ated by  Simon's estimate o f  B ritish  
new  portfo lio  investm en t in  N orth America minus th at in  Canada, 
ceased  to v a ry  c y c lic a lly . M. Simon(1968) k (1970)
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Fig n-14 The International Trade Cycle ID, 1886-1895/7
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Fig n-15 The International Trade Cycle IV. 1895/7-1902/4
financed  dom estica lly; on th e  o th er  hand, Ind ian  cap ita l formation 
appeared  h e a v ily  dependent u pon  B ritish sav ings.*5 As we shall see 
in  the f i r s t  section  o f  th e fo llo w in g  chap ter, th e broad  parallelism  
among th e c y c lic a l fluctuations in  the home investm en t o f  the fou r 
countries was to  a g rea t e x ten t, i f  not pu re ly , a  co in cidence.2* On 
the o th er  hand, the pattern  o f  varia tion s  in  the le v e l  o f  Indian home 
investm ent w as  probably no t determ ined  as autonomously as in the 
fou r in d u s tr ia l countries, in  v ie w  o f  In d ia 's  d epen den ce upon Britain 
fo r  capital.
The cyc lica l in flu en ces  gen erated  by  th e fo u r  industria l 
coun tries  w e re  transm itted to  the res t o f  the w orld  by  trade 
channels: th e  US increased  h e r  im ports from th e un developed  world  
by £28m d u r in g  the boom and decreased  by  £3m d u r in g  the slump, 
which may be  compared w ith  th e  £54m increase and £7m decline in 
German im ports, with the £57m increase and £2m declin e  in B ritish 
im ports, and fina lly  w ith th e  £20m increase and £9m decline in 
French im ports  from prim ary p rodu cers . In  F ig  11-15 is shown a 
ra th er un ique structu re o f  C yc le  IV.
C ycle  V , 1902/4 -  1908/9, w as led by th e US, Germ any, Argen tina  
and Canada(Tab le I I-4 ).  I f  the tw o in d u str ia l leaders w ere
finan cia lly  s e lf-su ffic ien t, th e  tw o prim ary p ro d u cers  had to  have 
recou rse to  fo re ign , mostly B ritish , sav ings to  a con siderab le  exten t 
in u n dergo in g  investm ent c y c le s :  as mentioned e a r lie r , in  Argen tina  
between one th ird  and one h a lf o f  net physica l investm ent was 
financed b y  fo re ign  cap ita l, whereas in 1905-09 fo re ign  sav ings
25 D. T h o rn «r( 1961) p.391
26 I t  would b e  relevan t to  n o te  h ere  that a t the tw o tu rn in g  points 
connected  w ith  th is trade c y c le ,  i.e. th e trou gh  in th e  mid-1890s and 
the peak arou n d  1900, the maximum d iscrepancy among th e turn ing 
poin ts o f  o u r  e igh t economies w as g rea te r  than at o th e r  tu rn ing 
points.
attrac ted  to Canada accou n ted  fo r  35.7% o f  Canadian g ross  dom estic 
cap ita l formation.*7 T h e  broad agreem en t between th e cyc lica l
fluctuations in the US and German home investm en t did not appear to 
resu lt from  close linkages betw een  the tw o th rou gh  capita l o r  trade  
flows.** I t  is , on the o th e r  hand, poss ib le  th a t the fluctuations o f  
the two investm ent econom ies in fluenced  th e  le v e l o f  capita l form ation 
in  A rgen tina  and Canada b y  a ffe c t in g  B ritish  ove rseas  lend ing.
The investm ent c y c le s  in  the US and Germany made them selves 
fe lt  in  the undeveloped  w o rld  v ia  the s h ifts  in  exports  from  th e 
la tte r  to  the form er: US im ports  from  th e p e rip h e ry  rose and fe l l  b y  
£81m and £29m in  th e C yc le  V boom and slump, whereas a £119m 
increase and a £37m d ecrea se  w ere ob se rv ed  in German im ports from  
th e undeveloped  w orld . O n the other hand, th e cyc lica l chan ges in  
the im ports o f  th e tw o cou n tr ies  from B rita in  p layed  a key ro le  in  
g en era tin g  an exp o rt- led  c y c le  in  B rita in: the cyc lica l varia tion s in  
B ritish  exports  to the US amounted to 7.3% and 19.6X o f  the r is e  and 
fa ll in total B ritish  m erchandise exports , and the correspon din g ra tios  
fo r  B ritish  exp orts  to Germ any w ere 12.7% and 18.6%. The B ritish  
finan ced  investm ent flu c tu a tion s  in A rgen tin a  and Canada form ed 
fu r th e r  major shocks to  th e  B ritish econom y: the cyc lica l r ise  and 
fa ll in  British exp orts  to  A rgen tina  accounted  fo r  9.2% and 6.1% o f  
to tal expansion and c on tra ction  in  B ritish  exports , w h ilst 6.4% and 
4.8% w ere  the c o rresp on d in g  ratios fo r  Canada. The fluctuations o f  
th e B ritish economy, to g e th e r  w ith the c y c lic a l in fluences from  th e US 
and Germany, w ere essen tia l in c rea tin g  th e French  exp ort c y c le . 
As a resu lt o f  the flu ctu ations in B rita in  and France, c yc lic a l 
movements o f  the u n deve loped  world  w ere  rein forced : B rita in
expanded her im ports fro m  the p e r ip h e ry  by  £H0m d u r in g  th e
27 A. I . B loom field(1968a), M. C. Urquhart(1986)
28 See Section 1, C hapter I I I .
v.
%upsw ing and con tracted  then b y  £36m d u r in g  the dow n sw ing , while 
£45m and £18m w ere the correspon d in g  f ig u re s  fo r  F rance. In  Fig 
11-16 are  d isp layed  major cyc lica l shocks in  the Cycle V yea rs .
I t  would now appear possib le to  summarize a common s tru ctu re  
u n der ly in g  the f iv e  pre-W WI trade c y c le s  in  the fo llow in g  w ay : the 
investm ent fluctuations in  industria l cou n tr ies , ty p ica lly  US and 
Germany, p ro v id ed  in itia l cyc lica l shocks; th ese  w ere sen t to  various 
parts  o f  th e  world  th rou gh  trade chan n e ls ; a t th e same time, the 
p rospects  o f  fo re ign  in ves to rs , typ ica lly  B rita in , w ere a lso  a ffected , 
which in  tu rn  had a s ign ifica n t impact upon  the cap ita l form ation  in 
th e p e r ip h e ry ; both th e or ig in a l shocks v ia  trade chan nel and the 
trade flow  e f fe c ts  connected w ith  the inves tm en t flu c tu a tion s  in  the 
p e rip h ery  produced an export-led  c y c le  in  the len d in g  economy, 
which form ed an add itional cyc lica l in flu en ce  upon th e p erip h ery . 
I f  home and fo re ign  investm ent was th u s  at the bottom  o f  the 
in ternational trade c yc le s  in  1870-1914 era , the w o rk in g  o f  these 
u n derly in g  fo rces , th at o f  fo re ign  in ves tm en t in particu la r, was most 
c lea rly  v is ib le  in  C ycle I I I ,  which we sh a ll examine in  g r e a te r  detail 
in la ter chap ters . B efore that, we f i r s t  tu rn  to th e exam ination o f 
the determ inants o f  the fluctuations in  home and fo r e ig n  investm ent 
in the yea rs  p reced in g  World War I.
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In  th is  chap ter, we f ir s t  in v e s tig a te  th e causes behind the 
sh o rt-ru n  cyc lica l varia tions in dom estic cap ita l form ation, which have 
b een  shown to  be at the bottom o f  in tern a tion a l economic fluctuations 
in  major economies w ith an adequate data  base. S ince capital 
e x p o rts  from  Brita in w ere seen to  h a ve  p layed  a v ita l ro le  in 
investm en t c yc les  in  some cou n tr ies , in  th e  second section we shall 
t r y  to  locate the determ inants o f  the flu c tu ation s  in  B ritish  overseas 
len d in g  to major reg ion s. I t  is  next asked  how the flow  o f  funds 
from  Brita in on such an ex ten sive  scale cou ld  have been ca rried  out 
w ith ou t causing major balance o f  paym ents d ifficu lt ies  in  pre-1914 
yea rs ; in the same context we examine th e  fo rces  tend in g  to produce 
ex tern a l equilibrium  in  oth er variou s econom ies. In  the fina l section, 
m onetary fo rc es  a re  in troduced  into th e system , and th e ir  ro le  in 
in ternation al fluctuations w ill be a ssessed : particu lar atten tion  is
paid  to  the explanation o f  the cyc lica l pa tte rn  in th e varia tion  o f  
m oney stock and in teres t rates.
Home Investment
While in th eoretica l an a lyses investm ent is  usually trea ted  as a 
homogeneous a g grega te , th is  approach  appears to be o f  lim ited use: 
d if fe ren t fa c to rs  seem to  be respon sib le  fo r  the va r ia tion s  in the 
le v e l o f  replacem ent and expansion investm ent, and th ere  is  a case 
fo r  con sidering  fixed  and in v en to ry  investm ent sepa ra te ly . I t  is  
a lso well-know n that, h is to rica lly , flu ctuations in  con struction  
investm ent followed a pa tte rn  d iffe r e n t  from  non-con stru ction . 
Hence, in t r y in g  to locate  th e determ inants o f  the le v e l  o f  home 
investm ent in major econom ies o f  1870-1914 period , we adop t a 
'lead ing s e c to r ’ approach: main investm ent fie ld s  a re  in  th e  f ir s t
place id en tified ; the fa c to rs  in flu en cin g  the le v e l o f  cap ita l formation 
in  these key  areas w ill be estab lished ; we shall then see how the 
investm ent fluctuations in  th e  lead ing sectors  induced those in  other 
sectors.
In  the f i r s t  two o f  th e f iv e  pre-W WI US trade cyc les , accord in g
to  R. Fels, investm ent in  the form  o f  ra ilw ay bu ild ing  was a main
d r iv in g  fo rce . In  the fo llow in g  trade  cyc le , Cycle I I I ,  th e in fluen ce
o f  railway bu ild ing upon th e  course o f  th e trade cyc le , a lth ough  still
important, diminished. Th is is  re fle c ted  in the fa c t  that, by
reach ing a peak in 1887, ra ilw ay  investm ent fa iled  to v a r y  in as close
agreem ent w ith  total investm en t and national income (p eak in g  in  1892)
as in C ycles I  & I I .1 Thus, one ob se rves  in  F ig  TII-1  th ree  major
1 R. Fels(1959) Chapters 6-10. Railway bu ild ing in C ycle I  and I I  
w ere  o f  d if fe r e n t  nature in  that i f  the railw ay bu ild ing du r in g  the 
upswing o f  C ycle  I was c h ie fly  bu ild ing  new main lines, in  C ycle  I I  
'much o f  the railroad bu ild in g  consisted  o f  com pleting th e mainlines 
o f  the roads which had been  stopped by  th e panic o f  1873 ... Even 
more im portant was con stru ction  o f  fe ed e rs  and branches fo r  paren t 
lines. In  addition , rep a irs  and im provem ents that had been  p u t o f f  
during the depression  w ere  now in it ia ted .’  p.115, 118
/
peaks in the flu c tu a tion s  o f the US railway b u ild in g  in 1870-90, 
whereas in 1890-1914 railway investm ent d isp la yed  much w eaker 
variations. I t  is  e ssen tia l to v iew  these short term  fluctuations in 
the pre-1914 US ra ilw ay  investm ent in  the con text o f  th e process o f 
the introduction o f  ra ilw ays  in the US, b egin n ing in  the early  19th 
cen tury  and v ir tu a lly  coming to and end in th e la te  1880s. The 
course o f  the US ra ilroad iza tion  was, W. Isard  says, character ized  by 
th ree  major long sw in gs , the second long sw ing co rresp on d in g  with 
the course o f  ra ilw a y  investm ent d u r in g  the C ycle  I  y ea rs , and the 
th ird , i.e. final, lo n g  sw ing  com prising the v a r ia tion s  in  the le v e l o f  
railway bu ild ing in  C yc le  I I  and I I I  years.* T h e  considerab ly
sh orter d istance be tw een  the two peaks in the 1880s -  f iv e  y ea rs  as 
compared w ith  15 y ea rs  between th e  f ir s t  and second  railw ay long 
sw ing peaks -  seem s to  ju s tify  trea tin g  the tw o sh o rt w aves aB 
form ing to ge th er  on e  lo n g  swing.*
In  the Schum peterian  theory o f  innovation w ith  an in itia tor and 
im itators, the in tro du ction  o f  a s ing le  new tech n o logy  would g iv e  rise  
to a sing le cyc le  in  investm ent. With the s ta rt o f  th e introduction 
o f  an innovation b y  a p ioneering en trep ren eu r (A  in  the f ir s t  chart 
o f  F ig  I II -2 ),  th e le v e l  o f  investm ent w ill r ise  as th e number o f  
fo llow ers in creases, i.e . as the techonology is  d iffu sed  o v e r  the 
economy con cerned , u n til the poin t o f  saturation (B in  the f ir s t  chart 
o f  F ig  I I I -2 ) ,  a fte r  wh ich investm ent declines due to  the exhaustion 
o f  pro fitab le  inves tm en t outlet. As is  shown in th e  second ch art o f 
F ig  I II -2 , the c on secu tiv e  app lication o f  n d i f fe r e n t  technologies
2 W. Isa rd ( 1942a)A( 1942b)
3 M oreover, 'the recess ion  in the m id-e ighties  was not as severe  nor 
o f  as long duration  as those experien ced  in the m id -seven ties '. W. 
Isard(1942a) p.152 A ccord ing to R. Fels(1959) p.124,125, 'In  con trast 
[to  the downturn a f t e r  1873, 1893 and 1907), the dow n tu rn  o f  the 
e a r ly  e igh ties  was slow  and qu iet.’
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resu lts  in  n w aves in investm ent4. In  rea lity , h ow ever, the
ra ilroad iza tion  o f  the US was associated w ith  th ree  major lon g  swings, 
and m oreover the fina l long sw ing c o n s is ted  o f  two sh o rte r  cycles. 
As we shall see in g rea te r  deta il in th e f i r s t  section  o f  th e  fo llow ing 
chap ter, th is  was due to the p ion eerin g  r o le  o f  the US ra ilw ays in 
the w estw ard  movement which d isp la yed  th e fo llow in g  pattern. 
F irs t, in  th e US new railway lines d id  n o t con n ec t ex is tin g  cen tres  o f 
settlem ent, but w ere mainly bu ilt ahead o f  settlem ent and attracted  
people and business into p rev iou sly  em p ty  reg ion s. Secon d , such 
havin g  been  the case, a limit was soo n e r  o r  la ter reach ed  beyond 
which p ion eerin g  railw ay bu ild ing cou ld  n o t be carried  on  without 
p ro fita b ility  g ra v e ly  deterio ra tin g . F in a lly , w ith  the establishm ent o f 
settlem ent and business around the ra ilw a y  lines and the consequen t 
increase in  tra ff ic  and stabilisation o f  r a i lw a y  p ro fitab ility , the f irs t 
s tage o f  ra ilw ay bu ild ing was ju s tifie d , a n d  th e second s tage  o f  the 
in trusion  o f  railway into v irg in  land b ega n , and so on.5
These railway long sw ings, by  c a u s in g  in tern a l and international 
m igration, induced those in con stru ction  investm en t w ith  irregu lar 
lags, as can  be seen in F ig  I I I —!•: f o r  in s ta n ce , in the case o f  the
4 F or  a more form al treatm ent o f  g en e ra t io n  o f  cyc lica l p a tte rn  in 
investm ent a c tiv ity  as a resu lt o f  bu n ch in g  o f  inventions, see  P. 
Stoneman(1983) chapter 13. I t  is  to  be n o ted  that the on ly  condition 
fo r  n d iffe r e n t  inventions to produce n in ves tm en t c yc les  is  th at the 
poin ts o f  introduction  o f  d if fe ren t in n ova tio n s (A , B, C) a re  no t too 
close betw een  each other; that is , it  is  n o t  necessary  that 
succeed ing innovation, say B, is  s tarted  a t  th e  point when th e  
investm en t connected w ith p reced in g  in n o va tio n , A, has fa llen  back to 
z e r o (A " ) .  The d istance between the p o in ts  o f  in trodu ction  w ill 
determ ine th e length  o f  up- and dow n sw ing : fo r  instance, supposing 
that the scale o f  technology is  on the in c re a s e , one could b e  expected 
to o b s e rv e  ’g row th  cyc les ’  in investm ent a c t iv i t y  when the distance 
betw een  th e poin ts o f  introduction is  s h o r t  enough , whereas ’ classical 
c yc le s ’ w ill resu lt in the opposite case.
5 ’ra ilw ays , particu larly  those w est o f  th e  M ississipp i, w ere  o ften  
bu ilt ahead o f  -  and enormously fa c ilita ted  -  the grow th  o f  population 
and t r a f f ic  that ultimately ju s tified  them a n d  led  to another spu rt o f 
ra ilro ad in g .' R. Fels(1959) p.118
6 W. 1s a rd (1 9 4 2 a )4 (1 942b)
th ird  lon g  swing, the trough  and peak o f  the ’ in d u ced ' construction  
c y c le  w ere reached tw o and f iv e  y ea rs  a fte r  th ose in  the railway 
b u ild in g  long swing, resp ec tiv e ly .
I t  appeared th at ra ilroad ization , the con sequ en t in terna l and 
in tern a tion a l m igration and the p ro g re s s  in u rban iza tion  p repared  the 
g ro u n d  fo r  the app lication o f  another Bet o f  n ew  technology: 
e le c t r ic a l in fras tru ctu re. While in the Cycle IV  & V yea rly
flu c tu a t ion s  in railw ay investm ent damped down co n s id e ra b ly  (F ig  I I I -  
1 ), Tab le  I I I - l  shows that th e grow th  o f  cap ita l s tock  in such 
in d u s tr ie s  as s tree t and e le ctrica l railways, e le c t r ic  ligh tin g  and 
p o w e r  and telephone was fa s te r  than in oth er m a jor industries  in 
post-1890  years: th ese e le c tr ic ity -b ased  in du str ies  rep laced  steam
ra ilw a y  as the lead ing sector o f  the US domestic c a p ita l form ation.7
I t  is  thus ob se rved  in F ig  I I I - l  that the th ird  railw ay long 
s w in g  was followed b y  a long sw ing  in the con stru c tio n  o f  s tree t & 
e le c t r ic  railways*, and that the la tte r  comprised tw o  s h o rte r  cyc les  
w h ose  patterns correspon d  w ith  those o f  the US C yc le s  IV and V. 
T h e  lon g  swing in investm ent in  e lectrica l in d u str ies  induced  a long 
s w in g  in building ac tiv ity , since e le c tr ic  traction , ’ b y  rem oving the 
p ro h ib it iv e  time and cos t considerations o f  res id e n t ia l location in 
su b u rbs  and o u tly in g  te r r ito r ie s ’ , perm itted ’ th e  d ispers ion  o f  
p opu la tion ’.*
7 S e e  a lso M. Flamant k  J. S inger-Kerel(1987 ) p.36, 42, 43. I t  would 
b e  re le va n t to note in  th is con text th at in the US a m arket fo r  
in d u s tr ia l securities began to d eve lo p  from the la te r  y e a rs  o f  the 
boom  o f  Cycle I I I ,  1890-93, and that the market m atured  du rin g  Cycle 
IV . T . R. Navin k M. V. Sears(1955)
8 E lec tr ic  traction was the most im portant o f  the th re e  e le c t r ic ity -  
b a sed  industries: du r in g  1890-99, the g ross in ves tm en t in s tree t and 
e le c t r ic  railways accounted fo r  62.8% o f  the total g r o s s  investm ent in 
th e  th ree  electrical industries , w hereas the c o r re sp o n d in g  figu res  fo r  
e le c t r ic  ligh t and pow er and te lephone industries w e re  21.6X and 
15.5X, respectively . M. J. Ulmer<1960)
9 W. Isard(1942b) p.105. See a lso H. N. Sch eiber(1976) p.271
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Table I I I - l  C han gea o f  Capital Stock in  M ajor US Indu atr ies (1929  
Sm)
1880-90 1890-1900 1900-09
food etc. 942(3.4) 1921(4.6) 1919(3.7)
textile 1026(3.7) 1121(2.7) 1760(3.4)
chemical 272(1.0) 393(0.9) 662(1.3)
iron  k  s tee l 671(2.4) 438(1.1) 2706(5.2)
m achinery* 746(2.7) 757(1.8) 1737(3.3)
steam ra ilw ay 3886(13.9) 1571(3.8) 2550(4.9)
motor veh ic le 4 56 194
e le c tr ic * * 419(1.5) 2308(5.5) 3636(6.9)
Source: C ream er e t  al(1960), M. J. Ulmer(1960), S. Kuznets(1961)
* excludes tran sp orta tion  equipm ent
* *  includea e le c t r ic  ligh tin g  and power, te lephone, and s tr e e t  k  
e le c tr ic  ra ilw ays
In  the p a ren th eses  is  g iven  th e percen tage  o f  the increase o f  th e  
cap ita l stock  in  each  industry  to  th e net dom estic cap ita l fo rm a tion  in 
the US in  th e corresp on d in g  period .
In  sum, th e th ree  US b u ild in g  cyc les  in  1860-1914 w ere  close ly  
rela ted  to th e  in trodu ction  o f  m ajor new tran sp ort technolog ies. The 
breaks in  th e fin a l ra ilw ay  u psw in g  and in  th e  e le c tr ic ity  upsw ing 
enables one to  id en tify  f i v e  sh o rt run c y c le s  in  1870-1914; the 
breaks p robab ly  re fle c ted  th e  fa c t that, as we see in Section  1, 
Chapter IV , one national lo n g  sw ing com prised asynchronous sh orter 
reg ion al cyc les .
Railway bu ild ing  was a lead ing sector in  the German Cycle I, 
too10. A lthough ra ilw ay  bu ild in g  started  in the e a r ly  1830s in
Germany, i t  seemed to f lu c tu a te  around a r e la t iv e ly  low le v e l un til the 
late 1860s. The yea rs  o f  th e  German C yc le  I  w itnessed  a major 
sw ing in  ra ilw ay  in vestm en t, t o  which both th e  v ic to ry  in  th e F ran co- 
Prussian  War and the estab lishm en t o f  a un ited  Reich appeared  to 
make a m ajor con tribu tion ; a fte r  1880 German ra ilw ay investm ent 
fa iled  to  show major flu c tu a t ion s .(F ig  I I I - 3 )11 In  sum, a substantia l 
boost was p rov ided  b y  th e  aforem entioned po litica l chan ges fo r  the 
p rocess o f  the German ra ilroad iza tion , wh ich was com pleted during 
the su bsequ en t upsw ing.
I t  was not un til th e  m id - 1890s that new investm ent opportu n ities  
com parable to ra ilw ays em erged . Consequently, during the Cycle I I  
yea rs  German home in ves tm en t languished, w ith  exports  v a ry in g  more 
w ide ly ; as we shall s ee  in  Section 1, Chapter V, th e  cyc lica l 
varia tion s  in  German home inves tm en t during th e Cycle I I I  y ea rs  w ere 
induced , th rou gh  p sych o lo g ic a l factor ra th e r  than trade  o r  capital 
flow s, by  th e sh ifts  in th e  le v e l o f the US railw ay construction .
10 H. M ottek(1977) p l57 . ’ ra ilw a y  was at th e f i r s t  p lace in the 
investm ent o f  "G rü n d e r ja h re " ’ .
11 W. G. Hoffmann(1965) p.257 Tabelle 41, W. O. Henderson(1975) p.161,
R. F rem d lin g (1977), H. Kellenbenz(1976) p.370

Finally, in C ycles IV and V technolog ical deve lopm en t opened major 
investm ent ou tlets  in the e lectrica l and chem ical industries .1* 
A ccord in g  to  F ig  I II -4 ,  show ing the annual increase  in  the financial 
cap ita l o f  quoted  jo in t s tock  companies in  Germ any, in  C ycle IV the 
annual chan ges in cap ita l in the e le c t r ic a l in d u s try  d isp layed  not 
on ly  th e c lea res t c yc lic a l pattern , bu t a lso  b y  fa r  w id e r  amplitude 
than o th e r  industries . On the o th e r  hand, in  none o f  the three 
in d u str ies  shown is a cyc lica l pa tte rn  o b s e rv ed  in  the annual 
varia tion s  in  capita l d u r in g  Cycle I I ;  an d  th e  inves tm en t in the 
German iron  in d u s try , in fluen ced  by  th e  US demand fo r  ra il, seemed 
to  lead th e German home investm ent flu c tu a tion s  d u r in g  Cycle I II .  
In  sum, th e courses o f  m ajor German in ves tm en t c yc les , such as Cycle 
I ,  IV  and V, rep resen ted  the p rocess  o f  th e app lica tion  o f  new 
technolog ies.
A ccord in g  to  T ip ton , the in du str ia l deve lopm en t in  Germany o f  
th e la te  19th cen tu ry  was la rge ly  a p ro c es s  o f  th e in dustria lisation  o f 
Ruhr d is tr ic t  w ith th e  eastern  p a r t o f  Germany spec ia liz in g  in 
a g ricu ltu re .1* T h e re fo re , industria l p ro g r e s s  was accompanied by 
acute reg ion a l im balances between demand fo r  and su p p ly  o f  labour, 
which g a v e  r is e  to a la r g e  scale in tern a l m igration  from  the middle o f  
the 19th cen tu ry . T h is  increased the num ber o f  p eop le  employed in 
in d u str ia l sector, mainly c ity  d w e lle rs .14 The p ro gress  in
urban iza tion  th rou gh  in tern a l m igration in  Germany d isplayed a
12 H. K ottek (1977) p l82 , 183, 188, K. v o n  B orch ardt(1976 ) p.268, 269,
P. B. Whale(1930) p.21. A ccord ing to M. Flamant & J. S in ge r- 
Kerel(1987) p.40, the German cr is is  in 1900 was ca lled  'e lec tr ica l 
c r is is ’ ; in  C ycle  V, M ottek says, more im portance came to  be attached 
to  e le c tr ifica tio n , and automobile and b ic y c le  in d u s tr ie s  a lso  began to 
in flu en ce  the economy increas in g ly .
13 F. B. T ipton(1976)
14 'a lthough the p rocess  o f  urbanization b egan  around th e  middle o f 
the cen tu ry  it  reached com pletion essen tia lly  betw een  1871 and 1910 
... In  1871 23.7% o f  the population liv ed  in  communities o f  o v e r  5000 
inhab itants; b y  1910 th is  f igu re  has r is en  to  48.8%’ . W.
Koelmann( 1969) p.62
d is tin c t cyc lica l p a ttern ,15 16 a con sequ en ce o f  which was th e  pre-W W I 
German bu ild in g  c yc les  similar to th ose  in the US,#. T h e  f i r s t
German bu ild ing  cyc le , peaking in 1875(Fig I I I - 3 ) ,  seem ed to  be 
induced  by  the in du str ia l deve lopm ent cen tr in g  a rou n d  ra ilw ay  
bu ild ing ; while in  correspon den ce w ith  the depress ion  o f  German 
in du str ia l investm ent a c tiv ity , in tern a l m igration and c on stru c tio n  
a c t iv ity  remained s lu gg ish  during th e  Cycle I I  y ea rs , c yc lic a l 
flu ctu ations in in du str ia l investm ent, c en tr in g  around th e  ir o n  and 
stee l in d u s try , produced  the second b u ild in g  cyc le  p eak in g  in  189217 18; 
the la s t two sh o rt run  investm ent c y c le s  gave  r is e  to  th e  th ird  
bu ild in g  cyc le  p eak ing in  1907. T h e re fo re , techn olog ica l d eve lo pm en t 
could be said to have been, though n o t to the same ex ten t as in  the 
US, a lso  a t the bottom o f  th e German Kuznets  cycles.
F ig  I I I -5  shows the flu c tu a tion s  in th ree  main f ie ld s  o f  
investm en t in pre-1914 Britain: con stru ction , sh ips, and p la n t and 
m achinery. I t  is  in the f ir s t  p lace seen  that con stru ction  in ves tm en t 
d isp la yed  fa r  w id er varia tion s than th e  other tw o com ponen ts, and 
moved fo llow in g  a lon g  sw ing p a tte rn  o f  around tw en ty  y e a rs ’ 
duration , w ith peaks in 1876 and 1903; thus, in C ycle IV , th e  un ique 
investm en t cyc le  in  pre-W WI B rita in , construction  was th e  lead in g  
s e c to r .1* The B ritish  build ing c y c le s  w ere out o f  s tep  w ith  th e  US 
bu ild in g  c yc les  to such an exten t th a t scholars in it ia lly  con s id e red  
the bu ild in g  c yc les  on both side o f  th e Atlantic to  b e  in v e rs e ly  
re la ted , which th ey  sought to exp lain  mainly in terms o f  th e  m igration  
o f  cap ita l and labour between the tw o  economies. A c c o rd in g  to  the 
famous ’Atlantic economy* thesis, th e  increase in  m igra tion  from
15 D. Langew iesche(1977) p.12
16 W. A. Lew is & P. J. 0 ’ Leary(1955)
17 Thu s, K. Borchardt(1976) p.267 con s id e rs  con struction  as  h a v in g  
su pported  th e C ycle I I I  upswing.
18 J. Blackman &. E. M. S igsw orth (1965), R. S. Sayers(1967 ) p.36,37

Brita in to  the US created  fa vou rab le  con d itions fo r  a housing boom in 
the US, which in turn a ttrac ted  B ritish  capital, w h ile the movement o f  
labour and capital in th is  d irec tio n  obv iou sly  had ad ve rse  e ffe c ts  
upon th e B ritish bu ild ing in d u s try , and upon B ritish  home investm en t 
as a w h ole .19 2013
I t  was, how ever, found th at th is  line  o f  explanation includes 
some d ifficu lt ies : in the f i r s t  p lace, the varia tion s  in m igration ra tes  
w ere  too  small to exerc ise  any m ajor in flu en ce upon the bu ild in g  
in d u s tr ie s  o f  both s id es90; lon g  sw in gs  in  B ritish  overseas  len d in g  
do not r e f le c t  those in th e B ritish  investm en t in th e  US, but in each 
long upsw ing the d irec tion  o f  ou tflow  d iffe r e d ; w h ile  it is  poss ib le  to  
expand accord in g ly  the con cep t o f  th e  A tlantic economy to include th e 
whole American con tinent and A u stra lia , the fa c t remains to  be 
exp la in ed  that the su rge  o f  cap ita l exp o r ts  to Latin  America was not 
accompanied by  the increase in m igration  th ere to .*1 Add ition a lly , 
th e sta tis tica l tes t condu cted  by M. Edelstein  shows that ’ dom estic 
inves tm en t conditions had an im portan t exogenous in fluence on th e 
a g g re ga te  rate o f o ve rseas  len d in g ’**, ra th er than the oth er w ay 
around.
T herefo re  i t  would appear reasonab le, fo llow ing H. J. 
Habakkuk**, to explain th e lon g  sw in gs  in  the US and B rita in mainly 
in term s o f  factors in terna l to  each o f  them, and th en  to  con sider th e  
d eg re e  o f  contribution o f  ex tern a l fa c to rs . I f  th e  US Kuznets c y c le s  
w ere, as seen above, ’ tra n sp o r t-b u ild in g  c yc les ’ , dem ographic sh ifts ,
19 B. Thomas(1968)
20 W. A. Lew is & P. J. 0 ’ Leary(1955) p.126
21 D. H. A ld cro ft & P. Fearon(1972) p.70
22 M. E delstein ( 1982) p.232
23 H. J. Habakkuk(1962)
due to domestic as w ell as to ex te rn a l factors , ap peared  respon s ib le  
fo r  the B ritish  bu ild in g  c yc les  in pre-W W I years.*4
F ig  I I I - 5  a lso shows that th e varia tion s in  investm en t in  p lant 
and m achinery la rg e ly  re fle c ted  th e bu ild ing c yc le s , w h ile the cap ita l 
formation in ships v a r ied  in a trad e  cyc lica l manner. Th is seem s to 
imply th at th e le v e l o f  investm ent in p lant and m achinery was to  a 
g rea t exten t determ ined  by the state  o f  home demand, which was 
p robab ly  h eav ily  in flu en ced  b y  th e bu ild ing trade*5; on th e o th er  
hand, varia tion s in th e  volume o f  world  trade, d ire c t ly  a ffe c t in g  the 
le v e l o f  demand fo r  B ritish sh ip p in g  se rv ice , appeared  th e major 
determ inant o f  th e investm ent in  ships.*5 T h e re fo re  i t  cou ld  be 
concluded that, in  con trast to  th e US and Germ any, th e non­
construction  com ponent o f  home investm ent in B rita in  had th e nature 
o f  ’ induced ’ investm ent**, w h ile th e fluctuations in  con stru ction  
investm ent seemed to  be o f  more autonomous kind.
As in B rita in , con stru ction  investm ent, u n dergo in g  20 -year 
cyc les , dominated th e  scene o f  pre-W WI F rench  dom estic cap ita l 24567
24 P. Lewis(1965) C hap ter 8, D. H. A ld c ro ft  & P. Fearon(1972) p.71-72. 
P ro fessor S. B. Saul(1962) says th a t the state o f  B ritish  bu ild ing 
in du stry  ’was la rg e ly  determ ined b y  the state o f  demand and b y  the 
nature o f  the opera tion  o f  the trad e  itself.*
25 Tak ing the absolu te  d evia tion s from  9 -year m oving avera ges , 
P ro fessor A. G. Ford  (1981) p.42 o b se rved  that th e cyc lica l va r ia tion s  
in the investm ent in  plant, m achinery and veh ic le s  tended  to  lag  
behind those in  GNP, which he in terp re ted  as su gges tin g  that 'in  
upsw ings r is in g  a c t iv ity  induced businessmen ... to  increase th e ir  
planned investm ent, which took tim e to  commission and implement, and 
thus lagged  behind a c tiv ity , w h ile  the subsequent dow nsw ing 
scotched some fu tu re  plans and led  to  fa llin g  in ves tm en t.’
26 A. G. Ford(1981) p.42
27 I t  should be no ted  that investm en t o f  autonomous character, 
sp ec ifica lly  that re la ted  to innovations, was not com p letely  absent: 
fo r  instance, in th e  B ritish  C ycle  IV  ’e le ctric  tram w ays and th e f i r s t  
London "tu b e " ra ilw a y ’ are said to  have been im portant f ie ld s  o f  
investm ent. R. S. Sayers(1967) p.37 A ccord ing  to  I. C. R.
Byatt( 1979) p.6 and C. H. Feinstein(1976) T.85,86, th e  g ro ss  fixed  
investm ent in  e le c tr ic a l in du stry  accounted fo r  3.0%, 10.8% and 15.4% 
o f  the UK g ro ss  investm en t in 1897, 1903 and 1913, resp ec tiv e ly .
form ation (F ig  I II -6 ).  The peaks o f  the F rench  Kuznets c yc le s
co in cided  rou gh ly  w ith those o f  th e  F rench  C ycles  I I  and IV. Hence 
it  would seem that the a lternation  o f  exp ort and investm ent c y c le  in 
F rance was c lose ly  rela ted  to bu ild in g  cyc les . C onsidering th e fac t 
th at ou tflow  o f  labour and cap ita l a ffe c ted  the F rench  economy to  a 
fa r  sm aller ex ten t than Britain**, it  seems e v en  less  lik e ly  than  in 
B rita in  th a t the French  bu ild in g  c yc le s  are exp licab le  b y  ex tern a l 
factors.**
Th e  trade cyc lica l p a tte rn  in the movements o f  F rench  
investm en t in ships and veh ic les  (F ig  I I I—6) may be in terp re ted  in  the 
same way as in  B rita in , i.e . a s  r e fle c t in g  th e  in fluen ces o f  the 
ch an gin g  state  o f  the w orld  trad e . On the o th e r  hand, in  con trast 
to  B rita in , th e capital formation in  th e form  o f  p lan t and m achinery 
a lso m oved in  a trade cyc lica l manner, su gge s tin g  that the le v e l  o f  
th is  com ponent o f  F rench home investm ent was s ign ifica n tly  a ffe c ted  
b y  o v e rsea s  as well as home demand.
T u rn in g  to  the capita l form ation  in  the un developed  w orld , one 
o b s e rv e s  that long sw ings w ere, perhaps, a e v en  more prom inent 
fea tu re  than in  deve loped  co u n tr ies (F ig  111-7,8 & 9). I t  could
28 In  F rance, overseas  in ves tm en t(in d irect estim ate) was less  than 
18% o f  g ro s s  domestic investm ent d u r in g  1865-1913, whereas the 
amount o f  fu nds equal to around tw o th ird s  o f  B ritish  g ross  domestic 
f ix ed  cap ita l formation flowed ou t o f  B rita in  d u r in g  1870-1914(indirect 
estim ate ). As fo r  the impact o f  em igration , in  pre-W W I yea rs  French  
and B ritish  population avera ged  around 38m and 30m, resp ec tiv e ly ; 
d u r in g  1871-1910 0.3m and 10.4m le f t  France and B rita in , r esp ec tiv e ly . 
M. L e vy-L eb oye r(1 9 7 8 ) p.287, C. H. Feinstein (1976), B. R. M itchell ft. P. 
Deane(1962), B. R. M itchell(1981)
29 It ,  h ow ever, needs to  be poin ted  ou t that the indem nity payment 
a fte r  th e F ranco-Pru ssian  War am ounting to Frl487m on annual 
a v e ra g e  du r in g  1871-73 p robab ly  exercised  con sid erab le  in fluence 
upon th e  in v e rse  rela tionsh ip  betw een  th e German and French 
Kuznets  c yc les : the indem nity paym ents f igu re  compares w ith  the 
annual a v e ra g e  o f  F rench g ro ss  dom estic cap ita l formation d u r in g
1871-3 o f  Fr2262m and with the annual a v e ra ge  o f  German net 
inves tm en t o f  Fr2688m. M. L evy-L eb oye r(1 9 7 8 ) p.287, W. G.
Hoffmann (1965)
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Fig n i-7  Annual Addition to Argentine Railways and British New Portfolio Investment in 
Argentina
Source: I. Stone(1972). B. R. MitcheU(1983)
Fig n i-8  Australian Gross Domestic Capital Formation by Sectors at Constant Prices
Source: N. G. Butlin(1962)
l ie
Fig HI-9 Canadian Gross Domestic Capital Formation by Sectors at Current Prices
Source: M. C. Urquhait(1986)
rea listica lly  be assum ed that the lo n g  sw in gs  in B rita in and those in 
prim ary p ro d u cers  w ere  not so in d ep en d en t o f  each oth er as between 
those in the US an d  Britain, in  v iew  o f  the im portant pa rt p layed  by 
B ritish capita l in  the capital fo rm a tion  in undeveloped  countries. 
Since, as E dels te in  says, home in ves tm en t conditions in B rita in  were 
exogenous in flu en ces  determ ining th e  le v e l  o f  the ou tflow  o f  B ritish 
sav ings, inves tm en t upswings in  p rim ary  producing a reas  with 
in su ffic ien t in te rn a l savings w ou ld  have been more lik e ly  to 
m ateria lize when th e  leve l o f  B ritish  home investm ent was re la tiv e ly  
low , e .g . in th e  1880s and in th e  1900s. This, how ever, is  not to 
a rgu e  that the lo n g  sw ings in th e p e r ip h e ry  w ere  predom inantly the 
outcome o f  th e B ritish  build ing c y c le s .  As we rha ll see  in the 
analysis in th e fo llow in g  section , th e  ’puli’  from  cap ita l im porting 
reg ion s, as w e ll a s  the ’push’ from  th e  B ritish side p layed  s ign ifican t 
p arts  in d e term in in g  capital flow  in to  prim ary p rodu cing  economies 
and, con sequ en tly , th eir levels  o f  c a p ita l formation.
For in s tan ce , in A rgen tina , w h ere  ra ilw ay bu ild ing was the 
dominant fie ld  o f  cap ita l formation in  pre-WWI yea rs , such favourab le  
changes in dom estic  environm ent a s  the pacifica tion  o f  pampas, 
po litica l s ta b ility  and curren cy  r e fo rm  seemed to  be cru cia l in  the 
b egin n ing o f  th e  long upsw ing in  1880s. And the course o f
subsequent s w in g (F ig  I I I—7) cou ld  be explained by th e log ic  o f 
ra ilw ay d eve lopm ent cyc le  as p ro p osed  by P ro fessor  A. G. Ford , which 
is  broad ly  id en tic a l with the mechanism  o f  the em ergence o f  the state 
o f  tem porary ov e rb u ild in g  and its  d isso lu tion  in th e US.30
Residen tia l construction, a c c o rd in g  to Butlin, led the Australian 
long sw ings.*1 F ig  III-8 , h o w eve r , suggests  that th ere  w ere two
30 A. 0. FordO  971)
31 N. G. B u tlin (1964) p.211
oth er  almost equally  im portan t fie ld s  o f  inves tm en t in  Australia :
agricu ltu ra l and pastoral in v e s tm en t and ra ilw ay bu ild in g . The 
th ree  major components o f  A u s tra lia n  home investm en t d id  no t appear 
to  be close ly  rela ted  to each  o th e r :  in particu lar, in  con tra s t to  the 
US and A rgen tina , the p io n ee r in g  ro le  o f  ra ilw ay b u ild in g , inducing 
construction investm ent, w as  ab sen t in Australia.** Australian
railway investm ent being c a r r ie d  ou t mostly b y  co lon ia l governm ent, 
ra ther than by  p riva te  en tre p re n e u rs , both p o litica l con siderations, 
e .g . 'in tercolon ial r iva lry '** , an d  'lon g  term p lan n in g ’34, ra th e r  than 
short term p ro fitab ility , g o  fa r  to explain th e movements in 
Australian ra ilw ay bu ild ing. On the other hand, th e  varia tion s  in 
residentia l construction seem ed c lose ly  connected w ith  those in the 
le v e l o f immigration in to  A u s tra lia . While th e flu ctu ations in
immigration resu lted  p a r t ly  fro m  the sh ifts  in th e  state  o f  the
Australian labour market, p u ll o f  other rec ip ien t cou n tr ies , such as 
the US, Canada and South A fr ic a ,  as well as the pu sh  from  Brita in, 
seemed to  e x e r t con siderab le  exogenous in fluences.** F ina lly , long 
term consideration tended to  b e  important in  the inves tm en t decision 
making in pastoral in d u s try , since 'P astora lis ts , in ten t on the 
build ing o f  ru ra l estates , w e re  o ften  unable to  p re d ic t  o r  even  
d iscover the p ro fitab ility  o f  c a p ita l ou tlays.’ **
Investm ent in ra ilw a y s  was important in a ll th e th ree  major 
periods o f  Canadian cap ita l form ation , i.e. in  'th e  f i r s t  h a lf o f  the
1870s, again th rough the m id -  to  late 1880s, and, ab ove  all, in the
32 N. G. Butlin(1964) p7399-404
33 E. A. Boehm(1971) p.133
34 N. G. Butlin(1964) p.327
35 A. C. Kelley  (1965) Im m igra tion  a ffected  the Austra lian  bu ild ing 
industry  both th rough th e c h a n ges  in total popu lation  and th rough 
those in age structu re. A. C. Kelley(1968)
36 N. G. Butlin(1965) p.153 T h u s , on the whole, lon g  term  element 
figu red  in Australian dom estic  cap ita l formation in pre-W W I yea rs , 
which, Butlin Bays, con tr ib u ted  to  the stab ility  in  Au stra lian  home 
investment.
period from  1900 to 1914**, (F ig  I I I - 9 ) .  Th e  cyc lica l va r ia tion s  in
Canadian cap ita l formation in the C yc le  I  y ea rs  w ere  a ttrib u ta b le  to 
the bu ild in g  o f  the in tercolon ia l r a ilw a y , undertaken b y  govern m ent. 
The bu ild in g  o f  the Canadian Pac ific  R a ilw ay  line to  th e  w est coast, 
undertaken p riva te ly  bu t aided by ’v e r y  gen erous treatm en t from  th e 
federa l govern m ent’ , w ere mainly resp o n s ib le  fo r  th e investm en t 
fluctuations during C ycle  II.** Th e  c y c lic a l va r ia tion s  in  Canadian 
home investm ent in C ycle  I I I  r e fle c te d  mainly the s h ifts  in hou sing  
construction , which, U rqu h art says, w e r e  induced  b y  th e  bu ild in g  o f 
the Canadian Pacific  Railway. I t  cou ld  th ere fo re  b e  said th at th e 
fluctuations in  Canadian home in ves tm en t in  pre-1895 period  w e re  to 
a g re a t  ex ten t in fluenced  by  go v e rn m en t po licy  reg a rd in g  ra ilw ay  
bu ild ing, apart from th e state o f  Lon don  cap ita l market.
A lthough railw ay investm ent con tin u ed  to be a major f ie ld  o f  
investm ent a fte r  1895, the Canadian in ves tm en t boom in  th e e a r ly  20th 
cen tu ry  was ’v e r y  b road ly  based ’ . I t  is  thus more accu ra te  to 
describ e  the boom as having been led  b y  investm ent ’ re la ted  d ire c t ly  
or in d ire c t ly  to the settlement o f  th e  W est’**. T h e  s ta rt o f  the 
rem arkable upswing seemed to be a ttr ib u ta b le  to  th e  r e c o v e ry  in 
wheat exp orts  in  th e late 1890s40, which induced  optim ism in 
in v e s to rs ’ prospects .41 The ou tb reak  o f  WWI seemed to  put an end
to the expansion.
In  summary: th e in trodu ction  o f  new tran sp ort tech n o logy ,
steam and e lectric  ra ilw ays in p a r ticu la r , seemed to  u n derlie  the 
investm ent fluctuations in the US an d  Germany, w h ils t dem ographic
37 M. C. Urquhart(1986) P-35
38 M. C. Urquhart(1986) p.35
39 M. C. Urquhart(1986) p.35
40 For th e reasons behind the in c rease  in  wheat exp orts , see G. M. 
M eier(1953) p.4.
41 R. E. Ankli(1980) p.256, M. C. U rqhu art(1986 ) p.39
s h ifts ,  to  a substantial d egree  domestic in  o r ig in ,  appeared  to go  fa r  
to  a c co u n t fo r  the bu ild in g  c yc les  in Brita in  an d  France, which w ere 
a t th e  bottom o f  th e investm ent c yc le s  in th e s e  countries. In  
p r im a ry  producing countries, ra ilroad iza tion  to ge th e r  w ith  the 
a v a ila b il ity  o f  fo re ign  cap ita l and govern m en t p o l ic y  seemed th e major 
fa c to r s  behind investm ent long sw ings. Such b e in g  the case, the 
b road  synchron ization  among the investm en t c y c le s  o f  th e fou r 
in d u s tr ia l countries cou ld  be con sidered  to  a g r e a t  exten t as a m atter 
o f  co in cidence. How ever, it  should be em phasized  th at with
in n o va tio n s  tending to  be made ava ilab le  fo r  d i f fe r e n t  countries more 
o r  le s s  at the same time in a w orld  w ith  w e ll d eve loped  means o f  
com munication and transportation , inves tm en t u psw ings connected  
w ith  the absorption o f  new tech n o logy  a r e  lik e ly  to  sta rt 
s im u ltaneously  in s eve ra l countries. On the o th e r  hand, i f  th ere  is 
o b s e rv e d  any degree  o f  corre la tion  b etw een  th e  investm ent varia tion s 
in  th e  developed  and undeveloped  w orld , th is  may be to a g rea t 
e x te n t  a ttributable to  the la tte r ’ s d epen den ce u pon  the fo rm er fo r
fu n d s .
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2. Fore ign  In vestm en t
In  p re-W W I years  lon g-term  cap ita l tended to  f lo w  out o f 
d eve loped  to  b e  invested  in  undeveloped  areas. O f ou r four
in du str ia l econom ies, Brita in and F rance dominated th e  scene o f  
in terna tion a l investm en t: in  terms o f  annual a v e ra ge  B rit ish  and
F rench  o v e r s e a s  lend ing in 1870-1914 period  am ounted  to 
approxim ately  £76m and £32m, resp ec tiv e ly , w h ere a s  the
co rresp on d in g  f ig u re s  fo r  Germany and th e US w ere £26m and 66m.1 
Th is  con tra s ts  w ith  the fa c t th at in pre-1914 yea rs  d om estic  capital 
form ation w as ca rr ied  out on  a more ex ten sive  scale in  th e  US and 
G erm an y  th an  in  the two o ld e r  cap ita lis t countries.* T h e  yea rly  
ou tflow  o f  c a p ita l o f  th is s ize  was equal to around tw o  th ird s  o f 
g ro ss  dom estic capita l form ation in B rita in  and around 1851 in the 
case o f  F ran ce ; on the o th e r  hand, in th e investm ent econom ies the 
ra tio  o f  fo r e ig n  to  g ross  dom estic investm ent was fa r  lo w e r :  IX  and 
6X in  the US and Germany, resp ec tiv e ly .*  123
1 These a re  in d ir e c t  estimates. In  con trast with o th e r  th r e e  
in du str ia l c ou n tr ies , which remained net cap ita l e x p o r te rs  th roughout 
th e period  con ce rn ed , the US borrow ed £13m on annual a v e ra g e  from 
1870 un til 1896, and lent in  th e rem aining yea rs  £38m a n n u a lly . US 
Dept o f  Com m erce(1961)
2 In  our p e r io d  the annual a v e ra ge  dom estic investm ent in  the four 
in du str ia l econom ies was as fo llow s: £716m fo r  the US(1871-1913), 
£183m fo r  Germ any(1870-1913), £121m fo r  Brila in (1870-1913), and 
£135m fo r  France(1865-1913). I t  should be noted th at th e  German 
investm ent f i g u r e  is in net term s, while fo r  other th ree  cou n tr ies  
annual a v e ra g e s  rep resen t g ro s s  investm ent. In  v iew  o f  th a t in 
Brita in  and th e  US rep lacem ent investm ent accounted f o r  62X and 46X 
o f  g ro ss  inves tm en t, r esp ec tiv e ly , we could reasonably m u ltip ly  the 
Germany an n u a l average o f  net investm ent by two, to  g e t  a rough 
estim ate fo r  th e  annual a v e ra ge  German g ro ss  in vestm en t, £366m. W. 
G. Hoffmanr (1965 ), C. H. Feinstein (1976), S. Kuznets(1961), M. L e v y -  
Le boy e r (  1978)
3 In  the US th e  net in flow  o f  capital p r io r  to 1897 accou n ted  fo r  2.9X 
o f  the g ro s s  dom estic cap ita l formation in the same p e r io d , whereas 
net ou tflow  o f  capital amounted to 3.4X o f  the g ross  dom estic  
investm ent d u r in g  the la ter yea rs  o f  ou r period.
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I t  is  w ell-know n th a t B ritish ov e rsea s  lend ing  d isplayed  lon g  
sw ings m oving almost p re c is e ly  in oppos ite  d irec tion s  to those in 
home investm ent: ro u g h ly  speaking, the yea rs  o f  C ycle I, I I I  & V 
correspon ded  to the p e r io d  o f  re la tiv e ly  a c tiv e  cap ita l exports  from  
B rita in , whereas in th e rem aining y ea rs  home investm ent was 
maintained at le ve ls  a b o ve  avera ge . As was a lready  poin ted ou t in  
th e p reced in g  section, th e  lon g  sw ings in  B ritish fo re ign  investm en t 
w ere  an outcome o f  th ose  in  domestic cap ita l form ation in B rita in , 
re fle c tin g  la rg e ly  bu ild in g  c yc le s , ra th er than the o th er  way around.
In  the sh o rt run , B rit ish  overseas  lend ing tended to v a r y  in  a
cyc lica l way, excep t fo r  th e  yea rs  o f  C ycle  IV, betw een  the mid-1890s
and the ea r ly  1900s, d u r in g  which B ritish  new portfo lio  fo r e ig n
investm ent showed c o n tra -cy c lic a l m ovem ents(F ig III-1 0 ). Th is
fig u re  a lso shows th a t th e  cyc lica l pa tte rn  in fo re ign  investm ent
p receded  that ob se rva b le  in  domestic investm ent b y  2-3 yea rs , th us
con vey in g  th e im pression th a t British fo r e ig n  and domestic investm en t
fluctuated  in  opposite d ire c tio n s  in th e sh o rt as well as in the lon g
run.4 The cyc lica l p a t te rn  in B ritish cap ita l exp orts  did not r e f le c t
th e cyc lica l fluctuations in  B ritish investm en t in e v e ry  in d iv idual
borrow in g  reg ion ; in s tea d , the con cen tra tion  o f  cap ita l flow s  in to
variou s  reg ion s  in d i f fe r e n t  years  p roduced  cyc lica l varia tion s in
to ta l B ritish  ove rseas  investm ent. In  Cycle I & I I ,  B ritish
investm ent in  the US an d  Europe was la rge ly  responsib le fo r  th e
cyc lica l movements; d u r in g  Cycle I I I ,  b esides the lend ing to the U S,
the cap ita l exports  to  S ou th  America made an im portant con tribu tion
to  the cyc lica l pa ttern ; fin a lly , B ritish investm ent in  Canada and A sia
la rge ly  determ ined the c o u rs e  o f  fluctuations in to ta l B ritish ov e rsea s
4 A . I."B loom fie ld ( 1968a) p.22. He found th at the corre la tion  
c oe ffic ien t o f  the f i r s t  d if fe r e n c e s  o f  B ritish  net cap ita l exports and 
g ro ss  domestic fixed  ca p ita l formation in  1860-1913 was -0.32, 
s ign ifica n tly  d iffe ren t fro m  zero  at th e 5X level.
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lend ing during C ycle V .5 6 This su gges ts  th at th e  explanation o f  the 
cyc lica l varia tions in to ta l B ritish  new p o r t fo l io  fo re ign  investm ent 
amounts to accounting fo r  the spurts  o f  c a p ita l flows into these 
particu lar areas in re levan t y ea rs . ThuB, in  the fo llow ing , we 
attem pt to  locate th e fa c tors  in flu en cin g  th e  flu c tu a tion s  in B ritish 
lend ing  to the US d u r in g  1872-95, to A rg e n t in a  during 1882-99, to 
Austra lia  du rin g  1870-99, and fin a lly  to  Canada d u r in g  1895-1913.
In  his attem pt to  explain th e varia tion s  in  th e  le ve l o f lon g  term 
capita l ou tflow  from  Brita in  into major b o rro w in g  coun tries  du rin g  the 
period  concerned , P ro fesso r  H. W. R ich ardson  observed  that the 
d iffe ren tia l in  rea lized  ra te  o f  retu rn  do not p ro v id e  a sa tis fac tory  
answ er. On the o th e r  hand, ind ices o f  econom ic opportu n ity , such 
as national income, in capita l im porting a reas  w e re  shown to a ffe c t 
the le v e l o f  cap ita l in flow .4 C onsiderin g th e  fo llow ing d ifficu lt ies  
included in his approach , how ever, such re s u lt s  cou ld  to some exten t 
have been expected . In  the f ir s t  place, in  P ro fe s s o r  R ichardson ’ s 
reg ress ion  equations a re  employed as in d ica to rs  o f  a lternative  retu rn s 
fo r  cap ita l the y ie ld  on consols fo r  Brita in  on  th e  one hand, and the 
a ve ra ge  retu rn s fo r  capita l in  borrow in g  c o u n tr ie s  on th e other 
hand7. H ow ever, as fa r  as cap ita l im p o rt in g  countries are
concerned , it  appears more app rop ria te  to  u s e  th e return  on  the 
cap ita l employed in  the s e c to r (s ),  upon w h ich  British in ves tors  
atten tion  was focu sed , such as ra ilw ays, r a th e r  than an average  
retu rn . Secon d ly, it  is  im portant to d is t in g u is h  expected, o r  ex 
ante, from  rea lised , o r  ex post, retu rn , and th e  form er ra th e r  than 
the la tte r  could more reasonab ly be con s id e red  to  a ffe c t the le v e l o f
5 M. Siroon(1968)&( 1970), I. Stone(1972)
6 H. W. R ichard son (1972)
7 Such as annual a v e ra ge  y ield  o f  th irty  y ea rs  U S corporate  bonds 
and th e estimates o f  in teres t paid on fo r e ig n  in ves tm en t d iv ided  by 
accumulated net b orrow in g  in Australia  and Canada.
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capita l flow s . In  fac t, th is  appears to be r e v e a le d  in  the
aforem entioned  fin d in gs  by R ichardson. For the ex  an te r e tu rn  for 
capita l to b e  in ves ted  abroad can be expected  to  be in flu en ced  at 
least p a r tly  by the ’economic op p ortu n ity ’  in  b o rro w in g  reg ions. 
F inally , w ith  a g iv en  d iffe ren tia l in expected  retu rn s  an d  w ith  the 
amount o f  wealth  rem aining constant, it  does not ap p ea r  r e a l is t ic  that 
flow  from , say, Brita in in to  the US w ill con tinue in d e fin ite ly . 
Accord ing  to  p o rtfo lio  th eo ry , con sideration s o f  r isk  can  p r e v e n t  one 
from in v e s tin g  all the resou rces  availab le in the asse t w ith  h ighest 
expected  ra te  o f  return .*
Thus, a model based upon stock th eo ry  and in c o rp o ra t in g  a 
partia l adjustm ent p rocess to account fo r  the d is c rep a n cy  between 
the expected  and rea lized  ra te  o f  retu rn  was estim ated u s in g  y ields 
on ra ilw ay  d eben ture stock as an ind icator o f  th e r e tu rn  on  home 
investm ent and railw ay p ro f it  ra te  in the US, A rgen tin a  a n d  Canada 
and y ie ld s  on New South Wales secu rities  as those o f  th e  re tu rn  on 
investm ent in  these coun tries .9 The resu lt aga in  w as that the 
d iffe ren tia l in  retu rn  does not explain cap ita l m ovement, w h ich  may 
re fle c t both inadequacy o f  th e data used and prob lem s in v o lv e d  in 
dea ling  w ith  the expectations on  fu tu re  retu rn  b y  means o f  partial 
adjustm ent p rocess. Hence, in th e fo llow ing an a lys is  o f  ours,
although th eo re tica lly  less than sa tis fac tory , fa c to rs  c o n s id e red  to 
in fluence expected  retu rn s , r a th e r  than expected  re tu rn s  them selves 
on both s id es  w ill be in trodu ced ; in  add ition , to  take th e  wealth
8 J. Wiiiiamson(1983) Chapter 9
9 The m odel is  as follow s: K*» = a n  + pWt, Kt -  Kt-t = 6 (K *t -  Ki­
l l ,  w h ere K*: desired  ove rseas  cap ita l stock, rt: y ie ld  d if fe r e n t ia l,  
W»: w ealth , Kt: actual o verseas  capita l stock. S u b s t itu t in g  the 
f ir s t  equation  fo r  K*t in the second equation, we g et:
Kt -  Kt-i = It = Oart + 0pWt -  0Kt-i, where It: o v e r s e a s  
investm ent. Lead ing th is equation  by one period  and s u b tra c tin g  
th is from  th e  or ig in a l equation, we get:
It = 0a (rt -  rt-i) + 0p(W, -  Wt-i) -  (l-O )It- i, w h ich  is  the 
equation estimated.
12*.
e f fe c t  in to  con sideration , th e UK annual accumulation, i.e. annual home 
plus fo re ign  investm ent, is  also included.
Let us f ir s t  con sid er the US du rin g  the yea rs  o f  the f ir s t  th re e  
trade  cyc les . As was shown in  the p reced in g  section , in these y ea rs  
ra ilw ay bu ild ing form ed the lead ing  sector  in th e cyc lica l flu ctu ations 
o f  the US economy, and a major portion  o f  B ritish  capita l flow in g  in to  
th e US was attrac ted  b y  the investm ent opportun ities  rela ted  to  
ra ilw ays .10 Thus, ra ilw ay  p ro fita b ility , rep resen ted  here by  ra ilw ay  
net earn in gs  per mile, in  th e p reced in g  yea r  cou ld  be rega rd ed  as an 
im portant fa c to r  in flu en cin g  B ritish  in v e s to r s ’ p rospects  on th e ir  
investm ent in the US in  th e cu rren t y ea r. On th e other hand, i t  
appears reasonab le to inc lude th e le v e l o f  home investm ent as 
ind icatin g the state  o f  investm en t opportu n ities  in Britain.
1872-95
USCt = -20.1 4 0.4USRPt-i -  0.3UKI» 4 0.3UKS»
( 1.4)  <o.i) (*.*> CM)
Ad ju sted  R2=0.62, DW=1.53, t-ra tio s  in paren theses
, w here USC: UK p o rtfo lio  investm ent in  the US 
USRP: net ra ilw ay earn in g  p e r  mile 
UKI: UK GDFCF 
UKS: UK annual accumulation
The above equation  shows that the fluctuations in the B ritish
portfo lio  investm ent in th e US du rin g  th e  f ir s t  th ree c yc le s  a re
10 In  1910, 85% o f  th e UK p o rtfo lio  investm ent in the U S (stock ) was 
in its  ra ilw ay. D. R. Ad ler(1970) p .vi.
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explained predom inantly b y  the 'puBh' fa c to rs  on th e B ritish side, 
such as home investm ent opportu n ities  and the p ressu re  o f  sav ings; 
on the o th er  hand, the s h ifts  in  the US railway p ro fita b ility  ha rd ly  
appeared  to be a s ign ifican t determ inan t.11
In  A rgen tin a  o f  1882-1899 p eriod , too, ra ilw ay bu ild ing f igu red  
in the investm ent by fo r e ig n e rs .1* Thus, as in  the US, the
A rgen tine railw ay p ro fit  r a te1* may be made to  rep resen t th e pu ll 
fo rces  from  the A rgen tine side; th e same two variab les , th e  UK 
savings and domestic investm ent, a r e  included in  the fo llow ing 
equation to  describe the conditions in  B rita in :
1882-1899
ARCt = -16.9 + 1.3ARRP*-» -  0.3UKI» + 0.3UKS.
CI.9) (1.0 (5.D (4.Wo.l LI hL
A d justed  R*=0.65, DW=1.64, t - ra t io s  in paren theses, b eta-
coe ffic ien ts  underlined
, w h ere ARC: UK p o rtfo lio  in ves tm en t in A rgen tina  
ARRP: A rgen tin e  ra ilw ay ra te  o f  p ro fit
The resu lt listed above shows th a t in  the A rgen tin e  case both 
pull and push fo rces  in fluenced  th e le v e l  o f  B ritish  investm ent in 123
11 Th is is  consisten t w ith th e conclu sions reached b y  M. 
Edelstein(1982) p.95-97.
12 'Som ething like 65-70% o f  a ll B ritish  cap ita l in ves ted  in A rgen tina  
during the fou r  boom yea rs  1886-9 was em ployed to finance ra ilw ays 
d irec tly  th rough the jo in t stock  com panies o r  in d irec t ly  th rough the 
medium o f governm ent borro w in g .' H. S. Ferns(1960) p.409
13 A. G. Ford  (1971) p.660
A rgen tina du rin g  the yearB con cerned , wh ile beta c o e ff ic ien ts  su ggest 
th e la tter to have been more p ow erfu l.14
As we have seen in the p reced in g  section , residentia l 
construction, pastoral and agricu ltu ra l in d u s try  and ra ilw ay  build ing 
constitu ted  th e th ree  major fie ld s  in Austra lian  dom estic capita l 
formation in 1870-99. N either d id  it appear the case th a t the th ree  
w ere in terrela ted  as lead ing and fo llow ing s e c to r (s ),  nor d id  B ritish  
in ves tors ’ a tten tion  seem to be con cen tra ted  upon one o f  the th ree 
main outlets. Thus, in the fo llow ing equation  the le v e l o f  Australian 
home investm ent is  employed as an ind ica to r o f  th e pull from 
Australia:
1870-99
AUC. = 0.4 + 0.6AUI» -  0.04UKI« -  0.004UKS.
(0.0  (t.?> (i.o) (o .i)
Adjusted  R*=0.64, DW=1.55, t-rn tios  in paren theses
, w here AUC: B ritish  investm ent in  Austra lia
AUI: Australian g ro ss  home investm ent
14 A. G. Ford (1971) reached a somewhat d if fe r e n t  conclusion: 
adm itting the impact o f  both pull and push fo rces , he rega rd ed  the 
form er as d ire c t and s tron ge r  than the la tte r . On th e  o th e r  hand, 
M. Edelstein(1982) b e lieves  that ’domestic UK fa c to rs  w ere  fa r  more 
pow erfu l in  th e A rgen tin ian  case than F ord ’ s e v iden ce  su gges ts  at 
f ir s t  g lance. Furtherm ore, g iv e n  the beta c oe ffic ien ts  o f  F ord ’s 
equations, it is  poss ib le  that th e UK va r iab les  w ere th e s tron ge r  
fac tor, a lbe it by  a slim m argin.’ (p.104) Th e  d iffe ren ce  betw een  the 
resu lt shown above and that p resented  in A. G. Ford(1971), how ever, 
may be at least p a rtly  a ttribu tab le  to th e fa c t that the form er is 
concerned on ly  w ith the last tw o decades o f  the 19th c en tu ry , while 
the la tter c ove rs  1900-1914 as well: accord in g  to Edelstein (1982) 
p.304, ’The UK’ s lend ing  to  A rgen tina  d u r in g  the e a r ly  tw en tieth  
centu ry  ... seems la rge ly  the resu lt o f  A rgen tin ian  investm ent and 
savings p ressu re  ra th er than o f  domestic UK fo rc es .'
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A cco rd in g  to  the above  lis ted  resu lt, in con trast to the US and 
A rgen tin e  cases , B ritish investm en t in Austra lia  was v e r y  s tro n g ly  
in fluenced  b y  th e pu ll o f  Austra lian  p rospects , ra th e r  than b y  the 
state o f  inves tm en t and sav in g  con d itions in B rita in .,s
D uring 1895-1913, the Canadian economy un derw ent a hu ge 
investm ent upsw ing, which was p a r tly  induced  by th e exp ort boom in 
the la te  1890s, and which at th e same time p repared  th e base fo r  the 
fu ll-sca le  exp o rt boom in  th e second decade o f  the 20th c e n tu ry .15 678 
As we have seen in th e p reced in g  section , th is  boom was v e r y  
b road ly  based , and although 41.7% o f  B ritish  new p o rtfo lio  inves tm en t 
in Canada w as absorbed  b y  the ra ilw ay sector in 1900-13, , l it  would 
appear more sensib le  to  rep resen t the state  o f  Canadian investm ent 
opportu n ities  b y  the le v e l o f  Canadian home investm ent, ra th e r  than 
by  Canadian ra ilw ay inves tm en t18:
1895-1913
CACt = -6 .6  + 0.03CAI* -  0.1 UKI. + 0.09UKSt
to .9 ) <V*> < « >
o.x
A d ju s ted  R*=0.91, DW=2.1, t-ra t io s  in paren theses,
c oe ffic ien ts  u nderlined
, w h ere CAC: B ritish p o r tfo lio  investm ent in Canada
15 N. G. Butlin(1965) p.149 says th at ’Capital im ports betw een 1871 
and 1890 accounted  fo r  h a lf to  tw o th ird s  o f  new cap ita l form ation , 
leav in g  Austa lian sav in gs  to  p ro v id e  the minor part. Th is su pp ly  o f  
fu nds seems to  have borne com para tively  l itt le  connection w ith  th e 
course o f  e v en ts  in th e B ritish  economy and on ly  a lim ited connection  
w ith o v e ra ll sh o rt term  movements in B ritish  fo re ign  in vestm en t.’
On th e o th e r  hand, a ccord in g  to  M. Edelstein (1982) p.106, 107, in 
1870-1914 ’UK and Australian  pa rtic ipa tion  and in flu en ce rou gh ly  
balanced in  th e Australian case.’
16 R. E. Ankli(1980)
17 M. Simon( 1970) p.249. Tab le  V II
18 In  fac t, su bstitu tin g  Canadian railw ay investm ent fo r  to tal home 
investm en t in  the fo llow in g  equation , we obta in  similar resu lt.
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CAI: Canadian g ro ss  home investm ent
The above equation su gges ts  that the push from  the B ritish  side 
and th e pu ll o f  Canadian economy were almost equ a lly  im portant in 
determ in ing the le ve l o f  B ritish  investm ent in Canada.19 201
T o  summarize, both push and pull fa c to rs  con tribu ted  to the 
p rodu ction  o f  the cyc lica l pa ttern  in B ritish  overseas  lend ing: in 
C ycle I  & I I  push fo rc es  w ere  im portant(U S ); in Cycle I I I  pull from 
A rgen tin a  and Australia  em erged , while push from Brita in  still had 
s tron g  in flu en ces  upon th e flow  o f  funds to  the US and Argentina. 
Both push and pull seemed equ a lly  respon sib le  fo r  the varia tion s in 
cap ita l ou tflow  in the C yc le  V years. Thus, on the whole, as 
Edelstein  a rgu ed , push fo r c e s  appeared somewhat more powerful.*®
As was b r ie f ly  poin ted  out in  th e second section  o f  the 
p reced in g  chap ter, th e p receden ce  o f  th e cyc lica l fluctuations in 
B ritish  ov e rsea s  lend ing  o v e r  those in B ritish  m erchandise exports 
p ro v id ed  the basis fo r  th e proposition that capita l ou tflow  from 
B rita in  on such an ex ten s iv e  scale cou ld  be maintained without 
causing m ajor balance o f  paym ents d ifficu lt ies  due to  the capab ility  
o f  the exported  cap ita l to  expand the m arket fo r  B ritish  goods.*1 
F ig I I I - l l ,  how ever, shows that such a tem poral rela tion sh ip  between 
cap ita l and m erchandise is  not a lways to be found on a reg ion al level.
19 Compare th is  with E d els te in ’s conclusion: ’UK in fluen ce and 
partic ipa tion  w ere  v e r y  im portant to the tra n s fe r  o f  B rita in ’ s savings 
to Canada and qu ite  p oss ib ly  the dominant fo r c e . ’  M. Edelstein(1982) 
p.108 He also mentions on p.286,287 the ’overabundan ce ’ o f  fo re ign  
sav in gs  in  Canada in th e yea rs  concerned.
20 M. Edelstein (1981) p.82
21 A. G. F ord (1965)

In  the f ir s t  p la ce , du rin g  the f i r s t  th ree  US c yc les , w h en both 
B rit ish  lending and m erchandise exp o rts  to the US m oved cyc lica lly , 
it  is  hardly possib le t o  o b se rve  the le ad -lag  rela tion  b e tw een  the two 
item s; rather th ey  ten ded  to move in  c lose syn ch ron iza tion 2*. As 
w e  shall see in C h ap te r  V I, in  the C yc le  I I I  yea rs  th ere  w as  sim ilarly 
no gap  between th e  flu ctu ations in  B ritish  capita l and m erchandise 
e x p o r ts  to A rgen tin a  and Australia . Furtherm ore, b e tw een  the
flu ctu ations in th e  B rit ish  investm ent in and the B ritish  m erchandise 
e x p o r ts  to Canada, no con sisten t re la tion  in found: w h ile  th e  form er 
m oved in a n o n -cy c lica l way, in the fluctuations o f  th e la t t e r  a re  to 
b e  id en tified  th e u su al f iv e  trade c yc les . These ob se rva t io n s , be ing 
made in the reg ion s  con tr ib u t in g  g re a t ly  to th e f lu c tu a tion s  in  B ritish 
o v e rsea s  lend ing in  corresp on d in g  yea rs , seem to s u g g e s t  the need 
c a re fu lly  to reexam in e the determ inan ts o f  the le v e l  o f  B ritish 
m erchandise exp orts .
Our f irs t s tep  in  such a reexam ination r e fle c ts  th e  d iscu ssion  in 
th e  final section o f  th e p reced in g  ch ap ter which s u g ge s te d  that not 
o n ly  the sh ifts  in  B rit ish  ove rseas  len d in g , but also th e fluctuations 
o f  the two m ajor investm ent economies, US and Germ any, had 
s ign ifica n t e f fe c ts  upon the state o f  th e w orld m arket. A ccord in g ly  
we rela ted th e le v e l  o f  B ritish m erchandise exp orts (U K X t) to the 
cu rren t level o f  na tion a l income in  th e two c ou n tr ies (U S Y » and GYt) 
and to the le v e l  o f  B ritish  fo r e ig n  investm ent in  th e  p reced in g  
year(O Lt-i). W hile UKXt-i, USYt-», GY»-i and OLt-t a r e  included  in 
th e  ligh t o f  th e fa c t  that these va r iab les  a re  d is tin c tly  tren d in g , we 
shall be mainly con cern ed  w ith th e coe ffic ien ts  a ssoc ia ted  with the 
cu rren t leve l o f  a c t iv it y  in the tw o investm ent econom ies and the 
amount o f  B ritish  len d in g  in the p reced in g  year:
22 A t ths~peak in  th «T e a r ly  1880s, cap ita l exports  e v en  la g g e d  behind 
merchandise exp o rts .
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1872-1913
UKXt = 45.0 + 0.7UKX.-. + O.OlUSYt -  O.OOlUSYt-i + 0.004GYt -
(Z .D  15.5) ( l . b )  0>5) 11.5)
0.006GYt-i + 0.20Lt-i -  0.030L.-Ï
C aA ) 11-3) <«•*>
A d ju s ted  R*=0.97, t-ra tio s  in  p a ren th eses
A c c o rd in g  to the above re s u lt , the leve l o f  US activ ity  was the 
on ly  s ig n if ic a n t factor exp la in ing  th e  sh o rt term  changes in B ritish  
m erchan d ise  exports , wh ile the c o e ff ic ie n ts  associated  with the German 
national p ro d u c t and B ritish  o v e rs e a s  lend ing a re  not s ign ifica n tly  
d i f fe r e n t  from  zero. I f  we rem em ber th at the con tribu tion  o f  th e US 
m arket to  th e  cyclical flu c tu ation s  o f  B ritish  e x p o r ts  declined ra p id ly  
th ro u gh ou t 1870-1914” , and th a t B ritish  lend ing to  the US ceased  to 
m ove c y c lic a lly  a fte r  C ycle I I I ,  i t  would seem u se fu l to examine the 
e a r lie r  and la ter years  o f  th e p e rio d  under con sideration  sepa ra tely :
1871-1893
UXKt = 83.7 + 0.7UKX»-i + O.OlUSYt -  O.OlUSYt-i + 0.005GY« -  
(3 .} )  ( V 4 )  CV Î) M )
_L3_ Ü
0.007GY*-i + 0.2OLt-i -  O.IOL»-*
C4-5-) <u> i° * >
_ 2 A
A d ju s ted  R*=0.88, t-ra tio s  in pa ren th eses , beta coe ffic ien ts  un derlined
1885-1913
UKXt = 48.8 + 0.3UKXt-l + 0.003USYt + 0.003USYI-1 + 0.003GYt -
Ci.%) l| .S ) Co«l) (.0.*) C o .»
0 .002G Y t-l + 0.2OLt-l + 0.2OLt-2
(0 .6 )  o . l )  C M )  23
23 S ee  S ection  3, Chapter I I .  T h e  r ise  and fa ll in  the exports  to  th e 
US accou n ted  fo r 25.2X and 40.3X o f  the cyc lica l increase and 
d e c rea s e  in  total B ritish m erchandise exports  in C yc le  I, w hereas the 
c o r re s p o n d in g  ratios fe ll  to 7.3% and 19.6% in C yc le  V.
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Adjusted R*=0.97, t— ratios in parentheses
It  is shown above that while in the earlier part o f our period 
the three independent variables had significant influence upon British 
merchandise exporta, none o f the three was associated with a 
coefficient significantly d ifferent from zero in  the later years. 
According to the beta coefficients in the firs t equation, the state of 
the US economy was the most influential factor, and the level o f 
British lending in the previous year the weakest. Since throughout 
the forty-odd years concerned the contribution o f  the US and German 
market to the cyclical shifts in British merchandise exports 
diminished*4, and since in quantitative terms the importance of 
British foreign investment declined relatively to  the US and German 
home investment**, it would seem sensible to interpret the 
deterioration in the explanatory power o f USYt and GYt as reflecting 
the rapidly increasing influence o f the indirect e ffec t, Le. impact via 
the undeveloped world, o f the fluctuations o f  the two investment 
economies. On the other hand, the insignificant contribution o f the 
shifts in British overseas lending to thoee in  British merchandise 
exports in the later years may be to a considerable extent related to 
the aforementioned relative decline o f British fo re ign  investment. It 
is, however, not v e ry  clear to what extent the significance o f the 
coefficient aseociated with British overseas lending in the earlier 
years can be considered as revealing the causal sequence between 
British capital and merchandise exports; fo r  in these years the 245
24 See the preceding footnote. The cyclical changes in British 
merchandise exports to Germany accounted for 14.6X and 22.7X o f the 
rise and fall in total British merchandise exporta in Cycle I; in Cycle 
V the corresponding figu res were reduced to 12.7X and 18.6X.
25 Net investment in  the US and Germany grew  from £258.9m and 
£74.8m, respectively, in 1878-82 to £482.9m and C232.3m, respectively, 
in 1898-1902, whereas British new portfolio inveatsmnt increased from 
£49.1m to £68.6m during the same period. S. Kusnets(1961), W. G. 
Hoffmann( 1966), If. Simon(1968).
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cyc lica l pattern  in B ritish  ov e rsea s  len d in g  reflec ted  to  a  g rea t 
exten t the varia tions in  B rit ish  investm ent in  the US, w h ere th e  role 
o f  B ritish  sav ings was seen  to  have been marginal.**
Thus, the o v e ra ll im pression  is  that the e f fe c t  o f  B ritish 
ove rseas  lend ing upon m erchan d ise  exp o rts  was re la tiv e ly  w ea k  when 
compared with th e in flu en ces  com ing from  the tw o in ves tm en t 
economies. Th is would im p ly  that in th e  production o f  th e  cyc lica l 
pa ttern  in B ritish cu rren t ba lan ce o f  paym en ts(F ig  III -1 0 ), u n d e r ly in g  
th e smooth tran s fe r  o f  c a p ita l, a t leas t as important a p a r t  was 
p layed  b y  the tendency  f o r  cu rren t balance o f  paym ents to  v a ry  
cyc lica lly  during exp ort c y c le s *7, as by  th e  expansion o f  m erchandise 
exp orts  duo to  cap ita l e x p o r ts . I f  the la tter  mechanism was in 
operation  in  B rita in ’ s re la tio n  with undeveloped  econom ies, it 
appeared  to be in B ritish  inves tm en t in  th e US that the w o rk in g  o f  
the form er was more prom inent.
F ig  III-1 2  shows th e sh o rt-ru n  fluctuations in F ren ch  fo re ign  
investm ent and balance o f  paym ents. I t  is  observed  th a t in  export 
c yc les (C yc le  I I I  4 V ) both v a r ie d  in a tra d e  cyc lica l way, w h erea s  in 
an investm ent cyc le (C yc le  IV )  ir re gu la r  fluctuations are fo u n d  in  both 
series . Such havin g  b een  th e  case, no g rea t balance o f  paym ents 
d ifficu lt ies  arose in  the c o u rs e  o f  F rench  cap ita l exports e ith e r .
As in the case o f  B rita in , th e cyc lica l pattern  in c u r re n t  balance 
o f  payments during exp o rt c y c le s  appears to be exp licab le  b y  weak
26 See Section 3, C hapter I I .
27 An export cyc le  is  by  d e fin it io n  a trade  cyc le , in which th e  
fluctuations in exp orts  o u tw e igh  those in  home investm ent. Th u s  it 
could be said that th e co n cep t o f  export c y c le  in vo lves  th e 
assumption that th e ac c e le ra to r  e ffe c ts  re la ted  to the ch a n ges  in 
exp o rt demand are weak. Such  being th e case, during an e x p o r t  
c yc le  im ports are lik e ly  to  show  r e la tiv e ly  weak fluctuations, a s  a 
resu lt o f  trade balance m oves cyc lica lly .
whidi
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dom estic investm en t varia tion s  inducing likew ise mild flu c tu ation s  in 
im ports; u n der  the condition  o f  weak domestic in ves tm en t demand, 
scope was g iv e n  to  the cyc lica l fluctuations in cap ita l ou tflow s . In 
con tra st, d u r in g  investm ent cyc les , w ide fluctuations in  th e leve l o f 
home inves tm en t brought abou t corresp on d in g ly  sharp  movements in 
im ports, w h ich  outweighed th e cyc lica l varia tion s in e x p o r ts , causing 
the trade  balance to fluctuate  in  a con tracyc lica l m anner; dynamic 
chan ges in  home investm ent demand at th e  same time p u t  on a brake 
upon the c y c lic a l varia tions in  cap ita l outflow .**
F ig  I I I - 13 shows th at in the export c y c le s  the cyc lica l 
flu ctu ations in  French ove rseas  lend ing  tended to p re c e d e  those in 
F rench  m erchandise exports  b y  one to  tw o yea rs . I t  cou ld  thus be 
asked  w h eth er this su gges ts  the lin kage  between F ren ch  fo re ign  
investm ent and merchandise exports. On th is p o in t opin ions are 
d iv id ed : some** argue that French cap ita l exports  d id  not stimulate
m erchandise exports  to any s ign ifica n t exten t, w h ils t  R. Cameron 
em phasizes th e  linkage betw een cap ita l and m erchandise exports  from 
Fran ce.30 A lthough in  th e absence o f  detailed d a ta  on French
ove rseas  len d in g  it is d if fic u lt  to h a ve  a de fin ite  an sw er  to th is 
question , T ab le  I II -2  su gges ts  that fo r e ign  investm en t was fa r  less 
c lose ly  re la ted  to m erchandise exports  in  France than in  Britain: in 
France is  o b se rved  a serious d iscrepancy  between th e  geograph ical 
d is tribu tion  o f  overseas len d in g  and that o f  e x p o r t  markets. 
M oreover, w h ile an ex ten sive  geograph ica l r ed is tr ib u tio n  o f  French 
overseas  cap ita l stock occu rred  in th e course o f  1870-1914, French
28 For a lte rn a t iv e  explanations o f  the tra n s fe r  mechanism  o f  French 
cap ita l exp o rts , see H. D. White(1933), J. S. Pesm azoglu ( 1951a).
29 H. D. White(1933) p.296,297, C. Treb ilcock (1981) p.181, R. 
G irault(1979) p.230
30 R. Cameron! 1961) p.504. He c ites  th e example o f  F re n c h  capital 
exports  to  southern Europe fo r  ra ilw ay bu ild ing. S ee  a lso  M. L e v y -  
L eboyer(1977 ) p.21
Fig III-13 French Merchandise and Capital Exports, Absolute Deviations from 9-year 
Moving Averages
Source: H. D. White(1933), R. Cameron(1961)
---- *. rr\«rchAna‘.S«
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Table III-2  Geographical Distribution of Merchandise Exports and
Stock o f Capital Invested Abroad, France and Britain(X)
France
Capital Stock Exports
1880 1910 1880 1913
N 4  W Europe 14.1 33.3 60.2 60.4
S Europe 56.4 22.6 10.4 8.2
Near East 20.2 12.3 2.4 2.1
US 2.5 4.7 9.6 7.3
Other 6.7 27.2 17.4 22.0
Brita in
Capital Stock E xports
1880 1913 1880 1910
N k  W Europe 16.4 5.1 27.9 28.3
S Europe 2.0 1.9 6.2 6.0
Near East 5.6 1.8 4.6 4.3
US 23.3 19.3 13.9 7.3
Other 52.7 72.0 47.1 53.5
Source: M. L evy -L eb oye r(1 9 7 7 ), Annuaire S ta tistiqu e d e  la France, B. 
R. Mitchell< 1962)
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export m arket underwent on ly  minor g eo g ra p h ic a l sh ifts . In
con trast, in  the British case, geograph ica l d is tr ib u t io n  o f  the capital 
stock  abroad corresponded rou gh ly  with that o f  e x p o r t  m arkets; with 
the excep tion  o f  the European continent exc lu d in g  Southern Europe 
the chan ges in the geograph ica l pattern  o f  o v e r s e a s  capita l stock 
ag ree  w ith  the red istr ibu tion  o f  B ritish  ex te rn a l market.31 
Th erefo re , i t  m ight be concluded that the smooth tra n s fe r  o f  French 
capita l in pre-1914 period was due to  a g r e a te r  exten t to the 
tendency fo r  the cu rren t balance o f  paym ents to  v a r y  cyc lica lly  in 
export c y c le s  than in Britain.
The cu r re n t  balance o f  payments o f  th e US an d  Germany tended 
to d e te r io ra te  during upsw ings and im prove d u r in g  downswings, in 
accordance w ith  what could a p rio ri be exp ected  o f  the short term 
varia tion s in  the balance o f  payments o f  econom ies un dergo ing 
investm ent c yc le s (F ig  III-1 4  & 15) In  G erm any, which remained a 
net cap ita l exporter, though on a r e la t iv e ly  small scale, th roughout 
1880-1914 period , d irect estimates o f  fo r e ig n  inves tm en t moved in  
almost p re c is e  parallel with th e cu rren t balance o f  paym ents, i.e. in a 
con tracyc lica l w ay.(F ig  III-1 4 ) Such e q u ilib ra tin g  movements in the 
balance o f  payments and capital exp o rts  may be ren dered  
com prehensib le in the fo llow ing way: w ith  th e  advance o f  an
investm ent boom, the increase in im ports ten d ed  to  worsen the
31 Such d iffe ren ces  between the two cou n tr ies  may be rela ted  to the 
fa c t that F rench  overseas lend ing was more p o lit ic a l and less 
developm enta l in nature in comparison w ith  B ritish  overseas  
investm ent: the lending to fo re ign  govern m ents accounted  fo r  35% o f  
total B ritish  new portfo lio  investm ent in 1865-1914, whereas around 
80% o f  to ta l French capital stock abroad in 1914 is  said to have 
consisted  o f  governm ent secu rities. M. Simon(1968) p.23, R. 
G irault(1979) p.227
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Fig UI-14 German Current Balance of Payments and Capital Exports, Absolute Deviations 
from 9-year Moving Averages
Source: W. G. Hoffmann(1965)
____  •_ Curran* p a y « » « " * *
----*. d irt.t iM - « i
Fig III-1S US Current Balance o f Payments and UK New Portfolio Investment in the US, 
Absolute Deviations from 9-year Moving Averages
Source: M. Simoo(1968)A(1970) f  o S  1 « ^  o f  C - m **r c e  < | « « 0
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balance o f  paym ents, while at the same time the in c reas in g  home
demand fo r  cap ita l p u t on a brake on cap ita l ou tflow s.32 3
The US was transform ed from  a borrow ing in to  a lending 
coun try  from  the mid-1890s. Since du rin g  1870-95 B rita in  was the 
main in ves to r  in  th e  US, fo r  th is p eriod  the UK new portfo lio
investm ent in the US m ight serve  as a proxy fo r  th e  d ire c t  estimate 
o f  the capita l in flow  in  the US, which is  unavailable. As is  shown in 
F ig  III-1 5 , B ritish  p o r tfo lio  investm ent in the US flu ctu ated  in a 
d is tin c tly  cyc lica l w ay  during th ese years  o f  f ir s t  th re e  Juglar
cyc les , which in  th e  con text o f con tracyc lica l pa ttern  in th e  current
balance o f  paym ents con tributed  to  th e US externa l balance. In
1895-1914, when B rit ish  investm ent in  th e  US fa iled  to v a r y  accord ing 
to the course o f  th e  trade cyc le , and when th e US w as lending
abroad in  net term s, it  appears probab le  that th e US overseas
lend ing varied  in a con tracyc lica l w ay , as a resu lt o f  th e  cyclical 
fluctuations in dom estic demand fo r  funds, thus ba lan cin g  the US 
externa l accounts.33
In  prim ary p rod u c in g  areas, such as A rgen tina , A u stra lia  and 
Canada, where im ported  capital p layed  an essen tia l ro le  in capital 
formation, the c u rren t balance o f  payments and lon g  term  capital
inflow  also tended to  move in a stab iliz in g  manner. The studies on
32 The close g overn m en t control o v e r  capita l exp orts  also seemed an 
im portant fac tor c on tr ib u tin g  to th e German externa l equ ilibrium . I. 
M. Drummond(1987) p.24
33 Th is cannot be ascerta ined  due to  th e unavailab ility  o f  d irec t 
estimates o f  the annual US capital exp orts  in these yea rs .
A ccord ing to C. Lew is(1938) the US cap ita l was in ves ted  
predom inantly in  th e  American con tinen t, which rec e iv ed  72.7% and 
71.7% o f  total e xp o rted  US capital in 1897 and 1914 resp ec tiv e ly ; 
among the c ou n tr ies  on the American continent, Canada and Mexico 
f igu red  as tw o b ig g e s t  im porters o f  th e US capital. I t  was 
ch aracter istic  o f  th e  US overseas len d in g  that it was la r g e ly  d irect 
ra th er than p o r t fo lio  investment.
the balance o f  payments ad ju stm en t mechanism in th ese areas** show 
th at this is a ttribu tab le  b y  and la r g e  to  th e fa c t that the increase in 
fo re ign  cap ita l flow s in to  th ese  reg ion s  was associated  w ith the 
simultaneous r ise  in to ta l inves tm en t activ ities , g iv in g  r ise  to  the 
increase in  im ports and th e con sequ en t deterio ra tion  in  cu rren t 
balance o f  paym ents, and v ic e  v e rs a .
To summarize th e d iscu ss ion  in th is section: th e cyc lica l
fluctuations in  British ov e rsea s  len d in g  w ere  the outcome o f  both the 
’push’ fo rc es  depen din g upon th e  investm ent and sav in gs  conditions 
in  Britain and the ’p u li ' o f  th e  p roapective  re tu rn  on B ritish  
investm ent in  variou s  reg ion s . I t  was also shown that both the 
m arket-expanding capacity  o f  o ve rseas  lend ing and the cyc lica l 
pattern lik e ly  to  be o b se rva b le  in  the cu rren t balance o f  payments 
during exp o rt cyc les  con tr ib u ted  to  the smooth tra n s fe r  o f  B ritish 
capital; th e la tte r  in g en e ra l appeared  to be somewhat more 
important. In  F rench cap ita l exp orts , the form er mechanism seemed 
to  be even  less  im portant. In  Germany, both the cu rren t balance o f 
payments and cap ita l exp o r ts  tended  to  v a ry  in  a con tracyc lica l 
fashion. Th is  was a ttr ib u ted  to  the cyc lica l movements in im ports 
induced by th e chan gin g  le v e l  o f  a c tiv ity , and to  the com petition 
between fo r e ig n  and dom estic demand fo r  funds. The same
mechanism seemed to  be in  op e ra tion  du rin g  the la te r  two US cyc les . 
In  the e a r lie r  th ree US c y c le s  th e  con tracyc lica l varia tion s  in  the US 
balance o f  paym ents w ere  m atched by  the cyc lica l movements in  the 
inflow o f  cap ita l from B rita in . Capital in flow  and cu rren t balance o f  
payments d e fic it  d isplayed  b ro a d ly  paralle l movements in A rgen tina , 
Australia and Canada. F o re ig n  capita l havin g  financed  a major
34 Ón A rgen tin a , see J. H. W illiams(1920), A. G. Ford(1962); on 
Australia, see E. A. Boehm(1971); on Canada, see J. V iner(1924), G. M. 
Meier(1953), J. C. In gram (1957).
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p ortion  o f  domestic investm ent in th ese reg io n s , th e pattern  o f  the 
v a r ia t io n s  in capita l in flow  re fle c ted  th a t in  to tal capital formation, 
wh ich in du ced  similar movements in im ports  and cu rren t balance o f 
paym ents d e fic it. These various m echanism s ensured  the la rge ly  
e q u ilib ra tin g  movements in the long term  ca p ita l flow s  and balance o f 
paym ents o f  major economies in pre-W W I e ra , and thiB seemed to 
u n der lie  the ’ smooth’ w o rk in g  o f  the c la ss ica l go ld  standard, to which
we now tu rn .
3. Money and Banking under the Gold Standard
An ou tstand in g  fea tu re  o f  pre-1914 monetary scen e was, as is 
w ell-know n , the m aintenance o f  the de fac to  o r  de ju re  gold  
c o n ve r tib ility  o f  m ajor currencies: among our e igh t econom ies, on ly  
in A rgen tin a  and In d ia  c ircu lated  cu rren c ies  w ithout go ld  basis fo r  a 
major pa rt o f  1870-1914 era .1 T h is  system  o f  g o ld  standard is 
known to have w ork ed  in a r e la t iv e ly  o rd e r ly  way, p a r ticu la r ly  in 
com parison with th a t o f  the in terw ar yea rs . As was shown in the 
p reced in g  section, a t  the bottom o f  th e  'su ccess ' seem ed to  lie the 
b road ly  stab iliz in g  fluctuations in c u rren t balances o f  paym ents and 
lon g  term  capital flo w s . The movements o f  these two item s, however, 
h a rd ly  cancelled each  oth er o f f  to  such an exten t as to  preclude 
in ternational g o ld  movements o f  considerab le magnitude.
In ternational m igration  o f  gold  meant changes in the national stocks 
o f  go ld  o f  cou n tr ies  in vo lved . And th is , under the g o ld  standard , in 
turn  could a f fe c t  th e  quantity o f  m oney and in te re s t ra tes  in the 
coun tries  in accordance  with various institu tional s e tt in g s . ThuB the 
poss ib ility  em erges that, even  in th e absence o f  gove rn m en t action
1 In  A rgen tin a , c o n ve r tib le  and in co n ve rtib le  p eriods a lte rn ated : 
1867-76, 1883-85, an d  1900-14 were the yea rs  when A rg en tin e  
cu rren cy  was based  upon gold , w h ereas  in the r e s t  o f  pre-W W I years, 
in con vertib le  paper money circu la ted. India was a s i lv e r  standard 
cou n try  until 1893, when gold  exchange standard was in trodu ced .
For a usefu l accou n t o f  the A rgen tin e  and Indian m onetary  h istory , 
see A. G. Ford(1962) Chap. VI, M. de Cecco(1974) Chap. IV . With the 
resum ption o f  sp ec ie  payments in 1821, Britain retu rn ed  to  gold 
standard . Austra lian  and Canadian cu rren cy  rem ained con ve rtib le  
th roughou t the p e rio d  concerned. H. C. Coombs(1965), R. 
Pom fret(1981) C h ap ter 8. In  the US s ilv e r  was dem onetized  in 1873, 
bu t the subsequent ag ita tion  fo r  s i lv e r  succeeded in th e  partial 
réin trodu ction  o f  s i lv e r  during 1878-1893. Although th e  centra l 
position o f  go ld  was rea ffirm ed a fte r  th e repeal o f  th e Sherm an S ilver 
A c t in 1893, it  was no t until 1900 th at the gold  s tan dard  was lega lly  
adopted . M. Friedm an & A. J. S ch w artz ( 1963b). In  Germ any a fu ll 
gold  standard  was estab lished  by law in  1876. F rance w as on 
bimetallism be fo re  1873, when the co in age  o f  s ilv er  was lim ited; in 
1876 France s topped  s ilv e r  coinage. M. de Cecco(1984) C hapter I II .
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in flu en cin g  m oney supp ly, exogen ou s  monetary shocks are  
adm inistered to an economy.
Such is  th e broad fram ew ork  in  which we shall examine the 
s h ifts  in the money stock, in  its  com ponents, and in the in teres t 
ra tes  o f  fou r g o ld  standard cou n tr ies : the US, Germany, B rita in  and 
Canada. The se lection  o f  th ese c ou n tr ies  is almost en tire ly  based 
upon the ava ila b ility  o f  data. A lth ou gh  fo r  France too k ey  m onetary 
and financial data  a re  ava ilab le , th e  problem s in th e ir  re lia b ility  fo rce  
one to exclude h er from  in ves tiga tion .*  The case o f  A rgen tina  
du r in g  her in co n ve rtib le  era , from  the mid-1880s to  the raid-1890s, 
w ill be dea lt w ith  in  Chapter V II.*
L e t us s ta r t w ith exam ining the changes con cern in g  gold . 
G enerally  speak in g, the volume o f  g o ld  in a coun try  could be said to 
be a ffe cted  b y  both i)  w o rld  p rodu ction  o f  new go ld  and ii) 
red is tr ibu tion  o f  g iven  stock  o f  g o ld  in the world; i f  the form er is 
mainly connected  w ith the lon g  term  changes in national stock o f  
go ld , short term  fluctuations may be  considered  to o r ig in a te  ch ie fly  
from  the la tte r . In  F ig  III -1 6  a re  shown both th e net go ld  im ports 
in to  the US, Germany and B rita in  and the annual varia tion s  in the 
national m onetary gold  stocks2 34 o f  th e  th ree  coun tries . The f i r s t
2 For instance, the estimates o f  F ren ch  ’money stock ’ pub lished  in M. 
Sa int Marc(1983) includes not o n ly  th e cu rrency  held b y  the public, 
bu t also bank cash.
3 For the A rgen tin e  experien ce as a go ld  standard cou n try  in  the 
e a r ly  20th c en tu ry , see A. G. F o rd (1962) Chap. VI.
4 National m onetary go ld  stock  is  d e fin ed  here rou gh ly  as gold 
cu rren cy  in c ircu la tion  and go ld  r e s e r v e  held by c e n tra l(o r  issu ing ) 
bank. In  the UK and German m onetary  gold  stock a re  a lso included 
some non-gold  elem ents, such as  s i lv e r  and bronze su b s id ia ry  coins, 
which are b e liev ed  to be o f  in s ig n if ic a n t magnitudes. The US 
monetary go ld  stock  com prises not o n ly  gold  coins and bullion held 
by the public and by issu ing and non-issu ing  banks, bu t a lso g o ld  in 
the US T rea su ry . I t  should a lso b e  noted that fo r  Germany net 
im ports o f  p rec iou s metal a re  used  instead  o f  net go ld  im ports in F ig
III-1 6  k 18.

th ing  to be noticed in this figu re is the close agreement between the
m ovem ents o f  the two items in  each o f  th e th re e  countries. T h is  
w o u ld  su ggest both that the s h ifts  in  th e go ld  stocks o f  th ese  
c o u n tr ie s  resu lted  mainly from in terna tion a l m ovements o f  go ld  ra th e r  
th a n  from  the changes in dom estic gold  p rod u ction 9; and th a t th e 
d a ta  on  the international g o ld  flo w s  con ce rn in g  the th ree cou n tr ies  
a r e  reason ab ly  accurate.5 6 78
F ig  I I I—17 shows that in tern a tion a l go ld  movements resu lted  in: 
1) th e broad ly cyc lica l p a tte rn  in the US m onetary go ld  stock  
d u r in g  Cycles I I-V ;  2) the cyc lica l flu ctu ations in German go ld  
s to c k  during Cycle I  & V, c on tra cy c lica l va r ia tion s  in Cycle I I  & IV, 
an d  v e r y  weak and irregu la r  m ovements d u r in g  Cycle I I I ;  3) the 
c o n tra cy c lic a l pattern  in B ritish  go ld  stock  d u r in g  Cycle I I  & I I I ,  
p ro c y c l ic a l  pattern  in  Cycle V, and ir re g u la r  movements in C ycle  IV. 
A m on g  these variou s  pa ttern s  o f  m ovements in gold  s tock , o f  
p a r t ic u la r  in teres t a re  the c yc lic a l m ovements in  the US and 
c o n tra cy c lic a l varia tion s in th e UK gold  stock  in Cycles I I  and I I I  
a n d , probab ly, in C ycle I .T F or, as is  w ell-know n, W. E. Beach 
a r g u e d  that in both Britain an d  the US o f  th e  pre-WWI period  g o ld  
f lo w e d  in during upsw ings and ou t du rin g  downsw ings.* I f  B each 's  
s u c h  fin d in gs  are consisten t w ith  ou rs as fa r  as the US is con cern ed ,
5 T h is  should not be con fused w ith  the statem ent that the annual 
c h a n g e s  in the stocks o f  gold  in  th e cou n tr ies  concerned  w ere  due to 
th e  red is tr ib u tion  o f  existing  w o rld  stock  o f  g o ld . For new-m ined 
g o ld  from  gold  p rodu cers  such as  South A fr ic a  and Australia w ere  
m o s t ly  sent to London and r ed is tr ib u ted  to  th e r e s t  o f  the w orld , 
th u s  a ffe c t in g  international g o ld  flow s. A. G. Ford(1962) p.19
6 O . M orgenstern(1955) exp ressed  doubts upon th e reliab ility  o f  
in tern a tion a l gold  movement s ta tis t ic s , wh ile C. A. E. Goodhar1(1968) 
w as  le ss  pessim istic. See a lso F. Capie & A. W ebber(1985) p.207,208.
7 C a lcu la tin g  the phase a v e ra ge  o f  absolute dev ia tion s  from  9 -y ea r  
m o v in g  averages o f  net gold  im ports  in to  th e tw o countries fo r  the 
C y c le  I up- and downswing, on e  ob se rv e s  th at th e avera ge  was 
h ig h e r  in the Cycle I  boom than in  the su bsequ en t depression  in  the 
U S , whereas the opposite  was th e  case fo r  B rita in .
8 W. E. Beach(1935)
International Monetary Assets. AbsoluteFig 111-17 Fluctuations in Monetary Gold Stock or 
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Webbe*1985). G. Rich(1987)
as to Brita in during 1870-95 period  th ey  seem to  con flic t . Beach 's 
g en era lization  on the g o ld  movements in vo lv in g  B rita in  is  d erived  
from  examining the fo u r -q u a r te r  m oving ave ra ges  o f  n e t fo re ign  
movements o f  gold  rep o rted  b y  the Bank o f  England du r in g  the yea rs  
o f  Cycle I I-V ; on the o th e r  hand, the argum ent made h ere  is  based 
upon the absolu te d e v ia tio n s  from  9 -yea r  m oving a v e ra g e s  o f  the 
p roxy fo r  th e UK go ld  stock  as defin ed  above. Such d iffe ren ces  
may go  fa r  in exp la in ing  th e con flic tin g  conclusions on the pa tte rn  o f  
go ld  movements in th e c o u rse  o f  the B ritish trade  cyc les . I t  is , 
how ever, im portant to  n o te  th a t Beach observed  th a t 'in  g en e ra l gold  
im ports [in to  B rita in ] became im portant d u r in g  th e  la t te r  s tages  o f 
the period  o f  business expan sion ’*; one finds in  F ig  III -1 8  that the 
absolute devia tions from  9 -y e a r  m oving ave ra ges  o f  net im ports o f 
go ld  into Brita in indeed  ten d ed  to r ise  during th e last 1-2 y ea rs  o f  
the upsw ings o f  the f i r s t  th re e  pre-1914 cyc les , w h ereas th e opposite  
happened in the case o f  th e  US. I t  is  also seen  in  F ig  III-1 7  that 
in terms o f  absolute d e v ia t io n s  from 9 -yea r  m oving a v e ra ge s  the US 
go ld  stock  reached peaks 1-2 yea rs  b e fo re  cyc lica l peaks in C ycles  II  
and I I I ,  while the UK go ld  stock  beg in s  to r is e  from  th e troughs 
p reced in g  th e peaks in  th e  le v e l  o f a c t iv ity  by  1-2 yea rs . In short, 
in 1870-1895, the yea rs  o f  C yc les  I—I I I ,  go ld  appeared  to flow  in to  the 
US during the early  y e a rs  o f  upsw ings and flow ed  ou t in  the fina l 
yea rs  o f  booms and d u r in g  th e subsequent dow nsw ings, w h ereas the 
opposite happened to B rita in . Such con trastin g  experien ces  o f  the 
two coun tries  with c lose  econom ic links would seem to su g ges t th at in 
Cycles I—I I I  gold  flow ed  from  Britain in to  the US in the e a r ly  yea rs  
o f  upsw ings and in the r e v e r s e  d irection  in the r e s t  o f  the trade 
cyc les  y ea rs . The g o ld  flow  from Brita in  into th e US in  the early  
boom yea rs  and the r e v e r s e  flow in  depression  appeared  to  be 9
9 W. E. Beach(1935) p.77. S tress  added.
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related la rg e ly  to the w ider amplitude in the c y c l ic a l  flu c tu ation s  in 
British investm ent in the US than th at in B r it is h  cu rren t accoun t 
surplus in  Anglo-Am erican trade; the flow  o f  g o ld  from  the US into 
Britain in la te  yea rs  o f  upsw ings was, as shall b e  a rgu ed  la te r  in 
this section , p robab ly  due to the in flow  o f  s h o r t  term  cap ita l in to  
London fo llow in g  the increase in sh o rt term  in te r e s t  rates.
Of th e f i r s t  th ree German trade cyc les , i t  w as  du rin g  C yc le  I 
that German national stock o f  gold varied  in a d is t in c t ly  cyc lica l way, 
whereas in  th e  fo llow ing tw o cyc les  it  showed o n ly  weak m ovements, 
e ither co n tra cy c lic a l(II ) o r  ir r e g u la r (II I ) .  I t  i s  p robab le  th a t the 
cyclical fluctuations o f  w ide amplitude du rin g  C y c le  I  w ere  c lo se ly  
connected w ith  the indemnity payments by F ran ce  a fte r  the F ran co - 
Prussian War, which reached as high as 55% o f  German net cap ita l 
formation d u r in g  1871-73. On the oth er hand, th e  rem arkab ly  close 
agreem ent betw een the movements in  the German c u r re n t  balance o f 
payments and those in Gorman fo re ign  in v e s tm en t(F ig  I I I—14) may be 
held respon sib le  fo r  the absence o f  w ide sh o rt term  va r ia tion s  in 
German go ld  stock during Cycle II  and I II .
From around 1890, besides the state  o f  c u r re n t  ba lan ce o f 
payments and the leve l o f  capita l flow s, supp ly  o f  new gold  b egan  to 
a ffe c t s ign ifica n tly  international gold  movements. World s tock  o f  
monetary g o ld  was augm ented by  29%(by 161m) betw een 1870-90; 
the increase between 1890-1913 was more than tw o fo ld (b y  862m).10 
More than h a lf o f  the new go ld  produced  a fte r  1890 con tribu ted  to 
the grow th  o f  the go ld  stocks o f  the US, Germany an d  B rita in .11
10 M. de Cecco(1984) "p.247
11 B ritish go ld  stock, which was maintained a t th e  le v e l  o f 
approxim ately 110m until 1890, rose th erea fte r  c o n s is te n tly  to reach  
183m in 1913; in Germany gold  stock flu ctu ated  arou n d  120m a fte r  
the aforem entioned indem nity rece ip t from  F rance u n til 1890, b u t in 
the fo llow in g  period  it g rew  stead ily  to record  260m in 1913. The
Thus, the w ider and ir re gu la r  fluctuations in B ritish g o ld  stock  
d u r in g  Cycle IV seemed to o r ig in a te  as much from  the d is ru p t io n  o f 
the r is in g  gold  supp ly  from  South A fr ica  during the Boer W ar as 
from  the fa c t that th is  was an exceptional investm ent cyc le , d u r in g  
which both cu rren t balance o f  payments and long term  cap ita l ou tflow  
d isp layed  patterns o f  fluctuations d is tin c t from the p reced in g  th ree  
cyc les . On the o th e r  hand, du rin g  the German and US C ycle  IV ,  the 
sh ifts  in gold  production seemed to  a ffe c t  trend  ra th e r  th a n  the 
pa ttern  o f  short term  varia tion s  in g o ld  stocks. Thus, in th is  c yc le  
German monetary go ld  stock con tinued to show mild va r ia tion s , w h ile 
in the movements o f  the US m onetary go ld  stock is  o b s e rv e d  the 
same pattern  as in the p reced in g  cyc les : b road ly  cyc lica l, w ith  the 
u pper tu rn in g  poin t p reced in g  that in the le v e l o f  a c t iv ity  b y  1-2 
yea rs .11
Cycle V  is unique in th at go ld  stocks o f  all the th ree  d e ve lo p ed  
coun tries  tended to move in a cyc lica l way. Th is is  the o n ly  cyc le , 
when B ritish  gold  stock va r ied  as W. E. Beach described ; in  this 
c y c le  the German go ld  stock  showed its  w idest flu c tu ation s  since 
C ycle  I; in the US the b eg in n in g  o f  the decline in gold  •■.lock did 
not precede, but lagged  behind the cyc lica l peak in 1907. While 
chan ges in the pattern  o f  fluctuations in cu rren t balance o f  paym ents
dramatic g row th  o f  the US m onetary go ld  stock began in the la te  
1890s: in the 1880s and the e a r ly  1890s it  remained a t around 110m; 
in 1913 it  reached 370m. Sources a re  the same as in F ig  I I I - 1 7 .
12 In  the case o f  Cycle IV, h ow ever, the US having been tran s form ed  
in to  a net capital exp orter, the b road ly  cyc lica l pattern  may b e  
a ttribu tab le  to the w ider con tracyc lica l varia tions in the US fo r e ig n  
lend ing  than those in  cu rren t balance o f  payments. H ow ever, th e  
beg in n ing  o f  the decline in go ld  stock  two yea rs  p rio r  to th e c y c lic a l 
peak(1901) may still be due to the ou tflow  o f  short term cap ita l to 
London as in the ea r lie r  cyc les .
and capita l flows** un derlay  such pecu lia rit ies  o f  C ycle  V, in the 
absence o f  the increase in ¿o ld  production  simultaneous cyc lica l 
varia tions in  the ¿old  stocks o f  th e th ree  countries would have been 
less  lik e ly  to  occur.
A ccord in g  to G. R ich11, Canadian cu rren t balance o f  payments 
showed con tracyc lica l varia tion s, w h ereas the cap ita l inflow into 
Canada m oved cyc lica lly . While th us the two items varied  in an 
equ ilib ra tin g  manner, the short term  fluctuations in cu rren t balance 
o f  payments seemed to  be w ider than those in cap ita l inflow , which 
resu lted  in the con tracyc lica l pa tte rn  in the stock  o f  Canadian 
international monetary a sse ts (F ig  I I I -1 7 ). ,S
Under a gold standard regim e th e sh ifts  in the issue o f paper 
cu rren cy  a re  normally regu lated  b y  those in go ld  stock or 
international monetary assets  held b y  issu ing au thorities , a lthough 
the rela tion  between the two qu an tities  may be c lose or loose. *• 
T h erefo re , the amount o f  cu rren cy  in  circu la tion  in a go ld  standard 
country, con sis tin g  rou gh ly  o f  go ld  coin s and paper cu rren cy , would 
tend to v a r y  in agreem ent with its  g o ld  stock. The fluctuations in
13 Spec ifica lly , it  needs to be rem embered th at B ritish investm ent in 
the US ceased to v a ry  c yc lica lly , and th e US began to lend in net 
terms from  C ycle IV.
14 G. R ich(1977>4(1984)
15 In ternational monetary asset in Canada is defin ed  as Canadian 
monetary g o ld  stock plus secondary re s e rv e s  held by chartered  
banks. In ternational m onetary asse t defin ed  as such could be 
considered  as the Canadian cou n terpart o f  monetary go ld  stock in the 
above examined three industria l econom ies, fo r  the reasons g iven  on 
G. Rich(1977) p.5. Canadian in ternational monetary asset data, 
toge th er w ith  other key  Canadian m onetary and finan cia l series, were 
k ind ly p ro v id ed  by Dr. G. Rich at th e Sch w eitzerische Nationalbank. 
This source is indicated in the fo llow in g  by  G. Rich (1987)
16 For instance, under a fid u c ia ry  system  like P ee l’s  A c t the 
fluctuations in the Bank o f  England notes in  circu lation  follow  close ly  
those in the gold held in its  Issue Department; in con trast, in 
Germany the law o f  1876 stipulated a more flex ib le  rela tionsh ip 
between the Reichsbank notes in c ircu la tion  and its g o ld  rese rve , i.e. 
a proportiona l system. For details, see  Section 4, chap ter V and VI.
m onetary base(h igh -pow ered  money, HPM), defin ed  as the cu rren cy  in 
c ircu la tion  plus bankers' deposits in cen tra l bank, would thus re fle c t 
those in the cu rrency in circu lation and th ere fo re  in  go ld  stock, if 
the b an k ers ’ deposits in cen tra l bank do not sh ift w ide ly.
Com paring F ig III-1 7  and 19, one ob se rv e s  that such indeed was 
the case in the fou r coun tries  in pre-1914 years: as in gold  stock, 
the US HPM tended to  v a ry  p rocyc lica lly ; in agreem ent with gold  
stock , German monetary base followed th e course o f  th e trade cyc le  
in C yc les  I & V and moved con tracyc lica lly  in Cycle I I  & IV, a lthough 
d is tin c t cyc lica l pattern  is  found in m onetary base d u r in g  Cycle I I I ,  
when th e  German go ld  stock  hardly fluctuated ; in B ritish  HPM are 
o b se rv ed  the patterns id en tified  in gold  stock, i.e. con tracyc lica l in 
C ycles  I ,  I I  & I I I ,  ir regu la r  and cyc lica l in C ycles  IV  and V, 
r e s p e c t iv e ly ;  Canadian monetary base moved con tracyc lica lly , 
fa ith fu lly  follow ing th e international m onetary assets. On the other 
hand, i f  in  some countries the agreem ent in the movements o f  the two 
s e r ie s  was not too p rec ise , but on ly b road , this may be considered  to 
be due to  the violation o f  the 'ru les o f  th e gold standard  game’ , as 
in te rp re ted  by Nurkse1T, by  centra l banks.1* We shall see in more 
deta il in  the fo llow ing chapters how the cen tra l bank o r  its 
equ iva len t failed to o b se rve  fa ith fu lly  the 'ru les ’  in the C ycle I I I  
yea rs .
I f  HPM failed to va ry  accord ing to  a uniform  pattern  in the fou r 
go ld  standard  countries, the cu rren cy  held by the public tended to 178
17 T h a t is , the changes in the holding o f  domestic assets  by  a 
cen tra l bank should be in the same d irec tion  as those in its  hold ing 
o f  in ternational assets.
18 See A. I. B loom field(1959) p.49 fo r  e v id en ce  on the vio lation  o f  the 
'ru le s ’ .
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Fig ni-19 Fluctuations in High-Powered Money, Absolute Deviations from 9-year Moving 
Averages
Source: M. Friedman ¿ A . J .  Sctawartz(1970), B. Sprenga<1982). F. Capie Sc A. 
Webbed 1985). G. Rich(1987)
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move cyc lica lly  in a ll the fou r co u n tr ies (F ig -2 0 ).19 I t  would be 
reason ab le  to in te rp re t the cyc lica l p a tte rn  in the cu rren cy  held by  
the p u b lic  as r e fle c tin g  the ch an ges in  demand fo r  cu rren cy ; fo r , as 
we h a ve  ju s t seen, th e supp ly  o f  c u r re n c y  was regu lated  la rge ly  by  
th e flu ctu ations in go ld  stock, in w h ich , excep t fo r  the US, is  hard ly  
o b s e rv a b le  any cyc lica l pattern .
The cyclical fluctuations in th e  cu rren cy  held b y  the public 
resu lted  in varied  pa ttern s  in the movements o f  commercial bank 
r e s e r v e s (F ig  I I I—21): the US bank r e s e r v e  moved cyc lic a lly  in  Cycles 
I ,  I I  & IV, and c on tra cyc lica lly  in  C yc les  I I I  &. IV ; German bank 
r e s e r v e  showed cyc lica l pattern  on ly  in  C ycle I , while in o th e r  cyc les  
it ten d ed  to move con tra cyc lica lly ; British bank re s e rv e  a lso 
flu c tu a ted  con tracyc lica lly  excep t fo r  C ycle IV. In  the Canadian 
case, although bank re s e rv e  data a re  not ava ilab le , th ey  most 
p ro b a b ly  moved c on tra cyc lica lly , s in ce  the cu rren cy  held in the 
p u b lic , rep resen ted  h ere  by  Dominion notes held by the public, 
show ed cyc lica l varia tion s, while m onetary  base tended to fluctuate  in 
o p p o s ite  d irections.
On the oth er hand, as F ig  I I I -2 2  shows, deposits  d isplayed
c y c lic a l pattern  in th e  fou r  c ou n tr ies  under examination, ir re sp ec tiv e
o f  w h eth er  commercial bank r e s e r v e s  moved cyc lica lly  o r
c on tra cyc lica lly . The am plitude o f  the cyc lica l fluctuations in
d ep o s it  money was much w ider than th a t in the cu rren cy  held by the
pu b lic . The cyc lica l fluctuations in  deposits  a lso overwhelm ed the
v a r y in g  patterns o f  the flu c tu ation s  in rese rves , so th at the
19 In  th e  chart fo r  Canada in F ig  I II -2 0 , Dominion notes held by the 
pu b lic  is  substitu ted  fo r  the c u rren cy  held  by the public.
A c co rd in g  to R. Pom fret(1981) p.176, ’R estric tion  o f  the ch artered  
b an k s ’ note issue to a minimum face va lu e  o f  $5 ga ve  Dominion notes 
a m onopoly o f small b ills ’ , while ’g o ld  co in s  were ra re ly  encou ntered  
in Canada. I. M. Drummond(1987) p.10
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Fig III-21 Fluctuations in Bank Reserves, Absolute Deviations from 9-year Moving 
Averages
Source: M. Friedman & A. J. Schwartz(1963fr, B. Sprengerf 1982), F. Capie & A. 
Webber*1985)
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d epo s it/ rese rve  ra tio  tended to  move c yc lic a lly  in  these c ou r itr ie s (F ig  
III-2 3 ).*0 Th is would im ply that th e  cyc lica l pattern  in  deposit 
m oney can more rea lis t ica lly  be rela ted  to  the cyc lica l flu c tu a tion s  in 
th e demand fo r  money, ra th e r  than to th e  p rocyc lica l s h if ts  in the 
con d itions g o v e rn in g  the su pp ly  o f  c r e d it  by  the bank in g  system :
commercial banks in  the th re e  d eve lo ped  go ld  standard coun tries
in c reased  the su pp ly  o f  d epos it money d u r in g  upsw ings d esp ite  the 
d ec lin in g  d epos it/ reserve  ra tio , and v ic e  versa . T h e  cyc lica l
v a r ia tion s  in  sh o rt term in te re s t ra tes , to  be examined below , a lso 
su g ges t the dominant part p layed  b y  demand in the s h o rt  run 
va r ia tion s  o f  deposits: i f  th e  cyc lica l ch an ges in  d eposits  w ere  due 
to  the sh ifts  in supp ly, it  is  more l ik e ly  that short term  in teres t 
ra tes  v a r y  con tracyc lica lly , ra th er than procyc lica lly . Thus, H.
M insky ob se rved *1, the m onetary s e c to r  became more an d  more
un stab le  as an economy expanded, and thus the s e tt in g  fo r  the
ou tb reak  o f  financial crises  was p repared .
The cyc lica l movements o f  the tw o components o f  m oney stock,
i.e . the cu rren cy  held by the public an d  deposits, na tu ra lly  resu lted  
in  a sim ilar pattern  o f  varia tion s  in m oney stocks o f  th e  fo u r  gold  
standard  c ou n tr ies (F ig  I I I—24). S ince th e  cyc lica l va r ia tio n s  in the 
tw o components w ere rela ted  to  the sh ifLs  in demand, i t  would follow  
th a t the cyc lica l pattern  in  money s tock  is exp licab le in  the same 
terms.
The cyc lica l changes in  demand fo r  money appeared  to  express 
them selves a lso in the cyc lica lly  flu c tu a t in g  le ve ls  o f  m arket short 
term  in tere s t r a te s (F ig  I II -2 5 ),  which p ro b a b ly  encou raged  commercial
20 A lthough Canadian depo s it/ rese rve  ra t io  is not shown in  F ig  H I-  
23, it would have fluctuated  cyc lica lly , s in ce  in Canada depo s its  
v a r ied  cyc lica lly  and bank r e s e rv e s  con tra cyc lica lly .
21 H. M insky(1982) chapter 5
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Fig m -2 4  Fluctuations in Money Stock. Absolute Deviations from 9-year Moving Averages
Source: Same as Fig III-19
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banks to v a r y  supply o f  d ep o s it  money in a co rresp on d in g  way. 
The cyc lica l pa tte rn  in sh o rt term  in terest ra te s ( h ow ever, was not 
brought abou t th rough dom estic money m arket mechanism alone. 
Cyclical ch an ges  in demand fo r  m oney also im plied sim ilar varia tions 
in the le v e l o f  interna l d ra in  o f  g o ld  coins from  cen tra l banks into 
domestic c ircu la tion , a ffe c t in g  th e  g o ld  rese rve  held  by  cen tra l banks 
and th eir r e s e r v e  ratios in a con tra cyc lica l manner. S ince in  the 
pre-1914 g o ld  standard system  th e  prim ary o b je c t iv e  o f  c en tra l banks 
lay in m aintaining the gold  c o n ve r t ib il ity  o f  th e ir  cu rren c ies , the 
le ve l o f  c en tra l bank discount r a te s  by and la rg e  depended  upon the 
state o f  g o ld  re s e rv e .21 T h e r e fo re ,  the in terna l go ld  d ra in  from  and 
re flu x  to cen tra l bank could b e  expected  to h a ve  con tribu ted  to the 
cyc lica l ch an ges  in centra l bank  discount ra te s  in th e  pre-1914 
period.
In B rita in , the in terna l d ra in  o f  gold from  the Bank o f  England 
during u psw ings tended to b e  coup led  with ex te rn a l go ld  ou tflows, 
which, as was shown above, w as connected  w ith th e e xcess ive  fo re ign  
investm ent re la tiv e ly  to the s ta te  o f  cu rren t balance o f  payments 
surplus; c o n ve rse ly , d u r in g  dow nsw ings g o ld  coin s in  circu lation  
returned  to  th e Bank o f  E n g lan d , while go ld  tended to  flow  into 
Britain. S ince externa l flow s , a s  well as in tern a l d ra in , o f  gold 
a ffected  th e absolute le v e l o f  g o ld  held in the - Bank o f  England, the 
la tter tended  to v a ry  con tra cy c lica lly . On th e o th e r  hand, the 
’Proportion* o f  the cash r e s e r v e  to the lia b ilitie s  o f  th e Banking 
Department declined d u r in g  upsw ings and im proved  during 
downswings, re fle c tin g  the accom modating respon se  on the p a rt o f  the 
Bank to th e  cyc lica lly  ch an g in g  demand fo r  cash from  the banking 2
22 A. I. B lo o » fieT d (\9t9)
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system.** The le v e l o f  g o ld  in the Bank and th e  'P roportion* w ere 
the two main ind ices, con su lted  when the Bank ra te  was revised .** 
ThuB, the Bank ra te  flu c tu ated  cyc lica lly , w h ich  re in fo rced  the 
cyc lica l tendency in m arket rates, r e fle c tin g  th e  cyc lica lly  chan gin g 
demand fo r  money.
The r ise  in  the London short term  ra tes  a ttrac ted  sh o rt term  
capita l from the res t o f  th e  world  to London, stemm ing the ou tflow  o f  
gold  from  Britain o r  in du c in g  gold  in flow .*5 Th is  meant in o th e r  
financial cen tres, such as Paris, Berlin and New York, the reduction  
o f  the supply o f  sh o rt term  cap ita l, exe rtin g  fu r th e r  upward p ressure 
upon the short term in te re s t ra tes  in th ese cen tres.**  A t the same 
time, to the increase in  the London sh o rt term  ra tes  du rin g  
upsw ings, the Reichsbank and the Banque de France reacted  by 
ra is in g  th eir own d iscount rates; in do in g so, they could defend  
th eir  gold  re s e rv e  m ainly by  a ttrac tin g  s h o rt  term fu nds from  
periphera l European cou n tr ies , ra ther than b y  p reven tin g  cap ita l 
from flow in g into London.*7
To summarize our d iscu ssion  so fa r , in  th e  cyc lica l fluctuations 
o f  two major m onetary va riab les , i.e. money s tock  and sh ort term  
in teres t rates, under th e  pre-1914 go ld  s tan dard , chan gin g le v e l o f  234567
23 C. A. E. Goodhart( 1972) p.218,219. Since note issue was s tr ic t ly  
tied to the le v e l o f  go ld  in the Issue Departm ent b y  P ee l’s  Act, it was 
th rough such in teraction  w ith  the banking system , a ffe c t in g  mainly 
the bankers' balance in th e  Banking Department, that the Bank o f 
England could v io la te  th e ru les  o f  the game.
24 R. S. Sayers(1976) p.30
25 W. E. Beach(1935), A. G. Ford(1962), C. A. E. Goodhart(1972)
26 It  w ill be noted that th e  market sh o rt term  ra te s  in these financial 
cen tres  w ere a lready  show ing r is in g  ten den cy , s in ce  they w ere 
un dergo ing simultaneous upsw ings; and that as aforem entioned the 
cyc lica l changes in  dom estic dra in  o f  go ld  from  cen tra l banks tended 
to in fluence cen tra l d iscou n t rates cyc lica lly .
27 P. H. Lindert(1969) p.52,53
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demand fo r  money in the course o f  the trade  cyc le s  p layed  a ro le  o f  
cen tra l importance.**
A ccord in g  to  Friedman and S ch w artz , money stock  is  determ ined  
by th ree  fac tors : h igh -pow ered  m oney, d epo s it/ cu rren cy  ratio,
d epo s it/ rese rve  ratio. I t  is  not asked  in  th is 'm u ltip lier* approach  
to th e determ ination o f the quantity  o f  money how th ese determ inan ts 
them selves a re  determ ined, and to w h a t exten t th ey  a re  exogenous. 
The equation re la tin g  money stock  to  th e  th ree determ inants** is  in 
fa c t an id en tity , and th ere fo re , does not explain th e p ro c es s , but 
on ly  d escrib es  the resu lt o f  th e determ ination  o f  money stock .*0 I t  
was shown above  that HPM was determ ined  under th e pre-W W I gold  
standard  la rg e ly  by  the le ve l o f  national go ld  stock , w h ich flu c tu ated  
as a resu lt o f  international go ld  m ovements; th at the cyc lica l pa tte rn  
in d epo s it/ reserve  ratio was mainly due to c yc lic a l v a r ia tion s  in 
d eposits  r e fle c tin g  the accommodating response from  th e banking 
system  to chan gin g  demand fo r  m oney, whereas the flu c tu a tion s  in 
the two elem ents form ing d epos it/ cu rren cy  ratio  w ere  a lso determ ined  
predom inantly b y  demand.** 289301
28 In  o th e r  w ords, short term flu c tu ation s  in money su p p ly  re fle c te d  
those in demand fo r  money. The conclu sions reach ed  b y  C. A. E. 
G oodhart(1 °'’ C) L G. Rich(1977) A (1984) upon the b eh av iou r o f  th e 
B ritish  and Canadian monetary sector in  pre-W WI yearB  a re  con sisten t 
w ith  the argum ent made here. I. M. Drummond(1976) p.686 also 
s tresses  the ro le  o f  demand in the determ ination  o f  th e Russian 
money Btock du rin g  gold standard p e r io d , 1897-1914.
29 M. Friedman & A. J. Schwartz(1963b) Appendix B
30 C. A. E. Goodhart(1975) p.136
31 Thus, when M. D. Bordo( 1981) p.124 fin d s  that in  the determ ination  
o f  the UK money slock not on ly  HPM b u t a lso d epo s it/ cu rren cy  ratio  
p layed  an im portant part -  while HPM was the sole dominant 
determ inant o f  the US money stock -  , he could no t be said  to 
'exp la in1 how the money stocks o f  the tw o countries w ere determ ined , 
bu t he is  in  fa c t d escrib ing  the d iffe r e n c e , seen ab ove , in the 
pattern  o f  th e variations in the gold  s tock s  and HPM o f  th e tw o 
countries: cyc lica l in the US and c on tra cyc lica l in th e UK.
1S7
On the o th e r  hand, the main concern o f  Friedm an and Schwartz 
lies  in th e tem poral relationsh ip between the flu c tu a tion s  in money 
stock  and those in the le v e l o f  a c tiv ity : com parin g  the cyc lica l
pattern  id en tified  from  the ra tes  o f  change in th e  US money stock 
w ith  the NBER refe ren ce  cyc les , they found th a t the cyc lica l 
varia tion s in money stock p receded  those in the le v e l  o f  activ ities , 
which th ey  con sid er as ev iden ce supporting th e ir  proposition that 
m onetary fo rces  a re  the ultimate cause o f  the trade cyc les .**
Since the referen ce cyc le  method r e lie s  basically upon 
id en tify in g  tu rn in g  points from various un processed  economic time 
series , what th ey  in fact did was to compare the tu rn in g  points fixed  
from one series  o f  raw data with those determ ined b y  looking at the 
varia tion s in th e ra te  o f change calculated from th e o th er. However, 
’ it  is  a mathematical fa c t that, g iven  any time se rie s  A which 
osc illa tes  in a regu la r  ('s inusoidal’  to be p rec ise ) fa sh ion , the rate o f  
change o f  A w ill lead A its e lf by a qu arter o f  a c y c le ’ .**
W. E. Huffman & J. R. Lothian(1984) appear to  have recogn ized  
such d ifficu lt ies  in  the work o f  Friedman & Schw artz(1963b). They 
thus compare th e rates o f  changes in both rea l income and money 
stock, and reach the conclusion that ’ the m onetary  shocks ... in 
almost a ll instances preceded or w ere coin ciden t w ith the cyc lica l 
con tractions ’ in the US and UK, and th ere fore  th a t 'money was an, 
and almost lik e ly  the, important causative fac tor in  th e major cyc lica l 
con tractions in  both countries ’ .*4 However, p lo tt in g  the annual
rates o f  change in real income and money stock in  each o f  the two 
coun tries  on the same space, one observes  on th e  con tra ry  that the
32 M. Friedman A A. J. Schw artz( 1963a), see also sec t ion  4, Chapter 
II.
33 N. Rau(1974) p.75
34 W. E. Huffman k  J. R. Lothian(1984) p.478,479
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flu ctuations o f  the ra tes  o f  chan ge in rea l income tended to  p reced e  
th ose in money stock in the p e rio d  con cerned .”
Whereas M. Friedman 4. A. J. Schwartz(1963b) w as mainly 
concerned  w ith the economic flu ctu ations in a re la t iv e ly  closed 
economy, Huffman & Lothian(1984) a lso d iscuss the mechanism  o f 
in ternational transm ission o f  the trade cyc les . T h ey  exp lain
in ternational p ropagation  mainly in terms o f  external gold  f lo w s  and 
th e consequent sh ifts  in the money stocks o f  the economies in vo lved :
An unanticipated decrease in m onetary grow th  in th e  UK, fo r  
example, in itia lly  reduced  ou tpu t g row th  in the UK, raised 
(rea l) in teres t rates, p roduced  downward p ressure on th e  rate 
o f  r ise  o f  p rices , and induced  a ba lan ce-o f-paym en ts su rp lu s 
and hence in flow  o f  spec ie  and cap ita l from  the US. M onetary  
grow th  in the US decreased  as a resu lt o f  the sp ec ie  ou tflow , 
the rea l ra te  o f  in teres t rose, ou tpu t grow th and th e  ra te  o f  
rise  o f  p rices fe ll .”
L et us see in  more de ta il what th is m onetarist m odel o f 
transm ission implies fo r  the pa tte rn  o f  fluctuations in trad e  balance, 
cap ita l movements and gold flow s  in the w ord economy co n s is t in g  o f 
tw o countries fluctuating  in broad  synchronization : A, tr a d e  cyc le  
exp o rte r , and B, trade cyc le  im porter. As the expan sion  in A, 
in itiated  b y  some exogenous increase in money supp ly, con tinues, 
accord ing  to this model, the trade  balance w ill d eterio rate  an d  capital 
ou tflow (in flow ) w ill s ta r t (s to p ); th is  causes gold  to flow from  A to B, 
transm itting  expansion to B and in it ia tin g  downswing in A; in  the 
downsw ing A ’ s trade balance w ill im prove and capital o u tflo w  (in flow ) 
w ill s to p (s ta rt); as a resu lt, go ld  flow s  back to A, exp o rtin g  
depression  to B and r e v iv in g  A, and so on. This amounts to  say ing 
th a t trade balance (con sequ en tly  cu rren t balance o f  p aym en ts ) and 356
35 I t  is a lso to be noted that one has d ifficu lty  in id e n t ify in g  Juglar 
cyc le s  in the movements o f  ra tes  o f  change.
36 W. E. Huffman 4 J. R. Lothian(1984) p.459
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cap ita l flow s fluctuate  in a d iseq u ilib ra t in g  way in both countries, 
g iv in g  r ise  to  la rge  scale go ld  movements, which p lay a centra l role 
in  th is model o f  international transm ission  o f  the trade cyc les . 
Furtherm ore, th is  model appears to im ply th at rates o f  in teres t move 
in  opposite d irec tion s  in th e two econom ies.
I t  was shown in the p reced in g  section  that th is  tended not to 
be the case under the pre-W W I g o ld  standard . The cu rren t and 
cap ita l accounts moved in such a w ay as to  cancel rou gh ly  each other 
o f f ,  w ith go ld  flow s  le ft  as a balancing item. Furtherm ore, as fa r  as 
the fou r go ld  standard cou n tr ies  exam ined above a re  concerned , gold  
movements a ffe c t in g  national stocks o f  g o ld  did not have a strong  
and d irec t impact upon the qu an tity  o f  money: money stock was
determ ined predom inantly b y  the v a r ia tion s  in the amount o f deposit 
money*7, which the banking system  appeared  w illing  to supply 
accord in g  to demand. On the o th e r  hand, short term in teres t rates 
showed the tendency  to fluctuate  in  p ara lle l in variou s economies.**
D. N. McCloskey and J. R. Zech er a rgu ed  that ’ the world o f  the 
19th cen tu ry  go ld  standard* was *a w orld  o f  un ified markets, in which 
flow s o f  go ld  represen ted  th e rou tin e  satisfaction  o f  demands fo r  
money’ ... ’ no t satisfied  by dom estic sources'**. Since the national 
trade cyc les  in 1870-1914 tended to  syn chron ize, the operation  o f  
such a mechanism would produce simultaneous externa l surpluses and
37 Not on ly  d id  deposit money accounted  fo r  a g rea te r  p a rt o f  money 
stock  than the cu rren cy  held by the pu b lic  on avera ge , but also, as 
is  shown by  the comparison o f  the am plitude in the cyc lica l 
fluctuations o f  the two items in  F ig  I II -2 0  ft 22, the short term 
fluctuations in money stock w ere exp licab le  mostly b y  those in 
deposits.
38 I t  is tru e th at ’r ea l’ ra th e r  than nominal in teres t rate is  in 
question in Huffmann 4 Lothian. In  th e late n ineteenth century 
w orld , w here in flation expectations w ere  absent, how ever, there would 
not be much poin t in d is tingu ish in g  b etw een  real and nominal in teres t 
rates.
39 D. N. McCloskey ft J. R. Zecher(1976) p.382, 385
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de fic its  in  a ll coun tries, which is  log ica lly  im possib le. In  fact« as 
was shown above, gold  tended to flow in du r in g  upsw ings and out 
during dow n sw ings on ly  in the US, w h ilst in  the oth er th ree 
coun tries  go ld  stock e ith er  did not v a ry  fo llow in g  a uniform 
p a tte rn (th e  UK and Germ any), o r  moved con tracyc lica lly (C an ada). To 
repeat, g o ld  movements w ere determ ined by  i )  th e state o f  cu rren t 
balance o f  payments, ii) cap ita l flows, and fin a lly  iii) supp ly  o f  new 
gold ; an d  the cyc lica l fluctuations in demand fo r  money w ere met 
mainly b y  v a ry in g  the le v e l o f  c red it supp ly.
In  con clu sion , the p oss ib ility  suggested  at the beg in n ing  o f  this 
section, th a t international go ld  movements a f fe c t  the quantity  o f  
money an d  con sequ en tly  the le v e l o f  a c tiv ity  seem ed to remain la rge ly  
a p o s s ib ility  rather than rea lity  under th e 19th cen tu ry  gold  
standard . For in the determ ination o f  money s tock , deposits  p layed 
a dom inant ro le , and th eir  su pp ly  seemed to v a r y  la rg e ly  in response 
to demand. This implies that centra l banks did not ob se rve  the 
ru les o f  th e  game, in terp re ted  in M ichaely’ s sense, e ith er.40 I f  the 
sh ifts  in m oney stock could not be con sid ered  as exogenous shocks 
upon th e  le v e l  o f  a c tiv ity  in  the period con cerned , the in fluence o f  
in teres t r a te s  upon the le v e l o f  investm ent was n eg lig ib le  in pre-1914 
Brita in41, whereas in Germany in teres t ra tes  a ffe c ted  investm ent 
decisions to  some exten t.4* Did then financial c r is es  a f fe c t  business 
a c t iv ity  to  any s ign ifican t exten t in pre-1914 yea rs?  T o  answer th is 
question p ro p er ly  would req u ire  a detailed research  on major crises  
in ou r p e r io d 4*; but as fa r  as Cycle I I I  is  concerned , as the 
analyses in  the fo llow ing chap ters  show, finan cia l c r is es  tended to
40 A c c o rd in g  to M. M ichaely, the ru les o f  the game req u ire  that the 
quan tity  o f  money varies  in accordance w ith the sh ifts  in gold 
r e s e rve . A. I. B loomfield (1968b)
41 J. T inbergen (1951), J. S. Pesinazoglu(1951b)
42 J. S. Pesm azoglu ( 1951c)
43 Such a s  those in 1873, 1890,1893 and 1907.
occur a fte r  the cyc lica l p eak  in the le v e l o f  a c tiv ity , thus p lay in g  the 
ro le  o f  a g g ra va tin g  th e con traction  a lready  sta rted , ra th er than 
in it ia tin g  downturn. Thu s, all in all, the conclusion  appears
in ev itab le  that the impact o f  m onetary fo rces  upon the course o f  the 
trade c yc les  in pre-WWI y ea rs  was o f lim ited nature.
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THE TRADE CYCLE, 1885-1896: THE USA
IV
From this chapter on, we shall concentrate our attention upon 
the courae o f one particular trade cycle, extending from the mid- 
1880s to the mid-1890s(Cycle III ). The cyclical experiences on 
national dimensions in these years will f ir s t  be discussed fo r  the four 
countries playing central parts in the international economic 
fluctuations concerned(Chapters IV-VII); then, it will be shown how 
the broadly synchronous movements o f  these countries were 
interlocked and affected the rest o f the world (Chapter V III).
We begin with the US Cycle III. The US was shown to  be one 
o f the major driving forces in the international economic fluctuations 
o f the pre-1914 period. In  US economic history, the ten odd years 
covered by Cycle I I I  appeared to be a  watershed: the railway
network, the essential basis fo r  the subsequent full-scale industrial 
development, was completed during the upswing o f this trade cycle; 
as a result, the frontier largely disappeared by .1890; the US became 
financially independent o f Europe, o f Britain in particular, by  being 
transformed into a net capital exporter in the mid-1890s1; the
controversy over bistetallism practically came to an end, and gold 
standard was confirmed by the defeat o f the Democratic candidate, W. 
J. Bryan, in the campaign o f 1896.
1 The US continued to  import considerable amount o f capital from 
Britain even a fter the 1890s, but her lending exceeded borrowing.
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Thus, it  is not surprising that Cycle I I I  has received  more 
attention from scholars than the other American trade cycles: C. 
Hoffmann (1970) examined the period o f depression a fter the 1893 
crisie; S. Rezneck(1953) was concerned with the social aapect o f the 
depression; and in R. Fels(1959) is  included the analysis o f the 
process o f the US Cycle I I I  along with that o f the earlier two trade 
cycles. However, the former two are mainly about the downswing on 
its own rather than about the whole process o f Cycle I I I ;  only after 
the publication o f Fels’ study were estimates made available o f the 
key US macroeconomic aggregates for the period concerned.* More 
fundamentally, all theae studies are interested la rge ly  in the 
fluctuations o f the US economy in isolation from the e ffec ts  upon and 
the influences coming from the rest o f the world. 2
2 Such as those published in D. Creamer et. aL(1960), M. Friedman k 
A. J. Schwarts( 1963b)&( 1970), S. Kusnets(1961) and T. 8. Berry(1968), 
among others.
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1. Home Investm ent
Two different estimates o f the US national product, at both 
current and constant prices, are available for the Cycle I I I  period: 
the series by T. S. Berry(1968) and that compiled by  R. B. Gall man k
S. Kuznets and presented in M. Friedman k A. J. Schwartz(1982). 
Apart from these data, we have J. W. Kendrick's estimate o f the US 
GNP at current prices starting from 1889. These are produced as 
Fig IV -1. According to Gall man k  Kuznets series, a t both constant 
and current prices, 188S(T)-1892(P)-1894(T) are the three turning 
points related to the US cycle III , which is consistent with the 
pattern identified in Kendrick's data. On the other hand, Berry'a 
estimate at current prices g ives  us 1885-1891-1894 as the three 
turning points; in his constant price data, it is d ifficu lt to determine 
a trough in the mid-1880s, but 1892 and 1893 were the subsequent 
peak and trough years. In  view o f the fact that W. A. Lewis' US 
industrial production index (F ig  II-2 ) and unemployment rate (F ig II-5 ) 
varied in accordance with Gallman and Kuznets estimate, we shall 
define the pattern o f the US Cycle I I I  as 1885<T)-1892(P)-1894(T).
The annual estimate o f US gross domestic fixed investment at 
current prices begins from 1889, which is produced as Fig IV-2. In 
the same figure are also shown the fluctuations in  non-residential 
investment in the US at 1929 prices. The two need not show does 
agreement, since residential construction accounted fo r  more than a 
quarter o f total investment*; it  could, however, reasonably be 
assumed that the US GDCF broadly followed the cyclical pattern 
observable in the non-residential investment, rising from the trough
3 In  1885-94, non-farm residential investment amounted to 28.5% o f 
the US gross domestic capital formation. S. Kuznets(1961) p.572,577
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in the mid-1880s to the peak in 1892, and falling back to the trough 
in 1896. Since the increase in the US gross fixed domestic
investment between 1889 and 1892 was $1124m, the total increase 
during Cycle I I I  upswing would have been far grea ter than this; on 
the other hand exports grew du ring  the upswing, 1886-92, by only 
$350m. During the downswing, domestic investment contracted by 
$921m(1892-96), whereas the decrease in exports was only $223m(1892- 
95) (Table IV-1). The grea te r  amplitude o f the fluctuations in 
domestic investment than in exports would suggest the leading role of 
Investment in the US Cycle III.
Although annual data on  capital formation by industry are 
unavailable, Pig IV-3 seems to  indicate that the cyclical pattern in 
the US home investment during Cycle in  reflected predominantly that 
in railway and construction investment, which also in terms o f 
averages accounted for the fa r  greater part o f  the total US gross 
investment. According to R. Pels, i f  the US Cycles I  and II  were 
driven largely by railway investment alone, in Cycle I I I  the 
importance o f railway building declined and construction investment 
became more influential.* Th e weakened position o f the railway 
sector in this cycle is revealed in the fact that the annual addition 
to the US railway mileages (P ig  I I I - l ) ,  used here as an indicator of 
the changing lavel o f railway investment, failed to  vary in this cycle 
in as close agreement as in th e  earlier two cycles with the level o f 
activity: whereas railway build ing activity expanded from the trough 
in 1885 to peak in 1887, the US boom did not cose  to an end until 
after 1892.* On the other hand, it appeared that the construction
4 R. Pels(1969) Chap. 6^10.
5 A similar pattern o f fluctuations is observed in  the US rail 
consumption. J. B. Partington( 1929) In M. J. Ulster (1960) are 
provided the annual estimate o f  capital formation in steam railway in 
pre-WWI period, but during the years o f Cycle I I I  they display a 
pattern o f fluctuations which is  at considerable variance with that
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Table IV -1  Key Macroeconomic A g g re ga te s : US
Year Y I X
1883 11228 804
1884 10889 725
1885 10127 727
1886 10521 666
1887 10887 703
1888 10717 684
1889 11093 2272 730
1890 11752 3042 845
1891 12112 2795 872
1892 12691 3396 1016
1893 12497 2842 831
1894 11005 2596 869
1895 12089 2764 793
1896 11445 2475 863
1897 12613 2656 1032
Y: Nominal National Income, I: G:
Domestic M erchandise Exports, M:
M
723 
668 
578 
635 
692
724 
745 
789 
845 
827 
866 
655 
732 
780 
765
b P r iv a t  Domestic Investm ent, X: 
a rch an d ise  Imports
Source: W. J. Kendrick(1961), US D epartm ent o f  Commerce! 1961), M. 
Friedman k A. J. Schwartz(1982)
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investment supported the investment upswing until 1892: F ig  I I I - l  
shown that the expansion o f the US construction activity, beginning 
from 1877, was continued after the peak in railway building until 
1892. Thus, it  could be summarized that the rev iva l o f  home 
investment in the mid-1880s reflected that in railway investment; 
that in  the earlier years o f the investment upswing both railway and 
construction industries played a central role; and that construction 
investment alone underlay the investment boom in 1888-92. In  other 
words, in the cyclical fluctuations o f the US home investment during 
Cycle I I I  the upswing was initiated by railway investment, continued 
by  construction investment, and the eventual downswing was led by 
construction activity.
According to  Table IV-2, the railway building during the first 
long upswing, coming to an end in the late 1850s, was concentrated 
in  the eastern p ert o f the US, such as Middle and South Atlantic and 
Central Northern district; in the second long boom o f th e  1860s 
South Atlantic loot its importance as an area o f railway investment, 
while Northwestern emerged as a new centre o f railway building 
besides Middle Atlantic and Central Northern region; the fron t of 
railway building moved south and further west in the 1880s, U .  
during the third railway long upswing. The westward expansion of 
railway network seemed to bring about the rapid population growth 
in  the west through internal and international migration: in the
1850s snd 1860s Central Northern area showed the largest increase in 
population, but in the following two decades population grew  fastest 
in  the South Western region.*
observed in the annual addition to the US railway mileage and rail 
consumption: whilst the latter peaked in 1887, Ulmer’s estimate o f 
railway investment continued to rise until 1893. R. Pela(1959) p.180 
also cast doubt upon the reliability o f Ulmer’s estimate.
6 US Dept o f Commeroe(196l) p.12,13
Table IV -2  In c re a s e  in the US Railway M ileage b y  Decade and 
Region
up to 1860 1860-70 1880-90
New England 
Middle
3660 834 855
Atlantic
Central
6353» 4224* 4891
Northern
South
9583* 5118* 11818*
Atlantic 
Gulf & Miss.
5463* 1018 8827
Valley
South
3272 1379 6348
Western
North
1162 3463 18803*
Western 655 4349* 14947*
Pacific 23 1911 6903
Source: S ta tis t ic a l A bstract o f  the US, 1899
* indicates th r e e  most im portant areas o f  ra ilw ay  bu ild ing  in 
correspon din g d eca de .
181
In the first railway long swing the extension o f the railway 
network in the states o f Ohio and Illinois was most remarkable*; 
Illinois appeared the sole lead ing region in the second railway long 
swing.* The railway building in the further western states o f Iowa, 
Texas, Kansas and Nebraska supported the th ird railway long swing.* 
It  is seen in Fig IV-4 that although the rela tive ly  eastern statee o f 
Ohio and Illinois participated in  all o f the three railway booms, the 
largest addition to railway mileage waa made during the firs t and 
second long swing. In contrast, it  was only from the mid-1860s that 
the four western states came under the influence o f railway long 
swing, and they experienced the strongest railway booms in the 
1880s. I f  1876-87 were the years o f the fina l railway long upswing, 
Pig IV-4 further shows that i t  can be decomposed into two shorter 
upswings in two regions: the railway boom from  the late 1870s to the 
early 1880s in Texas and Iow a and the other in the late 1880s in 
Kansas and Nebraska. Such geographical sh ifts of the centre o f 
railway building in the course o f the long expansion explain the 
break in the long upswing during 1883-86, which enables one to 
identify two Juglar cycles superimposed upon the US Kusnets cycle 
extending from the late 1870s and the mid-1890s.
In contrast to pre-C ivil War period, according to L. J. Mercer, 
evidence shows that land g ran t railways were built ahead o f  demand 789
7 The railway construction in  the two states up to 1858 amounted to 
one fifth  o f the total railway construction in the US. Poor's Msnual 
at Railways, 1876/77
8 The increase in the railway mileage in Illinois between 1861-71 wan 
equal to 10.3X o f the total increase in the US during the same years. 
Poor's Manual at Railways, 1876/77
9 The sddition to the railway adleage in the four states between 
1876-87 accounted for 2 7 . »  o f  the total addition to the US railway 
mileage in the same period. Poor's Manual o f  Railways, 1886 and 
1890.
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in the post-bellum West.1* In an agricultural reg ion  where railways 
were built ahead o f demand, it could be expected that during a 
pioneer railway building boom railway mileage increases faster than 
the acreage o f cultivation; and that during the years immediately 
after the boom areas o f cultivation increases, w h ilst railway mileage 
remain relatively stagnant. Thus, the ratio o f ra ilw ay mileage to the 
acreage o f cultivation would tend to rise during th e  building boom 
and to  fa ll during the subaequent depression. The movements in 
the ratio in the four leading states in the th ird  railway long 
swing (P ig  IV-5) suggest that 'building ahead o f  demand' indeed was 
the case in these states during the period between the mid 1860s and 
1890.
Iowa and Texas participated in the second ra ilw ay long upswing, 
which resulted in the rise o f the ratio from the late 1860s to the 
early 1870s; then the ratio declined until 1876 re fle c t in g  the increase 
in the cultivated land around newly built railways; the slight rise in 
the ratio in 1875-78/9, in spite o f the low level o f  railway building in 
these years, would suggest that a limit was reached in the expansion 
o f the area of cultivation on the basis o f the new railway lines built 
in the preceding boom. On the other hand, similar developments are 
observed in Kansas and Nebraska between the la te  1860s and the 
mid-1880a: building ahead o f demand seemed to  be carried out until 
1871; then the ratio o f mileage to  acreage declined until 1877/78 with 
the agricultural development facilitated by the preceding railway 
investment; between 1877/78 and the mid-1880s both  railway building 10
10 L. J. Mercer (1974) p.492 He concluded thus a fte r  testing the 
following two hypotheses derived from Pishlow's defin ition  of 
'building ahead o f demand’: i f  railways were built ahead o f demand, 
firs tly  'rate o f profit in its early years will be lass than alternatives 
for the railroad built ahead o f demand'; and secon d ly  'there should 
be a positive correlation between the firm's p ro fit ra te  and its age*.
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and land development stagnated, as •  result o f which the ratio 
stabilized at a relatively low leveL
According to  C. K. Harley, the railway companies in a frontier 
area in the period o f westward movement 'found themselves in a 
"Prisoners' Dilemma" with respect to new construction. Collectively 
the railroads maximized their profits by  not building any line until 
the present value o f the investment reached its maximum. But 
individually each railroad would be best o ff, assuming its rivals' 
action given, by building all lines in its own and its  rivals ' territory 
that it  perceived to have a positive present value.'11 Whether 
railways pursued the jo in t maximising strategy o r chose competitive 
solution depended upon the following two conditions: 'the barriers to 
outside entry* and 'the enforceability o f the collusive agreement’ , 
both o f which change 'to  stake cooperative behaviour more difficult as 
agricultural settlement proceeded'.1*
The railway building boom started in the late 1870s in Texas and 
Iowa with the collapse o f cooperative atmosphere as a consequence of 
the agricultural development and growth o f traffic, which appear to 
have contributed greatly  to the improvement in net railway earnings 
per mile after 1877(P ig  IV-6).U The boom caste to an end in the 
early 1880s, with the estergence o f the state o f overinvestaient1*, as 
is reflected in the decline o f net earnings per mile a fter 1880.(Fig IV-
11 C. K. Harley (1988) p.804
12 C. K. Harley (1982) p.804 Such was the case, both because with 
the progress in settlesient 'the benefits o f entry grew  relative to the 
costs', and because 'threat to  the maintenance o f the cooperative 
option astong the existing companies aroae from specifying and 
enforcing the cooperative outcome.'
13 For a detailed description o f «illusion and competition ass>ng the 
railways in the states concerned, see J. Orodinsky(1962) Chap. V III A 
X.
14 R. Pels(1969) p.124-128, L. If. Hacker(1968) p.197
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6)ia The downturn was followed by  the years o f decline in the 
ratio o f railway mileage to land under cultivation, which, as in 1872- 
75, was due to agricultural development.1*
I t  was not until 1885 that collective restraint from building 
ahead o f demand waa lost, and that railway companies yielded to 
competitive building with the progress o f  agricultural settlement in 
Kansas and Nebraska.1'  I t  would appear probable that the
agricultural development in these states waa at leant partly 
responsible for the brief halt in the fa ll o f the net earnings in 1885- 
87 (P ig  IV-6). The improvement in  railway profitability would have
contributed to the start o f the railway building boom also by 
rev iv in g  stock market: attributing the riae in stock prices from the 
mid-1885 to the beginning o f thé New York Central-Pennaylvania-Weat 
Shore negotiation, Com mercial and F in a n c ia l C h ron ic le  argued that 'the 
transformation in 1885 was based almost entirely on the one idea o f a 
tolerably certain status in railroad p ro fits , whenever the companies 
are placed in such a position that th ey  find it both practicable and 
necessary to maintain rates.'1* The upswing, thus started,
continued until 1887, when signs o f  overinvestment developed, 
including the decline in net earnings p e r  siile.(Pig IV-6)1* In  short,
15 The positive relationship in 1873-1895 period between the net US 
railway investstent and railway profit ra te  lagged by two years, 
which was identified by J. Kmenta k  J. O. Williamson (1966) p.178, may 
pick up auch a sequence o f events related to 'building ahead of 
demand' in the West, as well as the 'cap ita l stock adjustment' by 
established fir  sis, as they interpreted, (p . 175)
16 In  Iowa, the ratio fe ll a fter the railway building peak only in 1885 
and resumed to riae until 1887. This appears to be due both to the 
slow growth in settlement in the closing stage o f westward movement, 
even relatively to the not so active railway building in these years, 
and to the decline in acreage harvested in 1887 and 1888, which 
probably had something to do with bad harvest.
17 J. Grodinsky(1962) Chap. XV describes the shift from cooperation 
to competition among railway lines in ths two states.
18 January 9 1886, Com mercial and F ina n c ia l C hronocle
19 Com m ercial and F inancia l C h ron ic le  reported on 5 Jan 1889 that 
T h e  effects  o f excessive railroad building during ths three 
oonsecutive years 1886, 1887 and 1888 were distinctly visible; ths
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the movements in the level o f railway investment during the US Cycle 
in  ia explained both i) by the breakdown o f collusive maximising 
policy due to  agricultural development and the consequent 
improvement in profitability, and ii) by the disappearance o f the room 
fo r  profitable railway building in around 1887 in  western states such 
as Kansas and Nebraska, which virtually signalled the extinction o f 
the frontier in the US.
Aa ahown in the movements o f the index o f the US building
activ ity (P ig  I I I—1), compiled on the basis o f the value o f building
permits, the third railway long upswing, extending from  1876 to 1887,
waa accompanied by the longer expansion in  construction
industry (1877-1892). I t  appeared, as W. I sard argued, that the
railway building boom induced the long prosperity in  the construction
industry by encouraging both internal and international migration.**
The presence o f such a causal relationship aeema to be confirmed not
only by the precedence o f railway over construction long upswing,
b u t a lso b y  th e  fa c t  that th e boom in  con stru ction  a c t iv it y  figu red  in
western and southern part o f the US, where railway investment in
the 1880s was concentrated: Commercial and Financial Chronicle
observed in its 'Retrospect' o f the year 1887 that *The real estate
speculation in town lota became very  active in aome o f the Western
and Southern cities'*1; again in the summary o f  the business
conditions in 1891, it was reported that 'The World's Pair bill giving
Chicago the award was passed by Congress late in February, and this
led to much real estate activity and speculation in  the city. Other
western cities were boomed still more, and public improvements as
supply o f nsw railroad securities that had been created waa immenee, 
the effects o f competition were disastrous to rates, and the decline in 
net earnings o f certain prominent railroads west and southwest o f the 
Mississippi River was almost without precedent'.
20 W. Iaard( 1942a) ft (1942b)
21 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 7 January 1888
well as private building projects were carried on with undue
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I f  the start o f the long upswing in construction lagged behind 
that in railway building by two years, the downturn in the latter 
came five years after the railway investment peak, La. in 1892. 
Since prosperity in the construction industry depended upon the 
volume o f the investment opportunities opened by railway building, 
construction activity came to an end, when in 1892 the stock o f 
opportunities created by railway sector until 1887 were fu lly  
exploited, while new outlets fo r profitable construction were not being 
opened up rapidly enough with railway building in depression.** 
Thus, in discussing the causes behind the financial crisis in 1893, 
Sprague observed, 'In the Southern States real estate speculation in 
town lots and mineral lands seems to have been the most unsound 
element in the situation*; 'the enterprises which had failed were not 
worthy, and there were many more whose situation would have been 
made worse rather than better by additional capital, and an even  
greater number whose further expansion would have served on ly  to
22 Commercial and Financial Chronicla, 3 January 1891. The 
Economist is more specific on the connection between railway building 
and construction in the US: 'Soste months ago the speculative 
activity in the US, which had begun to withdraw from the stock 
markets, found a nsw and congenial sphere in land and real estate 
speculation ... this land speculation is daily beooming store prominent 
in the West and South-West. I t  is  following ... in the wake at the 
new railroad building, and encouraged by the large imstigration 
present and prospective ... In  Kansas, it is  stated, the speculation 
keeps full abreaat of the railway surveys for routes ...*(11 June 1887)
23 When the level o f construction activity in the US(CIt) was 
regressed fo r  the period 1868-95 upon the level o f railway building 
leading by fiv e  years(RI**), long term interest rate(lh) and the 
index o f construction cost(CC«), the following result was obtained:
C It :  7 3 .16  4  0 .0 0 1 R Iv-« -  1 3 .2 5 R . -  0 .0 2 C C ,,
O t-.o» (1 .1 4 ) (fe.o S) (o.<rt)
Adjusted R*=0.67, DWrl.54
(t-statistics in parentheses, statistics based upon Oochrane-Orcutt 
iterative technique)
provide fac ilities  for the production o f commodities already in excess 
o f profitable demand’.M
The downswing in the US domestic investment, thus started, 
touched a bottom in 1896, and thereafter resumed its riss. As was 
already shown1*, the rev iva l o f home investment was largely 
attributable neither to construction nor to railway building, but to 
the development o f electricity-baaed industries, such as electric ligh t 
and power, telephone and street and electric railways.** Various 
inventions related to the use o f electricity may be held responsible to 
s considerable extent for the emergence o f theee industries; it also 
appeared that the growth o f numerous cities during the construction 
boom o f the 1880s and the early  1890s stimulated the development o f 
these industries o f mainly urban nature, in particular street and 
electrical railway, the most important o f the three electrical 
industries.
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TO summarise our discussion so far: the upturn in 1885 was
related to  the beginning o f  railway building boom in Kansas and 
Nebraska, where the cooperative policy collapsed under the influence 
o f the p rogress in agricultural settlement around the railway lines 
built during the preceding upewing(late 1860s -  early 1870s); the 
downturn in  1892 reflected the end o f expansion in construction 
activity follow ing the exhaustion of profitable opportunities created 
by internal and international migration, which was induced by the
24 O. If. W. Sprague( 1910) p.161,165 
26 8ection 1, Chapter III.
26 R. Pels discounts the importance o f electrical industries in the 
revival o f the US home investsmnt in the mid-1890s: 'neither railroad 
nor building construction o ffered  opportunities comparable to those a 
few years earlier ... New industries that were later to bscosm so 
important -  automobiles and electric power -  did not yet amount to 
much. Investment opportunities apparently were few and uninviting 
in the firs t half o f 1897. R. P e l. (1959) p.208
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railway building boom in 1875-1887; the rev iva l in the mid-1890a 
aoemed to be supported to  a  great extent by  the development o f 
electrical induatriesf which ia a t leaat partly explicable by the growth 
o f urban centres in the previous construction boom. Thus, the 
picture emerges that one form o f  investaient opens up the outlet for 
another form o f investment: railway building in  the late 1860s and 
early 1870a prepared the ground for the railway boom in the 1880a, 
which induced long upswing in  construction, during which in turn 
was created the basis fo r  the development o f  electrical industries 
after the mid-1890s.
Finally, two points remain to be mentioned: firs tly , the
downturn o f the US construction activity after 1892 did not appear to 
be cloeely connected with the development o f fu l l  employment 
ceiling1. The variations in the wages o f bricklayers, in brick prices, 
and in construction cost index (F ig  TV-7) do not reveal any aerious 
shortage in the supply o f  productive factors around the upper 
turning point. Secondly, while the existence o f  a monetary ceiling 
will be discussed in the fourth  section o f this chapter in the context 
of the determination o f money stock, according to  Harley the rate o f 
interest o f railroad bonds fa ils  to account fo r  the fluctuations in the 
US railway in vest am nt in the late 19th century.** In oontrast, as 
we have eeen above**, the variations in long term interest rate 
appeared to have significant influence upon the level o f construction 
activity.
27 C. K. Harley (1982) p.816-818
28 See footnote 22, this section.
FigIV-7 Movements of the Prices o f Productive Factors: US
Source: US Department o f LabouKl934). US Department o f  Commerce(1961)
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2. Overseas Trade and Borrowing
During Cycle I I I  the value o f US merchandise export* and 
imports showed cyclical fluctuation*(Pig IV-8). I t  is unfortunate 
that neither the US overeea* trade volume data nor export and 
import price indices are available. The cyclical pattern in value, 
however, seem* to reflect that in volume: quantities o f m ajor article* 
exported and imported* varied broadly following the pattern  o f the 
US Cycle III. I f  the cyclical fluctuations in imports re flected  th* 
shifts in the US level o f activity  led by home investment, th e  state of 
the world market, influenced to a g reet extent by that o f  the US 
economy among other*, determined the level o f the US exports.
Not only did exports display far weaker cyclical fluctuation than 
domestic investment during the US Cycle III, but also th e  turning 
point year* in exports variation* tended to lag behind thoe* in 
changing level o f activity (F ig  IV-8, Table IV-1 8 S). Comparing the 
cyclical pattern* of level o f activity one th* one hand and the US 
home investment and imports on the other hand, one finds  that the 
peak in the level o f activ ity  (1892) preceded that in imports (1893); 
that the rev iva l in home investm ent1896) lagged behind tha t in the 
level o f activ ity (1894); and finally that in  other case* , tu rn ing point 
yeara were identical between the level o f  activity on the one hand 
and home investment and/or imports on the other hand. I t  is also 
found that the troughs in exports fluctuations lagged behind those 
for imports. 1
1 Such as coal, coffee, rubber, tin plate, silk, tobaooo and raw  wool 
in import trade and cattle, corn, wheat, copper ore, raw cotton, meat 
products in  export trade. Statistical Abstract for Principal and 
Other Foreign Countries.
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In  view o f both the leading part p layed by home in vestment in 
the p re—WWI US trade cycles, and the dominant position o f  the US in 
the pro-1914 world economy, such a sequence among turning point 
yearo in  the level o f activity, investment, exports and imports would 
su ggest the following: with the rise o f  home investment from 1886, 
the US economy began to expand, increasing its imports from and 
thus exercising expansionary influences upon the rest o f the world; 
this resulted in the increase in the US exports from the following 
year. The decline in construction activ ity  from 1892 brought about 
the contraction o f the economy from the same year, which is  reflected 
in th e  downturn o f imports from 1893. At this turning point, in 
con trast with the preceding one, the downturn o f exports preceded 
that in  imports, which suggests that contractionary forces other than 
the US slump were in operation: the end o f Argentine and German 
investm ent boom in 1889 and 1890, respectively. The interruption o f 
the fa l l  in national product in 1894 was due neither to the recovery 
in home investment, nor to the exports rev iva l, but to  the movements 
o f consumption expenditure(Table IV-3)*; consequently, imports 
p icked up from the same year, while exports and investment began to 
re co ve r from the troughs in 1895 and 1896, respectively. The 
r e v iv a l in exports may be attributed to  the earlier beginning o f 
investm ent booms in Britain(1893) and Germany(1894) than in the US.
In  Pig IV-9 are shown the fluctuations in the US imports from 
d iffe ren t  areas o f the world. The major part o f  the cyclical 
varia tions in the US imports during Cycle I I I  was attributable to the
2 I t  needs to be noted that the recovery in 1896 was not valid, as 
can b e  seen from the fact that the current US GNP declined again in 
ISM , though not to a level below that in  1894(Pig IV -1, Table IV -1); 
the so lid  revival in the level o f activity  c a m  after 1896 with the 
expansion in home investment. Correspondingly, the reoovery in the 
US imports after 1894 proved to be temporary by ooming to an end 
in IS M  and falling until ISM below 1894 level.
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shifts in the imports from the undeveloped world, specifically from 
the non-European periphery: the rise in the imports from non-
European primary producers corresponded to around (SOX o f the total 
increase in the US imports during the upswing, while the fall in the 
imports from the same region accounts fo r  more than half o f the 
decline in the tota l US imports during the downswing. Of various 
non-European undeveloped regions, Latin America was most strongly 
affected by the US investment fluctuations through trade channels.* 
The second moat powerful impact o f the US investment cycle was 
delivered to Britain: the size o f the increase in the imports from 
Britain was about 20X o f the total increase in the US imports during 
the upswing, and the decrease amounted to around 40X o f the total 
fall in the US imports during the downswing. Thus, the variations 
in the US imports from Britain and the non-European periphery 
explained around 80-90X o f the total cyclical changes in the US 
imports.
Correspondingly, primary, rather than manufactured imports 
accounted fo r  the greater part o f the total fluctuations in the US 
imports: the cyclica l fluctuations in the imports o f  coffee, sugar,
crude rubber and raw silk accounted fo r  almost SOX o f the total 
cyclical variations in the US imports during Cycle III.*  Thus, the 
variations in the US import desiand for prisiary products during
3 The rise in the US imports from Latin America explains more than 
BOX o f the increase in the US imports from non-European periphery. 
US Dept o f Oommeroe(1961).
4 US Dept o f Ooauaerce(1961) To the cyclical fluctuations o f primary 
imports, price amveaenta seemed to make at least as important a 
contribution as volume variations: for instance, in the case o f coffee, 
volusie showed 49X increase during the upswing and 16X decrease 
during the downswing, while price rose by 164X and fe ll by 67X; on 
the other hand, sugar import volume rose and fe ll by 69X and 18X, 
whereas 32X and 39X were the corresponding figures fo r  sugar 
import price. US Dept o f Oommerce(1961) Presumably these prices 
were world p rices and oould have had cyclical effects on some 
European import values.
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Cycle I I I  could be said to  have made themselves fe lt almost entirely 
in Latin America, whilst th e  shifts in the US manufactured imports 
seemed to be reflected mostly in her imports from Britain.
The cyclical fluctuations in the US exports to various regions 
are presented as P i* IV -10. In  contrast to  the US import trade, in 
the US exports Britain p layed  a much more important part than the 
periphery. Not only were th e  US exports to  Britain fa r greater than 
the US exports to undeveloped areas in terms o f average, but also 
the former displayed wider fluctuations than the latter. Moreover, 
although the US exports to  the non-Buropean periphery tended to 
exceed those to European agricultural areas, the former remained 
more stable than the latter, and even than the US exports to Prance; 
however, the exports to non-Buropean primary producers showed 
wider variations than those to  Germany.
The important position occupied by developed markets such as 
Britain and France in the US exports fluctuations and the relative 
stability o f undeveloped m arket appear to  be connected with the 
predominance o f primary products in the US exports: almost 80% o f 
the increase in the US exports  during the upswing o f Cycle I I I  is 
explained by the expansion in  the exports o f such primary products 
as raw cotton, wheat and w heat flour, meat products, and animal fats 
and oils; on the other hand during the following downswing the 
decline in wheat exports a lone amounted to 65X o f the total decrease 
in the US exports.*
5 Similar figure is obtained in  terms of average: during 1886-1895 
around 78% o f total US exports  consisted o f  crude material, crude 
food stuffs and manufactured foodstuffs. R. M. Robertson(1973) 
p.366 As in imports, p rice fluctuations made a significant 
contribution to the cyclical pattern in the US export value: wheat 
export price displayed 20% cyclica l increase and 44% decline, whereas 
wheat export volume rose b y  241% during the upswing and fe ll by 
61% during the downswing; in  the csss o f  cotton, price roee and fe ll
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Such having been the case, aa P ro fessor S. B. Saul has shown,
the US maintained a balance of paym ent« surplus in her relations
with Britain, while the opposite resulted from the transactions with
undeveloped world.* It  appears that, as Table IV-4 shows, the
deficit and surplus grew during the upsw ing and contracted during
the downswing o f Cycle III. Furthermore, since the deficit with the
undeveloped world changed by a g rea te r  amount than the surplus
with Britain, the overall visible trade balsnce(VTB) moved in a
roughly contracyclical way (Fig IV-11). VTB declined during the firs t
three years o f upswing (1885-88), mainly due to the rise in imports;
then it  improved until 1892, which is explicable by the rapid rise in
the US exports, reflecting the expansion o f  the world economy with
the progress o f the US and German investment booms and the active
British overseas lending. The sharp decline in 1893 could be related
both to the further rise in imports to a peak as a lagged response to
the peaking in the level o f activity in th e  preceding year and, more
significantly, to the downturn in exports, reflecting the beginning o f
the contraction o f the world economy due to the termination o f the
German home investment boom in 1890 and the decline in British
overseas lending a fter 1889*; the depression and the consequent
sharp decline in Imports brought about the big improvement in VTB
in 1894. With the resumption o f grow th  in the level o f activity and
the consequent increase in imports, VTB fe l l  in 1895; in the following
two years, however, it  improved, instead o f continuing to fall as at
the beginning o f Cycle III. This may he related both to  the rapid
by 7X and 45%, while volume showed 58% increase and 25% decrease. 
US Dept o f Commerce( 1961)
6 8. B. Saul (I960) p.58
7 Since the German domestic investment and imports reached peaks in 
1890 and in 1891, respectively, and since the level o f activ ity  in 
Britain and British imports peeked in 1891, it  could be attributed to 
price movements that the US exports to  th e  two countries did not 
begin to  fall until a fter 1892.
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T a b le  IV -4  US T ra de  Balance w ith  B rita in  and 
T u rn in g  Points, $ra
B rita in
P e r ip h e ry
Trough Peak T rou gh
(1885) (1892) (1894)
261 343 324
-86 -193 -117
U n deve lop ed  World at
S o u rce : US Department o f  Commerce(1961)
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increase in exports in 1896 and 1897 due to the earlier start of 
investment booms in Germany and Britain and to the relatively slow 
increase in imports owing to  the weak and unstable nature o f the 
expansion in these years.
I f  visible trade tended to  show surplus, the US recorded deficit 
in her invisible trade with the rest of the world during the years o f 
Cycle III(F ig  TV-11). Since th e  deficit tended to exceed the surplus, 
the US current balance o f payments(CB) usually remained in deficit. 
The current balance o f payments moved in  close agreement with VTB, 
for the invisible trade balance(ITB) varied in neither cyclical nor 
contracyclical, but in a weakly irregular way. In  Pig IV -11 are also 
shown the movements o f the British new portfolio investment in the 
US, which, when inverted, broadly fall upon the line showing the 
variations o f the US current balance o f payments. This would imply 
that the US current account d e fic it was by and large financed by the 
import o f long term capital from  Britain.
I t  was seen in Section 2  o f Chapter i n  that the level o f the 
British portfolio investment in  the US during the years 1872-95 was 
determined largely by the puah factors on the British side, rather 
than by the pull o f investment opportunities in the US, the latter 
represented by the net ra ilway earnings per mile in the preceding 
year under the assumption tha t moat o f British investment in the US 
was directed to railway sector. In Cycle IJI, however, 'Purchases of 
American railway shares! by British  investors) were important only in 
the early part o f this boom*, i.e . in 1885-87; in the later years o f the 
expansion in the British investment in the US, 1888-90, investment in 
American trust companies and industrial enterprises, such as brewing.
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■mat packing and milling, assumed new importance.* Therefore, as 
far as the British investment in the US during Cycle I I I  is 
concerned, railway earnings may not be regarded as the best index 
o f the American ’pull*. And it could be the case that in Cycle II I  
the influence coming from the US investment conditions was not so 
weak as the US equation in Section 2 o f Chapter I I I  suggests. 
Indeed, D. R. Adler ftresees the role o f  the changes in American 
conditions in  the beginning o f the expansion o f the capital exports to 
the US: i f  the boom in American railway shares in London starting 
in the middle o f 1885 was 'in part a resu lt o f the optimism generated 
by the sale o f West Share to the New York Central', it  was also 
influenced by  the 'large expansion o f trade then taking place* in the 
US.* On the other hand, the crisis connected with the financial 
difficu lties o f the Barings seemed to contribute to a great extent to 
the downturn o f the British lending to the US in 1890.**
Gold flowed into the US during the early  years o f the Cycle I I I  
upswing!1885, 1887 and 1888) in net terms, whereas gold outflow 
began in the later years o f the upswing and continued throughout 
the subsequent downswing period (Pig IV-12).** Such a pattern o f 8910
8 D. R. A d ler(1970) p.159
9 D. R. Adler(1970) p.159 According to Commercial History and 
Review o f  1886 by The Boonomist on 20 Peb  1886, the rise in American 
securities in  1885 in London 's ftsr an almost unbroken fa ll sines 1881* 
was caused by the 'reestablishment o f the trunk-line oompect by the 
action o f Mr. Vanderbilt.*
10 D. R. Ad ler(1970) p.160 According to O. II. W. 8prague(1910) 
p.132, during the summer o f 1890, Le. b e fo re  the outbreak o f the 
Baring crisis, South American securities w ere  crowding out the US 
eecurities in  London.
11 Besides the close agreement between n e t gold imports into the US 
and the annual changes in the US gold stock (P ig III-16 ), the almost 
precisely opposite movements between the net gold imports and the 
percent premium or discount o f sterling/dollar exchange rate, defined 
as '(do llars per pound quotation -  $4.8665)/$4.8666' seem to reassure 
one o f the reliability o f the U8 gold movements statistics. L. B. 
Davis A J. R. T. Hughee(1960) p.54
fo ld  flows reflect largely the gold movements between the US and the 
industrial European countries, Britain in particular.(Pig IV-13).
The net gold imports in 1885 could be attributed to the 
favourable trade balance connected with the low level o f  import* in 
the trough year. In the following year, the firs t yea r o f expansion, 
the direction o f gold flows was reversed; this was due to the rapid 
deterioration o f current account balance with the increase in imports, 
while overseas borrowing grew  only slowly. Gold flowed into the US 
in 1887 probably as a result o f  foreign investment exceeding current 
account deficit. It appears that short term capital inflows also 
contributed to the gold imports in this year: as Pig IV-14 shows, the 
short term interest rates d ifferential between New York and London 
widened since 1885 as a resu lt o f the rise in the New York rates 
reflecting the expanding demand for money during these early years 
o f upswing.1* Probably the gold imports from Prance and Germany 
had more to do with short term capital flows than w ith  long term 
borrowing, whereas in the case o f the gold imports from  Britain long 
term investment was more important. The slight reduction in net 
gold imports in 1888 could be related to the recession following the 
termination o f railway building boom. As a result o f the recession, 
the growth o f foreign investment slowed down, and short run interest 
rates declined in New York, bringing about the fa ll in  the interest 
rate differential and short term capital inflow. In  the following two 
years(1889 ft 1890), gold flowed out in net terms, in  spite o f the 
improvement in current balance and the continued increase in long
12 Commercial and Financial Chronicle also indicates the important 
part played by short term capital flows in the determination o f gold 
amvements in the early years o f  the boom. Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, 14 Nov 1885, 21 Aug 1886, 5 Jan 1889. According to this 
magscine, four major factors influenced exchange rate: short term 
interest rats, long term borrowing, trad* balance, and fina lly  silver 
question.
2QL
Source: Statistical Abstract o f the US, 1894 A  1897
2D5
Fig IV-14 Short Term Interest Rate Differential: New Yorko^r London
Source: M. Friedman & A. J. Schyartz(1982)
term borrowing; therefore, it  would appear moat likely that the net 
exports o f gold in these years were the outcome o f short term capital 
outflow consequent upon the rise in European interest rates. The 
flow o f short term capital from the US to Europe occurred in 1889 
and 1890 in the face o f a widening short term interest rate 
d ifferen tia l Pig IV-14), indicating that the abort term capital 
movements in these years had more to do with the difference in the 
pulling power among financial centres, as shown by P. H. Lindert1*, 
than with interest rate differential. While the increase in short term 
rates in Britain, Prance and Germany in these years basically 
reflected the simultaneous economic expansion in the three countries, 
as we shall see in the following chapters, defensive action by 
European central banks against gold outflow also contributed to the 
rise in the European rates. The net gold exports after 1890 was 
explicable by the sharp decline in long term capital inflow following 
the Baring crisis.
Thus, in gold movements were summarised i) the fluctuations in 
imports, determined by the level o f activity in the US; U) thoae in 
exports, affected by the sise o f the world market, which was jointly 
influenced by the level o f home investment activity in the US and 
Germany and by that o f British foreign investment; iii) those in long 
term capital flows into the US, for which the 'push’ on the British 
side, the 'puli' o f the investment opportunities' in the US, and, 
finally, the Argentine conditions were responsible; and lastly iv ) 
thoae in short term capital flows, explicable largely in tanas o f short 
run interest rates d ifferential and the discrepancy in pulling power 
among financial centres.
13 P. H. Lindert( 1969)
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3. Government1 and Consumption
During 1885-1895 the US federal government expenditures* 
amounted to $316 million on annual average, which was equal to 2.5% 
o f the annual US GNP in the same years. Federal government 
spending varied cyclically, rising from the trough in 1886 to the peak 
o f 1893 by C141 million, and falling between 1893-96 by $31 million(Fig
IV-15). These figures may be compared with the amplitude in the 
fluctuations o f the US domestic investment, $1124 million increase in 
the last three years o f the upswing and $921 million decline during 
the downswing. The cyclical variations in federal government
expenditures are explained mostly by the fluctuations in the payments 
o f veterans’ pensions, which were also the largest single item in 
these years in terms o f average. I t  appeared that the cyclical 
fluctuations in pension payments resulted from the lobbying efforts 
o f the veterans’ organisations during the upswing, which were 
directly influenced by the increasing government revenue during the 
upswing.*
On the other hand, the US federa l government revenue 
fluctuated also in a trade cyclical way, which was attributable mainly 
to the cyclical pattern in the movements o f  customs revenue. The 
cyclical movements in customs revenue reflected the similar pattern of 
variations in overseas trade, examined in the preceding section. The 
reault o f such variations in expenditures and revenue was the 
stabilising movements in government surplus, shown in Fig IV-16, 123
1 In  spite o f its  important role in the US economic development in 
the nineteenth century, state and local finance will not be discussed 
hare due to the lack o f adequate data.
2 This includes transfer payments such as veterans’ pensions and 
interest on public debt, but excludes debt repayment.
3 P. Studenski & H. B. Erooes(1971) p.206, 207
Fig IV-15 US Federal Government Spending and Revenue
Source: USDepaitmemofCominerce(1961).P. Cagan(1965)
Fig IV-17 US Consumption Expenditure
Source: J. W . Kendrick(1961)
rising during expansion and declining during contraction; this ’came 
about primarily because the revenue base ... expanded and contracted 
with the business cycle’ , rather than being 'the result of a positive 
policy on the part o f the government’*.
In  the same figure are shown the variations in the level o f 
public debt retirement, which broadly followed those in federal 
budget surplus: ’The peace time debt policy o f  the federal
government over the 19th century was, in a word, retirement’ .* 
They, however, did not cancel precisely each other off, which 
brought about the changes in the Treasury cash and consequently 
those in the US monetary base. Although, whether one measures the 
real effects o f government sector upon the short term fluctuations o f 
the US economy by the size o f variations in expenditure or by that 
in budget surplus, they were o f minor significance, the monetary 
effects o f fiscal operations appeared to be important, as we shall see 
in the following section; moreover, i f  in the determination o f 
expenditure and revenue the federal government remained largely 
passive, it  seemed to assume a more conscious attitude in varying the 
level o f borrowing or debt repayment, fu lly understanding the impact 
o f such actions upon the availability o f circulating medium.
Consumption expenditure constituted an item in the US national 
income far larger than investment or exports. Since the annual 
estimate o f consumption begins from 1889*, a comparison o f magnitude 
could be made among these three major components o f national 
product for the years 1889-1897: in these years, consumption 4*6
4 J. M. F ireeton e(1900) p.8,9
8 J. A. James (1984) p.193
6 As far as we can infer from the movements in Frickey’s non­
durable output index, consumption appeared to stake its way out o f 
the slump in the early 1880s a fter 1885.
amounted to 74.5X o f GNP, whereas 22.1X and 6.4X were the 
corresponding figures for gross domestic investment and exports.
Consumption, however, seemed to display greater stability during 
the upswing than both gross domestic investment, in both absolute 
and relative terms, and exports, in a relative sense: between 1889 
and 1892 domestic investment and exports increased by $1124 million 
and $286 million, whereas between 1889-1893 consumption showed an 
increase o f $750 million. The downturn in consumption expenditure 
came one year after that in the level o f activity, Le. in 1893, and the 
downswing lasted only one year (P ig IV -17), although the size o f the 
decline in consumption during the one year slightly exceeded the fa ll 
in domestic investment be '.ween 1892-1896. The stability o f
consumption during the upswing and the delayed downturn appear to 
suggest a passive role for consumption expenditures during the US 
cycle III : the shifts in consumption appeared to be induced by the 
fluctuations in the level o f activity , in which domestic capital 
formation played a central part. I t  is, however, important to note 
that the quick recovery in consumption was responsible for the 
resumption o f the US GNP growth a fter 1894. The recovery in 
consumption seemed to be connected with the temporary upward 
deviation o f domestic investment in 1895 from the course o f the 
downswing(1892-96). While home investment fe ll again in 1896 below
1894 level, the induced decline in consumption and national income in 
1896 was slight, so that they remained above the 1894 level. Thus, 
the growth in national product between 1894-96 could be regarded as 
unstable and lacking in a firm basis, which was provided a fter 1896 
by the rev iva l in home investment supported by the development o f
electrical industries.
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4. Money and Banking
The National Banking System, established during the Civil War 
and replaced by the Federal Reserve System in 1913, consisted o f two 
d istinct groups o f banks: national banka and non-national banks.
One o f the important d ifferences in banking functions between them 
was that the former was empowered to issue national bank notes, 
which 'circulated at par throughout the country, no matter where 
th ey  had been issued'.1 Both national and non-national banks were 
mostly 'unit banks', and under the banking system prior to 1914 they 
w ere connected with each other through the correspondent banking 
network, in such a way that the demand for and supply o f short 
term capital in the US were aggregated in the New York money 
market.*
The National Banking System lacked a central bank, although the 
functions o f central bank were carried out by  the US Treasury in an 
inadequate way: the US Treasury controlled the amount o f high- 
powered money by manipulating the balance in the Treasury*; while 
national bank notes were issued by individual national banks, they 
were to be redeemed by the Treasury, and national banks were 
required to deposit with the Treasury redemption funds amounting to 123
1 J. A. James(1978) p.75 Legally, state banks were also able to issue 
notes, but the imposition o f a 10% tax on the note issue o f state 
hanks 'made it virtually impossible for state banks to issue bank 
notes'. R. Sylla(1972) p.237
2 C. A. B. Goodhart(l969)p .l says that 'during the period 1900-1913, 
the institutional structure o f the banking system practically ensured 
that strains arising from fluctuations in the demand, or supply, of 
money within the country would be concentrated within the New York 
money market -  particularly in the market fo r  loans at call secured 
by  stocks as collateral.' See also J. A. James(1978) Chapter IV.
3 C. A. B. Goodhart( 1969) p.33-37
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5% o f  th eir n o te  issue*. The US T re a s u ry , how ever, d id  no t act as 
a 'len der o f  la s t  r es o rt ’ , which ap p ea rs  to  g o  fa r  in exp la in in g  th e 
instab ility  o f  th e  National Banking System .*
A lthough sp ec ie  payment was resum ed from  1879, th is  did not 
mean the es tab lishm en t o f  a fu l l  g o ld  s tan dard  scheme in  th e US: 
th e  ag ita tion  f o r  s ilv e r  was s tro n g  enough to  add $2 m illion -  $4 
million o f  s i lv e r  p e r  month betw een  1878 and 1890(B land-Allison A ct), 
and 4.5 m illion  ounces o f  s i lv e r  m onthly betw een  1890 and 
1893(Sherman S i lv e r  Purchase A c t) to  th e  stock  o f  cu rren cy . Thus 
th e  US c u r re n c y  under the National B anking System , a t leas t until 
1896, when th e  uncerta in ty  o v e r  th e  m onetary s tan dard  was 
p ractica lly  s e tt le d ,  consisted b as ica lly  o f  g o ld  and s ilv e r  co in s, notes 
redeemable in to  go ld , e .g . na tional bank notes an d  the US 
n o te s (g re en b a ck s ), and notes c o n ve r t ib le  in to  s ilv e r ,  e .g . s ilv er  
c e rtifica tes  an d  th e  T reasu ry  no tes  o f  1890.
Such a com position o f  s tock  o f  c u rren cy  in  th e  US was remote 
from  a fu l l- f le d g e d  go ld  standard  not o n ly  in  th a t th e amount o f  the 
purchase o f  s i l v e r  b y  the fe d e ra l g overn m en t a ffe c ted  th e  s ire  o f  the 
stock  o f  c u r re n c y ,  but a lso in  th a t th e  issue o f  th e national bank 
notes, redeem able  in to  gold, w as b y  no means c lo se ly  con nected  w ith 
th e  gold  held  in  the T rea su ry . The 'flu ctu ations in  notes in 
circu la tion  may be accounted fo r  b y  va r ia tion s  in  th e p ro fita b il ity  o f  
note issue, w h ich  w ere caused p rim ar ily  b y  fluctuations in  th e y ie ld  4*6
4 'Though na tion a l bank notes w e re  nom inally liab ilitie s  o f  th e  banks 
th a t issued th em , in  e ffe c t  th ey  w e re  in d ir e c t  liab ilities  o f  th e  federa l 
govern m ent th a n k s  to  both th e  r eq u ire d  govern m en t bond secu rity  
and con d itions f o r  th e ir  redem ption ’ I f.  Friedm an A A. J.
Schw arts( 1963b) p.21
6 In  times o f  fin an c ia l c rises , New York  banks cou ld  be said  to  have 
assumed th e r o le  o f  a  lender o f  la s t r e s o r t  to  some ex ten t, b y  issu ing 
C learing House C ertificates .
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on governm ent bonds'*, r e q u ire d  as the back ing fo r  th e no te  issue 
b y  national banks; on  th e  o th e r  hand, w h ile  the national banks w ere 
requ ired , in  add ition to  th e  governm ent bonds secu rity , to  maintain 
redemption fu nds in th e  T re a s u r y  equal to  5% o f  th e ir  note issue, the 
T reasu ry  go ld  was also s u b je c t  to fluctuations accord in g  to  th e state 
o f  govern m ent bu dget ba lan ce , th e le v e l the deb t repaym en t, and 
in terna l and externa l g o ld  flo w s .7
The US monetary base(H PM ) under th e  national bank in g  system  
is  defin ed  as the to ta l s to ck  o f  cu rren cy  in  th e  US minus th e 
T reasu ry  cash, i.e. th e  ca sh  held in th e  T reasu ry . The total 
quantity  o f  cu rren cy  w as  a ffe cted  d u r in g  the yea rs  o f  C ycle  I I I  
mainly b y  i )  th e ex tern a l flo w s  o f  go ld , i i )  s ilv e r  laws, and i i i )  the 
le ve l o f  national bank n o te  issue. On th e  oth er hand, th e cash held 
in the T rea su ry  va r ied  la r g e ly  accord ing  to  th e s ta te  o f  govern m en t 
budget balance and th e  l e v e l  o f  public d e b t  repaym ent o r  borrow ing .*  
Since, as aforem entioned , th e  fluctuations in  th e y ie ld  on govern m ent 
bonds in fluen ced  national bank note issu e, and s in ce  th e  T reasu ry  
operations in  bond m arket a ffe c ted  th e y ie ld  on gove rn m en t bonds, 
^ in terna tion al gold  m ovem ents, i i )s i lv e r  laws, and ii i )th e  bu dget 
balance and th e  T rea su ry  opera tion s cou ld  be con sid ered  as the th ree  
major determ inants o f  th e  U S HPM.
The quan tity  o f  to ta l cash in th e US showed a d is t in c t r is in g  
trend , a long which o n ly  m ild  short term  fluctuations, n e ith e r  cyc lica l 
nor con tracyc lica l, a re  o b s e rv a b le  d u r in g  C ycle I I I  y e a rs (P ig  IV - 18). 
A ccord ing to  P ig  IV -19 , in  1885-88 the r is e  in to ta l cu r re n c y  in  the
6 J. A. Ja»ss<1978) p.77
7 C. Hoffsmnn( 1970) p.221-223
8 Besides, th e  T reasu ry  d ep o s its  a t commercial banks and o th e r  
m iscellaneous accounts, su ch  as listed in  P . Cagan(1965) p.337, 
in fluenced the le v e l o f  c a s h  held in the T reasu ry .
FigIV-18 Total Stock of Currency, Monetary Base and Treasury Cash: US
Source: M. Friedman & A. J. Schwam( 19636)
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US was due to  th e g o ld  in flow  and th e monetization o f  s i lv e r  u n der  
th e Bland-Alliaon A c t ,  whereas national bank notes ou ts tan d in g  
declined as a con sequ en ce  o f  expan din g public deb t ret irem en t.*  
The increase in  p u b lic  deb t ret irem en t a fte r  1885 was b a s ica lly  
rela ted  to  the r is in g  b u d ge t surplus.1*
During 1889-1891, total cash rem ained stagnan t(F ig  IV -18 ), w h ich  
was the outcome o f  th e  reve rsa l in th e  d irection  o f  ex te rn a l go ld  
flow s, coupled w ith  th e  continued opera tion  o f  s ilv e r  laws an d  the 
decline in  national b an k  notes ou tstand ing. The stock  o f  c u r re n c y  
in  the US resumed i t s  grow th  from  1892, and th is could be exp la in ed  
mainly b y  th e b e g in n in g  o f  th e increase  in  national bank note issu e , 
fo llow ing the v ir tu a l disappearance o f  budget su rp lu s an d  th e 
consequ en t drastic redu ction  in  the sca le  o f  public d eb t rep aym en t 
from  the same y e a r (F ig  IV-16 k  19). For in  th ese y e a rs  go ld  
continued to  flow  o u t  and in 1893 th e  monetization o f  s i lv e r  u n der 
th e Sherman Act w as  suspended in the wake o f  financial c r is is .
As can be s e en  in  F ig  IV-18, th e  T reasu ry  cash m oved ro u g h ly  
in  a con tracyc lica l w a y , which in  con junction  w ith  th e more o r  less  
linear r is in g  tren d  in  the to ta l stock  o f  cash in  the US res u lted  in  
th e b road ly  cyc lica l pa ttern  in  the US HPM, grow ing  from  1886 un til 
1894, and then d e c lin in g  du rin g  th e fo llow ing th ree  y ea rs . Such 
movements in th e T re a s u ry  cash or ig in a ted  la rge ly  from  th e fa c t  th at 
pub lic  d eb t re t irem en t tended to  exceed  budget su rp lu s d u r in g  the 
C ycle  I I I  upsw ing, a n d  that govern m ent borrow ing was g r e a te r  than 910
9 A. D. N oyes( 1909) p .  106-112
10 See Section 3, C h ap te r  IV and F ig  IV -16 . Debt ret irem en t ra is ed  
the p ric e  o f  g ove rn m en t debt, w o rsen in g  the p ro fitab ility  o f  n o te  
issue b y  national ban k s , fo r  which was requ ired  the back ing o f  
govern m ent bonds.
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the b u d ge t d e fic it  du rin g  th e  subsequen t dow nsw ing.11 I f  the
broad  agreem ent in th e pa tte rn  o f  fluctuations in  bu dget surplu s and 
govern m en t d eb t retirem en t as show n  in F ig  IV -16  revea ls  the policy 
o f  retirem en t in the 19th c e n tu ry  US, it  is  im portant to  note that the 
excess o f  retirem en t(o r b o r ro w in g ) o v e r  su rp lu s(o r  d e fic it ) in 
u p sw in g (or  downsw ing) was c lo s e ly  connected w ith  the cyc lica l sh ifts  
in  th e  demand fo r  money d u r in g  th e US C ycle  I I I :  fo r  instance, the 
R eport o f  th e S ec re ta ry  o f  th e  T reasu ry  makes i t  c lear th at in the 
bond purchases in 1890 the fe d e r a l  govern m ent was in fluenced  by  the 
req u est from  ’ the in du str ia l a n d  commercial in teres ts  o f  the coun try  
... th a t la rge  add itional amounts [ o f  cash ] should be at once returned
to  th e channels o f  trad e .’1* In  o th e r  w ords, the cyc lica l
fluctuations in th e US HPM du rin g  C ycle  I I I  re flec ted  to  a 
con siderab le  exten t th e ch an ges  in  the demand fo r  cu rren cy , which 
induced  accommodating resp on se  du rin g  the boom from the T reasu ry  
in  th e  form  o f  both excess ive  d e b t  retirem ent r e la tiv e ly  to  th e sise o f 
govern m ent surplu s and th e  deposits o f  T reasu ry  cash with 
commercial banks.
I f  th e pattern  o f  th e f lu c tu a tion s  o f  th e  US HPM was in fluenced 
b y  th e chan gin g  le v e l o f  dem and fo r  cash  th rough th e T reasu ry
operation s in  capita l m arket a s  well as b y  international gold
movements and the S ilv e r  A cts , th e  cyc lica l pa ttern  iden tifiab le  in the 
movements o f  the cu rren cy  he ld  b y  th e p u b lic (F ig  IV-20) appeared  to 
be almost com pletely th e r e f le c t io n  o f  th e s h ifts  in th e economy’ s 
need  fo r  cu rren cy . Thus, w h ilst th e m onetary base and the
cu rren cy  held by the p u b lic  moved in broad  agreem ent, it  is 12
11 The d iffe ren ce  betw een  b u d g e t  su rp lu s (d e fic it ) and debt 
repaym ent (b o rro w in g ) moved in  c lo se  agreem ent w ith  the annual 
varia tion s  in  th e T reasu ry  cash .
12 Quoted from  the ex trac ts  in c lu d ed  in O. M. W. Sprague(1910) as 
Note F, Appendix.
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ob se rved  th at th e la tter  conform s more c lose ly  to  th e  cyclical 
varia tion s in  th e le v e l  o f  a c tiv ity  than the form er, an d  th a t cyclical 
pattern  is  more d is t in c t and be tte r  defined  in the la tte r .
The resu lt o f  th e  broad ly synchronous cyc lica l v a r ia t io n s  in HPM 
and the cu rren cy  held  in the hands o f  the public was th e  apparen tly  
acyclica l movements in  bank reserves , in wh ich g ro w th  trend 
predom inates(P iff IV -21 ). To determ ine more p re c is e ly  th e  pattern  o f  
th e  weak fluctuations along th e trend, absolute d e v ia t io n s  from 9 
yea r  m oving a v e ra ge s  w ere calcu lated and p rodu ced  in  the same 
f igu re , w here one ob se rv e s  m ildly con tracyc lica l m ovem ents. The 
cyc lica l varia tion s in  deposits (P ig  IV -22) w ith bank r e s e r v e s  changing 
in  opposite  d irec tio n s  resu lted  in th e c on tra cy c lica l pattern  in 
reserve/d ep os it r a tio .(F ig  IV -23) This, to ge th er  w ith  th e cyclical 
varia tion s in  sh o rt term in teres t ra te s (P ig  I II -2 5 ),  w ou ld  seem to 
su gges t that the US banking system  varied  the le v e l o f  its  supply o f  
c re d it  in  accordance with the changing demand fo r  m oney during 
C ycle  I I I ;  ra th er than  the changes in th e supp ly  o f  d ep o s it  money 
be ing determ ined b y  the state  o f  the r e s e rve s  h e ld  b y  the US 
commercial banks.
The im pression o f  the cen tra l ro le  o f  demand in  th e  fluctuations 
o f  deposits  is  stren gth en ed , when we look a t th e  s h ifts  in the 
in terreg ion a l d is trib u tion  o f  bank cash in  th e cou rse  o f  C yc le  I I I (P ig  
IV -24 ). I f  th e to ta l bank res e rve s  in the US v a r ied  con tra cyc llca lly  
d u r in g  the trade c y c le ,  this seemed to re fle c t  la r g e ly  th e  fluctuations 
in  th e cash r e s e r v e s  o f  the banka in the eas tern  p a r t  o f  the US, 
such states as New Y ork , New Jersey  and Pennsy lvan ia . In  contrast, 
th e  h igh -pow ered  bank res e rve s  in w estern  and sou th ern  states, 
such as Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and Texas d is p la y e d  cyclical
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Fig IV-2^- Cash Held by National Banks in Selected States
^ o o o
W yom ing
Source: Report o f the Comptroller o f the Currency, 1897, Vol 1
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va ria tion s .1* Bank cash did  no t show much varia tion s  in rem ote and 
mountainous states  lik e  Montana and Wyoming. In  short, d u r in g  the 
upsw ing  the total bank r e s e r v e  in  the US, declin ing as a whole 
re la t iv e ly  to  tren d  as a con sequ en ce o f  th e r is in g  demand fo r  cash 
from  th e public, was red is tr ib u ted  in  fa vo u r  o f  the banks in  w estern  
state  and a t the expense o f  eas te rn  sta tes  banks, and v ic e  ve rsa . 
Th is  seemed to be rela ted  to th e  flow s  o f  sh o rt term  capital from  Bast 
to  West (th e  la tte r  be ing th e c en tre  o f  domestic capita l form ation 
d u r in g  th e  C ycle I I I  u psw ing ) wh ich w ere  induced  p robab ly  b y  the 
increase  in  in tere s t ra te  d iffe r e n t ia l betw een  the two reg io n s 13 4 15. 
A ccord in g  to  th e r ep o rt  b y  th e  Commercial and Financia l C h ron ic le  on 
th e money m arket in  1887, 'T h e  banks and oth er regu la r  money 
len d ers  reaped  good  p ro fits  on  a  demand fo r  money which k ep t up 
from  March to  December. The tendency  o f  th e operation  w as to
draw  fu n ds  away from  th e A tlan tic  c itie s  to  th e In ter io r and keep 
them th ere , as th e  ra ilw ay b u ild in g  in  the fa r  West and South, the 
specu la tion  in tow n lo ts, and th e  wheat corn ers  in  Chicago an d  San 
F rancisco , all ca lled  fo r  a la r g e  amount o f  m oney'1*. A v e ra ge  g ro ss  
ra te  o f  retu rn  on  p riva te  ea rn in g  assets  o f  th e US banks was h ighest 
in  th e  g rou p  o f  w estern  s ta tes  com prising North and South Dakota, 
Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, W yom ing, Colorado and New Mexico du rin g
13 I t  is  tru e  th a t cyc lica l p a tte rn  is  less  d is tin c t in Kansas and Iowa 
than in  Nebraska and Texas. T h is  is  mainly due .to the sharp  
d eclin e in  bank cash in  1887/1888 in  th e form er states  fo llow in g  th e 
term ination o f  ra ilw ay  bu ild ing  boom; in  th e res t o f  the upsw ing  
y ea rs , how ever, bank cash in creased  in  th ese  states , and d u r in g  the 
su bsequ en t dow nsw ing declin ed .
14 Th is  would rem ind one o f  th e  autumnal d ra in  o f  cash to  th e  West, 
wh ich to  many con tem poraries seemed to g o  fa r  in  explain ing th e 
recu rren ce  o f  fin an cia l c r is es . Im portan t d iffe ren ces  appear to  be 
p resen t between th e  autumnal an d  cyc lica l tra n s fe r  o f  fu nds to  the 
West: in  th e form er case tra d e  d e fic it  on th e  p a r t o f  the eas te rn  
s ta tes  in  th e ir  rela tion  w ith  th e  West was th e  u n derly in g  fa c to r , 
w h ereas short term  cap ita l flo w s  rela ted  to  reg ion a l in teres t ra tes  
d iffe re n tia l la rg e ly  account fo r  th e  la tte r  phenomenon. O. M. W. 
Sprague (1910), C. A. B. Good h a rt (1969), J. A. James(1978).
15 Com mercial and  F inancia l C h ron ic le , 7 January 1888
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th e  C ycle I I I  years, and was m aintained in th ia reg io n  a t le v e ls  3-4% 
h ig h e r  than in m iddle A tlan tic  s ta te s .1*
As a consequence, w ith th e  r is e  in  th e le v e l o f  a c t iv ity  th e  cash 
r e s e rv e  base o f  the banks in w es te rn  s ta tes  was b e in g  broadened , so 
th a t th ey  w ere b e tte r  ab le  to  accommodate th e s u rg in g  app lication  fo r  
fu n d s  d u r in g  the upsw ing. I t  ap p ea rs  th at th e  expansion o f  the 
r e s e r v e  base by  means o f  cap ita l im ports from  A tlan tic  c it ie s  was 
essen tia l in  meeting th e  demand: fo r  instance in  the case o f  the 
national banks in  Ch icago, i f  r e s e r v e s  had n o t been  augm ented a fte r  
1887 and thus had rem ained s tab le , th ey  cou ld  h a ve  supp lied  in  1892 
le ss  than th ree  q u a rte rs  o f  th e  c r e d it  ac tua lly  p ro v id ed  in  th a t year 
w ith ou t v io la tin g  th e National B anking Law; in  S t  Louis, th e  r es e rve  
ra tio  o f  national banks fe ll  be low  th e lega l 25% le v e l  d u r in g  1890-92, 
in  sp ite  o f  the en largem ent o f  bank  re s e rv e  d u r in g  the u psw in g .1*
In  the cyc lica l flu c tu ation s  o f  th e money stock  in  th e US during 
C yc le  I I I (F ig  IV -22 ), demand fo r  money thus p layed  a dom inant role. 
Then , was i t  not th e  case th a t th e  d eclin e o f  m oney stock  a fte r  1892 
was due to  the p resen ce  o f  ’m onetary  c e ilin g ’ ? As was po in ted  out 
above , under the le ss  than fu ll-a ca le  v e rs io n  o f  th e  US go ld  standard 
th e  supp ly  o f  cash to  the US economy(HPM ) depended  upon th ree 
fa c to rs : in ternational go ld  m ovem ents, s ilv e r  law s, and th e  scale o f  
T rea su ry  operations r e la t iv e ly  t o  th e  s ta te  o f  b u d ge t balance. Since 
g o ld  stock  declined a fte r  1888, ex te rn a l g o ld  flo w s  could b e  said to  
h a ve  been  a ffe c t in g  the HPM a d v e rs e ly  a roun d  th e u p p er  tu rn in g  
p o in t in  1892. A ccord in g  to  th e  Sherman S ilv e r  Act, h o w ever , a fte r  
1890 around tw ice  as much s i lv e r  was b e in g  added to  th e US 
cu rren cy  stock as  b e fo re , an d  th is  appeared  to  con tem porary  167
16 G. Sm iley (1975) Tab le  A -3 , A-4
17 R eport o f  the Com ptro ller o f  th e  C u rren cy , 1897, v o l I , p.424
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o b se rv e rs  a s  excess ive  ra th e r  than in su ffic ien t; th ey  th e re fo re  
blamed th e  S ilv e r  A cts  fo r  th e ’m isch ief o f  in fla t ion ’ , and e v en tu a lly  
repealed  th e Sherm an Act as a means to  t id e  o v e r  the c r is is  in  1893. 
F inally , a lth ough  th e T reasu ry  cash had been dec lin in g  ra p id ly  since 
1888, in 1892 th e T reasu ry  s t ill held alm ost ha lf as much as i t  had in 
1888. T h is  would imply th a t th ere  w as su ffic ien t room fo r  the 
T reasu ry  to  in c rease  th e cash su pp ly  to  th e  economy b y  pu rch as in g  
govern m ent bon ds .1*
As to  th e  supp ly  o f  depos its , w h ile  i t  is  tru e  th a t th e  US 
national banks w ere  req u ired  b y  law to  maintain minimum r e s e rv e  
aga inst d epos its1*, th e US national banks as a whole maintained 
re s e rv e  ra tios  fa r  h igh er than the req u ired  le v e l d u r in g  C yc le  III .**
Th e  m ovements o f  sh o rt term  in te r e s t  ra tes  (F ig  I I I -2 5 ) d o  not 
su gges t an y  p a rticu la r ly  s e v e re  s tra in  in  money m arket in  th e  fin a l 
yea rs  o f  th e  boom, e ither: th e  sh o rt term  in tere s t ra tes  fo r  ca ll loan 
market, said to  be 'con s id era b ly  more im portant than th e com mercial 
paper m arket’*1, a fte r  reach ing  a peak in  1890, was on  th e  d ec lin e  in 
th e last y ea rs  o f  the upswing.**
18 N eve rth e less, i t  needs to  be rem em bered th at the T rea su ry  go ld  
was app roach in g  th e $100 m illion minimum sa fe ty  line. A lth ou gh  th is  
con stitu ted  no lega l lim it, red u c in g  th e T rea su ry  go ld , accou n tin g  fo r  
most o f  th e  T rea su ry  cash in  th e e a r ly  1890s, below $100 m illion could 
no t have been  ach ieved  w ith ou t d ifficu lt ies .
19 The le g a l minimum re s e rv e  ra tio  was 25% and 15% fo r  r e s e r v e  c ity  
and cou n try  national banks, re s p e c t iv e ly . On th e o th e r  hand, non­
national banks, L e . s tate and p r iv a te  banks, w ere  not u n der an y  
res tr ic tion s  con cern in g  r e s e rv e . J. A. James (1978) p.97, 98
20 P. Cagan(1965) p.359
21 C. A. B. Good h a rt(1969) p.20
22 Th is , i t  shou ld  be noted, how ever, is  b y  no means unambiguous 
ev iden ce  fo r  th e  re la tiv e  ease in  th e m oney m arket o f  1893 th an  in 
1890, s in ce  i t  is  most p robab le  th at th e  in crease  in  European sh o rt 
term  in te re s t ra tes  connected  w ith  the B arin g  c r is is  con tribu ted  
g rea tly  to  th e  h igh  le v e l o f  th e  US s h o rt  term  ra tes  in  1890.
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I f  a  m onetary ce ilin g  was not resp on s ib le  fo r  th e decline o f  
money atock  a fte r  1892, n e ith e r  d id  the bank in g  system  appear to 
fo resee  th e  p ro spec tiv e  d e te r io ra tion  in business con d itions and as a 
response began to  cu rta il c re d it  supp ly  p r io r  to  the d eclin e in 
demand f o r  funds, tr ig g e r in g  th e  financial c r is is  in  May, 1893. The 
depressed  trade con d itions a fte r  the d ow n tu rn  in  construction  
a c tiv ity  had been w orsen in g  th e  p ro fita b ility  o f  en te rp ris es , and the 
number and value o f  business fa ilu res  w ere  on  th e  increase during 
the e a r ly  months o f  1893**, th e most notab le  example be in g  the 
in so lven cy  o f  th e Ph iladelph ia  & Reading Railw ay Company on 20 
F eb ru ary . Under such con d it ion s  th e d ec lin e  o f  stock  p ric es  is  to 
be expected : index number o f  th e  p rices  o f  Am erican Railroad Stocks 
fe ll  from  47.70 in  January to  45.42 in  A p r il, and i t  reached 42.14 in 
May, fa ll in g  more in  one month than it  d id  d u r in g  th e p reced in g  fou r 
months*4. C o rrespon d in gly , th ere  was a s lig h t  con traction  (b y  $10 
million) in th e loans o f  th e  national banks b e tw een  Septem ber 1892 
and May 1893. Th is , h o w ever , was mainly du e  to  th e redu ction  o f 
loan m aking by  the banks o f  the New England and Middle Atlantic 
S tates, w h ereas d u r in g  th e  same e igh t months th e re  was a  fu rth e r  
increase  o f  £25 m illion in  th e  North C en tra l an d  W estern states, 
lead ing  reg ion s  in  th e business expansion.**
Thus, it  is  c lea r  th at w hen th e c r is is  b ro k e  ou t, the US economy 
was a lread y  in  downsw ing, and th at n e v e rth e le ss  in  w estern  states 
banks had been expanding c re d it  supp ly. Th e  fin an c ia l c r is is , which
23 C. Hoffmann (1 9 7 0 )p.6S
24 F . R. Macaulay(1938) p.A151
25 O. M. W. S p ragu e (lS lO ) p.159, 160 ’During 1892 th e low er rates 
fo r  loans w ere  a c lear in d ication  th at banks wou ld  have been  g lad  to 
lend more than th e  demand o f  b orrow ers  made poss ib le . Th is  
situation  was in m arked con tra s t to  the m onths p re c ed in g  o th er  
c r is es  when e v e r y  ava ilab le  c re d it  resou rces  a t  th e  money cen te rs  
has b een  stretch ed  to  the extrem e limits o f  s a fe ty  and beyond .’ (p .
162)
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began in  May 1893 with the b an k ru p tcy  o f  th e  National C ordage 
Company, did not revea l its  sca le to  th e fu ll un til the fo llow in g  
month, w hen la rge  w ithdraw als o f  money from  New York  to  the 
in ter io r  began . Th is was 'd ire c t ly  due to  th e fa ilu re  and suspension 
o f  la r g e  number o f  banks, both s ta te  and national, and o f  p r iva te  
ban kers  in  the West and South '; 'Quite apart from  mismanagement it 
was in ev ita b le  that some banks should have gone to  th e  wall in  
con sequ en ce o f  the many m ercantile fa ilu res , ... which occu rred  
d u r in g  th e  period from  January to  Ju ly  1893’.**
These mercantile fa ilu res  seemed to  or ig in a te , d ire c t ly  o r  
in d ir e c t ly ,  from overin vestm en t in  the con stru ction  in d u s try  
Thus, th e  line o f  causation seem ed to  run  in  th e  fo llow ing d irec tion : 
w ith  th e  overinvestm ent in  th e US con stru ction  in du stry  began  the 
con tra ction  o f  the US econom y, wh ich fou n d  express ion  in  th e 
d e te r io ra t in g  p ro fitab ility  and in c reas in g  fa ilu res  o f  en te rp ris es ; th is  
b ro u gh t about the decline in  th e  s tab ility  o r  fa ilu res  o f  cou n try  
banks, t r ig g e r in g  bank runs; as a resu lt, cou n try  banks began  to  
w ith d raw  deposits from  th e ir  corresp on den t banks in New Y ork , and 
thus s ta rted  the nationwide bank in g panic.**
26 O. M. W. Sprague( 1910) p l68 , 169
27 See Section  1, th is  chapter.
28 T h u s , in  ou r opin ion, th e s tr in g en cy  in th e  money market 
d eve lo ped  as a resu lt o f  th e d is location  o f  fin an c ia l system , ra th e r  
than m onetary con traction  causing finan cia l c r is is  and business 
dow n turn . M. Friedman and A. J. Schw art*(1963b) a lso con sid ers  the 
d ec lin e  in  money stock  as  a resu lt o f  th e pan ic in  1893.(p.l08-110)
On th e  o th er  hand, ou r u n ders tan d in g  o f  th e c r is is  is  a t varian ce  
w ith  th a t by  H. M insky(1982) k  C. P . K ind leberger(1978 ). See a lso M. 
Bordo(1986). While M insky and K in d leb erg er  s tres s  the increas in g  
f r a g i l i t y  o f  financial s tru ctu re  its e lf ,  in  ou r exp lanation  the emphasis 
is  p laced  upon the a lready  d ep ressed  trade  conditions, o r ig in a tin g  
from  th e  exhaustion o f  investm en t op p ortu n ities , ra th er than upon th e 
dec lin e  in  reserve/depos it ra tio  d u r in g  upsw ing. In  oth er w ords , it  
is  o u r  v iew  that the d e terio ra tion  o f  fin an cia l s tab ility , as exp ressed  
in  rese rve/ d ep os it ra tio  o f  th e bank in g  system , tends to  be 
assoc ia ted  w ith business expansion under th e  g o ld  standard , since 
th e  in c rease  in  money su pp ly  is  made poss ib le, as was shown in  
Section  3, Chapter I I I ,  la rg e ly  th ro u gh  the c rea tion  o f  deposits; but 
th a t th e  poss ib ility  o f  fu r th e r  'r e a l ' expansion decides w hether
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In  summary, th e US expansion from  th e  1885 trou gh  was due to  
th e  s t a r t  o f  the ra ilw ay  bu ild ing in  Nebraska and Kansas consequ en t 
upon  th e  ag ricu ltu ra l developm ent, wh ich b ro u gh t abou t the 
im provem en t in ra ilw ay  p ro fitab ility ; th e  dow n turn  in  1892 was
re la te d  to  the ove r in vestm en t in  the con stru ction  in d u s try  under the 
c o n d it io n  o f  the d epress ion  in  railw ay b u ild in g . The flu ctu ations o f  
th e  U S economy, led  b y  home investm ent, induced  c yc lic a l varia tion s 
in  th e  le v e l o f  m erchandise im ports, w h ils t th e  cyc lica l pa ttern  in 
e x p o r ts  resu lted  from  th e  sh ifts  in  th e  s ta te  o f  th e  w orld  market, 
w h ich  w as in fluenced  g re a t ly  b y  the s ta te  o f  th e US econom y. The 
c y c l ic a l  varia tion s in  th e  US money stock  seemed m ostly to  r e f le c t  the 
c y c l ic a l  changes in  demand fo r  money.
fu r th e r  d estab ilisa tion  o f  financial systsm  is  to  be a llow ed. I t  would 
b e  r e le v a n t  to no te  in  th is  con text th a t in  th e  US 'p an ics  have not 
p re c ip ita te d  cyc lica l dow nturn; a ll o f  them h ere  c ited  h a ve  follow ed 
p ea k s  in economic a c tiv ity * . P* Cagan( 1965) p.227
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V
THE TRADE CYCLE, 1885-1891: GERMANY
A fte r  the 'p re lim in a ry  s tage ' o f  indu str ia liza tion  in  th e  f ir s t  ha lf 
o f  the 19th c e n tu ry , Germany is  said  to  have 'taken  o f f  du r in g  1850- 
1873; havin g  le v e l le d  o f f  in  th e  'G rea t D epress ion ' e ra , German 
industria l d eve lopm en t entered  'm a tu rity* stage b etw een  th e mid-1890a 
and the ou tb reak  o f  WWI. D u rin g  the ta k e -o f f  p e r io d , ra ilw ay
construction  was th e  leading s e c to r , while e le c tr ica l and chemical
industries  p layed  a  cen tra l p a r t in  m aturity s ta g e .1 Thus, i t
appeared  th at in  th e  second h a lf o f  th e 19th cen tu ry  and in the
ea r ly  yea rs  o f  th e  20th cen tu ry , Germ any and th e US fo llow ed  similar 
paths o f  economic g ro w th , which con sis ted  basica lly  in  th e absorption  
o f  two major in n ova tion s , ra ilw ay and e le c tr ic ity ; the fa c t th a t these 
technologies a f fe c te d  in  turn th e tw o economies a t rou gh ly  the same 
time un derlay  th e  b road  parallelism  betw een  th e tra d e  c y c le s  o f  th e 
two coun tries , r e s u lt in g  ultimately in  th e  in ternational synchron isation  
o f  trade c yc les  in  th e  1870-1914 p e rio d .
The y ea rs  o f  th e  German C yc le  I I I  form  a p a r t o f  the 'G reat 
D epression ' p e r io d . While in th e  US railw ay bu ild in g  con tinued to 
d r iv e  sh o rt te rm  cyc lica l flu c tu a tion s  in the 1880s, th e railw ay 
netw ork was la r g e ly  completed in  Germany d u r in g  th e boom 
culm inating in  th e  1873 c r is is , and investm ent opportu n ities  
comparable to  ra ilw a y  expansion d id  n o t appear un til th e  1890s. As
1 W. W. Ros tow (1971 ) ,K .  Borchsrdt(1973), R. H. TUly(1978)
a resu lt, German domestic in ves tm en t a c t iv ity  stagn a ted  d u r in g  the 
Great Depression yea rs  r e la t iv e ly  to the fo llow in g  p e rio d , which was 
translated in to  th e con s id e ra b ly  low er rate o f  g ro w th .1
The o th e r  s ide o f  th e  re la tiv e  le th a rg y  in  German dom estic 
capita l formation in  the la te  1870s and in  the 1880a w as  that in  the 
cyc lica l fluctuations o f  th e  German economy d u r in g  th e Great 
Depression externa l in flu en ces  assumed g rea te r  im portance than in 
oth er pre-WWI trade  cyc les . In  th e German C ycle  I I  th e investm ent 
variations w ere so mild that th e y  seemed to  be ou tw e igh ed  by exp orts  
fluctuations, and although in  th e  subsequent trad e  c y c le  dom estic 
investm ent certa in ly  varied  m ore  w ide ly  than exp orts , th e  state  o f  the 
world  market appeared  to  e x e rc is e  s ign ifica n t exogenou s in fluen ces 
upon the le ve l o f  domestic in ves tm en t, as we shall see  sh o rtly . 2
2 Measured from  peak to  p ea k , th e German NNP a t con stan t p rices  
g rew  at the annual ra te  o f  1.7% between 1874 and 1890, whereas the 
correspon din g ra te  fo r  1898-1913 was 2.4%. Th e  g ro w th  ra tes  
calculated from  the German NNP a t cu rren t p ric es  a r e  1.2% and 3.6%; 
the g rea te r  d iffe ren ce  in th e  r a te  o f  grow th  would b e  attribu ta b le  to 
the con trasting p rice  m ovem ents in the tw o p eriods . W. G.
Hoffmann (1965)
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I t  is  observed  in P ig  V - l  and Tab le  V - l  th a t the g ro w th  o f  
German national p roduct was not in te r ru p te d  in  th e  1880a, and was 
resum ed a fte r  a b r ie f halt in 1891; m oreover, in the German 
in du str ia l production index, which n e v e r  declined  in  absolute term s in 
1880-99, cyc lica l elements a re  r e a d i ly  d isce rn ib le  on ly  a fte r  
d e tren d in g . The presence o f  such a  s tro n g  upw ard  trend led  K. 
B orch ardt to  conclude th at Germany experien ced  ’g row th  c y c le s ' in 
pre-1914 yea rs  as well as in  post-1945 period .*  I f  on the basis  o f  
national p rodu ct se rie s  we may r e g a rd  1890 and 1891 as th e German 
C ycle I I I  peak and subsequent trou gh , i t  is  not s tra igh tfo rw a rd  to 
d ecide when th is  trade cyc le  s ta rted . A sim ilar pattern  is  to  be 
found in  the movements o f  German home investm ent, but one is  g iv e n  
some clue as to  when the investm en t upsw ing  s ta rted : net cap ita l 
form ation in  cu rren t prices  d id  not g ro w  a t all, and in  con stan t p ric e  
term s i t  increased  by  on ly  MklOm betw een  1884 and 1885(Fig V -2 ). 
On the o th e r  hand, German m erchandise exp o rts (T ab le  V - l )  fo llow ed  a 
d is tin c t cyc lica l pattern : 1885(T )-1890(P )—1892(T). Such ha vin g  been
th e pa ttern  o f  movements in  the tw o autonomous spen d ing  item s, we 
may be allowed to  consider 1885 as th e  s ta rtin g  p o in t o f  the German 
C ycle  I I I ,  which was followed by  th e 1890 peak and 1891 trou gh .3 4
German net domestic cap ita l fo rm a tion  a t c u rren t p rices  showed 
an increase o f  Mk 1400 million b etw een  1885-1890 and declined  b y  Mk 
1280 million in 1890-1891, which can  b e  com pared w ith  the g ro w th  o f 
exp o rts  b y  Mk 481 million du r in g  th e  boom 1885-1890 and th e Mk 308
3 K. BorchardtTl982) p.98
4 A ccord ing  to  German unemployment ra te , as seen  in  P ig  I I-5 ,  1889 
and 1892 w ere  the fina l two tu rn in g  p o in t years .
FigV-1 German NNP
Source: W. G. Hoffmann(1965)
Table V - l  K ey  Macroeconomic A ggrega tes : Germ any(Mk m)
Year Y
1883 18014
1884 18540
1885 18731
1886 18935
1887 19280
1888 20716
1889 22249
1890 23676
1891 22624
1892 24061
1893 24357
1894 24361
1895 25254
1896 26979
1897 28714
I X
1810 3259
1960 3190
1960 2854
1980 2976
2230 3136
2400 3207
2940 3167
3360 3335
2080 3176
3140 2954
2930 3092
2530 2961
2830 3318
3590 3525
4150 3635
M
3221
3236
2923
2874
3109
3253
4015
4162
4151
4010
3962
3942
4119
4307
4681
p r ic e s , X, where Y: NNP at cu rren t pricea, 
m erchandise exp o rt value, M:
I: NI at cu rren t 
merchandise im port value.
Source: W. G. Hoffmann (1965), B. R. Mite hell (1981)
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m illion redu ction  in e x p o r ts  in  1890-1892.® Since i t  was a lready 
shown to  b e  reasonab le to  assume th at in th e yea rs  concerned  the
German g ro s s  investm en t was approxim ately  tw ice th e amount o f  net
investm ent*, during th e  German C yc le  I I I  th e amplitude o f  domestic 
inves tm en t varia tion s cou ld  be said to  have ou tw eighed  th at in 
exp o rts  movements to a g re a t  exten t.
Th e  varia tion s  in  net inves tm en t in  the th ree  main fie ld s  -  
commerce and in d u stry , con stru ction5 67 8910 and ra ilw ay -  show th at the 
c yc lic a l p a tte rn  in German net inves tm en t is  a ttribu tab le  mostly to 
th e  flu c tu ation s  in in d u s tr ia l and con struction  investm en t.(F ig  V-3) 
A cco rd in g  to  th e annual ch an ges in  th e financia l capita l o f  major 
lis ted  German indu str ies*, i t  ap peared  th at th e cyc lica l movements in 
inves tm en t in  iron , s te e l and coa l in du str ies  go  fa r  to  explain the
cyc lic a l pattern  in  o v e ra ll German in du str ia l investm ent.
C orresp on d in g ly , in th e  German stock  m arket boom between la te  1886 
and e a r ly  1890, 'th e  shares  o f  th e  mines and o f  the iron  and steel 
con cern s  ... [w e re ] ... th e  backbone’ .* The investm ent booms in the 
tw o lead in g  in du str ies  w ere  c lo s e ly  rela ted  to  each o ther, fo r  iron 
and s tee l trade  was 'th e  la rg e s t  consumer o f  coa l’1*. Since German 
jo in t  stock  ban ks (’K red itban ken ’ ) p layed  an a c tiv e  ro le  in m obilising 
cap ita l f o r  th e inves tm en t in  the tw o in du str ies  du r in g  the C ycle I I I
5 T h e  s iz e s  o f  exp o rts  flu ctu ations in  C ycle  I I I  a re  calcu lated  from 
th e  e x p o r ts  a t cu rren t p ric es  s e r ie s  which excludes th e trade with 
Hanae towns. S ta tistica l A b s trac t fo r  th e P rin c ipa l and Other 
fo r e ig n  Countries.
6 Footnote  2, Section 2, Chapter I I I
7 C onstruction  investm en t inc ludes non -agricu ltu ra l res iden tia l 
con stru ction , pub lic bu ild in g  and w orks.
8 J. K u czynsk i( 1962) p.49-52. T h ese  w ere  a lready  p resented  as F ig  
I I I -5 .
9 11 May 1889, The S ta tia t
10 21 Sep  1889, The Economist
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upsw ing11, b esides iron  and coal, bank secu rities  occupied an 
im portant position  in  th e boom o f  the la te  1880s.
The investm ent a c t iv it ie s  in  iron  and stee l in d u stry  seemed to 
r e v iv e  in la te  188611, a r e v iv a l  which or ig in a ted  from  the increase in 
demand fo r  iron  and s tee l and the consequ en t p rice  r ise .1* The 
increase in demand fo r  and p ric es  o f  iron  and s tee l products  was due 
to  the r ise  in exp orts , connected  w ith  th e  r e v iv a l o f  the US railway 
investm ent from  the trou gh  in  1885.1* In  v iew  o f  the fa c t that in 
term s o f  w e igh t o ve rseas  sales accounted fo r  around one th ird  o f  the 
f in a l p roduction  o f  th e  German iron  and stee l in d u stry1*, and that 
sa les in th e US w ere  o n ly  around 10% o f  German iron  and steel 
p rodu ct exp orts1*, th e nature o f  th e in fluence o f  th e increased 
exp orts  upon th e investm en t a c t iv ity  in th e German iron  and steel
11 For the c lose rela tion sh ip  between banks and in du stry  in th e p re -  
WWI Germany, see C hapter I I ,  P . B. Whale(1930).
12 I t  was as late as on  4 Dec 1886 th at The S ta tis t f i r s t  rep o rted  the 
'w ild  speculation* in  B erlin  bourse, w h ilst The Economist mentioned 
fo r  th e f ir s t  time th e specu la tion  in  ’ bank and industria l shares ' a 
w eek  ago.
13 On 6 Nov 1886, The Econom ist r ep o rted  th at 'Some im provem ent is 
f e l t  in  the Rhenish W estphalian iron  and s tee l industry , ex ten sive  
o rd e rs  havin g  been rece ived . S till p r ic es  have remained in  th eir 
depressed  con d ition '; tw o w eeks la ter, 'T h e  s tee l and metal makers in 
th e  Rhine P ro v in ce , W estphalia and S iles ia  a re  im proving, and p rices 
a re  a little  h igh er .'
14 'The b ig  increase [in  th e US ra ilw ay bu ild in g ] made considerab le 
demand upon iron  and s tee l in d u s try . S ince from oth er a reas  [than 
ra ilw ay  bu ild in g ] too  em erged  s tron g  demand, which could no t be met 
b y  [U S ] dom estic in d u s try  in  sp ite  o f  its  rap id  developm ent, a 
con siderab le  demand was made upon th e European production .'
Annual R eport o f  th e North  W estern Group o f  the Union o f  German 
Iro n  and S tee l In du str ia lis ts  fo r  th e yea r  1886, quoted  in  S tah l und 
Bison, 1887, p.122. A ccord in g  to  the r ep o rt  o f  th e m erchants o f  
B erlin , 'the r ise  o f  p r ic es  d u r in g  th e second h a lf-y ea r  [o f  1886] 
caused an im provem ent in  commerce f i r s t  and in du stry  a fterw ards.
Th e  increased  demand from  th e  US ga ve  th e f ir s t  im petus to  an 
im proved state  o f  th in g s .' 9 Ju l 1887, The Economist. See a lso 
Mottek(1977) p.171,172.
15 P ig  iron production  is  used  here as th e p roxy fo r  the Germany 
fin a l iron  and s tee l p roduction , fo r  a ccord in g  to R. C. Allen(1979) 
p.912 the d iv erg en ce  betw een  fin a l iron  and steel production and pig 
iron  production is  not la rge . T . H. Burnham & G. O. Hoskins(l943) 
Append ix I, W. Feldenk irchen(1982) Tab: 66 A 67
16 W. Feldenk irchen ( 1982) Tab: 71
23S
in d u s try  would appear to  a g re a t  e x ten t psych o log ica l. The
expansion o f  ir o n  and s tee l tra d e  stim ulated th e  production  and 
investm ent in  German coal in du stry .
A ccord ing to  Lan gew iesche, th e flu ctu ations in  German in terna l 
m igration to  and from  c it ie s  in  pre-W W I yea rs  fo llow ed  a trade 
cyc lica l pa tte rn 17 18: h is  index o f  in tern a l m igration  to  and from
German c ities  w ith  popu lation  o v e r  50,000 shows c le a r ly  th e cyc lica l 
in flu en ces upon in tern a l m igration, r is in g  betw een  1887-89 by  19 
poin ts  in  con tra s t w ith  th e  6 po in t in c rease  b etw een  1881-87, and 
th en  declin ing u n til 1893 b y  14 poin ts. Furtherm ore, more than ha lf 
o f  th e in terna l m igration in  the 1880s was from  th e  eas tern  p a r t o f  
Germany to the su bu rbs o f  B erlin , an d  to  cen tra l, n orthern  and 
w estern  Germany.1* Th ese  fa c ts  wou ld  su g ges t th a t the economic 
expansion, due both  to  th e r ise  in  e x p o r ts  o f  iron  and s tee l and to 
th e consequ en t r e v iv a l in  coal m ining a c t iv ity ,  a ttra c ted  labour from  
a g ricu ltu ra l reg io n s  to  commercial and in du str ia l cen tres , w here 
employment opportu n ities  w ere  im provin g.
I t  appears  that th e  in tern a l m igration  and th e  consequ en t 
p ro g re s s  in  u rban iza tion  crea ted  p ro fita b le  inves tm en t opportu n ities  
fo r  th e German bu ild in g  in d u s try . A s  is  shown in  F ig  V -3, the 
movements o f  con stru ction  investm en t d u r in g  the German C ycle I I I  
la gged  con sis ten tly  beh ind  those in  in d u str ia l investm en t b y  one 
yea r, su gges tin g  th at th e  v a r ia tion s  in  in d u s tr ia l investm ent 
produced  those in  con struction  inves tm en t b y  a f fe c t in g  the le v e l o f  
in tern a l m igration. I t  is , how ever, w o rth  p o in tin g  ou t that th e 
increase in con stru ction  investm ent d u r in g  th e upsw ing  exceeded ,
17 D. Langew iesche (1977) p.9
18 F. B. Tipton (1976) p.90
237
a lth ou gh  not by  v e r y  much, th a t in in du str ia l in ves tm en t.1* Th e  
w id e r  va r ia tion s  in  the 'in d u ced ' investm ent cou ld  b e  exp licab le  a t 
le a s t p a r tly  b y  th e fa c t  th a t the German in tern a l m igration  in  th e  
y ea rs  concerned  was a ffe c ted  not o n ly  b y  th e 'p u ll ' o f  econom ic 
expan sion  in  in du str ia l reg ion s  and urban c en tre s , bu t a lso b y  th e  
'p u sh ' fo r c es  in ag ricu ltu ra l d is tr ic ts  s u ffe r in g  from  d ec lin in g  
p rim ary  p rodu ct p ric es  d u r in g  the G reat D epression  p eriod .*0 In  
o th e r  w ords , th e ag ricu ltu ra l labou rers  in  eas te rn  Germ any appeared  
to  r ea c t  more sen s it iv e ly  to  th e  in du str ia l and commercial boom in  th e  
r e s t  o f  th e cou n try  than th ey  would have under r is in g  ag ricu ltu ra l 
p r ic e s , thus p rodu c in g  a substantia l bu ild in g  boom.
Thus, i f  th e expansion o f  externa l demand was a t th e bottom  o f  
th e  r e v iv a l  o f  the investm en t in  iron  and s tee l in d u s try  in  1886, 
fu r th e r  g ro w th  o f  investm en t a c t iv ity  in  th e fo llo w in g  y ea r  was based  
upon  th e  w iden in g o f  both ove rseas  and home m arkets, which w as 
su p p orted  b y  th e p ro g re s s  o f  the US ra ilw ay  investm en t boom and 
th e  b eg in n in g  o f  th e German con struction  boom, r es p e c t iv e ly *1: F ig
V -4  shows th at th e dom estic consumption o f  iron  and s tee l fin a l 
p roducts** re v iv e d  from  th e trou gh  in 1886, i.e . one y ea r  a fte r  th e 
u p tu rn  in  th e exp orts  o f  iron  and s tee l fin a l p rodu cts . A f te r  
p eak in g  in  1887, how ever, th e  exp o rt m arket fo r  th e  German iron  and 
s te e l in d u s try  began  to con tract, which seemed to  be c lo s e ly
19 T h is  may exp lain  w h y K. Borchardt(1976) con sid e rs  con stru ction  
inves tm en t as the sole su p p orte r  o f  th e  German C ycle  I I I  upsw ing.
20 T h e  em igration from  ag ricu ltu ra l areas was n e g a t iv e ly  re la ted  to  
'th e  va lu e  o f  g ra in s  p rodu ced '. F. B. T ipton (1976) p.91
21 In  Septem ber 1887, S tah l und  Bimen r ep o rted , 'P a rt icu la r ly  s tr ik in g  
is  th e  ex trao rd in a rily  s tro n g  demand fo r  s tru c tu ra l iron  from  all 
b ig g e r  c itie s ; the demand su gges ts  no t on ly  an ex trem ely  b risk  
b u ild in g  a c t iv ity , bu t a lso th e  increas in g  use o f  iron  in  e v e r y  k in ds  
o f  bu ild in g . The US m arket remains p e rs is ten tly  firm ...'
22 T h e  dom estic consumption o f  iron  and s tee l fin a l p ro d u c ts  is  
approxim ated  b y  p ig  iron  p rodu ction  minus iron  and s tee l exp o rts , fo r  
th e  reasons g iv en  in foo tnote  |5.
F i»V - »  Home Couiimption and Expons of Iron and Steel: Gennany
Source: T. H. Bumham & G. O. Hoskins(1943), W. Feldenkirchen(1982)
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connected w ith the term ination  o f  th e US ra ilw ay  bu ild ing  boom.1* 
Although the home m arket was b e in g  en larged  in  1888, th e dec lin e  in 
exports  a ffe c ted  the inves tm en t a c t iv ity  in th e German iron  and s tee l 
industry  ad ve rse ly , th ou gh  to  a minor d eg re e .(F ig  I I I—5) In  1889, 
how ever, investm ent in  th e  iro n  and steel in d u s try  r eco ve red  to  a 
le ve l h igh er  than in 1887, f o r  which th e fu r th e r  expansion o f  
domestic demand fo r  iron  and s te e l w ith the con tinu in g  p ro s p e r ity  in 
construction  in du stry  p ro v id e d  th e  ju stification .*4
The developm ent o f  th e  symptoms o f  partia l ove r in vestm en t in 
the bu ild ing  in d u stry  a t th e  end o f  1889**, to ge th er  w ith  the 
u n in terrup ted  con traction  o f  o v e rsea s  sale o f  iron  and s tee l p rodu cts  
a fte r  1887, appeared  to  a f fe c t  s ign ifica n tly  th e expectations o f  the 
in ves tors  in iron and coa l in d u s tr ie s  in  an u n favourab le  w ay from  the 
b egin n ing o f  1890.** Th e  dow n tu rn  in  the investm en t in th e two
23 The share o f  th e US m arket in  th e exports  o f  iron  and s tee l 
p roducts from  Germany dec lin ed  d rastica lly  from  th e peak o f  13.5X in 
1887 to 9.1% in  1888 in  term s o f  w e igh t. W. Feldenk irchen (1982) 
Tabl:71
24 On 7 Sep 1889, The S ta t is t  r ep o rted  th at ’th e  p resen t p ro sp e r ity  
in the iron , s tee l and tex tile  tra d es  ... [ is ] ... p reem inen tly  foun ded  
on the consumption o f  th e  dom estic m arket’ . A ccord in g  to  th e 
Annual R eport o f  the Un ion o f  German Iron  and S tee l In du str ia lis ts , 
at the beg in n ing  o f  1890, i.e . im m ediately p r io r  to  the dow nturn  in 
th e German iron  and s te e l in d u s try , 'when th e state  ra ilw ays and the 
marine ... made g rea te r  demand [ fo r  iron  and s te e l] ... a t th e  same 
time, and when the bu ild in g  a c t iv ity  fo r  p r iva te  purposes found 
g rea te r  business, these sim ultaneous demands [ fo r  iron  and s tee l] 
could not be satis fied  w ith in  s h o r t  time.’  S ta h l und Bison, 1891 
p.488
25 On 30 Nov 1889, The S ta tis t rep o rted  th at th e ’ specu la tors  in 
house bu ild ing and rea l e s ta te  experien ce  a touch o f  the u n favourab le  
times, fo r  th ey  find  it  almost a s  d iffic u lt  to  le t  th e  la rge  and ra th er 
expensive  dw ellings th ey  h a ve  made as to  g e t  money advanced  on 
th eir  p ro p erty . The shadow  o f  catastrophe in  th e bu ild in g  trade  ia 
a lready  on the wall though, so  fa r ,  a ll hope is  not y e t d is ca rd ed ’ ; in 
the rev iew  o f  th e business con d it ion s  in  Germany in  1889, The 
Econom ist mentioned th a t ’Th e  r en t  fo r  small dw e llin gs  has r isen  -  
fo r  la r g e r  and dearer ones th e re  is  a stagnation. A lthough the 
su rface o f  the gen era l pos ition  seems sa tis fa c tory , i t  cannot be 
denied th a t th e rea l e s ta te  bu s in ess  also was more than on ce on  the 
brink  o f  a c r is is . ’ (U  Jan 1890)
26 The weakening in iron  and coa l shares in  German stock  exchanges 
was f ir s t  rep o rted  in 18 Jan u ary  1890 by The Econom ist, and the 
decline o f  share p rices  con tinu ed  th roughou t th e yea r. A ccord in g  to
lead ing h ea vy  industries put on  the b rake  on  in terna l m igration, so 
th a t it  declin ed  a fte r  the 1889 peak, d e liv e r in g  con traction a ry  ahocka 
to  and b r in g in g  about the even tu a l dow n tu rn  in  th e con struction  
in d u stry  a f t e r  the 1891 peak. As a resu lt, th e  investm ent a c tiv it ie s  
in iron  and coa l on th e one hand and con atru ction  on th e o th e r  hand 
va r ied  in  op p os ite  d irections d u r in g  1889-91, th e  form er d ec lin in g  and 
th e la tter  expan din g, the consequence o f  wh ich was the 1890 peak in 
ove ra ll German domestic investm ent.
The e x p o r t demand fo r  German iron  and s tee l p rodu cts  resumed 
its  increase a fte r  1890, p robab ly  due to  th e o p en in g-u p  o f  
un developed  m arkets, such as East Asia and Latin  America.** Th is 
appeared  to  b e  due to  the en deavou r on  th e  p a r t  o f  German iron  and 
s tee l en trep ren eu rs  to  re lie v e  th e  p ressu re  o f  ove rca pa c ity  du r in g  
th e depress ion  in the e a r ly  1890s, and w as rea lized  th rou gh  the 
com petition w ith  and at th e expense o f  o th e r  in du str ia l coun tries  
exportin g  ir o n  and s tee l to  th ese  reg ion s , B rita in  in particu lar.** 
Such havin g  been  the case, th e w iden in g e x p o r t market in  th e ea r ly  
1890s did n o t lead to  the increase  in inves tm en t in  th e German iron  
and s tee l in d u s try , in  con tra st to  the m id-1880s.
On the o th e r  hand, P ig  V -4  shows th a t th e  home consumption o f  
iron  and s te e l manufacture r e v iv e d  a fte r  th e  b r ie f  se t-b ack  in  1891, 
which appeared  to be rela ted  mainly to  th e  em ergen ce o f  e lectrica l 
in du stry , p la y in g  a lead ing ro le  in th e fo llo w in g  two German trade
S ta h l und Biman, March 1890, th e German iron  and s tee l in d u s try  was 
also s ign ifica n tly  in fluenced b y  th e co llapse o f  th e  specu lation fo r  p ig  
iron  w arran ts  in Glasgow in F eb ru ary  1890.
27 The sh a res  o f  Latin Am erican cou n tr ies  (A rgen tin a  and B raz il) and 
Bast Asia in  to ta l German iron  and stee l e x p o r ts  rose  dram atica lly  
from  v ir tu a l n il to 7.5% in 1889 and 6.7% in  1891, resp ec tiv e ly . W. 
Feld enk irchen (l982 ) Tab:71
28 D. Burn(1961) p.81,82, R. J. 8 . Hoffman(1933) p.239-243, R. C.
A llen (1979) p.913, P. L. Payne( 1968) p.86
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cyc les .** In  fa c t, as we see in P ig  I I I - 5  investm en t in  the German 
e le c tr ic a l in d u stry  began to  r ise  a fte r  1891 un til th e 1898 peak, which 
is  p re c is e ly  th e pattern  fou n d  in the movements o f  to ta l German net 
investm en t. T h e re fo re , th e  aforem entioned predom inance o f  g row th  
tren d  in  German home investm en t and national p ro d u c t d u r in g  the 
C ycle  I I I  y ea rs  could b e  ascribed  to  th e expan sionary  fo rces  
con nected  w ith the em ergen ce  o f  e le ctrica l in d u s try  in  th e  e a r ly  
1890s ou tw e igh in g  the fa l l  in  construction  investm ent.*0
I t  is  im portant to  emphasize th a t th e inn ovation  in  s tee l
p rodu ction  at th e  end o f  th e  1870s u n derlay  th e inves tm en t boom in
th e la tt e r  ha lf o f  the 1880s: the Thomas p ro cess  enab led  Germany to
exp lo it phosphoric iron  o r e ,  w ith which she was r ich ly  endow ed . In
th e absence  o f  th is  techn olog ica l developm ent, the German iron  and
stee l in d u s try  could h a ve  increased  the exp o rts  to th e US in  1885-87
on ly  to  a smaller d e g re e , since German iron  and s tee l p rodu cts ,
ha vin g  had to  be made from  imported non-phosph oric  iron  o r e , would
have b een  less  com petitive  in  the US m arket than, say , B ritish
product.** In  such a  case th e p ro sp e r ity  in  Rhineland and
W estphalia would have b een  qu ite moderate, which would h a ve  implied
low er le v e ls  o f  in terna l m igration  and bu ild in g  investm ent.**
29~A. V. Desai(1968) p.99, C. Trebilcock(1981) p.47-49. See a lso  P ig  
I II -5 .
30 See foo tnote  4, section  1, chapter I II .
31 ’ Thomas had "d ea lt a  b low " -  a  fa ta l b low  -  "a t  th e  suprem acy o f  
E nglish  hem atite s te e l" ’ . D. Burn(1961) p.77 R. C. AUen(1979) 
con s id e rs  th e reduction  in  the excess p ro f it  earned  b y  th e German 
iron  an d  s tee l in d u stry  an d  the consequen t decline in  iron  an d  stee l 
p ro d u c t p ric es  as the main fac tor respon sib le  fo r  the em ergen ce o f  
Germ any as  a major e x p o r te r  o f  iron  and s tee l by  1880. In  1883-89, 
he says, 'The combined o r e  and coke cos ts  o f  making hem atite p ig  
iron  su itab le  fo r  acid Bessem er and open h earth  s tee l in  B rita in ’s 
m ajor p rod u c in g  d is tr ic ts  was v e ry  sim ilar to  th e o re  and cok e  cost 
o f  m aking basic p ig  iron  in  Westphalia’ ; th e  ra tio  o f  p r ic e  to  un it 
cos ts  was, as a resu lt o f  th e  reduction in  th e  excess p ro f it  in  
Germ any, more o r  less  eq u a l in  the two coun tries .
32 I t  appeared  th at d u r in g  th e investm ent upsw ing in  th e la te  1880s 
th e in trodu ction  o f  the Thomas process was in  p ro gress : on 6 
A u gu st 1887 The Economist reported , ’N ea rly  a ll w o rks  in  ...
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Th ere  hard ly  ap p ea rs  to  be any e v id e n ce  su gges tin g  th a t the 
developm ent o f  a fu ll-em p loym ent ce iling  choked  o f f  th e boom in  the 
la te  1880s. In  the f i r s t  p lace, th e m ovements o f  German w ages do 
not su gges t any p a r ticu la r ly  acu te  sh o rta ges  in th e su p p ly  o f  labour 
at th e end o f  the 1880s; th ey  rather d isp layed  a s low ly  r is in g
tren d 1*, which may b e  exp licab le  by  the fa c t  that du r in g  th e yea rs  
concerned  German in d u s try  could still d epen d  upon ove r-po p u la ted  
ru ra l areas to  s a tis fy  its  in creas in g  need fo r  labour. The massive 
c o u n try -to -c ity  m igration  con tinued un til around 1910 -  no t to
mention overseas  m igration .
Secondly, the p r ic e s  o f  p ig  iron , one o f  the most im portant basic 
m ateria ls in  th is  p e rio d , showed clear c y c lic a l fluctuations r is in g  
sh a rp ly  from  the m iddle o f  th e 1880s to  reach  a peak in  1890.** 
Th is , how ever, would b e  fa r  from  su ffic ien t to  enable us to  conclude 
th at the bottleneck  in  iron  production c on trib u ted  a t leas t to  some 
d eg re e  to  th e dow nturn  in  1890; fo r , e v e n  i f  th ere  had deve loped  
any bottleneck , Germ any could have d epen ded  upon overseas  
su pp liers , and the im ports  o f  p ig  iron in  fa c t  increased  from  157,102 
tons in  1887(3.9% o f  dom estic production ) t o  385,328 tons in  1890(8.3% 
o f  dom estic p rod u ction ).11 Whether the u p su rge  o f  th e demand fo r  
iron  from  Germany overw helm ed  the p rodu ction  capac ity  o f  o verseas  
su pp liers , especia lly  th a t o f  B rita in , th e m ost im portant s in g le  iron 
exp o rte r  to  Germany11, rem ains to  be seen in  the fo llow in g  ch ap ter.11
(Rhineland and W estphalia] ... have in trodu ced  the Thomas p ro cess ’ ; 
on 20 Aug 1887, ’the Thomas p rocess is sp rea d in g , so th a t A u stro - 
Hungarian w orks, w ith  th e ir  good  iron, w h ich  is  n ea r ly  f r e e  from  
phosphate, a re  be ing more and more p laced a t  a d isadvan tage ’ .
33 G. Bry(1960) p. 329, Tab le  A2
34 W. Pe lden k irchen (1982) p.184, Abb.15
35 W. P e lden k irchen (1982) Tab:66
36 P. L. Payne( 1968) p.82,83
37 See foo tnote  15, S ection  2, Chapter VI.
Finally, i t  is  poss ib le  th at a ce ilin g  deve loped  in th e  production 
o f  non -traded  material fo r  the bu ild in g  in d u s try , fo r  example bricks. 
However, wh ile the dow nturn  in b u ild in g  a c tiv ity  o ccu rred  in 1891, 
the bu ild ing  cos t index was on the d ec lin e  from  the peak  in 1889.
To summarize: th e upturn  o f  th e  German dom estic investm ent 
a c t iv ity  in  th e mid-1880a was d ire c t ly  connected  w ith  th e  r ise  in  the 
exports  o f  iron  and s tee l p rodu cts  con sequ en t upon th e  begin n ing o f 
the US ra ilw ay  bu ild ing boom. C onsid erin g  both th e minor position 
o f  the fo r e ign  r e la tiv e  to  the home m arket and the n eg lig ib le  share o f  
US sales in  to tal German iron  and s te e l exports , the shock from  the 
US would seem la rge ly  psycho log ica l. The p ro sp e r ity  in industria l 
reg ion s, such as Rhineland and W estphalia, induced in tern a l m igration 
from  the a g ricu ltu ra l east, which stim ulated bu ild in g  investm ent. 
Although th e downturn in US ra ilw ay  investm ent led  to  the 
con traction  in  the German iron  and s te e l exports  a fte r  th e  1887 peak, 
the con tinu ing expansion o f  dom estic demand due to  th e  upsw ing in 
con struction  investm ent un derlay  th e  increase o f  th e investm ent in 
the German iron  and s tee l in d u stry  u n til 1889. The appearance o f  
symptoms o f  partia l over in vestm en t in  the con stru ction  industry , 
to ge th er  w ith  the depressed  exp ort m arket, seemed to  r ev e rse  the 
optimism held by  th e German iron  an d  s tee l in du str ia lis ts  and the 
in ves tin g  public at th e beg in n ing  o f  1890. Th e  d eclin e in  the 
investm ent in  the lead ing  in du str ies  o f  Rhineland and Westphalia 
b rou gh t abou t the fa ll  in  in terna l m igration  a fte r  th e  1889 peak, 
which induced the dow nturn  in bu ild in g  a c tiv ity  a fte r  th e  1891 peak. 
The qu ick  r e v iv a l in dom estic investm en t in  th e e a r ly  1890s seemed to 
re fle c t  th e g row th  o f  German e lec tr ica l in du stry . I t  appeared  that 
the Thomas process and th e fa llin g  a g ricu ltu ra l p r ic e s  con tributed

2. Overseas T ra de  a n d  Lending
D uring C yc le  I I I ,  German m erchandise exp orts  and 
im ports(cu rren t v a lu e ) showed d is tin c t cyc lica l flu ctu ations: exp orts  
rose from the trou gh  in  1885 to  the peak in 1890, and then declined  
to  the trough in  1892; the upsw ing in  im ports ex ten ded  from  1886 to  
1891, and the d ow n sw in g  from  1891 to  1894.(first ch a rt, F ig  V -5 ) On 
th e other hand, in  the movements o f  the volum e o f  German 
merchandise tra d e  c y c lic a l patterns a re  fa r  less  c lear: i f  in th e
re la tiv e ly  mild v a r ia tio n s  o f  export volume the same th ree  tu rn in g  
poin t years  a re  s t ill id en tifiab le  as in  the va lu e  series , i t  is  not 
possib le to determ ine th e  two tu rn in g  poin ts fo llo w in g  the trou gh  in  
1886 in im port volum e fluctuations.(second  chart, V -5 ) The v ir tu a l 
absence o f  c yc lic a l elem ents in the fluctuations o f  im port volum e 
du rin g  the y ea rs  o f  C yc le  I I I  seems to  be rela ted  to  the s tab ility  in  
consumption exp en d itu re  during the German C ycle I I I 1, which in  tu rn  
re fle c ts  the p redom inance o f  r is in g  trend  in the movements o f  German 
national product.* On the oth er hand, the c y c lic a l varia tion s in  
German exports  w ere  determ ined  by  th e state o f  th e  w orld  economy, 
which in tu rn  was a f fe c te d  to  a g rea t exten t b y  th e  le v e l o f  th e US 
a c tiv ity  and B ritish  o v e rse a s  lend ing, as well as b y  th e state  o f  the 
German economy.
The cyc lica l v a r ia tion s  in German ex p orts (va lu e ) to  d if fe r e n t  
reg ion s  o f  th e w orld  in  the course o f  C ycle I I I  a r e  shown in  F ig  V -6. 
While exports to  u n deve loped  areas accounted fo r  around ha lf o f  th e  12
1 Section 3, C hapter V
2 A t the same time, h o w ever , the poss ib ility  could n o t be excluded 
th at the app lication  o f  an exaggera ted  p rice  d e fla to r  on  the cu rren t 
va lue o f  German im ports  aer ies  w iped ou t the c yc lic a l components in 
im port variations.
Fig V-5 German Merchandise Exports and Imports
inde« n u m b ers
Source: W. G. Hoffmann(1965)
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FigV-6 German Exports to Various Regions
'•'•5 J 90~
Source: Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries
Souk* :  Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries
cyc lic a l ch an ges  in German exp orts  du r in g  Cycle I I I ,  among d eve lo ped  
m arkets th e  US fluctuated  most w ide ly.* Furtherm ore, th e r e v iv a l  
came e a r lie s t  in  the exp orts  to  the US and undeveloped cou n tr ies , i.e. 
a fte r  1885. I f  the expansion o f  the US market was re la ted  t o  the 
b eg in n in g  o f  the US ra ilw ay  con struction  boom, the r e v iv a l o f  e x p o r ts  
to  th e  p e r ip h e ry , to  th e ex ten t th at it  reflected  changes in  volum e, 
p ro b a b ly  resu lted  from th e more o r  less  simultaneous r ise  in  B ritish  
o v e rse a s  lend ing, ra th e r  than from  the expansion o f  the
u n derd eve lop ed  world con sequ en t upon the US boom. I t  shou ld  be 
noted  th a t th e British fo r e ig n  lend ing  boom was in itiated  b y  th e  s ta rt 
o f  th e US railw ay bu ild ing boom and th e consequent increase  in  the 
B ritish  investm ent in th e US railway.* Therefo re , one cou ld  a rgu e  
th a t th e  upturn o f  th e  US economy a ffected  German exp o r ts  
fa v o u ra b ly  in  the mid-1880s both d irec tly , i.e. by  in c rea s in g  the 
German exp orts  to th e US, and in d irectly , i.e. b y  en la rg in g  
un deve loped  market th rou gh  th e increased  British ov e rsea s  len d in g . 
In  con tra s t , the r ise  in  th e  exports  to  Britain started  one y ea r  la ter,
i.e . a fte r  1886, as was th e case fo r  total merchandise im ports  into 
Brita in .
Th e  downturn in  exp orts  to  non-European p e rip h ery  came e a r lie r  
than in  exp o rts  to o th e r  areas, re fle c tin g  the con traction  o f  B ritish  
len d in g  an d  the consequ en t decline in  imports into A rgen tina .* The 
c y c lic a l peak  in 1890 in  exp orts  to  the US appeared  to  b e  mainly 
exp licab le  by  both th e in trodu ction  o f  the McKinley T a r i f f  and
3 Th e  in crease  and d ecrease in  the exports  to  undeveloped  a rea s  
accoun ted  fo r  54.4% and 47.7% o f  the cyc lica l up- and dow n sw in g  in 
to ta l German exports (exc lu d in g  those to  Hanse towns); the 
c o rresp on d in g  figu res  fo r  th e US m arket w ere 24.8% and 47.7%. 
S ta tis tica l Abstract fo r  th e P rin c ipa l and Other Foreign  C ou n tries .
4 S ec tion  1, Chapter V II
5 W hereas the German exp orts  to  non-European prim ary p ro d u cers  
fe l l  b y  Mk 21 million betw een  1889/90, the imports into A rg e n t in a  and 
Patagon ia  from  Germany declined  b y  Mk 33 million. S tatistica l 
A b s tra c t fo r  the P rin c ipa l and O ther Foreign  Countries.
com petition w ith  th e US in d u s try , as was also tru e  o f  B ritish exports  
to  th e  US.* On th e o th e r  hand, th e downturn in  1890 in exports  
from  Germany to  E uropean  ag ricu ltu ra l reg ion s  and Britain appeared 
to be c lose ly  con n ected  w ith  the collapse o f  B ritish  overseas  lend ing7 
and th e  con sequ en t d ow n tu rn  o f  the B ritish  economy.
The su bsequ en t u p tu rn  was ob se rv ed  ea r lies t, in 1890, in the 
exp o rts  to  non -E uropean  prim ary p rod u cers , which may be, as was 
argu ed  in th e p re c e d in g  section , a ttribu ta b le  to th e  e ffo r ts  o f  German 
ex p orte rs  to  expand m arkets  under th e p ressu re  o f  overcapacity  a t 
th e expense o f  com petito rs . While th e  r e v iv a l o f  exports  to  the 
European p e r ip h e ry  fro m  the 1892 trou gh  may be understood in  a 
sim ilar con text, th e contem poraneous resum ption o f  the g row th  o f  
exp o rts  to  B rita in  c o u ld  be exp lained  b y  th e b egin n ing o f  the 
dom estic investm ent boom in  Brita in in  th e ea r ly  1890s. The exports  
to  th e  US reach ed  a tro u g h  last, in  1894, when th e  fa llin g  le v e l o f  
a c t iv ity  in  th e US a lso  touched a bottom.
In  P ig  V -7  a r e  shown the movements in  the im ports in to  
Germany from  va r iou s  reg io n s  o f  the w orld  du rin g  Cycle I I I .  I t  is  
ob s e rv ed  that im ports from  Europe flu ctu ated  in  a  d is tin c tly  cyc lica l 
fash ion , w h ilst th ose from  the US and non-European p e rip h ery  
showed continuous g ro w th  devo id  o f  cyc lica l components. Such 
d iv e r g in g  p a tte rn s  o f  flu c tu ation s  cou ld  not be explained in  term s o f  
th e  d iffe ren ces  in  th e  commodity com position o f  im ports from  these 
reg ion s ; fo r , as is  shown in P ig  V -8 , im ports o f  foo dstu ff, raw 
m ateria l and m anu factu re all d isp layed  cyc lica l varia tion s. Rather, 
th ey  seem to  s u g g e s t  th e  em ergence o f  the US and non-European
6 W. A. S inclair(1957) p.B5,96
7 B ritish  inves tm en t in  Europe rose from  th e trou gh  in 1885 to  the 
p eak  in 1890. M. Simon(1968)
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FigV-8 German Overseas Trade by Type o f Commodities 
■ »**»p»r+5
A: raw i«a'Hr,'<l/ & : f udltuff C ■ "•'«
Source: W. G. Hoffmann(1965)
Fig V-9 German Trade and Current Balance o f Payments and Overseas Lending
-  lending
Source: W. G. Hoffmann(1965), B. R. MitcheU(1981)
prim ary p rodu c in g  c ou n tr ies  du r in g  C ycle  I I I  a s  th e  supp liers  o f  raw 
materials and fo o d s tu ffs  to  Germany, r ep la c in g  less deve loped  
European cou n tr ies , w h ere  in du str ia liza tion  w as  in  p rogress.*
The impact o f  th e  investm ent boom in  Germany was con veyed  
th rough tra d e  chan nels  most s tro n g ly  to  undeveloped  areas, 
particu la r ly  to  the European p e r ip h e ry ; th e  nex t b igg es t r is e  was 
recorded  in  the im ports from  th e  US; th e s iz e  o f  the increase in 
im ports from  Brita in  d u r in g  the C ycle  I I I  u p sw in g  was about h a lf as 
la rge  as th a t in im ports from  the US. On th e  o th er  hand, w h ile, as 
a forem entioned , th e US and non-E uropean  p e rip h ery  w ere  not 
a ffe cted  b y  th e German slump in  th e e a r ly  1890s, im ports from  
a g ricu ltu ra l Europe declined  b y  th e g r e a te s t  amount, wh ich was 
followed b y  th e fa ll in  im ports from  Brita in.
The German ov e rsea s  trade  d u r in g  th e  yea rs  o f  C yc le  I I I  
revea led  th e  typ ica l commodity com position o f  an industria l economy: 
the predom inance o f  m anufactures and p rim a ry  p roducts in  export 
and im port trade, resp e c t iv e ly  (P ig  V -8 ). I t  is  fu rth e r  seen  that 
cyc lica l flu ctu ations a re  ob se rvab le  mainly in  th e  trade  o f  th ese  major 
items, w h ereas  th e m anufactured im ports an d  p rim ary  exp orts  va r ied  
on ly m ild ly du r in g  C yc le  I I I .  Th is  is  co n s is ten t w ith th e fa c t  that 
the cyc lica l flu c tu ation s  in  German exp orts  an d  - im ports du r in g  Cycle 
I I I  a re  accounted  fo r  to  a g re a t  ex ten t b y  th e varia tions in  the 
German exp orts  to  and im ports from  u n deve lop ed  countries.
The cyc lica l va r ia tion s  in  German im ports  and exp orta (va lu e) 
during C yc le  I I I  g a v e  rise  to  th e  c o n tra -cy c lic a l pattern  in the 
movements o f  German v is ib le  trade  ba lance(VTB  in  F ig  V -9 ), w h ich fe ll 8
8 S. Po llard  (1981) C hapter VI.
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w ith  th e s ta rt o f  th e  upsw ing from  1886 un til 1892, and th en  rose 
d u r in g  the fo llow in g  fou r  y ea rs . In  the b ro ad ly  c o n tra -cy c lic a l 
varia tion s  o f  German VTB is  r e f le c te d  th e fa c t th a t a lth ough  exports  
fluctuations had s ign ifica n t exogen ou s  impacts upon the s h if t s  in  the 
le v e l o f  German dom estic cap ita l form ation  the m ovements in  th e  la tter  
overwhelm ed those in  the fo rm e r  in  qu a n tita tive  term s. The
in v is ib le  trade balance havin g  v a r ie d  in  a n eith er cyc lica l n o r  con tra - 
cyc lica l fashion, German c u r re n t  balance(CB) flu c tu a ted  la rge ly  
fo llow in g  the pa tte rn  found in  VTB.
On th e o th e r  hand, th e d ire c t  estimates o f  German lo n g  term 
cap ita l exports* m oved w ith ou t d iv e r g in g  con sid erab ly  from  th e  path 
follow ed by  the cu rren t ba lance. Thus, both CB and lo n g  term 
cap ita l exports  showed c on tra cy c lica l movements, a s  a re s u lt  o f  which 
no serious balance o f  paym ent d ifficu lt ie s  a rose fo r  G erm any during 
th e  trade cyc le  con cerned . B eh ind such s tab ilis in g  v a r ia t io n s  in the 
tw o items o f  balance o f  paym ents seemed to  lie  the fa c t th a t  th e  rise  
in  home investm ent a c t iv ity  d u r in g  the C ycle I I I  u p sw in g  both 
w orsened the c u rren t balance o f  paym ents and d e te rred  th e  ou tflow  
o f  funds, and v ic e  ve rsa . Th e  close co rresp on den ce  in  the
fluctuations o f  German cu r re n t  balance o f  paym ents an d  overseas  
lend ing  appeared  due also to  th e  fa c t  th at 'th e  p rocess  o f  lo n g  term 
cap ita l export was under c lose regu la t ion '.10
The o th e r  con sequ en ce o f  th e equ ilib ra tin g  c h a n ge s  in  the 
German cu rren t balance o f  paym ents and fo re ign  len d in g  w as  th at the 
go ld  movements in vo lv in g  Germ any w ere  on a re la t iv e ly  m in or scale.11
9 These a re  th e statis tics  o f  fo r e ig n  issues in  Germany, p ro d u ced  in 
W. G. Hoffmann( 1965) p.262.
10 I. M. Drummond (1987) p.24
11 In  1885-94 n et p rec iou s m etal im ports into o r  exp o rts  fro m  
Germany added up  to  Mk 451 m illion; in the same yea rs  th e  amount 
o f  net gold  movements in v o lv in g  th e US and B rita in  w ere  Mk 1295
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P ig  V-10 seem s to show th at th rou gh ou t the yearB  o f  C ycle  I I I  
Germany rem ained a net g o ld  im porting cou n try , an d  th at as a resu lt 
her m onetary go ld  stock “  v a r ied  in a mild and acy c lica l way a lon g  a 
s tron g  u pw ard  tren d .(F ig  III-1 6 )
The r e la t iv e  s tab ility  in  the n e t go ld  im ports  into Germany 
conceals w id e r  and more v a r ied  fluctuations in  th e  go ld  movements 
betw een  Germ any and d iffe r e n t  reg ion s  o f  th e w o rld , as shown in  P ig  
V—11. T h e  g o ld  flows betw een  Germany and B rita in  seemed to  be
determ ined la r g e ly  b y  the state  o f  th e trade  balance betw een  th e  tw o 
cou n tr ies  w h ich  sh ifted  in creas in g ly  in  fa vo u r  o f  Germ any d u r in g  th is  
particu lar tra d e  cyc le . I t  is  s ign ifica n t th a t th e  r ise  in London 
sh ort term  in te re s t rates in  the la te  y ea rs  o f  th e  C ycle  I I I  upsw ing 
could not r e v e r s e  the d irec tion  o f  g o ld  flo w s  betw een th e  two 
coun tries . In  the p resence o f  the su bstan tia l tra d e  d e fic it  on  the 
p a rt o f  B rita in  and w ith th e d e fen sive  r is e  in  th e  German in te re s t 
ra te  and th e  consequent increase in  th e in te r e s t  ra te  d iffe re n tia l 
between B er lin  and Lon don (F ig  V -12 ), th e fin an c ia l su p e rio r ity  o f  
London o v e r  Berlin11 alone seemed in su ffic ien t to  draw go ld  from  
Germany.
In  c o n lra s t , the net go ld  in flows from  P ra n ce  va r ied  in opposite  
d irec tion s  to  the con tracyc ltca l movements in  th e German trade  
su rp lu s w ith  Prance. In  v iew  o f  th e fa c t th a t Germ any was a sh o rt
million and Mk 920 million, resp ec tiv e ly . W. G. Hoffm ann( 1965), US 
Dept o f  Commerce(1961), S tatis tica l A b s trac t fo r  th e  UK.
12 German m onetary gold  stock  is  approxim ated b y  th e amount o f  
metallic cu r re n c y  in and ou ts ide German bank in g  system , inc lud in g 
the go ld  b a rs  in  banks o f  issue. B. S p renger(1982 ) I t  was shown 
in  P ig  I I I - 15 th at the annual varia tion s in  the s tock  o f  metallic 
cu rren cy  in  and outside th e German bank in g system  correspon d  
c lose ly  w ith  th e  fluctuations in net im ports o f  p rec iou s  metal into 
Germany.
13 P. H. L in d e r t ( 1969) p.58

Fig V-12 Short Term Interest Rate Differential among Major Financial Centres
Source: F.Capie &  A. Webber(1985), M. Friedman &  A. J. Schwartz(1982). H. D. 
White(1933)
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term  debtor in  re la tion  to  Prance14, th e cyc lica l flu c tu a tion s  in  the 
go ld  inflows from  F ran ce  could be a ttrib u ta b le  to th e sim ilar changes 
in  the sh o rt term  cap ita l flow s  from F ran ce to  Germany: th e  short 
term  in teres t ra te  d iffe re n tia l betw een  Berlin  and P a r is  moved 
b road ly  in  para lle l w ith  th e le ve l o f  the n et gold  flow  from  France 
in to  Germany, th e notab le exception be in g  th e low er le v e l o f  net gold 
im ports in 1890 than in  e ith e r  1889 o r  1891 (F ig  V -12 ). T h e  d ip  in 
th e net gold  in flow  in  1890 in  th e face o f  th e peak ing o f  th e  in teres t 
ra te  d iffe ren tia l in  th e  same yea r cou ld  be rega rd ed  as con sisten t 
w ith  the finan cia l dom inance o f  Paris o v e r  Berlin, as su gges ted  by 
L indert.
In  rela tion  to  th e  US, Germany seemed to  e x p o r t small amounts 
o f  go ld  in  n e t term s in th e e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  the u p sw in g (F ig  IV -15 ), 
whereas du rin g  the r e s t  o f  th e C ycle I I I  y ea rs  go ld  flow ed  from  the 
US into Germany. I t  appeared  that such  varia tion  in  th e  g o ld  flows 
betw een  Germany and th e US had som ething to  d o  w ith  s h o r t  term 
cap ita l movements1*. F ig  V-12 shows th a t the sh o rt term  in teres t 
ra tes  d iffe ren tia l b etw een  Berlin  and New York  declin ed  u n til 1887 
and then fluctuated  a lo n g  a r is in g  tren d , w hereas th e German trade 
balance w ith th e US w as d e terio ra tin g  th rou gh ou t the y e a rs  o f  Cycle
I I I .
The sh ifts  in  th e  go ld  flow s betw een  Germany an d  A u str ia - 
Hungary up to  1889 seem ed to  re fle c t  Germ any's d e te r io ra t in g  trade 
balance. S ince th e tra d e  d e fic it  w idened in  1890 and 1891, the net 
go ld  inflow  from  A u str ia-H u n gary  in to  Germany in  th e tw o years 
could be a ttrib u ted  to  the g rea te r  command o f  G erm any ove r
14 A. I. B loom field(1963) p.78
15 A ccord ing to  B loom field (1963) p.78, Germany was a sh o rt term  
deb tor to  the US.
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exchange rate and go ld  flow s  th ro u gh  short-term  cap ita l movements 
in  h er rela tion w ith  p e rip h era l Europe.1* In  rela tion  to  Russia, 
r is in g  German in te r e s t  ra tes  in  th e  late yea rs  o f  the c y c le  I I I  
upsw ing  did not seem to have s ign if ica n t e ffe c ts  upon go ld  flow s.
In  summary, th e fluctuations in  German exports  d u r in g  C ycle  I I I  
w e re  determ ined la rg e ly  b y  th e US domestic investm ent an d  British 
ov e rsea s  lend ing; th e le v e l o f  German im ports (volum e) h a rd ly  showed 
c yc lic a l fluctuations, p robab ly  du e  to  the s tab ility  o f  German 
consumption expend itu re; s ince lo n g  term  cap ita l ou tflow  an d  cu rren t 
balance o f  paym ents moved in  c lo se  agreem ent, the gold  f lo w s  during 
th e  German C ycle I I I  w ere  on a m oderate scale and seemed exp licab le 
to  a g rea t exten t b y  sh o rt term  cap ita l movements.
16 P. H. L indert(1969) p.58
3. Government and Consumption
Both th e  governm ent expend itu re and rev e n u e  o f  the German 
Empire flu c tu ated  in  a cyc lica l way d u r in g  the C yc le  I I I  yea rs , and 
th e German govern m en t broad ly  maintained balance in  its  b u d ge t(F ig  
V -13 ). As a resu lt, small su rp lu ses and d e fic its  a lternated  in  the 
yea rs  con cerned . The fluctuations in govern m en t revenu e re fle c ted  
la r g e ly  the c y c lic a l variations in  customs du ties , th e  most im portant 
s in g le  source o f  th e German govern m ent reven u e, w h ich w ere rela ted  
to  th e  c yc lic a l chan ges in  the volume and va lu e  o f  overseas  trade. 
T h e  sh ifts  in  th e  expenditure fo r  th e ’m aintenance o f  the Arm y’ , the 
la rg e s t  s in g le  expend itu re item, exp lain  most o f  th e  cyc lica l varia tion s 
in  German govern m en t expend itu re.1 I t  would th e re fo r e  appear that 
th e  German govern m en t ad justed  its  le ve l o f  exp en d itu re  to the state  
o f  reven u e , r a th e r  than the o th e r  w ay around.
The c y c lic a l movements in  th e govern m ent sp en d in g  would have 
g iv e n  fu r th e r  stim uli to the expansion o f  th e  German economy, and 
h a ve  a g g ra va ted  the subsequent depression , w h ils t a t the same time 
th e  con tra cyc lica l in fluences o f  sim ilar m agn itudes w ere  in operation  
in  th e form  o f  various taxes d u r in g  C ycle I I I .  Between 1886-1890 
govern m en t sp en d in g  increased by  Mk 660 m illion and in 1890-92 it  
f e l l  b y  Mk 110 million. These f ig u re s  a re  com parable w ith the Mk 
2760 million increase  and Mk 2560 decrease in  th e  g ross  German 
dom estic investm ent*, and w ith  th e Mk 481 m illion increase and Mk 
308 decrease in  th e German m erchandise exp o rts  d u r in g  the u p - and 
dow nsw ing o f  th e  German C ycle I I I .  Thus, in  c on tra st to th e US,
1 S ta tis tica l A b s tra c t fo r  the P rin c ipa l and O th er F o re ign  Countries.
2 These f ig u re s  a re  obtained b y  m ultip lying th e s ize  o f  the cyc lica l 
in crease  and d ecrease  in net investm ent in C ycle  I I I  b y  two, fo r  the 
reasons g iv e n  in  footnote 2 Section 2, Chapter IV.
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Fig V-13 Government Expenditure, Revenue and Deficit: Germany
Source: Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries
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the m agn itu de  o f  cyc lica l fluctuations in  German govern m ent spending 
could h a rd ly  be d escrib ed  as n eg lig ib le . In d eed , in th e late yea rs  
o f  th e C yc le  I I I  boom, th e p ro sp e r ity  in  German iron  and s tee l 
in d u s try  seemed to depend to a con s id e rab le  exten t upon the 
g o v e rn m en t demand, the tem porary  na tu re  o f  which appeared  to have 
d e s ta b ilis in g  e f fe c ts  upon th e expecta tions  o f  German in ves to rs  in  the 
h eavy  in d u s tr ie s , con tribu tin g  to  th e  co llapse  o f  the investm ent 
boom.*
D u r in g  the C ycle  I I I  upsw ing, consum ption expend itu re increased  
b y  Mk 2706 million, which is  com parable to  th e  estimated s ize  o f  the 
in c rea se  in  German g ro ss  investm ent, Mk 2760 million. Consumption, 
h o w ever , accounted fo r  a fa r  g re a te r  p o rtion  o f  German national 
p ro d u c t than  e ith e r  investm ent o r  e x p o r ts  du r in g  the C ycle I I I  
y ea rs3 4, w h ich  im plies that in  re la tiv e  te rm s consumption d isp layed  fa r  
g re a te r  s ta b ility  than dom estic cap ita l form ation . In  fac t, du rin g  the 
y ea rs  o f  th e German C ycle I I I  consum ption expend itu re g rew  w ithout 
fa llin g  in  absolute terms in  any s in g le  y ea r, in  con tra st to  the 
m ovem ents in  national p roduct, in ves tm en t and exports . Such a 
p a tte rn  o f  movements would su g ges t a  p a s s ive  ro le  o f  consumption 
e x p en d itu re s  in  the course o f  th e German C yc le  I I I .
3 On 4 M ay  1889, The S tatist p red ic ted  th e  term ination o f  th e  boom in 
more th a n  h a lf a y ea r  in  th e fo llow in g  w ay : 'Y e t a fte r  a y ea r, o r  a 
y ea r  a n d  a ha lf, th ese w onderfu l fe a tu re s  o f  p ro sp e r ity  w ill vanish , 
fo r  b y  th a t  time the bulk o f  th e w an ts o f  th e  ra ilw ays and o f  the 
arm y a n d  n avy  w ill have been atten ded  to , and who else could supply  
a s u ff ic ie n t ly  la rge  amount o f  o rd e rs  to  th e  iron  and stee l works, 
la r g e  in  numbers and in exten t? '
4 In  1885-9S, consumption expend itu re am ounted to  almost 80% o f  
German NNP. W. G. Hoffmann(1965)
4. Money and Banking
I t  was as e a r ly  aa  1876 that a fu ll gold  standard  system  was 
adopted  and th at th e  Reichsbank assumed the ro le  o f  a cen tra l 
issu ing  bank in Germ any. The issue o f  notes by th e Reich sbank  was 
regu lated  by  'tw o  ru le s  independent o f  each o th e r ': on  th e  one
hand, the Reichsbank w a s  requ ired  to  maintain at leas t on e  th ird  o f 
its  note issue in  cash, w h ich  was d e fin ed  as 'cu rren t German money, 
T reasu ry  notes ( 'R e ich sk assen sch e in e '), and gold  in  b ars  o r  fo re ign  
co in s ’ , w ith the r e s t  o f  th e  note issue be ing covered  b y  d iscounted  
b ills ; on the o th e r  hand , the Reichsbank was a lloca ted  a certa in  
f ig u re  by law, wh ich w as  increased  a few  times d u r in g  pre-1914 
yea rs , and the excess  o f  note issue o v e r  this amount p lu s  cash 
r es e rve  was su b ject to  a  tax  at the ra te  o f  5% per y ea r .1
Coins and th e  Reichsbank notes, the amount o f  w h ich  was 
con tro lled  accord in g  to  th e  p rin c ip les  ju s t describ ed , form ed  the 
major part o f  German cu rre n c y . In  add ition to  go ld  and su bs id ia ry  
coins and the R eich sbank  notes, T reasu ry  notes, th e Reich sbank  g iro  
deposits  and th e 'sm all an d  dw indling stock  o f  note is su es  b y  other 
banks ' also con stitu ted  th e  German m onetary base in  pre-W W I period.* 12
1 M. Seeger(1968) p.20,21 I t  would be usefu l to note th a t th is  
system  o f  gu a ran tee in g  th e  con ve rtib ility  o f  the Reichsbank no tes  was 
a loose one re la t iv e ly  t o  P ee l's  Act, wh ich underlay the B ritish  
ve rs ion  o f  gold  s tan da rd . While a ccord in g  to P ee l's  A c t th e  increase 
o f  th e gold held in  th e  Issu e  Department o f  the Bank o f  England  by 
£1 enables the Bank to  increase its  notes by the same amount, in 
Germany the add ition  o f  the same s ize  to  the Reichsbank g o ld  r es e rve  
could brin g about th e  expansion o f  th e Reichsbank note issu e  b y  £3.
2 P. McGouldrick (1984) p.314
The German banking system  com prised  under th e Reichsbank
variou s sorts  o f  business banks*, among which jo in t-s tock  
banks(K red itbanken ) w ere the 'dom inan t fo rc e  w ith in  German bank in g ' 
in  pre-1914 era .3 4 567 As is  well know n, a  crucia l fea tu re  o f  German 
jo in t-s tock  banks was th at in ad d ition  to  th eir fu nctions as o rd in a ry  
commercial banks th ey  p layed  a c t iv e  p a r ts  in fin an c in g  lon g  term  
investm ent.4
I t  was shown in th e second s e c t io n  o f  th is  ch a p te r (F ig  V-10) 
th a t the un interrup ted  net go ld  flo w s  in to  Germany du rin g  C ycle I I I  
resu lted  in  the continuous grow th  o f  German m onetary gold  stock*, 
a long with which w ere  o b se rved  m ild and ir re gu la r  fluctuations. 
Th e  German m onetary gold  stock  w as d iv id ed  in to  th e gold  held in 
th e Reichsbank and oth er minor is s u in g  banks and th at held by  non­
issu in g  banks and the public, w h ich  is  equal to  the gold  pa rt o f  
German HPM. Approxim ating the g o ld  elem ent o f  German HPM by the 
m etallic part o f  th e HPM, one o b s e rv e s  that i t  tended  to  v a r y  
c yc lica lly , r is in g  from  the trou gh  in  1888 to the peak in 1890 and 
th en  declin ing back to  th e trou gh  in  1891(Fig V -14).T On the oth er 
hand, the go ld  held in  the German b an ka  o f  issue, approxim ated h ere  
b y  the metallic cu rren cy  in th e  banka o f  issue, m oved in  most o f  the
3 T h ey  are  jo in t stock  ban k s (K red itb an ken ), no te-issu ing 
banks(Notenbanken ), jo in t-s tock  m o r tga g e  banks(H ypothekenbanken ), 
association o f  lan dow n ers (Lan dsch a ften ), banks run b y  p rov incia l 
governm ent, such as Landesbanken an d  Provinzia l-H ilfakassen ,
S a vin gs  banks(Sparkassen ), c o o p e ra t iv e  cred it
soc ieties (C red itgen ossen sch a ften ), an d  fin a lly  Koenigliche Seehandlung. 
P . Barrett Whale(1930) p.2-4
4 H. N eu berger k  H. H. Stokes(1974) p.712
5 On the rela tionsh ip  between th e K red itban ken  and German in du stry , 
s ee  P. B arre tt Whale(1930) Chap. I I .
6 I t  should be remembered th a t th e  German monetary go ld  stock was 
approxim ated b y  th e German stock  o f  m etallic cu rren cy  in and ou ts ide 
German banking system , w h ereas th e  g o ld  flows w ere  rep resen ted  by  
th e  flow s o f  p rec iou s metal.
7 In  1885-94, the go ld  pa rt accou n ted  f o r  almost 60% o f  the metallic 
pa rt o f  the German monetary base, an d  th e annual varia tion s  in  the 
tw o items showed c lose agreem ent. B. Sprenger(1982 ) p.123

y ea rs  in  o p p o s ite  d irections to  the m etallic cu rren cy  held  ou ts id e  the 
issu in g  ban k s fi.e . metallic p a r t  o f  th e HPM), d isp la y in g  th e re fo r e  a 
rou gh ly  c on tra cy c lica l pa ttern .*  I t  appears reasonab le to  in te rp re t  
such a c y c lic a l pattern  in  th e  d istribu tion  o f  m onetary go ld  stock  
betw een  b an k s  o f  issue and th e res t o f  th e economy in  th e  cou rse  o f  
th e German C ycle  I I I  in  term s o f  the cyc lica l sh ifts  in  th e  demand fo r  
m etallic cu r re n c y , i.e. as th e in tern a l co in  drain from  an d  re flu x  to  
th e  banks o f  issue d u r in g  th e  trade cyc le ; fo r  i t  is  h a rd ly  poss ib le  
to  id e n t ify  cyc lica l elem ents in  the supp ly  o f  m etallic  cu rren cy , 
c on sis tin g  m ainly o f  g o ld , to  th e  German economy.
T h e  Reichabank be in g  b y  fa r  th e most im portan t among th e
issu ing  b an ks , the con tra cyc lica l pa tte rn  in the f lu c tu a tion s  o f  the
m etallic c u r re n c y  held b y  the German banks o f  issue r e f le c te d  la rg e ly
th e m ovem ents o f  the coins o r ,  more narrow ly , th e g o ld  held  in  th e
R eich sbank ( F ig  V-14 k  IS ). In  F ig  V-15 are a lso p re s en ted  th e
m ovem ents in  the Reichsbank notes in  circu lation , w h ich  did  not
fo llow  c lo s e ly  the pa ttern  o f  fluctuations in  the coin s (o r  g o ld ) held
b y  th e Reichsbank: in  particu la r, i t  should be noted  th a t in  1888/89
and 1890/91 the two items va r ied  in  opposite d irec tio n s . A s  a
resu lt, in  con tra st to  th e co in s (o r  g o ld ) held in  th e  Reich sbank , in
th e va r ia t io n s  o f  the Reichsbank notes in c ircu la tion  is  ob s e rv ed  a
cyc lic a l p a tte rn . Thus, th e  Reichsbank would a p p ea r  to  have
ch an ged  i t s  notes in  c ircu la tion  la rg e ly  accord ing to  th e  cyc lic a lly
m oving demand fo r  cu rren cy , and w ithout much reg a rd  to  th e  le v e l o f
its  go ld  r e s e r v e .  The cyc lica l chan ges in the econom y 's  demand fo r
c u rre n c y , a s  re flec ted  in  th e  fluctuations o f  the Reich sbank  notes in
c ircu la tion ! 1885 (T )-1889(P )-1891(T )), tended  to p reced e  th e  cyc lica l
8 Th e  co in a  held in the Reichsbank accounted fo r  m ore th an  90% o f  
th e m eta llic  cu rren cy  held b y  banks o f  issue in Germ any; o v e r  60% 
o f  the co in a  in  the Reichsbank was in  go ld . B. S p ren ger (1 9 82 ), M. 
S eeger (1 9 68 ), National M onetary  Commission! 1910)

pattern  in  the varia tion s o f  the m etallic cu rren cy  in
c ircu la tion (1888(T)-1890(P)-1891<T)>. Th is is  p robab ly  exp licable by 
the d i ffe r e n c e  in the sphere o f  c ircu la tio n  betw een  the two typ es  o f 
cu rren cy : the Reichsbank notes, th e  minimum denomination o f  which 
was Mk 100 until 1906', w ere u sed  mainly in commercial transactions, 
whereas co in s  were used in s e t t l in g  smaller scale, e v e ry d a y  business. 
In  accommodating the econom y's n eed  fo r  cu rren cy , the Reichsbank 
did no t need  to v io la te  the a b o v e  d escrib ed  regu lations concern ing 
note is su e , due to  th e h igh  le v e l  o f  cash r es e rve  maintained 
th rou gh ou t C ycle I I I .1*
H ow ever, i t  does ap p ea r  th a t the lack o f  close agreem ent 
betw een  th e movements in th e Reich sbank  notes in circu la tion  and 
those in  co in s  (o r  g o ld ) held in  th e  Reichsbank, espec ia lly  du rin g  the 
yea rs  aroun d  the u pper tu rn in g  p o in t, resu lted  from  the v io la tion  o f  
•the 'ru le s  o f  th e go ld  standard ga m e ' by  the Reichsbank, in terp re ted  
in the sen se  o f  Nurkse: B loom field  has shown th a t during th e years  
o f  th e German Cycle I I I ,  i.e. 1885—91, in ternational and domestic assets 
o f  the Reichsbank sh ifted  in th e  same d irec tion  on ly  in 1886 and 
1887.11
S in ce the Reichsbank notes in  circu la tion  amounted to nearly  7OX 
o f  to ta l paper cu rren cy  in  c ircu la tio n  in  1885-941',  the cyc lica l 
m ovements in  the form er r e s u lt e d  in the similar pa ttern  o f  
flu ctu ations in  th e la tte r (F ig  V -1 5 ).  In  add ition  to  the metallic and 
i t  R. Bopp(1953) p.56, 57
10 Th e  low es t ratio  o f  cash r e s e r v e  o f  th e Reichsbank to  its  note 
c ircu la tion  during 1885-95 was 83.5%, the lega l minimum being 33.3%; 
at the same time, the Reichsbank n o tes  in  c ircu la tion  n ever  exceeded 
du rin g  th ese  yea rs  the amount s p e c if ie d  by law, Mk 250 million, plus 
cash r e s e rv e .  M. Seeger(1968)
11 A. I . B loomfield (1959) p.49
12 B. Sprenger(1982 ) The p a p er  c u rren cy  inc ludes besides the 
Reichsbanks notes th e notes is su ed  b y  o th e r  issu ing  banks and 
Reichskassenacheine.
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paper cu rren cy  in  c ircu la tion , as a fo rem en tion ed , German monetary 
baae(HPM) com prised th e Reichsbank g ir o  d ep o s its .1* As was the 
case in  th e cu rren cy  in  c ircu lation , th e g i r o  deposits, approxim ated 
h ere  b y  th e Reichsbank demand liab ilitie s  o th e r  than notes, tended to 
move in  a cyc lica l w ay, fo llow ing more c lo s e ly  th e pattern  shown in 
th e p ap er ra th er than  in  th e m etallic c u r r e n c y  in  c ircu la tion (F ig  V - 
15); th is  is  in correspon den ce w ith  the f a c t  that the nationwide 
Reichsbank g iro  system  o f  tra n s fe r  was a v a ila b le  ’on ly  fo r  banks and 
la rg e  nonbank en terp rises*.1* I t  is  to  b e  noted h ere  th a t the
vio la tion  o f  the 'ru les  o f  th e game’ was e x p res s e d  not o n ly  in  the 
lack  o f  c lose  agreem en t between the ch an ges  in  th e Reichsbank cash, 
m ostly m etallic cu rren cy , res e rve  and th ose  in  the Reichsbank notes 
in  c ircu la tion , but a lso in the cyc lica l v a r ia t io n s  in th e Reichsbank 
demand liab ilities  o th e r  than notes in  th e fa c e  o f  the con tracyc lica l 
v a r ia tion s  in  the Reichsbank cash re s e rv e . I n  short, th e Reichsbank 
accommodated th e demand fo r  fu n ds  d u r in g  cyc le  I I I ,  la rge ly  
ir re s p ec t iv e  o f  th e state  o f  its  r e s e r v e ,  w h ich  resu lted  in the 
con tra cyc lica l movements in  the Reichsbank r e s e r v e  ra tio .1* Such 
ha vin g  been the case, the consequence w as  th a t the German HPM, 
approxim ated here b y  the sum o f  th e  pap er  a n d  metallic cu rren cy  in
13 ’ L ik e  th e  Bank o f  England, th e Reichsbank had monetary liab ilities  
add ition a l to  its  notes. But w h ile th e  Bank o f  England held  bank 
depos its  lik e  those o f  modern cen tra l banks, d epo s its  a t the 
Reichsbank w ere re la ted  to th e deve lopm ent a n d  operation  o f  the only 
nationw ide system  fo r  "noncash " paym ents -  th e  g iro  system  o f  
tra n s fe r . Functionally, the g iro  system  w as a  check ing system , but 
one opera ted  b y  the cen tra l bank, in stead  o f  b y  ind ividual p r iv a te  
banks.’ P. M cGouldrick(1984) p.313
14 P. McGould rick  (1984) p.314
15 A. I . B loom field(1959) p.31, Chart I. K. R. Bopp(1953) p.21 is  o f 
th e op in ion  th at in th e  pre-1914 Germany ’c r e d i t  was alw ays availab le 
on sp ec ified  terms and th at the Reichsbank d id  not m odify its  ru les 
o r  in terp re ta tion  as a  d e libera te  means o f  e x e r t in g  o r  re leas in g  
p ressu re  on the m arket.’  Also, M essrs. M an k iew icz and B lin z ig  o f  
th e Deutsche Bank an sw ered  to the National M on etary  Commission that 
'th e  g r e a t  stren gth  o f  ou r financial system  in  Germany is  th e 
Reichsbank. Under th a t system  th e qu es tio n  o f  our cash r e s e r v e  is  
o f  secondary  im portance, as we can a t a ll tim ea con ve rt ou r hold ings 
o f  commercial paper in to  cash at th e R e ich sba n k .’  Quoted from  K. R. 
Bopp(1953) p.26, and underlines a re  mine.
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circu lation  plus the Reichsbank demand liab ilities  o th e r  than notes, 
moved in a cyc lica l pa ttern : 1885 (T )-1889 (P )-1890 (T ).(F ig  V-16)
I f  the cyc lica l chan ges in  th e  demand fo r  c u r re n c y  p layed  a 
cen tra l p a rt in  determ in ing th e  p a tte rn  o f  fluctuations o f  the German 
HPM, th ey  appeared  to  do so mainly b y  in flu en cin g  th e  cu rren cy  held 
b y  the public, in th e  movements o f  wh ich is  o b s e rv a b le  a cyc lica l 
pattern  more d is tin c t than in  HPM (F ig  V-16 ). On th e  oth er hand,
th e oth er major com ponent o f  th e  German HPM, th e  cash  r es e rve  o f  
th e non-issu ing banks, d isp la yed  un in terru p ted  g ro w th  devo id  o f  
cyc lica l elements du r in g  C ycle I I I .  Thus, the d iv is io n  o f  the German 
HPM1* in to  th e cu rren cy  held b y  th e  pub lic  and n o n -issu in g  bank 
cash r es e rve  would appear more o r  le ss  equ iva len t to  th e  separation 
o f  short run  cyc lica l fluctuations and tren d  in th e m ovem ents o f  the 
German m onetary base.
The s low ly  r is in g  cash  r e s e r v e  o f  n o n -is su in g  banks was 
associated w ith  the fa r  more rap id  in crease  in non-bank deposits  (F ig  
V—17). Cyclical elem ents a re  not an y  more rea d ily  v is ib le  a long the
ris in g  trend  o f  th e d eposits  than  in  th e  case o f  th e  cash  r e s e rv e .16 7 18
As a resu lt, the ra tio  o f  non -issu in g  bank cash r e s e r v e  to  non-bank 
depos its (F ig  V-18) showed mild and ir re g u la r  flu c tu ation s , ra th er than 
a d istinct con tracyc lica l pattern  as in  th e  US (F ig  IV -2 5 ).1*
16 To be more p rec ise , the d iv is io n  o f  th e  German HPM in  the form  o f  
cash, to  the exclusion o f  the Reich sbank  g iro  deposits.
17 I t  is  on ly  in  the movements o f  th e  absolu te d ev ia tion s  from  the Si- 
yea r m oving av e ra ge s  o f  the cash r e s e r v e  and d epos its  th a t cyc lica l 
patterns can  be determ ined: 1888(T)-1890(P )-1892(T ) f o r  th e  form er 
and 1888(T)-1889(P)-1892(T) fo r  the la tte r .
18 I t  is  to  be noted in  F ig  V-18 th a t th e  German res e rve/ d ep o s it  
ra tio  was fa r  low er than e ith e r  in  th e  US o r  in B rita in : th e ratio  
fluctuated  around 5% du rin g  C ycle  I I I  in  Germany, w h ich  compares 
w ith  the a ve ra ge  le v e l o f  around 18% in  th e US and 11% in  Britain. 
See a lso P. B arrett Whale(1930) p.135.
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Fig V-16 High-Powered Money(A). Currency Held by the Public(B). Cash Reserve Held by 
Non-Issuing Banks(C): Germany
Source: B. Sprenger(1982), National Monetary Commission(1910)
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In  F ig  V-19 are shown th e annual am ounts o f  c re d it  p rov ided  b y  
th e tw o m a jor types o f  German business banks -  Kred itbanken and 
Notenbanken -  in the form o f  i )  b ill d iscou n tin g , ii) lend ing  aga inst 
co lla tera l ('Lom barddarlehen ’ ) '  and fin a lly  i i i )  cu rren t account c re d it  
( ’ K on tok orren tk red ite ’ )1*. I t  is  in tere s tin g  to  o b se rve  in the f ig u re  
th a t th e volum es o f  c red it  g iven  b y  means o f  the th ree  d iffe r e n t  
m ethods flu c tu ated  accord ing to  th ree d is t in c t  cyc lica l patterns: th e 
cyc lica l m ovements in  K on tokorren tk red ite (A ) tended to  p recede  th ose 
in Lom bard in g (C ), behind which lagged  b ill d iscou n tin g (B ).
In  pre-1914 years , P. B arrett Whale s a y s , 'th e  a v e ra ge  German 
firm  has a lw ays depended to a rem arkab le d egree  upon ob ta in ing 
c u rren t accou n t advances [L e . K on tcko rren tk red ite ] ... not m erely to 
p ro v id e  i t s e l f  with w ork ing funds, bu t a lso  fo r  th e purpose o f  
ex ten d in g  i t s  permanent equipm ent ... in  an tic ipa tion  o f  recou rse to  
th e  inves tm en t market’ .** On the o th e r  hand, in  v iew  o f  th e
q u a n tita tiv e  in fe r io r ity  o f  fo re ign  to  dom estic trade  in  Germany 
du r in g  C yc le  I I I ,  the cyc lica l pattern  fou n d  in  the c red it  supp lied  by  
means o f  b ill discounting would la rge ly  r e f le c t  the chan ges in  the 
amount o f  in land b ills discounted. Now, i t  appears s ign ifican t th at 
th e p a tte rn  o f  the fluctuations in K on tokorren tk red ite  resem bled th e 
course o f  th e  investm ent in  iron , stee l and coa l in dustries , while that 
in  the b il l  d iscount c red it  tended to  a g r e e  w ith th e movements in 
c on stru c tio n  investm ent, a  major in flu en ce upon the state  o f  dom estic 
trade . Th is seems to  su gges t th a t the fluctuations in
K on tok orren tk red ite  w ere rela ted  to th ose  in  the amount o f  c red it  
p ro v id ed  fo r  the investm ent a c tiv it ie s  in  the German heavy  
in d u str ies , whereas the v a ry in g  le v e ls  o f  b ill d iscount c re d it
19 For a  de ta iled  descrip tion  o f  ’K on tok orren tk red ite ’ as a ’combined 
dem an d -depos it account and line o f  c re d it ’ (H . N eu berger k H. H. 
S tokes(1974 )), see P. B arrett Whale<1930) p.37-39.
20 P. B a rr e tt  Whale(1930) p.38
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Fig V-19 Amount o f Credit Given by Means o f Current account credit(A). Bill 
Discounting(B) and Lombarding(C) by German Joint Stock Banks and Issuing Banks
Source: E. Eistert &  Ringel(1971)
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rep resen ted  th e volume o f  c red it  g iv en  t o  various trad es, a ffected , 
d ire c t ly  o r  in d irec t ly , b y  the le v e l o f  b u ild in g  investm ent.
Such a v a r ie ty  in the pa ttern  o f  ch a n ges  in the c re d it  supplied 
to  d if fe r e n t  sec to rs  o f  the German econom y would be exp licab le e ither 
b y  th e  changes in  the demand fo r  c re d it  fro m  d iffe r e n t  in du str ies  or 
b y  th e  response on the p a r t o f  th e banka to  the sh ift in g  conditions 
an d  p rospects  o f  each o f  th e in d u str ies11; ra th e r  than b y  th e factors  
a ffe c t in g  the cap ab ility  o f  th e banks to su p p ly  c red its . F or in  the 
la t t e r  case, i t  would be more lik e ly  th a t  the fluctuations in  the 
volum e o f  c re d it  made ava ilab le  th ro u gh  variou s  channels fo llow  a 
m ore o r  less  uniform  pattern . I f  th e  ch an ges  in  th e amount o f 
c r e d it  p ro v id ed  can reasonably be exp ec ted  to lead to  correspon d in g  
va r ia tion s  in  th e volume o f  deposits , th e  con sisten t g row th  o f  
d epo s its  d u r in g  the German C ycle  I I I ,  w ith c yc lic a l in fluences 
o b se rva b le  on ly  in th e ra te  o f  g row th , w ou ld  appear a p rodu ct o f  
v a r ie d  and asynchronous pa ttern s  o f  c y c lic a l fluctuations in  the 
amount o f  c red its  p rov ided  to  d if fe r e n t  s e c to r s  o f  th e economy.
The cyc lica l fluctuations in  th e  German sh o rt term market 
in te r e s t  rates (F ig  I I I—24) could be c on s id e red  as an add itional p iece 
o f  ev id en ce  revea lin g  the im portant p a r t  p layed  b y  th e  demand fo r  
m oney in the fluctuations o f  d epos it m oney. For, i f  th e re la tive  
s ta b ility  in th e reserve/d ep os it ra tio  w as  the consequence o f  the 
German banking system  in creas in g  its  s u p p ly  o f  d eposits  in  response 
to  th e r is in g  cash res e rve , th e sh o rt te rm  market ra tes  would have
21 B. E is tert k  J. Ringei(1971) pp.122-124. Such a channel o f  
in flu en ce  from  the banking system  to  th e  in d u s try  would appear v e ry  
p lau sib le , in  v ie w  o f  such a c lose  re la tion sh ip  between th e tw o in 
Germ any as exp ressed  in Kon tokorren t con nection , th e a c tiv e  ro le  o f 
banks in th e promotion o f  en trep ria es  a n d , fin a lly , th e represen tation  
o f  banks on  board o f  superv is ion  o f  firm s . P. B arre tt Whale(1930) 
C hap ter II.
d isp layed  con sis ten t decline, instead  o f  fluctuating  c y c lic a lly . This, 
how ever, is  not an unequivocal p iece  o f  ev iden ce, since German short 
term  ra tes  w ere  in fluen ced  b y  th e  changes in in tere s t ra te s  in other 
fin an cia l cen tres : sp ec ifica lly , th e  r ise  in London ra tes  in  the late 
y ea rs  o f  th e C yc le  I I I  boom** seemed to induce a d e fen s iv e  rise  in 
Reichabank d iscount rate**, w h ich in  tu rn  con tribu ted  to  th e  rise  in 
m arket ra tes , and v ic e  versa .*4 The r ise  in London r a te  alone, 
how ever, does no t su ffic ien tly  account fo r  th e in c rease  in the 
Reichsbank ra te  in  1889 and 1890: accord ing  to  Bopp, 'T h e  reserve  
ra tio  and m arket ra tes  w ere th e most im portant g u id e s ' to the 
d iscount ra te  p o lic y  o f  the Reichsbank**. Bloomfield a lso  considers 
th e  con tracyc lica l changes in  res e rv e  ra tio  as th e more important 
fa c to r  exp la in ing th e  cyc lica l pa ttern  in  th e cen tra l ban k  discount 
ra tes  in pre-W W I yea rs  than the in terdepen den ce am ong financial 
cen tres.*4 Th e  con tracyc lica l movements in the Reichsbank reserve  
ra tio  was th e consequence o f  both the cyc lica l flu c tu ation s  in its 
demand liab ilities , i.e . notes and deposits, and the con tracyc lica l 
fluctuations in  its  cash r e s e rv e (P ig  V-15). I t  was a lre a d y  shown 
th a t the cyc lica l pa tte rn  in the Reichsbank demand liab ilitie s  resulted 
from  the accommodating respon se o f  the Reichsbank tow ards the 
app lication  fo r  fu n d s , while the con tracyc lica l pa ttern  in  cash  reserve  
was connected  w ith  the cyc lica lly  changing demand fo r  coins. 
T h e re fo re , i t  cou ld  be said th a t in the con tracyc lica l p a tte rn  in the 
Reichsbank r e s e rv e  ra tio  w ere summarized th e cyc lica l ch a n ges  in the 
demand fo r  money. Furtherm ore, the yea rs  betw een  th e  e a r ly  1880s
2SfSection 4, Chapter VI.
23 For th e cyc lica l movements in  th e Reichsbank d iscount ra te , see A. 
I. B loom field(1959) p.37
24 The ou tflow  o f  sh o rt term cap ita l to  London, i f  th ere  w as any as a 
consequence o f  th e  r ise  in London rates, would a lso have w orked  in 
th e  d irec tion  o f  ra is in g  short-term  in teres t ra tes  in  Germ any by 
redu cin g  th e  su p p ly  o f  funds.
25 K. R. Bopp(1953) p.30
26 A. I. B loom field (1959) p.37
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an d  th e mid-18908 w ere  th e p e rio d  o f  'easy  m oney', du rin g  which the 
Reichabank was com pelled to  ap p ly  a p re fe ren tia l ra tes  below  th e 
o f f ic ia l  rate in  o rd e r  no t to  'lo se  con tact w ith  th e open m arket'.*7 
U n d er  such circum stances, i t  does  not seem v e r y  lik e ly  th a t the 
s h if ts  in th e  Reichsbank ra te  exp la in  much o f  th e cyc lica l ch an ges  in 
th e  German m arket rate , a lth ou gh  in  th e pre-1914 German money 
m arket the Reichsbank occup ied  an in fluen tia l position.**
In  conclusion, the flu ctu ations in  German money stock  d u r in g  
C yc le  I I I ,  as shown in P ig  V-17, th ere fo re  could be said to  h ave been  
determ ined  predom inantly b y  th e  v a ry in g  le v e ls  o f  th e demand fo r  
m oney. While, as aforem en tion ed , th e p oss ib ility  could no t be 
p rec lu d ed  th a t the bank in g system  changed  th e le v e l o f  c re d it  su p p ly  
in  accordance w ith its  assessm ent o f  th e  con d itions in  d i f fe r e n t  
in d u s tr ie s , i t  d id  not appear th a t the absolu te le v e l o f  cash r e s e r v e  
o r  th e  lega l requ irem ent o f  minimum ra tio  o f  cash re s e rv e  aga in st 
d ep o s its  o r  note issue exerc ised  any s ign ifica n t in flu en ces upon the 
determ ination  o f  money stock  d u r in g  th e German C ycle I I I .  The 
German banking system  cou ld  accommodate the chan gin g  le v e ls  o f  
app lica tion  fo r  fu n ds  in  a f le x ib le  manner du r in g  th e yea rs  under 
con sid era tion , both because th e  Reichsbank maintained an ample 
r e s e r v e  re la tiv e ly  to  the lega l requ irem ent, and because the German 
bu s in ess  banks w ere not req u ired  to  maintain a minimum re s e rv e  
a g a in s t th e ir  deposits.** U n der such c ircum stances, it  would no t be 
v e r y  rea listic  to  suppose the em ergen ce o f  a  m onetary c e ilin g  around 
th e  upper tu rn in g  poin t.
27 K . R. Bopp(1953) pp.36-42
28 'R ou gh ly  one th ird  o f  a ll b ills  draw n passed  th rou gh  the 
Reichsbank; ... the a v e ra g e  p o r tfo lio  o f  th e  Reichsbank varied  
b e tw een  10 and IS  X  o f  th e a v e ra g e  amount o f  b ills  ou ts tan d in g.' K. 
R. Bopp(1953) p.9
29 K. R. Bopp(1953) p.74 The Reichsbank was not req u ired  e ith e r  to  
k e ep  minimum r e s e rv e  aga in st its  d eposit liab ilities .
276
F ina lly , i t  ia  worth n o tin g  th a t in co n tra s t to  the US, around 
th e  u pper tu rn in g  poin t o f  th e German C ycle  I I I  no serious financial 
c r is is  o c cu rred .10 While the d i f fe r e n c e  in  th e  stren gth  o f  the
investm en t boom and th e ex ten t o f  specu la tion  may g o  fa r  in 
accou n ting  fo r  th is , the ex istence o f  a cen tra l bank capable o f  actin g 
as a len der o f  la s t res o rt in Germ any would a lso  have con tribu ted  to 
th e  r e la tiv e  s ta b il ity  in th e German m onetary scene.*1
The s ta r t  o f  the German inves tm en t boora in  the mid-1880s is 
a ttr ib u ta b le  to  a  g rea t ex ten t to  th e fa vo u ra b le  e ffe c ts  o f  the 
in crease  in  ir o n  and s tee l e x p o rts  to  th e US, rela ted  to  th e US 
ra ilw ay  b u ild in g  boom, upon th e expectations o f  th e  German iron  and 
s te e l in d u s tr ia lis ts . The re tu rn  o f  p ro s p e r ity  to  in dustria l reg ion s 
in  Germany in du ced  in terna l m igration , which stim ulated th e bu ild ing 
in d u s try . T h e  downturn o f  German home investm en t appeared  to be 
due to  th e r e v e r s a l in the optim ism held b y  the in ves to rs  in  German 
iron  and s te e l in d u s try , to which th e  d eve lopm ent o f  e a r ly  s ign s  o f  
su p p ly  o f  h ou s in g  o u ts tr ip p in g  demand a t th e end o f  1889, as w ell as 
th e  d epressed  ov e rsea s  sale o f  German iron  and s tee l p rodu cts  since 
1887, seem ed to  make cru cia l con tribu tion s . Th e  cyc lica l fluctuations 
in  exp orts , exp licab le  mainly b y  th e  s h ifts  in  th e US le v e l o f  a c tiv ity
30 M. Bordo(1986) reco rds  in  Tab le  6.1A th e ou tb reak  o f  financial, 
s tock  m arket an d  banking c r is e s  in  the US in  1893, whereas 
acco rd in g  to  h is  Tab le  6.1C o n ly  stock  m arket c r is e s  w ere  ob se rved  
in  Germany in 1890, 1891 and 1893.
31 In  v iew  o f  th e  recu rren ce  o f  bank in g pan ics in  pre-1870 B rita in 
d e sp ite  th e p re s en ce  o f  the Bank o f  England, th en  s till an immature 
cen tra l bank, th e  v irtu a l absence o f  absolu te maximum in  the 
Reichsbank n o te  issue, in  con tra s t to  P ee l's  A c t, could also be 
con sid ered  as  a fa c to r  con tr ib u t in g  to  the fin an c ia l s tab ility  in 
Germ any. When th e V ice P re s id en t and D irector o f  th e Reichsbank 
w ere  asked  b y  th e  National M on etary  Commission what would the 
Reichsbank d o  i f  its  cash r e s e r v e  w ere  to  fa ll  below on e -th ird  o f  its  
n o te  issue, th ey  answ ered  th a t 'We should have to  g o  on discounting 
b ills . We shou ld  simply have to  do it. We cou ld  not stop  it. I f  
w e d id , i t  w ou ld  b rin g  abou t th e  g re a te s t  pan ic we e v e r  experien ced .' 
Quoted in K. R. Bopp(1959) p . 27,28
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and B ritish o v e rs e a s  len d in g , th u s  seemed to  have qu a lita tive  rather 
than qu a n tita tive  im portance in  the varia tion s  o f  German home 
investm ent. T h e  German m onetary  system  appeared  to  v a r y  its 
money supply  b y  and la rge  in  accordance w ith  th e  ch an gin g  le v e l o f  
demand fo r  m oney.
VI
THE TRADE CYCLE, 1885-1893: BRITAIN
As ’th e f ir s t  in d u str ia l na tion ', B rita in  is  said to  have reached 
the phase o f  industria l m a tu r ity  and r e ta rd a t io n  in the la te  19th 
cen tu ry , when in  th e US an d  Germany in d u s tr ia l developm ent was 
fa th e r in g  momentum. T h e  d iffe ren ce  b e tw een  Britain on  the one 
hand and the US and G erm any on the o th e r  hand in  the s ta g e  o f  
economic developm ent is  o b s e rv a b le  in  in ves tm en t ratios: d u r in g
1885-1894 the ratio  o f  n e t dom estic in ves tm en t to  NNP was 12.7%, 
11.6% and 1.6% in  the US, G erm any and th e  UK, resp ec tiv e ly  (Tab le  I I -  
3). In  B rita in, how ever, home investm en t n e v e r  occupied such an 
im portant position as in  th e  US and G erm any: the h igh est ra tio  o f  
g ro ss  domestic fixed  in ves tm en t to  GDP e v e r  reached in B rita in  since 
the m id-18th cen tu ry  up to  th e  ou tbreak  o f  WWI was 10.4% d u r in g  
1781-1800*, whereas th e g r o s s  investm ent r a t io  o f  the US in 1885-94 
was o v e r  20%. That is , e v e n  in  the m ost youth fu l phase o f  the 
B ritish  industria lization , dom estic  cap ita l form ation con tribu ted  to 
national income to a much sm aller exten t in  r e la t iv e  terms than in  the 
la te  19th cen tu ry  US o r  Germ any, w ith  exp o rts  p lay in g  a v e r y  
im portant part.
The im portance o f  exp o rts  and th e  re la tiv e ly  minor p a rt 
a ttribu ta b le  to home in ves tm en t in  th e la te  19th cen tu ry  B ritish  
economy ga ve  it  an a d d ition a l fea tu re  o f  a  lend ing  economy: both 1
1 C. IL L ee (Í986 ) l> .5 Í, T ab le  3.1
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pushed by th e re la tiv e  lack o f  d om estic  demand fo r  fu n d s  and pulled 
b y  more a ttrac tiv e  o ve rseas  in v e s tm en t opportu n ities , a roun d  two 
f i f th s  o f  B ritish sav in gs  flow ed  a b ro a d  in pre-1914 y ea rs .  Besides 
b e in g  rela ted to th e low  le v e l o f  dom estic  investm ent, th e  overseas  
lend ing  on th is  scale is  said to  h a ve  con tribu ted  to  th e  predom inance 
o f  exports  in the B ritish  economy.1
Such pecu liarities  o f  the B r it ish  economy determ ined  its  ro le  in 
the international economic flu c tu a t ion s  during th e p re-1914  period. 
A s  w e have seen in Chapter I I ,  B r ita in  rece ived  th e e f fe c t s  o f  the 
fluctuations o f  the US and Germ any, o c cu rr in g  la rg e ly  d u e  to  fac tors  
in terna l to each o f  th e  two, and transm itted  them to  u n developed  
areas; a t the same time, she p ro v id e d  an add ition a l source o f  
international trade cyc le s  b y  s u p p ly in g  funds es sen tia l fo r  the 
developm ent o f  various reg ion s  s u rro u n d in g  her. T h u s , th e  analysis 
in  th is  chapter begin s w ith  the exam ination o f  the o v e rs e a s  trade  and 
cap ita l exports  o f  B rita in. 2
2 A. Q. Ford (1981)
1. Overseas Trade and Lending
In  the movements o f  the absolu te le ve l o f  th e  UK GDP a t both 
c u r r e n t  and constant p rices  is  id en tified  a c y c l ic a l  pattern  w ith  the 
fo llo w in g  th ree tu rn in g  poin t y ea rs (F ig  V I-1 , T a b le  V I-1 ): 1885 (T )-
1890(P )-1893(T ).* One can find  th e same p a tte rn  in  the fluctuations 
o f  e x p o r t  volum e(Fig  V I-2 ), w h ilst exp ort va lu e  ro s e  from  th e 1886 
t r o u g h  to the peak in  1890 b y  £50.8m, and th en  fe l l  until 1894 b y  
£47.5m.4 Gross domestic fixed  cap ita l form ation (G D FCF) in the UK, a t
b o th  constant and cu rren t p rices , on  the o th e r  hand, follow ed a 
p a t te rn  lagg in g  behind that in  e ith e r  exports  o r  national p rodu ct, 
h a v in g  1887, 1892 and 1893(GDFCF a t cu rren t p r ic e s )  o r  1894(GDFCF 
a t  con stan t p ric es ) as tu rn in g  poin t yea rs . Furtherm ore, the
va r ia t io n s  in  the GDFCF w ere much m ilder th a n  those in  exports , 
sh o w in g  an increase o f  £29m and decrease o f  £4m du rin g  th e Cycle 
I I I  u p - and downsw ing, resp ective ly .*  These ob se rva t ion s  would 
s u g g e s t  that exp orts  p layed a more im portant ro le  than domestic 
in ves tm en t in  the trade  cyc le  under examination.
In  F ig  VI-2  a re  a lso shown th e varia tion s in  th e  d irec t estimate 
o f  B ritish  long term  fo re ign  in vestm en t(1885 (T )-1889 (P )-1893 (T )), 
w h ich  tended to lead those in  both m erchandise e x p o r t volume and 
v a lu e .  M oreover, th e fluctuations in  o v e rs e a s  lend ing  -  £67.6m
3 F e in s te in ’s 'comprom ise estim ates' o f  GDP at f a c t o r  cos t a re  used 
h e r e .  C. H. Feinstein(1976) T12 4 T18. The t r a d e  union 
unem ploym ent reco rd  su ggests  1886-1890-1893 as  th e  turn ing 
p o in ts (F ig  I I-5 ),  w h ereas accord ing to  th e NBER th e  B ritish  C ycle  I I I  
is  d e fin ed  by the fo llow ing th ree  tu rn in g  poin ts: June 1886, 
S ep tem ber  1890 and February 1895. O. M orgen stern (1959 )
4 I t  is  possib le to  fin d  the same th ree  tu rn in g  p o in t  y ea rs  in  the 
c r e d i t  items o f  th e balance o f  payments cu rren t a ccou n t. See F ig
V I-2 .
5 S u ch  a d iffe ren ce  between the r ise  and fa ll o f  B r it ish  home 
in ves tm en t would imply that much o f  the £29m in c re a s e  du rin g  the 
u p sw in g  was attribu tab le  to  trend  ra th er than c y c l ic a l  element.
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Fig V I-1 UK GDP
Fig VI-2 Exports, Imports. Home and Foreign Investment: UK
A : m C rcW and’. U  mpor+fc
3 r*»e«o»i4'iö<se
pit** o * * * r  n*t
cred.r ;tv**s :*» b*i«au. 
o f  payments
C : dkM«%t;c merer» o*Wse 
export*
D'.C-oFc f
£ : new psrtfol o ov«r »^«S
Source: B. R. MitcheU(1962). C. H. Feinstein(1976). M. Simon(1968). W. Schlote(1952)
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Table VI-1 Key Macroeconomic A ggrega tes : UK 
(C u rren t P ric es , £m)
Y OL X I M
1883 1177 61.2 239.8 102 426.9
1884 1152 63.0 233.0 93 390.0
1885 1124 55.3 213.1 80 371.0
1886 1130 69.8 212.7 69 349.9
1887 1183 84.4 221.9 68 362.2
1888 1229 119.1 234.5 74 387.6
1889 1320 122.9 248.9 84 427.6
1890 1345 116.6 263.5 89 420.7
1891 1327 57.6 247.2 94 435.4
1892 1292 39.8 227.2 97 423.8
1893 1290 32.1 218.3 93 404.7
1894 1372 48.3 216.0 99 408.3
1895 1401 77.7 226.1 99 416.7
1896 1451 68.5 240.1 113 441.8
1897 1487 78.4 234.2 132 451.0
Y: GDP, 
exports ,
OL: new 
I: GDFCF
p ortfo lio  fo r e ig n  investm ent, 
, M: m erchandise im ports
X: merchandise
Source: C. H. Feinstein (1976) T8 , 
P. Deane (1962)
T12, M. Simon(1968), B. R. Mitch«
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increase and £90.8m declin e -  exceeded  th ose  in the cu rren t value o f  
m erchandise exports.* The exp o rt flu c tu a t ion s  would, thus, appear 
to  have been in fluen ced  b y  th e s h if t s  in  the le v e l o f  overseas 
lend ing . In  the same f igu re  a re  f in a l ly  produced  the varia tion s in 
th e va lue and volume o f  B ritish m erchan d ise  imports; th ese are seen 
to  lag behind those in  th e le v e l o f  a c t iv it y ,  which would su gges t that 
chan ges in  the le v e l o f  a c t iv ity  caused  th e  le v e l o f  im ports to  va ry .
T h ere fo re , from  an  examination o f  th e  sequence o f  tu rn in g  points 
in  th e fluctuations o f  k ey  m acroeconom ic ag grega tes , as summarized 
in  Tab le  V I-2 , would em erge th e fo llo w in g  mechanism o f  th e British 
C ycle I I I :  the sh ifts  in  th e le v e l o f  o v e r s e a s  lend ing s ign ifican tly  
a ffe cted  B ritish  exp orts , which in  tu rn  determ ined th e leve l o f  
dom estic investm ent, th e le v e l o f  a c t iv it y ,  and con sequ en tly , o f  
im ports.T
P ig  V I-3  shows the varia tion s  in  merchandise and long term 
cap ita l exp orts  from  Brita in  to m ajor reg ion s . In  the US and 
A rgen tin e  c a s e s (f ir s t and second ch a rts  in  F ig  V I-3 ) -  th e varia tions 
in  th e lend ing  to wh ich accounted fo r  90.2X and 68.8X o f  th e cyc lica l 
r ise  and fa ll o f  to ta l B ritish  new p o r t fo l io  fo re ign  investm ent during 
C ycle I I I  -  the r e v iv a l and con traction  o f  both lend ing and exports 
a re  seen to  have occu rred  in  th e same yea r.*  The len d in g  to the
6 The c re d it  items in  th e  cu rren t accou n t o f  the balance o f  payments 
increased  b y  £86.6m, and declined  b y  £60.lm  during the u p - and 
downsw ing o f  Cycle I I I .
7 Th is  is  the broad ou tline o f  th e s tru c tu re  o f  the B ritish  trade 
c yc les  in  1870-1914 e ra , p roposed  b y  P ro fe s s o r  A. G.
Ford (1965)4(1981).
8 Besides M. Simon's estim ate o f  B ritish  len d in g  to  A rgen tina , shown 
in F ig  V I-3 , the estimate o f  o v e ra ll A rg e n t in e  fo re ign  borrow ing  by  J. 
H. Williams! 1920) and th e  estim ate o f  th e U K  issues fo r  A rgen tin a  by  
P ro fesso r  A. G. Ford (1962) a re  ava ilab le . A  major d iscrepancy  
betw een  Simon's se rie s  on  the one hand an d  those by  Williams and 
Ford  on  the other hand is  th at th e fo rm e r  peaka in 1889, whereas the 
la tte r  reach es upper tu rn in g  poin t as e a r ly  as in 1888. For our 
purpose hero Williams’ s e ries  would be le s s  re le van t than th e other
Table VI-2 Turning Point Years: UK
Trough Peak Trou gh
Y 1885 1890 1893
X 1885 1890 1893
I 1887 1892 1894
OL 1885 1889 1893
M 1886 1892 1893
Y: GDP at constant fa c to r  prices  
X: merchandise exp o rt volume 
M: merchandise im port volume 
I: GDFCF at constant p rices
OL: Simon's d irec t estimate o f  new p o r tfo lio  fo r e ig n  investm ent
Source: C. H. Feinatein(1976), W. Schlote(1952), M. Simon(1968)

th ird  major capital im porter d u r in g  Cycle I I I ,  Australia , also moves in 
c lose agreem ent w ith th e  m erchandise exp orts  from  Brita in to the 
same reg ion (th ird  ch a rt). On th e  o th e r  hand, the fou rth  and fifth
ch arts  in F ig  VI-3  show th a t th e  cyc lica l pa ttern  found in  capita l
exp orts  leads that in m erchandise exp orts  in  th e tw o cases o f  Latin 
America exclud ing A rgen tin a  and ag ricu ltu ra l Europe.* How ever, it  
should be noted that th e lead is  not so regu la r  as between total
exp ort value and ov e rsea s  len d in g  from  Brita in . Although in  both
cases a one yea r gap  is  found in  th e u p turn  in  the mid-1880s, the 
subsequent downturn in  th e len d in g  to  Latin  America exc lud ing 
A rgen tina  leads that in  th e  m erchandise exp orts  to  the same area  by  
tw o yea rs , and the c o rresp on d in g  lag  is  th ree  yea rs  in agricu ltu ra l 
Europe. F inally , h a rd ly  an y  correspon den ce  is  observed  between 
th e varia tion s in the cap ita l and m erchandise exp orts  from Brita in  to  
Asia and Canada(sixth and e igh th  ch a r ts ); in  A fr ica , at the f i r s t  and 
th ird  tu rn in g  points the s h ifts  in  m erchandise exp orts  p receded  those 
in  len d in g (seven th  ch a r t).  Thu s, exam ining th e  fluctuations in
len d in g  and exports  on a reg ion a l le ve l, one scarce ly  fin ds  th e neat 
lead -lag  rela tionsh ip  as is  o b s e rv ed  in  a g g re ga te  data, which seems 
to  su gges t that the in terp re ta tio n  o f  Tab le  V I-2  as g iv en  in the 
p reced in g  paragraph can be som ewhat too simple.
In the f ir s t  p lace, it  w ou ld  appear reasonab le to  r eg a rd  the
re v iv a l o f  exports  from  Brita in  to  th e US from  the 1885 trou gh  as
d ire c t ly  rela ted  to  the b eg in n in g  o f  th e  US dom estic expansion, led
two; o f  the two d if fe r e n t  estim ates b y  Ford and Simon, Simon's 
f ig u re s  a re  used here, because t ra n s fe r  o f  fu nds could be con sidered  
to  occur actua lly  when ca ll is  made, ra th e r  than when secu rities  are 
issued.
9 T o  be more prec ise , in th e f i f t h  ch a rt o f  F ig  V I-3  a re  compared the 
fluctuations in British len d in g  to  Europe w ith  those in  British 
m erchandise exports  to  Europe exc lu d in g  France and Germany; th is 
may be ju s tified  by  th at th e ca p ita l flow in g  in to  Europe was p robab ly  
u n liks ly  to  be invested  in  cap ita l exp orte rs , such as Germany and 
France.
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by  ra ilw ay  investm ent, ra th er than to  the s ta r t o f  th e increase in the 
B ritish  investm ent in the US. For, as was a lre a d y  poin ted ou t1*, 
the B ritish  capita l in vested  in the US du rin g  th e  Cycle I I I  years  
accounted fo r  on ly  an in s ign ifican t portion  o f  US domestic capital 
form ation11. On the oth er hand, it  was shown in  Section 2, Chapter 
IV th a t th e begin n ing o f  th e increase in  the len d in g  to the US in the 
m id- 1880s was in fluenced  by  th e favou rab le  tu rn  in  the US situation. 
T h e re fo re , it  could be said that the b eg in n in g  o f  the US investm ent 
boom b rou gh t about more o r  less  sim ultaneously the r ise  in  both 
m erchandise and capita l exports  from  Brita in to  th e  US from th e  1885 
trou gh .
I f  such was the case in  the upturn in  1885, i t  could be expected  
that both B ritish merchandise and cap ita l exp o r ts  to  the US would 
have continued to expand until around 1892, th e  peak year fo r  the 
US dom estic cap ita l formation. In  rea lity , how ever, th e upper 
tu rn in g  po in t was reached in 1890 fo r  both len d in g  and exports  from 
Brita in  to  the US. As we have a lready  seen , i t  appeared th a t the 
A rgen tin e  c r is is  was mainly responsib le fo r  th e  decline o f  B ritish 
investm en t in th e US a fte r  1890.1* The fa ll in  m erchandise exports  
a fte r  th e  same yea r, how ever, did not appear to  b e  c lose ly  connected 
with th e  con traction in the flow  o f  fu nds into th e  US. Accord ing  to 
W. A. S incla ir, the fo llow ing fac tors  con tribu ted  to  the fa c t that 
B ritish  exports  to the US declined ea r lie r  than d id  the le v e l o f  US 
a c tiv ity : f ir s t ly ,  the fa c t that ’as a resu lt o f  in d u s tr ia l developm ent, 102
10 S ection  3, Chapter II.
11 L. H. Jenka(1951) p.388 says that in th e US ’B ritish  capital was 
used as a con ven ience'. I t  appears possib le th a t th e  US railw ay 
companies raised fu nds in London to take ad van tage  o f  low er in teres t 
rates, ra th e r  than because the US in terna l s a v in g s  w ere  insu ffic ien t.
12 Section  2, Chapter IV.
the US was becoming an in c reas in g ly  com petitive m arket fo r  B ritish  
m anufactu rers'; second ly , th e passage o f  th e McKinley T a r i f f  A c t .1*
A  d if fe r e n t  state  o f  a ffa irs  seemed to  p reva il in  A rgen tin a . 
Foreign , m ostly British , cap ita l appeared  to  p lay  a much more 
substantial ro le  in A rgen tin a  than in  the US1*, which would imply 
that the fluctuations in th e  le v e l o f  B ritish  len d in g  could exerc ise  
d ecis ive  in fluen ces upon th e  le v e l o f  domestic cap ita l form ation  in 
A rgen tina  and th ere fo re  upon th e le v e l o f  im ports. T h e  funds 
raised in  London w ere  p ro b a b ly  used  p a rtly  in B rita in  to  purch ase 
investm ent goods; a t th e  same time, the exported  cap ita l in d ire c t ly  
stimulated UK m erchandise exp orts  to  A rgen tina  b y  be ing u sed  to 
finance investm ent expen d itu re  in  A rgen tina , th ereb y  in creas in g  
income and consumption im ports v ia  th e m ultip lier mechanism. I t  is  
im portant to  note that th e  lag  betw een  th e chan ges in the le v e l  o f 
lend ing to  A rgen tina  and the con sequ en t sh ifts  in m erchandise 
exports  to  A rgen tina  from  B rita in  was sh o rte r  than one y ea r.1*
One ob se rv e s  sim ilar th in gs  happening in  Australia . In  1885-90 
B ritish sav in gs  financed  more than ha lf o f  Australian GDFCF, a n d  as a 
resu lt cap ita l flow  in to  Au stra lia  on  th e one hand and Au stra lian  home 
investm ent and im ports on  th e o th er  hand moved in  broad  agreem en t 
in the yea rs  o f  C ycle I I I . 1* Furtherm ore, it  is  o f  in tere s t t o  note 
that Australian im ports from  Brita in  and total Austra lian  im ports11
13 W. A. Sinclair(1967)~p.96, 96
14 See Section 1, Chapter V II. I f  in  the US B ritish  cap ita l w as  used 
as a 'con ven ien ce ', 'in  A rgen tin a  i t  came to dominate a con sid erab le  
sector o f  th e economy.’  L . H. Jenks(1951) p.388
16 Even A rgen tin e  consumption goods im ports, more lik e ly  to  v a r y  
la g g in g  behind capital im ports than investm en t goods im ports, re v iv e d  
and con tracted  during C yc le  I I I  in  th e same yea rs  as cap ita l im ports 
into A rgen tina . See A. G. Ford(1962) p.142, Tab le XV.
16 N. G. Butlin ( 1962)4(1964)
17 Australian im ports from  Brita in  accounted fo r  more than h a lf o f  
total Austra lian  im ports d u r in g  C ycle I I I .  B. R. M itchell(1983)
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m oved in  c lose r  paralle l w ith  B ritish  len d in g  to  Austra lia  than with 
A u stra lian  GDFCF, again w ith  Lags s h o rte r  than a year.
In  co n tra s t to th e th re e  major cap ita l im porting  areas, rece iv in g  
around tw o  th irds o f  to ta l cap ita l ou tflow  from  Brita in du rin g  Cycle 
I I I ,  a  c lo s e  correspondence was ab sen t betw een  the fluctuations in 
B ritish  le n d in g  and m erchandise e x p o r ts  to  the res t o f  th e world. 
A lth ough  in  both Latin Am erica e xc lu d in g  A rgen tin a  and agricu ltu ra l 
Europe a lead  o f  lend ing o v e r  m erchandise exp o rts  is  observab le , the 
ir r e g u la r it y  o f  the gaps  betw een  th e  flu ctu ations in  the tw o items 
makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to b e liev e  that len d in g  was th e  major determ inant 
o f  th e  l e v e l  o f  merchandise exp orts  to  th ese  areas. I t  would rather 
appear th a t the le v e l o f  exp orts  from  Brita in  to  th ese areas was 
a ffe c ted  s ign ifica n tly  b y  th e le v e l o f  a c t iv ity  in  th ese reg ion s , which 
d epen ded  upon  their exp o rts  to  th e US (in  th e case o f  Latin  America 
e xc lu d in g  A rgen tina ) o r  to  Germany (in  the case o f  a gricu ltu ra l 
E u rope). In te res tin g ly  enough, on e  ob se rv e s  that th e cyc lica l
pa tte rn  fou n d  in B ritish  m erchandise exp orts  to  ag ricu ltu ra l 
E urope( 1886-1890-1895) is  id en tica l to  th a t in  German im ports from 
a g r ic u ltu ra l Europe. I f  the cyc lica l v a r ia tion s  in B ritish  m erchandise 
exp o rts  to  Latin America exc lu d ing  Argentina(1885-1890-1897) ag ree  
on ly  b ro a d ly  with those in  th e US im ports  from  th e  same region (1885- 
1892-1898), th is  may be due to a con sid erab le  ' exten t to d iv e rg in g  
p ric e  m ovem ents in the US and B rita in , particu la r ly  in  th e years  
around th e  upper tu rn in g  point.
I t  w ou ld  be more d if fic u lt  to  su ppose any c lose  linkage between 
cap ita l a n d  merchandise exp orts  to  Asia, A fr ica  and Canada. In  the 
case o f  A s ia , while scarce ly  any c yc lic a l pa ttern  is  id en tifiab le  in the 
flow  o f  fu n d s , merchandise exp orts  m oved in a d is tin c tly  cyc lica l way.
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While both cap ita l and m erchandise exp orts  to  A fr ic a  fluctuated 
cyc lica lly ! at the tw o low er  tu rn in g  poin ts  r e v iv a l o c cu rred  earlier  in 
th e la tte r  than in  th e fo rm er . T h erefo re , the cyc lica l varia tion s  in 
m erchandise exp orts  from  Brita in to  th ese reg ion s  cou ld  more 
reasonab ly  be exp lained  in  terms o f chan gin g  le v e l o f  a c t iv ity  in Asia 
and A fr ica , which resu lted  from  the s h ifts  in  the w orld  demand fo r  
th e prim ary p rodu cts  from  th e  two continents.
Canada form s a p ecu lia r  case in  th a t neither m erchandise nor 
cap ita l exports  from  B rita in  in to  the reg ion  varied  c y c lic a lly . In  the 
Canadian C ycle I I I ,  home investm ent seemed to p lay  rou gh ly  as 
im portant a role  as e x p o r ts .1* A lthough fo re ign  cap ita l made a 
s ign ifica n t con tribu tion  to  Canadian dom estic inves tm en t during the 
C ycle  I I I  years  in  term s o f  a v e ra ge1*, th e tw o items fa ile d  to  move in 
c lose agreem ent: th e  c y c lic a l pattern  found in  Canadian home
investm ent was not o b s e rv a b le  in  the fluctuations o f  cap ita l flow  into 
Canada. As a resu lt, th e  pattern  o f  varia tion s  id en tifiab le  in capita l 
im ports was not to  be fou n d  in Canadian m erchandise im ports, which 
moved cyc lica lly , a s  d id  exp o rts , home investm ent and, th ere fo re , the 
le v e l  o f  a c tiv ity . Furth erm ore , the sh o rt term  va r ia tion s  in  Canadian 
im ports re fle c ted  m ainly th ose in im ports from th e US, whereas 
im ports from  Brita in w ere  s low ly  declin ing on a lon g  term  basis.
18 The Canadian C yc le  I I I  ia  defined  b y  th e fo llow in g  th re e  turning 
poin ts, obta ined  b y  exam ining the fluctuations o f  the abso lu te  le v e l o f  
Canadian GNP in cu r re n t  p ric es : 1885-1891-1895. On th e  other 
hand, Canadian e x p o r t va lu e  rose from th e  1885 trou gh  to  the 1893 
peak b y  831m, and th en  fe l l  to  the 1894 trou gh  b y  $7m; Canadian 
GDFCF increased  b y  826.3m in the 1886-89 upsw ing and declined  by 
$38m in th e 1889-96 dow n sw ing . M. C. U rquhart(1986 ), B. R.
Ifitch e ll( 1963)
19 B ritish  new p o r tfo lio  inves tm en t in Canada, estim ated b y  14. 
Simon(1970), amounted to  30.8% o f  Canadian GDFCF in  1885-94; the 
ra tio  o f  net lon g  term  ca p ita l flow  into Canada, estim ated b y  P. H. 
T h u n berg  and p resen ted  in  A. I. B loomfield (1968a), to  Canadian GDFCF 
in  th e same yea rs  w as 46.9%. Canadian GDFCF data a re  from  M. C. 
Urquhart(1986).
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To summarize the flu c tu a tion s  in  merchandise exp o rts  from  
Brita in  to major reg ion s: exp o rts  to  th e  US w ere mainly in flu en ced  
b y  the US le v e l o f  a c t iv ity , as w e ll a s  by  McKinley T a r i f f  and th e 
com petition w ith  th e US in du str ies ; th e  state o f  th e US and, to a 
m inor exten t, German economies seem ed to  be an im portant fa c to r  
determ in ing th e le v e l o f  UK exp orts  to  undeveloped  areas o th e r  than  
th e  two major cap ita l im porting p r im a ry  producers , A rgen tin a  and 
Australia ; fin a lly , chan ges in B ritish  lend ing to  A rgen tin a  and to  
Australia  appeared  to b r in g  a b ou t correspon d in g  s h ifts  in 
m erchandise exp o rts  from  Brita in  to  th e  two cou n tr ies , w ith  a la g  
sh o rte r  than a yea r; th ere fo re , a lth ou gh  B ritish fo r e ig n  len d in g  d id  
have s ign ifica n t e f fe c ts  upon m erchan d ise  exports  from  B rita in , th e  
p receden ce o f  to ta l o ve rseas  len d in g  o v e r  total m erchandise exp o rts  
b y  one yea r  in  C ycle  I I I  could no t b e  considered  as ev id en ce  fo r  
such a linkage. As to  tu rn in g  p o in ts , it  would seem th a t th e  
beg in n ing  o f  th e US home investm en t boom p layed  a cen tra l ro le  in  
th e  in itiation o f  th e B ritish  e x p o r t u psw ing , both d ire c t ly  -  th e  
increase in  B ritish  m erchandise e x p o r ts  to the US d u r in g  th e 
expansion accounted  fo r  19.9% o f  to ta l increase  -  and in d ire c t ly , i.e ., 
a s  we shall see  sh o rtly , b y  s tim u la tin g  British cap ita l e x p o rts  to  
o th e r  reg ion s than the US, p a r ticu la r ly  to  A rgen tina: th e con sequ en t 
r is e  in  B ritish  m erchandise exp o rts  to  A rgen tin a  was equ a l to  11.8% o f  
to ta l increase in  B ritish  exp o rts  d u r in g  th e upsw ing. The co llapse 
o f  th e boom in  the investm ent in A rgen tin a  appeared th e  m ajor in it ia l 
con traction a ry  shock to  B ritish  e x p o r t  industries , the con sequ en t 
d ec lin e  in B ritish  m erchandise e x p o r ts  to  Argen tina  am ounting to  
13.7% o f  to tal fa l l  in  B ritish  m erchandise exports  d u r in g  th e C ycle  I I I  
downswing.
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Fig  V I-4  shows that th e  impact o f  the c y c lic a l fluctuations in 
B rita in  was most s tron g ly  transm itted v ia  tr a d e  channels to 
u n developed  cou n tr ies  and th e  US: th e  v a r ia tion s  in  im ports from 
th ese areas exp la in  most o f  th ose in to ta l B ritish  im po rt value during 
C ycle  I I I ,  w h ich  was also the case in B ritish  e x p o r ts (F ig  V I-5 ). The 
predom inance o f  prim ary p ro d u cers  in  B ritish  o v e r s e a s  trade would 
b e  con sisten t w ith  th e fa c t th a t more than 80% o f  B r it is h  im ports and 
around 80% o f  B ritish  m erchandise exp o rts  c on s is ted  o f  prim ary 
p rodu cts  and m anufactures, resp ec tiv e ly .*0 I t  is  in teres tin g  to
ob se rv e  in F ig  V I-4  that th e fluctuations in  the B r it is h  im ports from 
Europe and th ose  in  th e im ports from  ou ts ide E u rop e  follow ed two 
d is tin c t pa tte rn s : in  particu la r the peak in  th e  im port value from  
Europe(1889) p reced ed  th at in  the im ports from  o u ts id e  Europe(1891 
o r  1892). S in ce one o b se rv e s  a sim ilar d isp a rity  in  the pattern  o f  
fluctuations b etw een  raw m ateria l and fo o d s tu ff im p o rt values*1, th is 
may be exp licab le  by  the d iffe ren ce  in  the com m odity composition 
between th e im ports from  Europe and ou ts ide Europe: Britain
appeared  to  im port from  th e form er mainly raw m ateria ls, whereas the 
exports  from  th e la tter  in to  B rita in p ro b ab ly  con s is ted  la rge ly  o f  
foo ds tu ffs . A ccord in g  to  Th e  Economist, the d ec lin e  in  raw material 
im port va lu e  d u r in g  the tw o yea rs  a fte r  th e  1889 peak was 
attribu tab le  to  both the ’ unusually la rge  stocks ... ca rr ied  forw ard  
from  1889 to  1890’ and the fa ll  in raw m ateria l p r ic e  in  1891**. On 
th e oth er hand, fo o d s tu ff im port p rices  reached a p eak  in 1891.**
C onsid erin g  F ig  V I-4  k  5 to ge th er , one f in d s  th a t the B ritish  
m erchandise tra d e  balance w ith  European a g r ic u ltu ra l reg ion s, and
20 W. Sch lots ( 1982) p -M  lt 71
21 W.Schk>te(1952) p.122, Tab le  4
22 The Economist, 21 Feb 1891, Commercial H istory  an d  R eview  o f
1890, 20 F eb ru a ry  1892, Commercial H istory  and R eview  o f  1891 Raw
m ateria l im port p r ic e  index peaks  in 1890. W. S ch lo te (l9 5 2 ) p.177
23 W. Sch lote( 1952) p.177, Tab le  26

w ith the US and Germ any, was in  d e fic it ;  wh ile in  th e  trade  w ith  
non-European prim ary  p ro d u cers  B rita in  rou gh ly  m aintained balance. 
Since accord in g  to P ro fe s s o r  S. B. Saul, B rita in reco rd ed  surp lu s in  
h er rela tion  w ith u n deve loped  c ou n tr ies  ou tside E urope14, her 
in v is ib le  trade w ith  non -E uropean  p e r ip h e ry  was p ro b ab ly  in  surplu s. 
A s Table V I-3  shows, B r ita in 's  v is ib le  trad e  d e fic it  w ith  th e  tw o major 
d e fic it  areas, the US an d  European ag ricu ltu ra l reg ion s , increased  
du rin g  the upsw ing, an d  v ic e  ve rsa , w h ils t the m oderate tra d e  d e fic it  
w ith  non-European p e r ip h e r y  du rin g  th e  ea r ly  y ea rs  o f  th e  upsw ing 
was transform ed in to  a  n eg lig ib le  su rp lu s  in the las t y ea rs  o f  th e 
boom, which again tu rn ed  in to  d e fic it  w ith  th e dow n tu rn  o f  th e 
economy. In  o th e r  w o rd s , during th e  trade c yc le  B ritish  im ports 
fluctuated  more w id e ly  than exp orts  in  rela tion  w ith  th e  US and 
European prim ary p ro d u cers , w h ereas th e  opposite  ten ded  to  be the 
case with non-E uropean  undeveloped  areas. Such d iffe r e n c e s  may 
be exp licab le by  th e fo llo w in g  fa c to rs : com petition w ith  the US
in du str ies  in  the US m arket and w ith  German in du str ies  in  European 
p e rip h ery , in  con tra st t o  th e r e la tiv e ly  s tron g  position  o f  B rita in  in  
non-European u n deve loped  markets; g re a te r  depen den ce o f  B rita in 
upon estab lished  s u p p lie rs  o f  p rim ary p roducts , fo o d s tu ffs  in 
particu lar, such as th e  US and Russia, than upon em ergen t prim ary 
producers.
Such havin g  been  th e  case, the o v e ra ll v is ib le  trade  balance(VTB  
in  F ig  V I-6 ) remained in  d e fic it  th rou gh ou t the y ea rs  o f  C ycle  I I I .  
The outcome o f  the c o n tra s t in g  cyc lica l varia tion s in reg ion a l trade 
balances was that o n ly  ir re g u la r  flu ctu ations a re  ob se rv ed  a long the 
d e te r io ra t in g  trend o f  VTB . On th e o th e r  hand, i t  is  seen  in  th e 
same figu re  that th e in v is ib le  trade ba lan ce(ITB ), in c lu d in g  income
24 S. B. Saul (I960 ) p.58
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Tab le  VI-3  Sizes o f  B ritish M erch a n d ise  Trade Balance at Tu rn in g
Poin ts  with Respect to Various A reas (£m )
Trough Peak Trough
USA -50.9 -81.7 -58.6
(1888) (1892) (1895)
European -49.4 -70 .8 -60.7
P erip h ery (1886) (1889) (1892)
Non-European -11.0 6.2 -21.8
P eriph ery (1885) (1890) (1895)
Source: B. R. M itchell A P. D eane(1962)
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from  abroad, was in su rp lu s du rin g  the yea rs  con ce rn ed , and that 
th e  surplus va r ied  in  a trade cyc lica l way. The in v is ib le  trade 
su rp lu s  exceed in g the v is ib le  trade d e fic it, the su rp lu s  in  cu rren t 
balance o f  payments(CB, F ig  V I-6 ) resu lted , which va r ied  in  a  cyclical 
w ay , re fle c tin g  the movements o f  the in v is ib le  trade su rp lu s .
The cyc lica l ch an ges in  the cu rren t account s u rp lu s  were 
associated w ith  the sim ilar pattern  o f  movements in  th e  lo n g  term 
len d in g  by B rita in (F ig  V I-6 ). The r e v iv a l o f  fo r e ign  in v e s tm en t from 
th e  1885 trou gh  was connected mainly w ith  th e in c r e a s e  in the 
ou tflow  o f  fu nds to  th e US and South America, A rg e n t in a  in 
particu lar, and to a m inor exten t with the r ise  in  th e in v e s tm en t in 
Europe.1* Th e  b egin n ing o f  the expansion o f  B ritish  in ves tm en t in 
th e  US in th e mid-1880s seemed to be determ ined b y  th e 'p u l i ’  forces 
on  the US s id e  as well as b y  the 'push ' from  Brita in .1* I t  appeared 
th a t the resum ption o f  th e increase in B ritish  inves tm en t in  the US 
a ffe c ted  the lend ing to Latin  America and Europe fa v o u ra b ly .11 In 
particu lar, in  th e fluctuations o f  the B ritish  investm ent in  Argen tina  
in  the 1880s the in fluen ces coming from  th e US a r e  clearly  
observab le . On the one hand, the broad pa ttern  o f  th e  lo n g  swing 
in  the B ritish  lend ing to  Argen tina  exten d in g from  around 1880 to the 
mid-1890b was shaped b y  both the pu ll o f  A rgen tin e  investm ent 
opportu n ities  and the push o f  British dom estic conditions**. On the 
o th e r  hand, how ever, the tem porary setback in th e m iddle o f  th e long 
upsurge, i.e . in  1885, was due to  the w orldw ide d e p re s s io n  in the
25147 Simon(1968)4(1970)
26 Section 2, Chapter IV.
27 'American railw ay secu rities  w ent up w ith  a g re a t  "b o o m ", and all 
o th e r  issues sym pathized w ith them to a decided  ex ten t’ . Commercial 
H istory  and Review  o f  1885, The Economist 20 Feb 1886. A cco rd in g  
to  Financial and Commercial H istory o f  1885 b y  The S ta tis t, 30 Jan 
1886, 'the partia l r e c o ve ry  o f  business in th e US ... in  th e  la tt e r  part 
o f  the year reacted  on  th is  side and con tribu ted  to  th e  g r o w th  o f  a 
more hopefu l fe e lin g  on th e Stock Exchange and in  fin a n c ia l c irc le s .’
28 See Section 2, Chapter I II .
298
mid-1880s fo llo w in g  the collapse o f  the US ra ilw ay investm ent boom in 
the e a r ly  1880s, w h ich  made i t  d if fic u lt  fo r  A rgen tina  to ra ise  funds 
in London.**
The dow n turn  in B ritish ov e rsea s  lend ing  in  1889 rep resen ted  
the collapse o f  th e  investm ent in  A rgen tina , which was rela ted  to  the 
overbu ild in g  o f  ra ilw ays  in  Argen tina.** The A rgen tin e  dAb&cle 
seemed to  a f fe c t  th e  lend ing to  r e la tiv e ly  unfamiliar areas immediately 
and a d ve rs e ly : len d in g  to  Asia and A fr ica  declined  a fte r  1889. On 
the o th e r  hand, th e e f fe c ts  o f  th e A rgen tin e  c r is is  upon the 
investm ent in th e  re la tiv e ly  w ell-know n and 's a fe ' reg ion s such as 
the US and E urope w ere not fe lt  u n til a fte r  1890(Fig V I-3 ). F inally , 
B ritish len d in g  to  Australia had a lready  reached a peak in 1888, 
which was due to  the exhaustion o f  investm ent opportu n ities  in 
Australia*1; i t  is  poss ib le  th at the declin e in  Australian borrow ing  
a fte r  1888 was acce lera ted  by th e  Baring cris is .
Both the s ta te  o f  the cu rre n t  balance o f  payments and th e le v e l 
o f  lon g  term  o v e rs e a s  lend ing  w ere the major determ inants o f  the 
gold flow s  in  and ou t o f  B rita in , which b rou gh t about the sh ifts  in 
the stock  o f  B ritish  monetary gold.** Accord ing to  F ig  V I-7 , du rin g  
the e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  the C ycle  I I I  u psw ing ( 1885-88) the stock  o f  
monetary go ld  in  B rita in  was reduced , due e ith e r  to the n e t gold  
exports  from  B rita in  o r  to  th e  broad balance in  the go ld  trade  
coupled w ith th e  d ivers ion  o f  g o ld  fo r  non-m onetary pu rposes. In
29 For a more d e ta iled  d iscussion on th is  su b ject, see Sections 1 k  2, 
Chapter V II.
30 Section 1, C h ap ter VII.
31 Section 2, C hap ter I I I  It Section  2, Chapter V III.
32 The stock  o f  m onetary go ld  in  Brita in is  approxim ated by  the 
bullion in  the Is su e  Department o f  the Bank o f  England plus coin s in 
c ircu lation , which includes the coin s in th e Banking Department o f 
the Bank. I t  w as seen in F ig  I I I - 15 th a t th e f i r s t  d iffe ren ces  o f  the 
stock o f  m onetary go ld  thus d e fin ed  a g re e  c lose ly  w ith the varia tion s 
in net go ld  im ports  into Britain.
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th e r e s t  o f  the C ycle I I I  y ea rs , B rita in  was im porting go ld  in net 
term s, and con sequ en tly  the m onetary go ld  stock  g rew  without 
in terrup tion .
P ig  V I-8  shows th e flu c tu ation s  in  the n e t gold  im ports from 
major reg ion s  in to  B rita in  d u r in g  C ycle I I I .  I t  is  f ir s t  o f  a ll seen 
th at B rita in  was exp ortin g  go ld  to  Germany and im porting go ld  from 
go ld  p roducers  such as South A fr ica  and Australasia in  net terms 
d u r in g  C ycle I I I .  As was a lre a d y  poin ted  ou t in  Section 2, Chapter 
V, th e gold  ou tflow  to  Germany seem ed to  o r ig in a te  from  the grow ing  
trade  d e fic it  on th e B ritish  s ide. The yea r  1890 was a tu rn in g  point 
in  th e gold  im ports from  go ld  p rod u c in g  reg ion s  in to  Britain: in  p re -  
18 90 yea rs  gold  in flow  from  g o ld  p rodu cing  cou n tr ies  remained at a
low le v e l, while a fte r  1890 th e  amount o f  net go ld  im ports from
Australia , New Zealand and South A fr ica  g rew  rap id ly . Thus, it
could be said th at th e go ld  e x p o r ts  to  Germany d u r in g  the depression  
in  the e a r ly  1890s, on  a g re a te r  scale than in  th e p reced in g  boom 
yea rs , w ere  fac ilita ted  b y  th e  increased  new go ld  supp ly. In 
rela tion  to  the two m ajor b o rro w in g  reg ion s , US and Latin  America, 
B rita in  exported  go ld  in  th e e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  expansion, w h ilst in  the 
r e s t  o f  the Cycle I I I  p eriod , th e  d irec tion  o f  gold  flow s  was reversed . 
Thus, it  would seem th at th e sim ilar pa ttern  o f  th e fluctuations in 
to ta l net go ld  im ports in to  B rita in  was re la ted  .to the le v e l o f  long 
term  cap ita l ou tflow . As w as a lready  poin ted  ou t in Section  2,
Chapter IV , the net go ld  exp o r ts  from  Brita in  in to  the US d u r in g  the 
e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  the C ycle  I I I  boom had som ething to do w ith  the 
ou tflow  o f  both long and sh o rt term  cap ita l from  Brita in  to  the US, 
w h ilst the net go ld  im ports from  th e US in to  B rita in  in th e la te  years  
o f  th e expansion w ere  la r g e ly  re la ted  to  th e ren ew ed  in flow  o f  short
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Fig VI-8 Net Gold Imports into Britain from Various Regions
Source: Statistical Abstract for the UK
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term cap ita l to  London, a ttrac ted  by  h igh short term  in te r e s t  rates.** 
The continued net g o ld  im ports from  the US d u r in g  th e  d epress ion  
was p robab ly  th e con sequ en ce o f  the decline in  the lon g  term  len d in g  
to th e US. The sim ilar pa ttern  o f  fluctuations in  th e  n e t gold  
imports from  Latin  Am erica would be exp licab le in  b ro a d ly  th e  same 
terms as in the US. F inally , the fo llow ing  o b se rva t ion s  seem to 
su ggest th at th e g o ld  flow s between B rita in an d  F ran ce w ere 
determ ined la rg e ly  b y  sh o rt term  cap ita l movements: th e  d e fic it  in 
the trade  w ith F ran ce showed a d is tin c t r is in g  tren d  w ith ou t much 
short term  flu c tu ation s  du r in g  C ycle I I I ;  both c ou n tr ies  w e re  major 
long term  len d ers  in  pre-1914 yea rs ; the fluctuations in  th e  n e t gold  
inflow  from  F rance to  B rita in  b road ly  correspon ded  w ith  th ose  in  the 
short term  in tere s t r a te  d iffe ren tia l between London o v e r  Paris  (F ig  
VI-9 ).*«
In  summary, th e  le v e l o f  B ritish overseas  len d in g  and o f  US 
ac tiv ity , among o th e rs , appeared  to be th e two major d eterm inan ts o f  
the le v e l o f  m erchandise exp orts  from  Brita in , upon w h ich  th e  le v e l  o f  
a c tiv ity  in  Brita in p rim ar ily  depended; im ports in to  B rita in  w ere 
mainly in fluenced  b y  th e  le v e l o f  domestic a c t iv ity . M erchandise 
imports exceed in g  m erchandise exports , and the am p litudes o f  the 
cyc lica l varia tion s  in  th e  tw o items being o f  sim ilar s izes , the 
resu lting  v is ib le  trad e  d e fic it  showed ir re gu la r  flu c tu ation s . The 
cyc lica l pa tte rn  in  th e  c u rren t account surplus was th u s  la r g e ly  due 
to  the cyc lica l m ovements in  the in v is ib le  trade su rp lu s; w h ile  the 
state o f  cu rren t balance o f  payments and th e le v e l o f  lon g  and sh ort
33 See Section  4, C hap ter VI.
34 I t  should be noted  th a t most o f  th e net gold  in flow  from  F ran ce  in 
1890 amounting to  a roun d  £4m w.ia rela ted  to th e em ergen cy  su p p ly  
o f  gold  reach in g  £3m from  Banque de France, in  respon se  to  th e 
requ est o f  th e G ove rn or  o f  th e Bank o f  England in th e  m idst o f  the 
Baring c ris is . L . S. Pressnell(1968 ) p.199


2. Home Investm ent
The d epen den ce o f  the le v e l  o f  domestic cap ita l form ation in 
Brita in upon the ata te o f  the w orld  market d u r in g  C ycle  I I I ,  as 
suggested  by the sequence o f  tu rn in g  poin t y ea rs (T ab le  V I-2 ), is 
confirm ed b y  the d iffe r e n t  p a tte rn s  o f  varia tion s fo llow ed  b y  home 
investm ent in  variou s  fo rm s (F ig  V I-1 0 )1
I t  is  in  th e movements o f  investm ent in  sh ip s th a t th e most 
d is tin c t cyc lica l pa ttern  is  fou n d ; m oreover, i t  p icked  up and 
reached a peak ea r lie r  than o th e r  form a o f  inveatm ent, syn ch ron iz in g  
w ith  the fluctuations in m erchandise exp ort value. Aa is  w ell known, 
th ere  ex is ts  a c lose  agreem ent be tw een  the flu ctu ations in sh ipp in g  
fre ig h ts  index* and those in sh ipbu ild in g , which would su g ges t the 
d irection  o f  causation runn ing fro m  th e form er to  th e la tte r . I f  
’ f re ig h ts  ra tes  w ere  based on  th e  demand fo r  sh ip p in g  se rv ic e  
re la tiv e  to  th e ex is tin g  pool o f  to n n a ge ’*, the increase  in  th e  volume 
o f  world tra d e  seemed to u n der lie  th e  upturn in sh ip p in g  f r e ig h ts  in 
th e mid-1880s, w h ereas th e su b seq u en t downturn was re la ted  to  the 
increase in  sh ipbu ild ing  ou tpu t: ’The [sh ip b u ild in g ] boom in  the
second ha lf o f  th e 1880s must be a ttr ib u ted  in its  e a r ly  s tages  to  the 
v e r y  la rge  Eastern European h a rv e s ts  o f  1886-87 and la te r  to  a 
gen era l expansion o f  trade co in c id in g  w ith a  fa ir ly  la r g e  North 
American h a rv e s t in  1889’ ; on  th e  oth er hand, ’ I t  is  im possib le to 
explain the tu rn in g  poin t [in  sh ip b u ild in g ) in  th e f i r s t  h a lf o f  1890 
w ithout re fe ren ce  to  the increase in  th e  tonnages a floa t as a resu lt
1 Gross dom estic fixed  capita l form a tion  in variou s in d u str ies , as 
shown in F ig  VI-10  ia  measured in  cu r re n t  p rices ; in  GDFCF at 
constant p ric es  a re  ob se rvab le  s im ila r patterns o f  flu ctu ations. C.
H. Feinstein(1976) T88
2 A. K. C a irn cross ( 1953) p.176, T ab le  39
3 S. Pollard k  P. Robertson(1979) p.26
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o f th e boom o f  th e la te  1880s ... a fte r  1890 th e  volume o f  trade  
p robab ly  con tinued to  r ise , b u t the en largem ent o f  sh ipp ing  capac ity  
was ou t o f  p roportion  to  th e  increased  dem and.’ * With B rita in  
occu py in g  a dominant pos ition  in  both th e w o rld  sh ipp in g  and 
sh ipbu ild ing in d u s try  in  pre-1914 period*, th e s h if ts  in  the volum e o f  
w orld  trade a ffe c ted  B ritish  sh ipbu ild ing  v ia  th e  fluctuations in  the 
exp orts  o f  sh ip s from  B rita in , as well as th ro u gh  chan gin g demand 
from  the dom estic sh ipp in g  indu stry .*
In  F ig  V I-10  is, secon d ly , ob se rved  that in ves tm en t in p lan t and 
m achinery fo llow ed  a c yc lic a l pa ttern , which ia  f a r  less  d is tin c t than 
and lags beh ind  th at in  investm en t in  ships. A ccord ing  to  W. A. 
S incla ir, d u r in g  C ycle  I I I  ’ th e  add ition to  p ro d u c t iv e  capacity  in  lig h t 
in du str ies  was not la rg e  enou gh  to  make much d iffe ren ce  to  to ta l 
investm ent. W ithin h eavy  in d u s try  its e lf  ... la r g e  capita l expen d itu re  
waa con fin ed  to  tw o in d u s tr ie s  oth er than sh ip b u ild in g , namely, op en - 
hearth  s tee l and coa l m in ing.’* Thus, one cou ld  sa fe ly  reg a rd  the 
fluctuations o f  th e cap ita l form ation  in form  o f  ’p la n t and m ach inery ’ 
as b y  and la rg e  r e fle c tin g  th e le v e l o f  in ves tm en t in these tw o h eavy  
in dustries .
The open -h earth  s tee l in d u s try , S incla ir con tin u es , was ’ th e most 
im portant example o f  induced  investm ent resu lt in g  from  the
4 W. A. S incla ir (1957) p.323, 330, 334 Th is  is  b ro a d ly  con sisten t w ith 
the mechanism o f  sh ipbu ild ing  c y c le  as su gges ted  in  S. Pollard  k  P. 
R obertson (1979) p.27
5 D. H. A ld c ro ft ( 1968) p.326, S. Pollard  A P. R ob ertso n (1979) p.37, S. 
Po lla rd (1957) p.432
6 S. Pollard  k  P. Robertson (1979) p.250, Tab le  B.8 shows th at both 
to ta l m erchant tonnage b u ilt in  th e UK and th e p ro p ortion  o f  
o ve rseas  sale in  th e to ta l v a r ied  cyc lica lly  in  th e  C ycle  I I I  y ea rs .
’ In  th e  p eriod  1869-1883 an  a v e ra ge  o f  12% o f  B r it ish  ouput w as aold 
abroad; in 1900-1913, it  was 24%, ch ie fly  m erchan t vesse la .’ (p .37 )
7 W. A. S inclair(1957) p.538
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sh ipbu ild ing  boom’. '  Un til around 1890 investm ent in op en -h ea rth  
s tee l was determ ined  by  th e  d esire  to  expand p ro d u c tiv e  capac ity  
under th e  condition  o f  th e  r is in g  demand com ing fro m  the 
sh ipbu ild in g  in du stry , w h ereas the inves tm en t a c t iv ity  in  op en -h ea rth  
s tee l in th e  e a r ly  1890s was connected  w ith  ’com petitive  co s t-red u c in g  
im provem ent in  the techn ique o f  p rod u ction ’ .*
Both the sh ipp ing  boom and th e expansion  o f  o ve rseas  demand 
appeared  to  a f fe c t  th e coa l in d u s try  fa vou rab ly . Th e  form er
in fluen ced  the coal in d u s try  both d ire c t ly , i.e . by  consum ing more 
coal, and in d ire c t ly , b y  stim ulating s te e l in d u s try 1*; w h ile  du rin g  
th e C ycle I I I  y ea rs  ov e rsea s  m arket ab sorb ed  a s ign ifica n t p ortion , 
around 20X, o f  the to tal coa l ou tput11. H igher p ro fits  con sequ en t 
upon th e r is e  in coal p rices  meant g re a te r  amount o f  fu n ds  ava ilab le  
fo r  investm ent in  th e coal in du stry , w h ich  was ’ th e most im portant 
s in g le  fa c to r  determ in ing th e  amount o f  new s in k in g ’.1* The
im portance o f  th e a va ilab ility  o f  funda in  th e investm ent d ec is io n s  in 
th e  coal in d u s try  exp lains w hy a h igh  le v e l o f  in ves tm en t was 
maintained u n til a fte r  the e a r ly  1890s: ’ th e fu nds raised  an d  the 
p ro fits  made d u r in g  th e boom w ere la r g e  enough to  m aintain the
8 W. A. S in c la ir (1957) p.540 A lso, a ccord in g  to  S. Po llard  k  P . 
R obertson ( 1979) p.36-37, ’Th e  rela tion sh ip  betw een  sh ipbu ild in g  and 
th e s tee l in d u s try  was p articu la r ly  im portant. A lthough it  w as  little  
understood  a t th e time, n itrogen  im pu rities  made Bessemer s te e l 
unsu itable fo r  sh ip  p lates. The rap id  in crease  in  th e use o f  s te e l in 
sh ipbu ild ing  made the open  hearth  s e c to r  o f  th e s tee l in d u s try  in 
B rita in , in  c on tra st to  Am erica, fa r  more dynam ic from  the 1880s than 
th e  Bessemer sector, which depended la r g e ly  on the s tagn a tin g  exp ort 
demand fo r  ra ils . A fte r  1890, rou gh ly  h a lf o f  th e open h earth  
ou tpu t in  Brita in  was fo r  sh ip  p lates and an gles . The s e ve re  
fluctuations in  sh ipbu ild ing production  w e re  rap id ly  transm itted  to  
th is  o th e r  basic in d u stry  and from  it  to  th e  rem ainder o f  the 
economy.’
9 For de ta ils , see  W. A. S in cla ir (1957) C hapter V II.
10 In  the y ea rs  con cerned , iron  and s te e l w orks seemed to consume 
around 10X o f  total coal production , w h ile  coastin g  steam ers absorbed  
less  than IX  o f  the to ta l coal output. A. J. T a y lo r (1968) p.39
11 A. J. T a y lo r (1968) p.39
12 W. A. S in c la ir (1957) p.162
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impetus o f  expansion when less p rosperou s  conditions re tu rn ed ’.1* 
T h e re fo re , i t  could be concluded th at th e m ild ly cyc lica l movements in 
the le v e l o f  the investm en t in  'p lan t and m ach inery ’ , as shown in  P ig 
VI-10, w e r e  produced  to a substantia l ex ten t b y  th e  p reced in g  
cyc lica l flu c tu ation s  in  the investm ent in  ships.
In  the varia tion s  o f  the inves tm en t in  n o n -ree id en tia l new 
bu ild in g  an d  w orks is  also id en tified  a weak cyc lica l p a ttern : i t  rose 
from  th e  trou gh  in 1888 to  the peak  in  1891, and th en  remained 
s tagnan t un til around 1895. The u p tu rn  in  th is  ca tego ry  o f
in ves tm en t, la g g in g  even  behind th e r e v iv a l  o f  inves tm en t in  plant 
and m ach inery, seemed to  have more to  do w ith  the re la tiv e  
abundance o f  fu nds than w ith  the ch an ges in  demand; the v irtu a l 
absence o f  a declin e in th e absolute le v e l  o f  th e non -resid en tia l 
c on stru c tio n  investm ent d u r in g  th e depress ion  in  th e e a r ly  1890s may 
be e xp licab le  in  the same terms as inves tm en t in  coa l industry . 
F ina lly , i t  is  to  be noted th a t res id en tia l investm ent h a rd ly  made any 
con tr ib u t ion  to the cyc lica l movements in  B ritish  home investm ent 
du rin g  C yc le  I II .
T h e re fo re , i t  may now be reasonable to  conclude th a t th e sh ifts  
in the volum e o f  w orld  trade, o r ig in a tin g  mainly from  th e  changes in 
the US an d  German domestic cap ita l form ation  and B ritish  overseas  
len d in g , tr ig g e re d  th e chain reaction  o f  cyc lica l flu ctu ations in the 
in ves tm en t a c tiv ity  in  a  se ries  o f  in du str ies . As a consequ ence, the 
cyc lica l pa tte rn  in the to ta l B ritish  home investm ent la g ged  behind 
th at in  exp orts ; in  particu lar, the peak in  home inves tm en t was 
reached tw o  yea rs  la te r  than that in  m erchandise e xp o rt value, i.e . in 13
13 W. A . S inclair(19S7) p.162
1892, thus p robab ly  a lle v ia tin g  the p reaau re o f  th e depreaaion  in  the 
e a r ly  1890a.
In  such a p ro cess  o f  investm ent fluctuations, the in flu en ces  o f  
in te r e s t  rates a re  rep o rte d  to  have been  weak.14 I t  is  a lso d iffic u lt
to  b e lieve  that the B arin g  c r is is  had an y  v is ib le  e f fe c ts  on th e  le v e l 
o f  B ritish  home in vestm en t. 'S h ips ' and 'p lant and m ach inery ' w ere  
th e  two typ es  o f  in ves tm en t which peaked  in 1889. As we h ave seen 
a b o v e , the decline o f  sh ipbu ild in g  a fte r  1889, how ever, had more to 
d o  w ith the ov e rca p a c ity  crea ted  in  th e p reced in g  boom and th e 
con sequ en t fa ll in  fr e ig h ts  than w ith  th e ad ve rse  finan cia l e f fe c ts  
r e s u lt in g  from th e c r is is ; in v iew  o f  th e close connection  betw een  
th e  rev iv a l in sh ipbu ild in g  and that in  h eavy  in d u s try , th e s ligh t fa ll 
in  th e  investm ent in  p la n t and m achinery in  1890 and 1891 seemed to 
b e  rela ted  to the d epress ion  in sh ipbu ild ing  indu stry .
Both the v a r ied  p a tte rn  o f  cyc lica l fluctuations in  th e investm ent 
a c t iv i t y  in  d iffe ren t s e c to rs  and th e con tracyc lica l ro le  o f  home 
in ves tm en t in th e e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  th e slump would su g ges t th at the 
d ow n tu rn  o f  the B ritish  economy in around 1890 was not v e r y  c lose ly  
con n ected  with a 'fu l l  employment c e ilin g ’ . F or, i f  th e re  had
d eve lo p ed  any rea l c e ilin g , it  would h ave choked o f f  the expansions 
in  variou s  in du str ies  more o r  less a t the same time, ra th e r  than 
k il l in g  the p ro sp e r ity  in  one sector, say , sh ipbu ild ing, in  1889, and 
th e n  pu ttin g an end to  the boom in an oth er, say , open  h earth  stee l, 
t h r e e  years  la ter.1*
14 J. 8. PeamasogluT1961b),  J. T in b erg en (1951), A. G. Ford(1962) 
p p . 44-46
15 I t  is  to be noted in  connection  w ith  th e d iscussion on the 
p oa s ib ility  o f  the d eve lopm ent o f  fu ll employment ce ilin g  a t th e  end o f  
th e  German Cycle I I I  boom in Section 1, Chapter V th at th e expansion 
o f  th e  demand, both dom estic and fo re ign , fo r  B ritish  p ig  iron  du rin g  
th e  Cycle I I I  boom was s o  mild th at th e B ritish  p ig  iron  p rodu cers  
c o u ld  meet the r is in g  demand la rge ly  b y  ad ju stin g  th e le v e l o f
3 0 8
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Such con clu sion s  o f  ou rs on  th e r o le  o f  home investm en t in  the 
course o f  the B r it is h  Cycle I I I  appear a t  variance w ith  th e p ic tu re  o f  
th is trade c y c le  painted  by  W. A. S in c la ir. A t th e end o f  h is s tu d y  
on the flu c tu a t ion s  o f  the B ritish  econom y during 1886-1896, S in cla ir 
concluded th at 'th e  course o f  th e  tra d e  c y c le  in th e y ea rs  1886-1896 
may be r e g a rd e d  as having been  m ain ly  determ ined b y  period ic
addition to  c a p ita l equipment in  B rita in  and its  deprec iation .
Superimposed u p on  this dominant p a tte rn  was a less  im portant c yc le  
in  fo re ign  t r a d e  which usually r e in fo r c e d  the im pulse to  cyc lica l 
fluctuations r e s u lt in g  from dom estic in ves tm en t.,,•
S incla ir based  his argum ent upon h is  own estim ate o f  B ritish  
home in ves tm en t, which is  a rev is e d  v e rs io n  o f  A. K. C a irn cross ' 
series . In  F ig  VI-11 are com pared S in c la ir 's  estim ates w ith  those o f  
Cairncross an d  Feinstein. I t  is  s e en  in  the f ig u re  th at while 
C airncross a n d  more recen t F e in s te in  estim ates move in  good
agreem ent, S in c la ir 's  figu res  show g re a te r  amplitude than th e oth er 
two; m o reo ver , the cyc lica l tu rn in g  poin ts  found in  S in c la ir 's
series(1886-1889-1893) tend to p reced e  th os e  in both  C a irncross '(1886- 
1891-1893) and F ein ste in ’s estimates(1887-1892-1893). The estimate o f  
B ritish g ro ss  hom e investm ent b y  J. H. L en fan t17, wh ile exceed in g  the 
th ree  estim ates shown in  F ig  VI-11 su bstan tia lly , fo llow s a cyc lica l 
pa ttern ( 1887-1891-1893) c loser to  th ose  fou n d  in  C a irn cross ' o r  in 
F einstein ’s. I t  would th e re fo re  a p p ea r  th at th e  predom inance o f  
home in ves tm en t in S inclair's in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the B ritish  C ycle  I I I  is
stocks, i.e . w ith o u t being both ered  to  expan d  production  capacity .
W. A. S incla ir (1957 ) Chapter VI
16 W. A. S in c la ir (1957) p.572 I t  shou ld  b e  noted th a t S incla ir a t the 
same time con ced ed  the im portance o f  fo r e ig n  trade at tu rn in g  poin ts: 
'F o re ign  trade  seem s to have been  dom inan t in th e r e v iv a l in  the 
second ha lf o f  th e  1880s and th e  rec e s s ion  in the e a r ly  1890s.’ (p . v )
17 J. H. L e n fa n t ( 1951) p.161
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at least pa rtly  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  possible d iffic u lt ie s  in  h is  estimation o f  
the B ritish g ro ss  dom estic investm ent.
Secondly, S incla ir com pared  the flu c tu ation s  in  h is estimate o f  
domestic investm ent not w ith  those in  th e le v e l o f  exports , but with 
those in ’overseas  ba lan ce ’ , i.e. trade balance o r  ba lan ce o f  payments 
on cu rren t account. H ow ever, s ince th e le v e l  o f  im ports is  in
gen era l considered  as determ ined  b y  th e le v e l  o f  income, fixed  
p rev iou sly  by  the s iz e  o f  autonomous sp en d in g  items, such as 
investm ent and exp orts , i t  would be more a p p ro p r ia te  to  com pare 
domestic investm ent w ith  exp o rts , ra th er than w ith  o v e rsea s  balance.
F inally , e ven  i f  w e w e r e  to  accept S in cla ir ’ s  estim a te o f  domestic 
capita l formation and to  o b s e rv e  that dom estic in ves tm en t v a r ied  at 
least as w idely  as m erchan d ise  export va lu e , th is  n eed  not mean that 
the fluctuations o f  th e B rit ish  economy betw een  th e  mid-1880s and 
the m id- 1890s can be exp la in ed  in dependen tly  o f  externa l shocks. 
For, as S incla ir c lea rly  show ed , investm ent in  sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  
was o f  importance in  d e term in in g  the cou rse  o f  to ta l B ritish  domestic 
investm ent. While one m ay only ra re ly  ob se rv e  d u r in g  th e B ritish  
Cycle I I I  the operation  o f  the mechanism th at ’th e  exp o rt r ec o ve ry  
stimulate! s ] investm ent in  export in d u str ies ’ 1*, th e  le v e l o f  domestic 
investm ent a c tiv ity  seem ed  to be c lose ly  linked  to  th e  state o f  the 
world market v ia  the s h ip p in g  industry .
18 W. A. S incla ir(1957) p .573 As was mentioned a b o v e , such, a t least 
p artly , seemed to  be th e c a s e  in the B ritish  coal in d u s try .
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Fig VI-11 Estimates of UK Home Investment
Source: C. R  Feinstein(1976), A. K . Caimcross(1953), W. A. Sinclair(19S7)
Fig VI-12 UK Government Income and Expenditure
Source: B. R. MitcheU(1962)
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3. Governm ent and Consumption
I t  is  d ifficu lt  to  id en tify  cyc lica l pattern  in  th e  movements o f  
the UK govern m ent expend itu re and income. Incom e tended to
exceed  expend itu re, and the resu lt in g  gove rn m en t bu dget surplus 
moved in  a cyc lica l w ay (F ig  V I-12 ). The short te rm  fluctuations in  
th e govern m ent income w ere la rg e ly  explained b y  v a r ia t io n s  in exc ise  
and death duties.1 On the oth er hand, th e  s h ifts  in m ilitary 
expend itu re accounted fo r  much o f  th e m ovem ents o f  governm ent 
spending. Both the v irtu a l absence o f  c y c lic a l elements in the 
fluctuations o f  governm ent expend itu re and the m od era te  amplitude in  
th e stab ilis ing  varia tion s o f  govern m ent su rp lu s , £6.6m increase 
du r in g  th e  upsw ing and £4.1m decline in  the dow n sw ing1, would 
su gges t a m arginal ro le  o f  govern m ent in  the UK C y c le  I I I .
In  1885-95, consumption expend itu re amounted to  82.6% o f  th e UK 
GNP, while 15.2% and 5.7% w ere  th e c o r re s p o n d in g  ratios fo r  
m erchandise export value and GDFCF, r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Not on ly  d id  
consumption exceed exports  o r  home investm ent in  term s o f  a vera ge , 
b u t a lso th e  s ize  o f  the increase du rin g  the C yc le  I I I  upsw ing, 
£189m, was fa r  g rea te r  than the £51m r ise  in  m erchan d ise  exports  o r  
th e £29m increase in  g ross  home investm ent. T h e  s iz e  o f  the decline 
in  consumption du rin g  th e fo llow ing dow nsw ing, £5m, how ever, was 
fa r  less than the fa ll in exports , £47.5m.* I t  w ou ld  thus appear th a t 
the increase in consumption expend itu re d u r in g  th e  upswing had 
more to do with lon g  term trend  than w ith c y c l ic a l  fluctuations: in
1 B. R. M itchell( 1962) p.394
2 These magnitudes a re  to be com pared w ith  th e £50.8m increase and 
£47.5m declin e in B ritish domestic m erchandise e x p o r ts  and with th e 
£29m r ise  and £4m fa ll in B ritish  dom estic fixed  c a p ita l  formation.
3 Gross domestic fixed  capita l form ation c on tra cted  b y  £4m. C. H. 
Peinstain(1976)
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fac t, the amplitude o f  cyc lica l fluctuations, as rep resen ted  b y  the 
absolute devia tions from  9 -year moving averages, was g r e a te r  in  
exports  than in  consumption.
Comparing tu rn in g  poin t yea rs«, one finds th a t th e  cyc lica l 
pa ttern  o f  consumption expenditure, 1886 (T)-1891(P)-1893(T), tended  
to  la g  behind that found in GDP, as well as that in  o v e rsea s  len d in g . 
In  th e mid-1880s the r ev iv a l in  consumption and m erchandise exp o r ts  
came in the same yea r, a t the fo llow ing downturn e x p o rts  p reced ed  
consumption, and fin a lly  in the upturn in th e e a r ly  1890s 
consumption, syn ch ron iz in g  w ith domestic investm ent, le d  exp o rts . 
Here i t  needs to  be remembered that, in  con trast to th e  f i r s t  two 
tu rn in g  poin ts, at the b egin n ing o f  the B ritish  C ycle  IV  inves tm en t 
led exports , and that the B ritish  Cycle IV  was an in ves tm en t cyc le . 
Then, consumption expenditure would appear to have resp on d ed  to  
th e chan ges in the le v e l o f  a c tiv ity , caused by the s h ifts  in  e ith e r  
exports  (a t the f ir s t  tw o tu rn in g  poin ts) o r  home in ves tm en t (a t  th e 
fin a l tu rn in g  po in t). The plausib le conclusion th ere fo re  seem s to  be 
th at consumption expend itu re, in sp ite o f  its  m agn itude, d id  not 
exercise  s ign ifican t autonomous in fluences upon th e le v e l  o f  a c t iv ity  
du rin g  th is  particu lar trade cyc le . 4
4 S ince i t  is  im possible to  f ix  the f ir s t  low er turn ing po in t in  th e 
consumption at constant prices  series, the comparison o f  tu rn in g  
poin ts in  th is paragraph is  based upon those found in  c u r re n t  p ric es  
series.
4. Money and Banking
In  th e pre-1914 era , Brita in maintained a more r ig id  form  o f  g o ld  
standard  than e ith e r  Germany o r  th e US, as fa r  as note issue was 
con cerned : the Bank C harter A c t o f  1844 u n der ly in g  th e B ritish
ve rs ion  o f  go ld  standard  allowed -  assuming no chan ge in th e  
fid u c ia ry  c ircu la tion  -  th e Bank o f  England to  v a ry  its  note issu e  
on ly  b y  th e same amount as the increase o r  decrease o f  th e go ld  held  
b y  its  Issu e  Department. Besides the Bank o f  England notes, co in s, 
mostly g o ld 1, also c ircu la ted  in  th e UK; thus, th e B ritish  cu rren cy  in  
the la te  19th cen tu ry  con sisted  la rge ly  o f  the Bank o f  England no tes  
and coins.* H igh-pow ered  money in  Britain d u r in g  th e yea rs  u n der
con sideration , on th e o th e r  hand, is  defined  as com prising ban k ers ' 
balances a t th e Bank o f  Bngland, in  add ition  to  the cu rren cy  ia  
circu lation .*
As was seen in  Section 1 o f  th is  Chapter, th e national stock o f  
go ld  in Britain* declin ed  du rin g  the early  y ea rs  o f  th e C ycle I I I  
upsw ing (m ainly as a resu lt o f  externa l go ld  flow s ), and in  th e r e s t  
o f  th e C ycle  I I I  p eriod  i t  in creased (F ig  V I-7 ). F ig  VI-13 shows how  
the stock  was d iv ided  between th e Issue Department o f  th e Bank o f  
England and the r e s t  o f  the economy in th e course o f  th e tra d e  1234
1 In  1885-94 almost 80% o f  th e coin s in  the UK w ere go ld  coins. F. 
Capie k A. W ebber(1985) p.198
2 In  th is  section , w e ab strac t from  the small amount o f  notes issued 
by  banks o th er  than th e Bank o f  England.
3 Th is is  th e de fin ition  employed b y  F. Capie k  A. Webber(1985) p.12. 
I t  is  to  be noted th at th ey  included the cash held in  the Banking 
Department o f  the Bank o f  England in  the t ill money o f  banks, 
th ere fo re  in  the cu rren cy  in c ircu la tion  and HPM, because th ey  
rega rd ed  i t  'as a p a r t o f  th e commercial a c tiv itie s  o f  the Bank and 
not pa rt o f  its  ro le  as a cen tra l bank ’ .
4 Approxim ated b y  th e bullion in the Issue Department o f  th e Bank o f  
Bngland plus coins in  c ircu lation , which includea the coins in  the 
Banking Department.
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Fig VI-13 Issue Department Bullion(A), Coins in Ciiculation(B). and Coins Outside the 
Bank of England(C)
Fig VI-14 Bank o f England Notes Outstanding(A), Bank o f England Notes Outside the Bank 
of England(B). Issue Department Bullion(C). Bank o f England Notes in Banking 
Department^)
Source: F. Capie &  A. Webber(1985). B. R. Mitchell(1962)
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cyc le . I t  is  fu r th e r  seen in  th e same f ig u re  th at th e fluctuations in 
th e  m etallic cu rren cy  ou ts ide the Issu e Department c lose ly  followed 
those in  th e m etallic cu rren cy  ou ts ide th e  Bank o f  England, w ith the 
Banking Departm ent m aintaining more o r  less  constant and 
in s ign ific a n t amount o f coins; and th a t th e tw o items revea led  a 
cyc lica l p a tte rn  lagg in g  con sid erab ly  behind th at in the le v e l o f  
activ ity (1 88 9 (T )-1 89 2 (P )-1 89 4 (T )). S ince it  is  ha rd ly  possib le to 
id en tify  an y  cyc lica l e lem ents in  the su pp ly  o f  gold , i.e . in  the 
national stock  o f  gold, d u r in g  C ycle  I I I ,  one could reasonably 
a ttr ib u te  th e cyc lica l pattern  found in  co in  c ircu la tion  to  the changes 
in  th e in tern a l demand fo r  m etallic cu rren cy .
P e e l 's  A c t d ictated that the volum e o f  cu rren cy  ou ts ide the 
Issu e  D epartm ent va ry  in c lose agreem en t w ith  th e national stock o f  
gold .* F ig  VI-14  shows th at th e Bank o f  England indeed fa ith fu lly  
ob s e rv ed  th e  Act: Bank o f  England notes ou ts tand in g(A ) fluctuated 
in c lose agreem en t w ith th e amount o f  bullion held in the Issue 
Departm ent. The same fig u re  a lso show s how du rin g  Cycle I I I  the 
Bank o f  England note supp ly  from  th e Issu e Department was 
d is tr ib u ted  betw een  the Banking Departm ent and th e economy outside 
th e Bank o f  England. While the Bank o f  England note circu lation 
ou ts ide th e  Bank moved accord in g  to  th e trade  cyc le (1888 (T )-1892 (P )- 
1894(T)), in  th e varia tions o f  the Bank o f  England notes in the 
Banking Departm ent is found a pa ttern  sim ilar to  th at observab le  in 
the Bank o f  Bngland note ou tstan d in g(con sequ en tly  the Issue 
Departm ent bu llion ). Again , in th e absence o f  an y  cyc lica l elements 5
5 G =  Gi + Gc, C = ~(Óí+F) ♦  Gc = (Gi+Gc) ♦  F = G + F, w here G: 
national s tock  o f  gold, Gi: go ld  in  Issu e  Department, Gc: go ld  coin 
ou ts ide th e  Issu e  Department, F: f id u c ia ry  issue, C: stock o f  cu rren cy  
ou ts ide  th e Issu e  Department. In  a rgu in g  thus, we ignore 
su b s id ia ry  co in s, notes issued  by  banks o f  issue oth er than the Bank 
o f  Bngland, and the chan ges in F, con sequ en t upon the decline in  the 
number o f  p r iv a te  issu ing banks.
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in th e supply  o f  Bank o f  E ngland  notes, i.e. Bank o f  England notes 
ou tstand in g, th e chan ges in  th e demand fo r  th e  Bank o f  England 
notes could be held resp on s ib le  fo r  th e cyc lica l flu c tu a tion s  in  the 
Bank o f  England notes in  c ircu la tion  ou tside th e Bank o f  England.
Th e  broad agreem ent b etw een  th e fluctuations in  th e  Bank o f  England 
notes ou tstand ing and th ose  in  the Bank o f  England notes in the 
Banking Department was du e  to  the m ildness o f  th e  c yc lic a l varia tion  
in  th e  Bank o f  England no tes  ou ts ide the Bank.*
Since, as was seen  in  P ig  VI-13, the va lue o f  co in s  in the 
Banking Department was b o th  small and stable, the cash  re s e rv e  o f 
th e Banking Department cou ld  be represen ted  by th e  Bank o f  England 
notes held in  the Banking Department. On th e  o th e r  hand, the 
d eposits  bu ilt upon the r e s e r v e  moved in  a d is t in c tly  c yc lic a l way: 
1886(T)-1891(P)-1893(T). T h e  consequence was the con tracyc lica l 
fluctuations in  the res e rve/ d ep o s it  ra tio  o f  the B anking Department, 
i.e . the ’P roportion ’ (F ig  V I—15). Since th e cyc lica l m ovements in  the 
Banking Department d epo s its  resu lted  la rge ly  from  the ch an ges  in the 
ban kers ’ balances a t the B anking Department6 7, we m igh t, fo llow ing 
P ro fesso r  Good hart, in te rp re t  th e  cyc lica l varia tion s  in  the Banking 
Department deposits  and th e  con tracyc lica l ch an ges in  th e  P roportion
6 I t  should be noted th at th e  upturn in  th e coins ou ts id e  th e  Bank 
o f  England lagged  behind th a t  in  the Bank o f  England no tes  ou tside 
th e  Bank o f  England b y  one y ea r , which may be exp licab le , a s  in  the 
case o f  Germany, b y  th e d if fe r e n c e  in th e sphere o f  c ircu la tion  
betw een  the tw o form s o f  cu r re n c y : in  pre-1914 yea rs , ’ England 
con tinued to  use go ld  s o v e re ig n s  and h a lf-s o ve re ign s  fo r  th e g rea te r  
p a r t  o f  her in terna l c ircu la tion  until the war, but su bstan tia l amounts 
o f  s ilv e r  and b ronze coin s an d  Bank o f  England and co u n try  bank 
notes w ere a lso in use. N one o f  the bank notes w ere  le s s  than £5 
in  denomination, how ever, an d  th ey  w ere but litt le  used in  o rd in a ry  
transactions ... For the m ost p a r t  notes w ere  used ... o n ly  in  payment 
o f  la rge  salaries, fo r  tr a v e ll in g  expenses, and as t i l l  m oney fo r  
banks.’ W. E. Beach(1935) p.50
7 Around 60% o f  the in c rease  in  the d eposits  w ith  th e Banking 
Department in 1886-91 was d u e  to  the increase in  th e  ban k ers ’ 
balance. F. Capie k  A. W ebber(l985 ) p.398
3)8
Fig VI-15 Reserve/Dcposit Rojio o f  the Banking Department
Source: F. Capie &  A. Webber(1985)
Fig VI-16 Currency in Circulation Outside the Bank o f England(A), Currency Held by the 
Public(B). Banks’ Total Cash(C)
SO“ " :  F. Capie A  A. W eN »(1 9 «3 )
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as revea lin g  th e accommodating respon se  on the p a r t o f  th e  Bank to 
th e app lication  fo r  l iq u id ity  from  th e  bank in g system .*
Th is  would im ply that th e re  d id  not need to  b e  any close 
correspon den ce  b etw een  the ch an ges in  th e Bank’s  in tern a tion a l and 
domestic assets. S ince th e Issu e  Department bu llion * tended to
decline d u r in g  the e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  the Cycle I I I  boom, and then 
increased  du r in g  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  C ycle  I I I  years , w ith  th e  Banking 
Department c red it  su p p ly  v a ry in g  cyc lica lly , one m igh t exp ect the 
Bank o f  England ’ s in terna tion a l and dom estic a ssets  to  v a r y  in the 
same d irec tio n  on ly  in  th e la te  yda rs  o f  the boom. T h is  indeed is 
b road ly  con sis ten t w ith  B loom field ’ s  fin d in gs : he o b s e rv e d  th at 1886, 
1889, 1890 and 1891 w ere  the y ea rs  when the tw o ty p e s  o f  assets 
changed  in  the same w ay .8 910 U n der th e  mechanical c o n tro l o f  P eel's  
Act o v e r  note issue, th e  Banking Department c red it  th u s  constitu ted  
th e sole medium b y  w hich the Bank cou ld  v io la te  th e  ’ ru le s  o f  the 
gold  standard  game.’
As was poin ted  ou t above , and as we see in F ig  V I—16, notes and 
coins in  c ircu la tion  ou ts ide th e  Bank fluctuated  in  a  c yc lic a l way. 
D iv id ing the cu rren cy  ou ts ide th e  Bank in to  the c u r re n c y  held by 
th e pub lic  and th e cu rren cy  in  th e bank in g system , on e  f in d s  that 
w h ile the cyc lica l pa tte rn  in  th e  cu rren cy  ou tside th e  Bank was due 
to th e c yc lic a l ch an ges  in  demand fo r  cu rren cy , th e  ch an ges in 
demand mainly a ffe c ted  the cu rren cy  held by  the p u b lic , ra th e r  than 
bank cash.
8 C. A. B. Good h a rt( 1972) p.210, 211
9 T o  be more p rec ise , the coin s in  the Banking D epartm ent a lso need 
to be included  in  the in ternation al assets  o f  the Bank o f  England, but 
th ey  a re  ign ored  h e re  because o f  th e ir  quan tita tive  in s ign ifican ce .
10 A. I. B loomfield (1959) p.49
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The cu rren cy  in  th e bank in g system (C  in  F ig  V I-16 ) con sists  o f  
t i l l  money(B in F ig  V I-17 ) and banks ' r e s e r v e  fo r  note 
is su e (= d iffe ren ce  betw een  C in  F ig  V I-16  and B in  F ig  V I-17 ). T ill 
m oney p lu « ban kers ' balance a t th e Bank o f  England (A  in  F ig  V I-17 ) 
form a the r es e rve  fo r  th e d eposits  w ith  th e bank in g system ; banks ' 
r e s e r v e  fo r  note issu e  was connected  w ith  the note issu ing  business 
o f  th e rem aining p r iv a te  banks o f  issue o th e r  than th e Bank o f  
England, from wh ich we abstrac t. While th e res e rv e  aga inst
d epo s its (A  in  F ig  V I-17 ) v a r ied  n eith er cyc lic a lly  n o r con tracyc lica lly , 
th e  deposits  crea ted  upon i t  d isp la yed  c yc lic a l f lu c tu a tion s (F ig  V I-18 ); 
as a resu lt th e res e rve/ d ep os it  ra tio  o f  th e  bank in g system  moved in  
a con tracyc lica l way (F ig  V I -19). Thus, as the Bank o f  England did  
fo r  the banking system , B ritish  commercial banks seemed to sa tis fy  
th e  v a ry in g  le v e l o f  demand fo r  fu nds from  the r e s t  o f  th e economy, 
la r g e ly  ir re sp ec tiv e  o f  th e s ta te  o f  th e ir  r e s e r v e .11
The c yc lic a l movements in sh o rt term  in tere s t ra tes  in 
B rita in (F ig  I II -2 4 ) would appear to  con firm  the im portant ro le  o f  
demand in th e determ ination o f  th e su p p ly  o f  d eposit money. I f  in  
th e  absence o f  any chan ges in  demand the banks had va r ied  the 
su p p ly  o f  c red it  fo r  some reasons in tern a l to  th e  banking system , 
th en  -  since ch an ges  in  d eposits  accoun ting fo r  most o f  th e 
va r ia tion s  in  th e UK money s tock (F ig  V I-18 ) - .  sh o rt term  in teres t 
r a te s  would have tended  to  fa l l  du r in g  th e upsw ing, and v ic e  ve rsa . 
In  fa c t, T in bergen  fou n d  the cyc lica l chan ges in  th e ra tio  o f  sh o rt 
term  claims, d iscounts and advances, to  to ta l liab ilitie s  o f  a ll banks in  
th e  UK to  be p o s it iv e ly  c orre la ted  w ith  th e s h ifts  in  sh o rt term  
in te r e s t  rates, and n ega tiv e ly  w ith  th ose in  lon g  term  rates . He
11 Commercial banks, inc lu d in g  th e Banking Department o f  the Bank 
o f  England, w ere no t le ga lly  bound to maintain minimum res e rve  
a ga in s t th e ir  liab ilities . C. A. E. Good h a rt( 1972) p.113
Fig VI-17 Banks' Till Money Plus Balances at the Bank of England(A), Banks’ Till 
Mooey(B)
Source: F. Capie &  A. Webber(1985)
Fig VI-18 Money Stock(A), Deposits(B), Currency Held by the Public(C): UK
Source: F. Capie A  A. Webber{1985)
Fig VI-19 Reserve/Deposit R a io  of the UK Banking System
Source: F. Capie A  A. Webber<1985)
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in te rp re te d  th is  as the banka* demand fo r  sh o rt term  claims, i.e. 
banks* su p p ly  o f  sh o rt term  c re d it , respon d in g  to  th e chan ges in  th e 
e a rn in g s  from  holding sh o rt term  claims.11 On th e o th e r  hand, 
a c co rd in g  to  P ro fessor  G oodhart, the increase  in  th e volum e o f  
ad va n ces  g ran ted  b y  the banks d u r in g  the upsw ing w orsened  the 
l iq u id ity  position  o f  the bank in g  system , to which th e banks reacted  
b y  ca llin g  in loans from  th e  d iscount m arket, causing a r ise  in 
m arket in te re s t rate. The r is e  in  in te re s t ra te  a ttrac ted  fo r e ign  
sh o rt term  fu nds to the London d iscount m arket; th e d iscount 
m arket respon ded  to the d ec lin e  in  th e su pp ly  o f  fu nds from  the 
banks b y  seek in g  accommodation a t th e Bank o f  England, which, as 
w e h a ve  a lready  seen , th e Bank pass ive ly  g ran ted . By do in g so, the 
P ro p o r tio n  declined, causing th e r ise  in  the Bank ra te , which 
r e in fo r c e d  the r ise  in  the m arket ra te .11
In  determ in ing the le v e l  o f  Bank rate , th e Bank consu lted  the 
le v e l  o f  go ld  in the Bank, as w ell as th e P ro p ortion .12 34 The amount 
o f  g o ld  held b y  the Bank o f  England was a ffe c ted  b y  both in tern a l 
and ex te rn a l drains. As can  be seen in  P ig  VI-13 , the go ld  in  the 
Bank o f  England (most o f  wh ich was k ep t in  th e  Issu e Department) 
d ec lin ed  until 1888 due to  ex te rn a l ou tflow ; in  1886-1889, coins w ere  
r e tu rn in g  from  domestic c ircu la tion  to th e B ank (F ig  VI-13 , C ). The 
n et g o ld  exp orts  from  Brita in  and the con sequ en t fa ll in  th e Issu e 
D epartm ent bullion in  th ese y ea rs  w ere, as was poin ted  ou t in  Section 
1 o f  th is  chap ter, due to  excess ive  lon g  term  len d in g  re la t iv e ly  to 
c u r r e n t  account surplus. I t  appeared  th at i t  was the declin e in  the 
Is su e  Department bullion, ra th e r  than th e fa ll  in  th e P roportion , 
w h ich  led  to  the m oderate r is e  in Bank ra te  in 1885-88: wh ile the
12 J. T in b e rg e n ! 1961) p.66-68
13 C. A. B .Goodhart(1972) pp.218, 219
14 R. S. S a ye rs ! 1976) P-30
bullion in  the Issue Departm ent tended  to  dim inish d u r in g  th ese  
yea rs , the P roportion  in  1888, 41.8X, was above  th at in  1886, 41.7X(Fig 
VI-15). In  con trast, in  1889 and 1890, w ith  sh o rt term  cap ita l and 
gold  be ing drawn from  th e  r e s t  o f  the w orld  to  London b y  the r is in g  
market rate , the Issu e  Department bu llion in creased18, while the 
P roportion  fe ll; thus, th e  r ise  in th e Bank ra te  in  th e  two yea rs  
could be a ttribu ted  m ore to  the d e terio ra tion  in  th e  Banking 
Department r es e rve  ra tio  than to the volum e o f  g o ld  in  th e Bank o f  
England.18
During the dow n sw in g  in  the ea r ly  1890s, th e demand fo r  money 
weakened, which was p ro b a b ly  re fle c ted  in the fa l l  o f  the ra tio  o f  
advances in  the a sse ts  held by commercial banks. With th e
consequen t im provem ent in  the liqu id ity  position  o f  th e banking 
system , the banks in c reased  th eir su pp ly  o f  fu n d s  to  th e d iscount 
market in  re la tiv e  term s, which exe rted  downward  p ressu re  upon 
sh ort term market ra tes . Both the d eclin e in  th e  demand fo r  sh o rt 
term c red it  and re la tiv e  im provem ent in  th e ava ilab ility  o f  funds from  
the banks resu lted  in th e  decline in th e app lication  fo r  fu nds to  th e  
Banking Department fro m  th e  money m arket. As a resu lt, th e
Proportion  im proved. On the oth er hand, the Issu e  Department 
bullion continued to  in c rea s e  during th e  d epress ion , mainly due to 
the un interrupted  net g o ld  in flow s17, which may b e  exp licab le  la rg e ly  
by  the sharper d ec lin e  in  lon g  term len d in g  r e la t iv e ly  to  th at in  
cu rren t account su rp lu s. With th e im provem ent in  both th e
Proportion  and th e g o ld  held by  th e Bank, th e  Bank rate was
15 I t  should be noted th a t  th e  Issue Department bu llion  increased  in  
these yea rs  in the face  o f  th e interna l d ra in  o f  g o ld  a fte r  1889.
16 In  1890 the Baring c r is is  a lso made a s ign if ica n t con tribu tion  to  
the r ise  in the Bank ra te .  L . S. Pressnell(1968)
17 I t  should be noted th a t th e drain o f  go ld  coin s ou t o f  the Bank o f  
England into domestic c ircu la tion  was in  p ro g re s s  in  1890, 1891 and 
1892. F ig  VI-13
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lo w ere d , which s tren gthened  th e dow n w ard  trend in the m arket ra tes  
d u r in g  the depression .
Therefo re , i t  would appear that th e  cyc lica l pattern  in  th e sh o rt 
te rm  market in tere s t rates was re la ted  n o t on ly  to  the chan ges in  th e 
dem and fo r  fu nds , in flu en cin g  the r e s e r v e  position o f  both th e 
com m ercial banks and the Banking Department, but a lso to  th e 
in tern a tion a l go ld  flow s, wh ich a ffe c ted  th e  le v e l o f  gold  in  th e Bank 
o f  England. I t  is , how ever, re le va n t to  recogn ize  that th e 1880s was 
a  period  when the Bank o f  England had d ifficu lt ies  in  m aking th e  
B an k  rate 'e ffe c t iv e ’ , Le. in  in flu en c in g  th e  market rates , due bo th  to  
th e  re la tiv e  decline in  its  pos ition  in  th e  money market and to  the 
s u r v iv a l  o f  the com petitive fe e lin g  b e tw een  the Bank o f  England and 
th e  res t o f  th e banking system .1* Th is would im ply th a t th e
in flu en ce  o f  international go ld  flow s  th ro u gh  the Bank ra te  upon  th e 
s h o r t  term m arket ra tes  was o f  lim ited s ign ifica n ce  during C yc le  I I I .
To summarize th e d iscu ssion  so  fa r :  under P ee l’s  A c t th e  stock  
o f  cu rren cy  ou ts ide the Issu e  D epartm ent o f  the Bank o f  England was 
determ ined  c lo se ly  by  the stock  o f  g o ld  in B rita in, which show ed 
acy c lica l pattern  o f  varia tion ; th e s to ck  o f  cu rren cy  was d iv id e d  
b etw een  the cu rren cy  in the Banking Department and in th e econom y 
ou ts id e  the Bank o f  England; wh ile th e  cu rren cy  ou tside th e Bank o f  
England fo llow ed  a cyc lica l p a tte rn , th e cash in  th e B anking 
Departm ent fluctuated  ne ith er c y c lic a lly  nor con tracyc lica lly ; the 
c yc lic a l varia tion s in the cu rren cy  o u ts id e  the Bank re fle c ted  b y  and
18 W. T. C. King(1936) pp.296-301 T h e  b eg in n in g  o f  th e use o f  g o ld  
d e v ic e s  as an a lte rn ative  method o f  p ro te c t in g  th e go ld  r e s e r v e  o f  
th e  Bank in th e  la te  1880s a lso ap p ea rs  to  ind icate the d iffic u lt ie s  the 
Bank was experien cin g  in  making its  d iscou n t ra te  e ffe c t iv e .  R. S. 
Sayers(1936) C hapter IV. A ccord in g  t o  King(1936), i t  was o n ly  a fte r  
th e  Baring c r is is  that the Bank o f  E ng land  rega in ed  the con tro l o v e r  
th e  money m arket through moral suasion .
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la rge  the s im ila r  pattern  o f  fluctuations in  th e  cu r re n c y  held by the 
public, in  w h ich  w ere exp ressed  the c yc lic a l chan ges in  th e demand 
fo r  cash d u r in g  the trade cyc le ; the cash re s e rv e  in  the banking 
system  v a r ie d  acyclica lly ; th e  deposits b u ilt upon th e  cash rese rve  
showed c y c l ic a l  varia tion s, and as a resu lt th e res e rve/ d ep o s it  ratio 
o f  the b a n k in g  rtystem v a r ied  con tracyc lica lly ; th is  appears to 
su gges t th a t  the banking system  supp lied  the econom y with the 
amount o f  fu n d s  i t  needed rega rd less  o f  th e  state  o f  i t s  rese rve ; in 
doin g so, i t  was helped b y  th e  Bank o f  England, w h ich  re lie ved  the 
liqu id ity  p re s s u r e  upon th e  banking system  d u r in g  th e upswing; 
th ere fo re , th e  fluctuations in  money stock  du r in g  th e  B ritish  Cycle 
m  w ere  d e term in ed  predom inantly b y  th e s ta te  o f  demand fo r  money; 
th e c y c lic a l fluctuations in  sh o rt term  in te re s t r a te s  a lso re flec ted  
the ch a n g in g  demand fo r  fu n ds  during th e  trade  c y c le .“
U n d e r  such conditions i t  would no t appear v e r y  rea listic  to 
suppose a m onetary  ce ilin g  chok in g  o f f  th e  boom o f  th e late 1880s: 
as a m ajor in ternational finan cia l cen tre  London cou ld  a ttra c t short 
term  ca p ita l and gold  by  ra is in g  its  in te r e s t  rate an d  thus broaden 
th e cash b a s e  o f  th e B ritish  economy; as was a lr e a d y  poin ted out, 
the B ritish  commercial banks, includ ing th e  Banking Department o f  
the Bank o f  England, w ere  no t lega lly  req u ired  to  hold a minimum 
cash r e s e r v e  aga inst th e ir  liab ilities , w h ich im plies th at, at least 
th eo re tic a lly , th e  banking system  could expand i t s  c red it  supp ly  
w ithout lim it on th e basis o f  a limited r es e rve .
19 W. A. S in c la ir (1957) chap ter XI con sid ers  the role  o f  monetary 
fac tor as 'n eu tra l*  du rin g  th e  B ritish C ycle  I I I  u p sw in g  and as 
'in te n s ify in g *  th e subsequent downswing.
326
Finally, the Baring c r is is ,  o rig inatin g  from  the u n derw r itin g  o f  
unmarketable A rgen tin e  s to c k  by the Baring Brothers**, appeared  to 
have on ly  lim ited e f fe c ts  upon the course o f  the trade  cyc le . 
Accord ing to  W. A. S in c la ir, ’ th e "c r is is " does not appear to  have 
occu rred  a t the peak o f  th e  boom ... the le v e l  o f  a c t iv ity  appears to  
have been declin ing g ra d u a lly  from early  in  1890, p robab ly  some 
months b e fo re  the "c r is is " ;  ’more important is  the fa c t th a t th ere  is  
no s ign  o f  a sudden p lu n ge  in  economic a c t iv ity  im mediately a fte r  th e 
"c r is is "  such as is u su a lly  assumed to be associated w ith  a m ajor 
financial d istu rbance ’ ; ’a lth ou gh  fo re ign  investm ent ... was more 
lik e ly  to be a ffe c ted  b y  th e  Baring cris is , th ere  are ind ications th a t 
i t  had begun to  fa ll o f f  b e fo r e  November 1890’ .**
The b egin n ing o f  th e  expansion o f  th e  B ritish  economy in th e  
mid-1880s was due to  th e  in crease  in exp orts  con sequ en t upon both  
th e s ta rt o f  th e  US in ves tm en t boom and th e  r is e  in  fo r e ig n  len d in g  
from  Britain. The s ta r t o f  the fo re ign  investm en t boom was a t leas t 
p a rtly  in fluenced  by th e  im provem ent in th e US economic conditions. 
The downturn in  1890 r e s u lted  from  the d ec lin e  in exports , fo r  wh ich 
th e collapse in  ov e rsea s  lend ing , p a rticu la r ly  the investm en t in  
A rgen tina, as w ell as M cK in ley  T a r iff  and th e German d epression  w e re  
mainly responsib le. A lth ou gh  the export varia tion s d id  not seem to  
have g rea t e f fe c ts  upon th e leve l o f  home . investm ent v ia  th e  
acceleration  prin c ip le , th e  state o f  th e world  m arket e x e rted  
s ign ifica n t in fluences u p on  th e investm ent a c tiv ity  in  B rita in  as  a 
whole th rough the sh ip b u ild in g  industry . The m onetary sector  b y
20 A s  fo r  th e process o f  th e  c ris is , see L. S. P ressnell(1968 ), R. A. 
Batchelor (1986).
21 W. A. S incla ir (1957) p .492, 493 For a de ta iled  d iscussion on  the 
e ffe c ts  o f  th e Baring c r is is  upon the investm ent in variou s  reg ion s , 
see Section 1, this C hapter.
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THE TRADE CYCLE, 1885-1894: ARGENTINA
In  th e p eriod  between the b eg in n in g  o f  modern econom ic growth 
in  A rgen tin a  in around 1860 and the ou tb reak  o f  WWI, A rg e n t in e  real 
GDP ia estim ated to have grow n  a t th e annual a v e ra g e  ra te  o f  'a t 
leas t 5X’ .1 Th is  can be com pared w ith  th e  fo llow ing g ro w th  rates in 
th e  com parable era : 4.6X fo r  th e US, 2.3X fo r  Germany, a n d  1.9X fo r  
th e  UK.* I t  is  w ell known th a t th e in flow  o f  cap ita l a n d  labour on 
an ex ten sive  scale made a cru cia l con tribu tion  to  th e  rapid
deve lopm ent o f  the A rgen tin e  economy in  pre-1914 y ea rs . Dynamic 
g ro w th  and consequ en t h igh p e r  cap ita income* led  some
con tem porary  ob se rv e rs  to rega rd  A rgen tin a  as 'th e  se co n d  America', 
and thus to  p red ic t her fu tu re  from  th e recen t e x p e r ie n ce s  o f  the 
US.
While A rgen tina  tru ly  resem bled the US in  som e important 
asp ects , essen tia l d iffe ren ces  w ere  ob servab le  b e tw een  the two 
cou n tr ies . Despite some p ro g re s s  in  indu str ia lisa tion , Argen tina 
basica lly  remained a prim ary p rodu c in g  economy in  p re -1914  years, 
w h en th e US was un dergo ing  th e 'second in d u s tr ia l revo lu tion '. 
In te rn a l sav in gs  w ere  in su ffic ien t to  such an e x te n t  th at the
Í  C . 9. Dias A le ja n d ro !1970) p.3
2 These annual ave ra ge  grow th  ra tes  a re  calcu lated from  peak  to 
peak  fo r  th e  US rea l GNP, the German rea l NNP and th e  U K  rea l GNP.
T . S. B e r ry (1968), W. G. Hoffmann(1965), C. H. Feinste in (1976 )
3 Accord ing  to M. G. Mulhall(1896), th e A rgen tin e  p e r  c a p ita  income in 
1895, £24, was about the same as those o f  Germany, H olland  and 
Belgium.
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varia tion s  in  th e  le ve l o f  cap ita l in flow  seemed to  a f fe c t  s ign ifica n tly  
the le v e l o f  dom estic cap ita l formation and o f  a c tiv ity  in  A rgen tina , 
w h ereas in  th e  US the con tribu tion  o f  fo re ign  capita l was m arginal. 
B esides o v e rs e a s  borrow ing, th e state o f  th e w orld  demand fo r  her 
p rim ary p ro d u c ts  was the o th e r  principa l determ inant o f  A rgen tin e  
economic con d it ions , in  con trast w ith  the secondary  ro le  o f  exp o rts  in 
th e US. Thus, accord ing to  P ro fessor  Rostow, in  pre-W W I yea rs  
A rgen tin a  w as s till in  th e p re - ta k e -o ff  stage.4
4 W. W. Rostow(1971) p.8
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1. Home Investm ent an d  Capital Im ports
The A rgen tin e  GDP data  at constant p rices  b eg in  from  as late as 
1900. Thus we a re  com pelled  to  r e ly  on  less  com prehensive ind ices 
o f  th e le v e l o f  a c t iv it y ,  among wh ich ra ilw ay rece ip ts  and 
im ports (va lu e ) would em erge  as tw o u sefu l series . The form er 
su gges ts  1886, 1890 an d  1892 as the th re e  tu rn in g  poin ts re la ted  to 
th e  C ycle I I I  in  A rgen tin a , whereas 1885, 1889 and 1891 de fin e  the 
tra d e  c yc le  accord in g  to  th e  la tte r .(F ig  V II-1 )
In  a Keynesian fram ew ork , le v e l o f  income is  determ ined b y  the 
s izes  o f  autonomous sp en d in g  items, investm ent and exp orts  in 
particu lar.* While dom estic capita l form ation data a re  unavailable, 
we have estim ates o f  fo r e ig n  cap ita l flow  in to  Argen tina . Since 
'd u rin g  1880-1914 fo r e ig n  sav ings finan ced  between on e -th ird  and 
on e -h a lf o f  net p h ys ica l investm ent’* in  Argen tina , i t  cou ld  be 
expected  th at the f lu c tu a tion s  in  fo re ign , mostly B ritish , investm ent 
in  A rgen tina  se rv e  as a  rough gu ide to  those in  A rgen tin e  home 
investm ent. Th ere  a r e  th ree  d if fe r e n t  d irec t estim ates o f  the 
fo r e ig n  investm ent in  A rgen tin a  du rin g  pre-1914 yea rs : one is  the 
estimate o f  g ro ss  fo r e ig n  cap ita l in flow  b y  J. H. Williams5 67 89; another 
th e estimate o f  the UK is su es  fo r  A rgen tin a  by P ro fesso r  A. G. Ford*; 
fin a lly , th e estimate o f  th e  UK new issues(ca ll) fo r  A rgen tin a  b y  M. 
Simon*. These a re  p ro d u ced  as F ig  V II-2 .
5 In  say in g  so, wo a b s tra c t  from  govern m ent sector. F or th e 
r e la tiv e  unimportance o f  govern m en t sector in the A rgen tin e  economy, 
see Section 3, th is ch a p te r .
6 C. F. Diaz A le ja n d ro (1970) p.31
7 J. H. Williams (1920) pp . 45, 101, 152
8 A. G. Ford (1962) p.195
9 I. Stone(1972) p.546
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In  th e f i r s t  p lace, Williams’ estim ate con sid erab ly  exceeds those 
b y  P ro fesso r  Ford  an d  Simon, w h ich  is  rea d ily  accounted  fo r  by  the 
fa c t  th at Williams’ f ig u re  in c lu des  not on ly  B ritish  p o rtfo lio  
investm ent in  A rgen tin a , bu t a lso B ritish  d ire c t  investm en t and 
len d in g  b y  o th er  cou n tr ies .10 12 On th e o th e r  hand, i t  is  ob se rved  
th at, while th e  estim ates by Williams and Ford  peak  in 1888, Simon’ s 
s e r ie s  reaches an u pper tu rn in g  po in t in  1889. Such a d iscrepan cy  
appears to be re la ted  to  th e fa c t  that Simon’ s f ig u re  m easures the 
amount o f  actua l ’c a ll ',  w hereas th e  o th er  two s e r ie s  reco rd  ’c rea tion ' 
in  th e p rocess  o f  fo r e ig n  is su e .11 A ccord in g  to  H. S. F erns, in  
A rgen tin a  ’th e  acts  o f  inves tm en t and th e  grow th  o f  cap ita l claims ... 
p receded  b y  som ething lik e  tw o yea rs  th e p h ys ica l g ro w th  o f  the 
ra ilw ays  th em selves ’ 11; th e  1891 peak in  ra ilw ay  bu ild in g , the 
lead ing  fie ld  o f  investm en t in  th e  A rgen tin e  C ycle  I I I ,  la g s  behind the 
peak in  Simon’s and th at in th e  o th e r  tw o estim ates by tw o and th ree  
yea rs , resp ec tiv e ly .
Thus Simon’ s  series  w ou ld  appear a b e tte r  in d ica to r o f  the 
fluctuations in  th e A rgen tin e  dom estic cap ita l form ation , and i t  is  th is 
th a t is  com pared w ith  o th e r  a g g re ga te s  in F ig  V II-1 . I f  Simon’ s 
estim ate su gges ts  th a t A rgen tin e  home investm ent flu ctu ated  fo llow in g  
a cyc lica l pa ttern  d e fin ed  as 1885-1889-1894, A rgen tin e  m erchandise 
e xp o rt va lu es  rose  from  the tro u g h  in  1886 to  th e 1889 peak and then 
fe ll  to  th e 1893 trou gh . T h e re fo re , i t  would appear p robab le  th at 
th e A rgen tin e  econom y began  to  expand a t th e  la tes t a fte r  1886 to 
reach a peak in  1889, and th a t th e su bsequ en t dow nsw ing did not
10 The com parison o f  th e  th re e  estim ates s u g ges ts  th at th e  B ritish  
p o rtfo lio  investm en t accounted fo r  around 60% o f  to ta l cap ita l flow  
in to  A rgen tina  in 1886-1890.
11 S incla ir ’ s  estim ate o f  th e c a lls  made in  London b y  the A rgen tin e  
companies and pub lic  in  1885-90 a lso in d icates  1889 as th e  peak yea r. 
W. A. S incla ir (1957) p.520
12 H. S. F ern s (1960) p.443
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come to  an end a t th e  earlies t b e fo re  1893. I f  the f i r s t  and second 
tu rn in g  points, 1885/6 and 1889, a re  g iv e n  b y  ra ilw ay  rece ip ts  or 
im ports data, th e f in a l tu rn in g  po in t su gges ted  b y  e ith e r  o f  th e two 
in d ica to rs  o f  le v e l o f  a c tiv ity , 1891 o r  1892, appears  too e a r ly  to  be 
ju s tif ie d  by th e movements o f  th e tw o k ey  autonomous spending 
items. Such inconsistencies in  th e e a r ly  1890s may b e  attribu tab le  
to  th e fo llow ing problem s in  u s in g  ra ilw ay  rec e ip ts  and im port value 
as  in d ices o f  economic fluctuations: u n der the ra ilw a y -led  fro n t ie r  
s ituation , such as th e US and A rgen tin a  in  the second h a lf o f  the 
19th cen tu ry , ra ilw ay  rece ip ts  a re  in fluen ced  not o n ly  b y  le v e l o f  
a c t iv ity , but a lso b y  both th e p ro g re s s  o f  a g r icu ltu ra l developm ent 
around completed ra ilw ay lines, and b y  h a rv e s t con d itions1’ ; the 
le v e l  o f  im ports in to  an economy, w h ere fo r e ig n  cap ita l occup ies  an 
essen tia l position, is  to a g re a t  ex ten t determ ined  b y  the le v e l o f  
fo r e ig n  borrow ing .1* T h e re fo re , i t  would b e  reasonab le  to  defin e 
the A rgen tin e  C yc le  I I I  w ith  th e  fo llow in g  tu rn in g  po in t years : 
1885/6-1889-1893/4.
I t  is  seen in P ig  V I I - 1 th at e x p o r t va lu es  d isp la yed  fa r  m ilder 
fluctuations than B ritish  p o r tfo lio  investm en t. I t  should be
rem embered that B ritish  p o rtfo lio  investm en t amounted to  on ly  around 
60% o f  to tal cap ita l flow s in to  A rgen tin a  in  th e  la te  1880s, and that 
fo r e ig n  sav ings accounted fo r  'b etw een  o n e -th ird  and on e -h a lf o f  net 
ph ys ica l investm ent* in 1880-1914. J. H. W illiams' estim ate su gges ts  
th a t cap ita l flow  from  countries o th e r  than B rita in  fo llow ed  a cyc lica l 
pa tte rn  similar to  that found in  B ritish  new p o r tfo lio  investm ent in 134
13 In  addition , ra ilw ay  rece ip ts  data may s u ffe r  from  th e  d is to rtion  
re la ted  to the app lication o f  g o ld  premium.
14 The fa ilu re  o f  th e im ports s e r ie s  to  r e f le c t  th e  ch an ges  in the 
le v e l  o f  a c tiv ity  in A rgen tina  may a lso be re la ted  both  to  the 
problem s in th e ir  re lia b ility , as d iscu ssed  in  A. G. Ford(1962) p.194, 
and to  the e ffe c ts  o f  the flu ctu ations in  exchange ra te , fa llin g  
sh a rp ly  in 1889-91, as we see below  (F ig  V II-15 ).
A rgen tin a ; fu rtherm ore, it  would be reasonab le  to  assume th a t home 
finan ced  investm ent, such as housing and land im provem ent, a lso 
moved c y c lic a lly . T h ere fo re , the am plitude o f  th e  flu c tu ation s  in  
to ta l A rgen tin e  domestic cap ita l form ation would h a ve  exceeded  th a t in 
A rgen tin e  m erchandise exports  to  a g re a t  exten t. A t th e same time, 
a ccord in g  to  F ig  V II-1 , the u p turn  in  B ritish  new p o r tfo lio  investm en t 
in  A rgen tin a  p reced ed  that in  A rgen tin e  exp orts  in  th e  mid-1880s, 
w h ile  both peaked  in  1889. Such c ircum stances would su g ges t a 
predom inant ro le  o f  home investm en t in  th e  A rgen tin e  C ycle I I I . 1*
As fa r  as th e  com position o f  fo re ign  inves tm en t in  the la tte r  ha lf 
o f  th e 1880s c o r re c t ly  re fle c ts  th e  nature o f  the A rgen tin e  investm ent 
boom, ra ilw ay  bu ild ing and land im provem ent p ro v id ed  tw o  major 
investm ent ou tlets . A ccord in g  to Williams’ estim ate o f  fo re ign
in vestm en t, p resen ted  as Tab le V II-1 , d u r in g  1886-90 ra ilw ay bu ild ing  
and land im provem en t!’cédu las ’ , land m ortgage bon ds ) absorbed  48% 
and 38% o f  to ta l p r iva te  b orrow in g  abroad , resp ec tiv e ly .**  Railway 
investm en t w as the more im portant in  th e  A rgen tin e  C ycle  I I I  not 
on ly  in q u a n tita tiv e  terms, bu t a lso in th e  sense th at, as in th e US, 
ra ilw ay  b u ild in g  crea ted  con d itions fo r  lan d  boom b y  both a ffe c t in g  
economic p oss ib ilitie s  o f  a lread y  settled  a reas  and open in g  v a s t  areas 
fo r  cu ltiva tio n .17 The o n e -yea r  p reced en ce  o f  th e cyc lica l
15 On th e  o th e r  hand, the e a r lie r  r e v iv a l in  exp o rts  than in  cap ita l 
in flow  in  th e e a r ly  1890s would su gges t th e  predom inance o f  exp orts  
in  th e A rgen tin e  C ycle IV, w hen fo r e ign  inves tm en t rem ained on  a 
re la t iv e ly  low  le v e l.
16 A ccord in g  to  H. S. F ern s (1960) p.409 A 422, 'Som eth ing lik e  65-70% 
o f  a ll B ritish  cap ita l in ves ted  in  A rgen tin a  du r in g  th e  fou r  boom 
y ea rs  1886-9 w as employed to  finance ra ilw ays  d ire c t ly  th rou gh  th e 
jo in t stock  com panies o r  in d ire c t ly  th rou gh  the medium o f  govern m en t 
b o rro w in g ’ ... 'th e  investm ent [in  land m ortgage bon ds ] was many 
tim es la r g e r  th an  the investm ent in m eat-packin g p lan ts, and 
con sid erab ly  sm aller than th e investm en t in  ra ilw ays .’  See a lso A. G. 
Ford  (1966) p.128
17 H. S. F e rn s (1960) ’The acts  o f  investm en t and th e  grow th  o f  the 
cap ita l claim s ... preceded  b y  som ething lik e  two y ea rs  the physica l 
g ro w th  o f  th e ra ilw ays them selves and b y  som ething lik e  fo u r  yea rs  
th e  e f fe c t iv e  use o f  th e ra ilw ays ’ . (p . 409) 'A rgen t in a  "g re w  in to ”
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Tab le  V II-1  A rgen tin e  B orrow in g , million gold  pesos
priva te
cédulas
1885 /
1886 /
1887 54
1888 47
1889 56
1890 14
ra ilw ay oth er
12 2
16 10
38 15
89 20
52 15
20 0
public
national p rov inc ia l
/ /
16 25
34 13
32 60
13 18
0 0
Source: J. H. Williams (1920)
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fluctuations in  th e fo r e ig n  investm ent in  A rgen tin e  ra ilw ays o v e r  
those in th e A rgen tin e  borrow ing in th e form  o f  cedu las appears to 
confirm  the p resen ce  o f  such a rela tionsh ip  b etw een  th e tw o main 
typ es  o f  in vestm en t. T h erefo re , ra ilw ay con stru ction  could be 
considered  as the 'le a d in g  sector ’  in  th e A rgen tin e  C yc le  I I I .
The pattern  o f  fluctuations in  fo re ign  inves tm en t in  A rgen tin a  in 
the 1880s and 1890s( P ig  V I I - 1) su gges ts  th e  need  to  v iew  th e
varia tions in  A rgen tin e  home investm ent du rin g  th e  C ycle  I I I  y ea rs  in 
the con text o f  a lo n g e r  wave: in  fac t, the 1885 tro u gh  was no more 
than a minor re la p se  in the lon g  upsw ing o f  th e  1880s, and the 
con traction o f  the ca p ita l flows into A rgen tina  a f t e r  th e  peak in  1889 
did not come to  an  end until the begin n ing o f  th e  new cen tu ry . 
The s ta rt o f  the ra ilw ay  expansion from  around 1880 is  said to  be 
mainly due to th e fo llow in g  variou s  fac tors : pac ifica tion  o f  v a s t
areas o f  Pampa th ro u gh  m ilitary exped itions; em ergen ce o f  a s tron g  
national govern m en t b y  means o f  th e settlem en t o f  the con flic t 
between prov in ce  an d  nation; m onetary reform ; th e em ergen ce o f  a 
new poss ib ility  fo r  A rgen tina  as a major w heat su pp lier  w ith  the 
beginn ing o f  w heat e x p o r t  from  1878; and, ab ove  a ll, the p lau s ib ility  
o f  p ro fitab le  ra ilw ay  build ing d isp layed  b y  p re v io u s  con struction .1* 
The long upsw ing th u s  set in  motion came to  a tem porary  ha lt in 
1885, when cap ita l in flow  declined  in the w ake o f  world  w ide 
depression  o r ig in a tin g  from  the collapse o f  th e  US ra ilw ay boom.1*
the railway m ileage p ro je c ted  in  the late 1880s and com pleted by  
1892.’ (p.443)
18 H. S. F ern s (1960) pp.399, 400, A. G. Ford (1962) p.87, C. M.
Lew is(1983) pp.43,44, A. G. Ford(1986)
19 A ccord ing to J. H. Williams(1920) p.39, the d if f ic u lt y  in  ra is in g  
funds abroad in c reased  in  1884, because 'European  len d ers , d is tu rbed  
b y  the un preceden ted  frequ en cy  w ith which A rgen tin a  was appearin g  
in  the loan m arket, w e re  becoming w ary .' The con traction  o f  th e 
world  market, due p rim arily  to th e US slump, h o w ever , would also 
have a ffe c ted  th e A rgen tin e  borrow ing b y  ex e r tin g  a d ve rs e  in flu en ces 
upon the a b ility  and w illin gn ess o f  major cap ita l ex p o r te rs  to  lend .
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The con traction  o f  o ve rseas  b o rro w in g , occu rrin g  w h ile  im ports  and 
se rv ic e  paym ents w ere  on the in c rea se  as a resu lt o f  th e  r is e  in 
fo re ign  borrow in g  in  th e e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  the 1880s, b ro u gh t abou t a 
balance o f  paym ents c ris is . A lth ou gh  the decline in  e x p o r t  values 
seemed to  occu r o n ly  a fte r  th e c r is is *0, and thus may not be held
p os itiv e ly  respon s ib le  fo r  th e  ba lan ce o f  paym ents c r is is , the
in ternational d epression  could be c on sid e red  to  have con tr ib u ted  to 
th e c r is is  b y  p re v en tin g  A rgen tin e  exp orts  from  show ing  a ’marked 
increase ’ .** The c r is is  led to  the suspension o f  th e  c o n ve r t ib il ity  o f  
the peso  in  th e e a r ly  1885, which had been maintained fo r  le ss  than 
two yea rs , and the peso remained in co n ve rtib le  th e re a fte r  u n til 1900.
The h itch in  th e m iddle o f  th e  lon g  upsw ing o f  the 1880s could
thus be con sid ered  as mainly due to  ad ve rse  ex tern a l con d it ion s , w ith
the investm en t opportu n ities  in A rgen tin a  rem aining as y e t  b y  no 
means exhausted.** T h ere fo re , th e  im provem ent o f  the in terna tion a l 
economic climate, w ith  the s ta r t o f  the US ra ilw ay  boom in  1885, 
rev iv ed  th e flow  o f  fu nds in to  A rgen tina**, and thus, p ro b a b ly , the
20 Whereas the m erchandise im port v a lu e , s e rv ic e  paym ents and 
cap ita l im ports declin ed  in 1885, th e  b r ie f  setback in  m erchandise 
exp ort va lu e  occu rred  in  th e fo llo w in g  yea r. A ccord in g  to  Th e  
Economist on  17 January 1885, 'w e m ust not be led  aw ay to conclu de 
that th e p resen t d iffic u lty  [in  A rg e n t in a ] is  due ... to  th e  d epressed  
condition  o f  the p roduce markets. F or in th is  r esp ec t the Republic 
has not su ffe red  as o th e r  cou n tr ies  h a ve  su ffered  -  its  c h ie f  exports , 
wool, h ides and ta llow s, having fa ir ly  maintained th e ir  v a lu e s . ’  See 
also A. M. Quintero-Ramos(1965) p.81
21 A. G. F o rd (1962) p.134 Thus, th e  fo llow ing statem ent b y  C. M. 
Lew is (1983) pp.55,56 would seem ao mew hat a t var ian ce  w ith  w hat 
actua lly happened in  1884 and 1885: ’A rgen tin a 's  e x p o r t e a rn in g s  
w ere fa llin g  a t p rec ise ly  the time th a t  her im port b ill was in c rea s in g .’
22 On 17 January 1885, The E conom ist repo rted  th a t ’Th e  d isas te r  ... 
is unconnected w ith  th e question o f  th e  p ro sp e r ity  o f  th e co u n try  
[i.e . A rgen tin a ], and is  lik e ly , th e re fo r e , to be on ly  o f  a tem pora ry  
na tu re.’
23 Th is  seemed to  be ob served  e a r lie s t  in  the la te  1886 in  A rgen tin e  
borrow in g  from  Germany: ’The h e a v y  borrow ings o f  th e A rgen tin e  
Republic have la tte r ly  met w ith  some ad ve rse  critic ism  in  th is  
cou n try , and th at is  p robab ly  th e rea so n  why the la s t Buenos A y res  
loan has ju s t  been issued  in B erlin , w h ere it  has m et w ith  un qualified  
success.’  30 O ctober 1886, The Econom ist.
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A rgen tin e  home investm en t a c tiv ity , p a r ticu la r ly  in the form  o f  
ra ilw ay  con stru ction . A ccord in g  to Lew is, ra ilw a y  bu ild ing in  the 
la tte r  h a lf o f  th e 1880s, in  comparison w ith  th a t p r io r  to th e  balance 
o f  paym ents c r is is , assumed more o f  a maniacal ch aracter and o ften  
was duplication  o f  ex is t in g  lines, being u n dertak en  to  a fa r  g rea te r  
ex ten t b y  new, ra th e r  than estab lished  and u su a lly  b igg e r , companies 
in  a  h ig h ly  com petitive  atm osphere.2* M ore im portantly, these
com panies o fte n  a ttrac ted  fu nds from  London w ith  th e rate o f  retu rn  
gu aran teed  b y  the A rgen tin e  governm ent.“
Due to  its  revo lu tion a ry  e f fe c ts  upon b o th  cu ltivab le  acreage 
and econom ic poss ib ilities  o f  a lready  se  tled  a reas , ra ilw ay bu ild ing 
g a v e  r ise  to a land im provem ent boom. From  1887 th is found its  
exp ress ion  both in th e  increase o f  borrow in g  ab road  b y  th e medium 
o f  cedu las (Tab le  V II-1 ) and in  th e  rap id  r is e  in  land va lues.“  The 
expansion  o f  the A rgen tin e  economy, led b y  th e in crease  in th ese  two 
ty p es  o f  investm ent, was re in fo rced  b y  th e  e xp o rt boom, which 
re fle c ted  a w iden in g w orld  market, o r ig in a t in g  mainly from  the 
inves tm en t booms in th e  US and Germany and th e  increase in  B ritish 
ov e rsea s  lend ing .
Railway bu ild in g  on an e v e r  in c reas in g  scale could not be 
con tinued in d e fin ite ly  under th e fro n tie r  con d it ion s  o f  la te  19th 
cen tu ry  A rgen tin a  and the US, p rim arily  because as railw ay 
con stru ction  p ro gressed  ra ilw ays tended to  be b u ilt  in  more and more 
sp a rse ly  populated reg ion s . A lthough ra ilw a y  bu ild ing had the 
a b ility  to  c rea te  tr a f f ic ,  developm ent around n ew ly  bu ilt ra ilw ays  was
24 C. M. Lew ia (1963)pp .67-72
25 H. S. Ferns(1960) p.439
26 'T h e re  is  much ev id en ce  to  su gges t th at land va lu es  apprec iated  
b y  som ething lik e  1000% betw een  1883 and 1887 in  Buenos A ires  
p ro v in ce , 420% in Santa Fe, 750% in  Cordoba and 370% in Entre Rio.'
H. S. F orns ( 1960) p.444
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a slow process. Thus, in the course o f  1888, a situation  o f
'o ve rb u ild in g  in  re la tion  to immediate use ’17 appeared  to d eve lo p , 
which was exp ressed  in  both the sharp  decline o f  the p ro fita b ility  o f  
A rgen tine ra ilw ays a fte r  the peak in  1888(Table V II-2 )**  and th e  fa ll 
in A rgen tin e  stock  p r ic e s  in  June and July o f  the same y ea r (F ig  V I I -  
3 ).“
The slowness o f  th e agricu ltu ra l developm ent around the n ew ly  
bu ilt ra ilw ays was re fle c ted , as we shall see in th e fo llow in g  section , 
in the fa ilu re  o f  exp o rts  to  increase ra p id ly  enough to match th e 
upsu rge o f  im ports, w h ich  un derlay  go ld  ou tflow  and the r ise  in  g o ld  
premium in  1889. On the oth er hand, s ince, as aforem entioned , th e  
new lines w ere more depen den t upon govern m ent guarantee o f  f ix ed  
retu rn  in  ra is ing  fu n ds  than estab lished  lines, th e d ec lin e  in  
p ro fitab ility  led  to  the rap id  increase in  ra ilw ay guaran tee paym ents 
as a com ponent o f  A rgen tin e  govern m ent spen d ing  (Tab le  V II-3 ). As 
we see in  Section 3 o f  th is  chap ter, th is was one o f  the major fa c to r s  
respon sib le  fo r  th e  r is e  in  th e govern m ent d e fic it  du rin g  1886-89, 
which ra ised  the question  on th e p a rt o f  fo re ign  crea tors  as to  the 
ab ility  o f  the A rgen tin e  govern m ent to honour th e commitment i t  was 
assuming. A t th e same time, th e w iden in g gap  between g overn m en t 
revenu e and expen d itu re , be ing unable to be financed b y  the
27 H. S. Ferns(1960) p.444
28 It ,  how ever, d id  no t seem to  be the case th at th e d eclin e in n e t 
earn in gs  w ss ob se rv ed  in  e v e r y  railw ay lines, bu t that in  th e main 
new companies es tab lished  a fte r  1885 su ffe red  from  w orsen ing 
p ro fitab ility . Thus, C. M. Lew is (1983) p.74 says, 'A rgen tin e  ra ilw ay  
a ffa irs  du rin g  the la te  1880s p resen t a dual image: increasing 
d ifficu lt ies  w ere experien ced  b y  new lines, while op era tin g  con cern s  
w ere apparen tly  un troub led  un til ove rtak en  b y  th e cra sh ', i.e . th e  
Baring c ris is .
29 The Econom ist 30 Nov 1889. A lso On 24 Nov 1888, The E conom ist 
repo rted  that B ritish  'in v e s to rs  a re  now f igh t in g  shy  o f  A rgen tin e  
issues'. I t  may a lso  be remembered th at accord in g  to  J. H. W illiams' 
estimate o f  fo re ign  cap ita l in flow , based upon 'c rea tio n ', ra th er than  
upon 'c a ll', 1888 was peak year.
T a b le  V II-2  A rgen tin e  Railway P ro f it  Rate,X
1883 5.75
1884 7.34
1885 4.63
1886 4.68
1887 4.83
1888 5.05
1889 2.36
1890 2.63
1891 1.74
1892 1.77
S o u rce : A. G. Ford (1986)
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Tab le  V II-3  A rgen tine R a ilw ays : Guaranteed Payments, Tota l Annual 
L iab ilities , £000
1883 60
1886 170
1888 440
1889 542
1890 620
1891 921
1892 1369
Source: C. M. Lewis(1983) p.82
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in crease in  taxation, led the go v e rn m en t to r e s o r t  to  the p rin tin g  
p ress; th is  p robab ly  accelerated  th e r is e  in the g o ld  premium.*0
The r ise  in th e gold  premium im plied  the d ec lin e  in  the earn inga 
from  cedu las, land m ortgage bonds, th e  in tere s t on  w h ich  was payable 
in paper pesos. P ig  V II-3  appears to  su gges t th a t th e  rise  in the 
go ld  premium, a ffe c t in g  retu rn s  on  th e investm en t in A rgen tina  
a d ve rs e ly , was a d ec is ive  fa c to r  in  th e  collapse o f  cap ita l flow  into 
A rgen tina : as was a lready seen , th e  d eclin e o f  ra ilw ay  p ro fitab ility  
caused th e  fa ll in stock  p rices , r ep re sen ted  here b y  th e p rices  o f  5X 
A rgen tin e  govern m ent bonds, in  th e  second ha lf o f  1888(Fig V II-3 ) 
and led  to  the fa ll in  fo re ign  in ves tm en t in A rgen tin e  ra ilw sys  a fte r  
the 1888 peak (Tab le  V II-1 ); the r e c o v e r y  in  stock  p ric es  from  the 
end o f  1888 was p robab ly  connected  w ith  th e con tin u ed  increase in 
the borrow ing  in  th e form o f  cedu las (Ta b le  V I I- 1 ) ;  i t  is  then 
im portant to note th at the s ta rt o f  th e  rap id  rise  in  th e go ld  premium 
coincided  w ith  the fa ll  o f  stock  p ric e s  from  m id-1889(Fig V II-3 ), which 
was associated w ith the decline in  th e  investm ent in  cedu las(Table
V II-1 ).
F inally , th e downturn o f  th e  A rgen tin e  dom estic investm ent 
a c t iv ity  in  1889 did  not appear to  b e  attribu ta b le  to  th e developm ent 
o f  a  fu ll employment ce iling . As t o  labour su p p ly , varia tion s in 
A rgen tin e  wages follow ed n eith er a  cyc lica l n o r a  con tracyclica l 
pattern : in  paper pesos, w ages rose  con sis ten tly , w h ile  in term s o f
go ld  pesos, th ey  tended to fa ll d u r in g  C ycle  III .*1 T h is  should not 
be g re a t ly  su rpris in g , when i t  is  rem em bered th a t th e  number o f  
im migrants into A rgen tina  va r ied  in  a  cyc lica l way.** As to  the
30 See footnote 11, Section 3, this chapter.
31 J. H. Williams (1920) p.192
32 A. G. F o rd (1962) p.139
su p p ly  o f  materials fo r  ra ilw ay bu ild ing, which w e re  m ostly im ported, 
i t  may be re le va n t to  note that one h a rd ly  f in d s  an y  ev id en ce  o f  
d if fic u lt ie s  in m eeting exp ort demand in  B rita in , th e  main supp lier  fo r  
Argen tina.**
33 Section 2, Chapter VI.
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2. O verseas  T ra d e
In  th e  fluctuations o f  A rgen tin e  fo re ign  trade in  th e  late 
n in eteen th  cen tu ry , as in  A rgen tin e  domestic cap ita l form ation , long 
sw in gs  a re  a prom inent fea tu re ; th e trade  cyc les , superim posed upon 
th e  lon g  w aves , appear as a phenomenon o f  secondary im po rtan ce .(F ig  
V II—1) N eve rth e less, i t  is  poss ib le  to  id en tify  th e fo llo w in g  trade  
c yc lic a l tu rn in g  poin ts in th e va r ia tion s  o f  A rgen tine m erchan d ise  
e x p o r t and im port values: 1886-1889-1893 fo r  exp orts  and 1885-1889- 
1891 fo r  im ports.
The tra d e  cyc lica l fluctuations in  A rgen tin e  export va lu es  d u r in g  
th e  C yc le  I I I  y ea rs , re in fo rc in g  th e  investm ent cyc le , la r g e ly  
r e fle c te d  th e  chan ges in the le v e l  o f  world  demand fo r  h e r  g ra in s  
and animal p rod u cts1. The cyc lica l changes in  demand seem ed  to 
indu ce sim ilar changes in A rgen tin e  export p rices  and volum e: 
a cco rd in g  to  F ig  V II-4 , the cyc lica l fluctuations in  export v a lu e s  w ere 
a ttr ib u ta b le  to  th ose in the exp o r ts  o f  wool and maize, ra th e r  th a n  to 
th e  sh ifts  in  w heat exports*; on  th e oth er hand, a com parison o f  the 
va r ia tion s  in  e x p o r t volume (F ig  V II-4 ) and those in export p r ic e s  (F ig  
V II-5 )*  show s th at the fluctuations in  the exp o rt value o f  g ra in s
1 G rains and animal products  accounted  fo r  most o f  A rgen tine 
exp o rts , a lth ou gh  th e ir  re la tiv e  im portance was changing th ro u gh o u t 
pre-W W I y ea rs : du rin g  1880-4 g ra in s  and animal products  e x p o r ts  
amounted to  5 .1 *  and 90* o f  to ta l m erchandise exports , r e s p e c t iv e ly ;  
in  1889 th ese  f ig u re s  w ere chan ged  to  13.2* and 66.7%; in 1900-14 
th e co r re sp o n d in g  w eights  w ere  47.5* and 23.9*. B. A lb ert(1983 )
p.61
2 D uring 1885-95, the exports  o f  th ese th ree  main items accou n ted  fo r  
56.4* o f  to ta l A rgen tin e  exports ; the cyc lica l chan ges in th e e x p o r t  
v a lu e  o f  th ese  commodities accounted fo r  53.6* o f  the cyc lica l 
in crease  and 75 .9* o f  th e cyc lica l decrease  in  to ta l A rgen tin e  e x p o r t  
va lu e . B. R. M itchell (1983)
3 Wheat p ric e  used  here is  w orld  p ric e  index, which is ju s t if ie d  by  
th e  m inor position  o f  A rgen tina  as a wheat producer. A. G.
F o rd (1956) p.31
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re fle c ted  those in  volum e, w h ereas  th e  varia tion s in  th e  value o f  wool 
exported  resu lted  la rg e ly  from  p r ic e  movements. T h ere fo re , the 
cyc lica l pa ttern  in to tal A rgen tin e  e x p o r t  values cou ld  be explained 
la rge ly  b y  the cyc lica l v a r ia tion s  in  wool p rice  and maize export 
volume; the con tinued increase in  w h ea t exports d u r in g  th e slump o f  
the e a r ly  1890s p reven ted  such a  s h a rp  decline in  A rgen tin e  exports  
a fte r  1889 as occu rred  in im ports. Th e  g rea ter  v o la t ility  o f  wool 
p rices  and s tab ility  o f  wool e x p o r t  vo lum e, re la tiv e ly  to  wheat, may 
re fle c t  both the g rea te r  v a r ia b il ity  o f  demand fo r  raw  m aterial than 
foo ds tu ffs  in  the course o f  th e  t r a d e  cyc le  and th e  d ifficu lty  in 
v a ry in g  wool production  accord in g  to  th e  sh ifts  in demand. On the 
o th e r  hand, b earin g  in mind th a t in  pre-W W I yea rs  both home and 
fo re ign  consumption o f  maize v a r ie d  d irec tly  w ith  th e s ize  o f  
harvest*, the cyc lica l pattern  in  m aize export volum es may be 
rega rd ed  la rge ly  as a matter o f  a c c id en t. With home consumption 
rem aining r e la t iv e ly  stable, th e  p a t te rn  o f  fluctuations in  wheat 
exp ort volume re fle c ted  mainly th ose  in  w heat production*, which was 
to a g rea t exten t determ ined b y  ra ilw a y  build ing.
F ig  V II-6  shows the flu c tu ation s  in  th e cu rren t va lu e  o f  exports  
from  A rgen tina  to  fou r  major in d u s tr ia l countries.* Whilst the 
exports  to  France, Germany and th e  U S varied  fo llow in g  a uniform  
cyc lica l pattern  o f  1886-1889-1893, i t  is  d ifficu lt  to  say  that exports  
from  Argen tina  to  B rita in  v a r ied  in  a  tra d e  cyc lica l way. I f  th e  
cyc lica l pattern  foun d  in the A r g e n t in e  exports  to  th e form er th ree  
coun tries  does not conform  p re c is e ly  to  those id en tifiab le  in the
4 A. G .Ford<1956) p.34
5 A. G. Ford (1956) p.34
6 In  1885-94 the exp o rts  to th e fo u r  cou n tr ies  accounted fo r  60.7X o f  
to tal m erchandise exports . Belgium  a ls o  was a key m arket fo r  
A rgen tin e  p roducts , absorb ing  a rou n d  14% o f  total exp o rts  in the ten 
yea rs . S tatistica l A bstrac t fo r  th e  P r in c ip a l and O ther Foreign  
Countries.

varia tions o f  th e  le v e l o f  a c tiv ity  in each  o f  th e  th ree  econom ies7, 
th is may be d u e  to  a g rea t ex ten t to  th e in flu en ces o f  A rgen tin e  
export p rice  m ovements* and to  the im perfections in A rg en tin e  exp ort 
data*. On th e  o th e r  hand, the s im ila rity  in  th e pa ttern  o f  ch an ges 
between A rg en tin e  wheat exports  and A rgen tin e  exp orts  to  B rita in  
su ggests  th a t th e  le v e l o f  B ritish  im ports from  A rgen tin a  was 
determ ined b ro a d ly  by  A rgen tine capacity  to  p rodu ce w h eat. Total 
B ritish im ports o f  g ra in  and flou r, how ever, fo llow ed  th e p a tte rn  o f 
the B ritish C yc le  I I I  reasonably c lose ly , pass ing  th rou gh  1886-1891- 
1894 as tu rn in g  poin ts. T h ere fo re  it  would appear rea son ab le  to 
suppose th at B rita in  was p robab ly  sh ift in g  h e r  sou rce  o f  wheat 
supply  in fa v o u r  o f  A rgen tina  in  th e y ea rs  con ce rn ed , as a 
consequence o f  both  the p ro gress  o f  in du str ia liza tion  in  trad ition a l 
wheat g ro w e rs  in  Europe and the em ergen ce o f  the p o s s ib il ity  o f  
cheap supply  o f  w heat from  A rgen tina , as a resu lt o f  ra ilw ay  bu ild ing  
and fa llin g  f r e ig h t  rates .10
While th e  le v e l  o f  A rgen tine exp o rt va lu es  was d eterm ined  in  the 
short run b y  th e  state o f  the w orld  economy, th e v a r ia t io n s  in 
A rgen tine m erchandise im ports(va lu e)11 seemed to  be c lo s e ly  rela ted  
to those in th e  flow  o f  fu nds in to  A rgen tin a , as th e  fa ir ly  close
7 For instance, th e  US Cycle I I I  is  d e fin ed  as 1885-1892-1894, an d  the 
German C ycle I I I  as 1885-1890-1891.
8 For instance, a ccord in g  to  German data, German im ports from  
Argen tina  ro s e  fro m  the trough  in  1887 to  th e peak in 1891 an d  then 
fe ll  to  the 1892 trou gh , which is  a t con sid erab le  varian ce  w ith  the 
aforem entioned c y c lic a l pattern  in  A rgen tin e  exp orts  to  G erm any, but 
more con sis ten t w ith  the pattern  o f  th e German C ycle  I I I .
9 A. G. F ord (1956) Appendix B to  Chapter I I .
10 F re igh t ra te s  began  to decline on a lon g  term  basis from  around 
1880. S. B. S a u l(1969) p.22, 23
11 Although A rg en tin e  im port volume data appear to  be u n ava ilab le , 
the fo llow ing com parison o f  v o la t ility  b etw een  im port va lu e  an d  price 
seems to s u g g e s t  th a t the cyc lica l flu ctu ations in  im port va lu e  w ere 
the jo in t p ro d u c t o f  similar chan ges in  im port volume and p r ic e s : 
im port value in c reased  between 1885 and 1889 b y  79.3X an d  declin ed  
between 1889 an d  1891 by 59.4X, whereas im port p r ic es  rose  b y  10.3X 
in 1886-1889 an d  fe l l  by 17.7X in  1889-1896. A. G. Ford(1962) p.139, 
144
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parallelism  between the tw o (F ig  V I I - 1) su ggests . S ince, as we have 
seen in th e p reced in g  section , in  Cycle I I I  th e chan ges in  fo re ign  
borrow ing  had a d ec is iv e  im pact upon A rgen tin e  le v e l o f  a c t iv ity ,  the 
dependence o f  th e le v e l o f  m erchandise im ports upon cap ita l im ports 
would mean that the s ize  o f  im ports  was also rela ted  to the le v e l o f  
a c t iv ity .1* F ig  V II-7  g iv e s  th e im pression o f  consumption im ports 
accounting fo r  g rea te r  pa rt o f  th e  sh o rt term  fluctuations in  to tal 
A rgen tin e  im ports. Consumption im ports fluctuated  more w id e ly  than 
investm ent im ports, and as a re s u lt  th e pattern  o f  va r ia tion s  in  to tal 
im ports la rg e ly  re fle c ts  th at in  consumption im ports; m oreover the 
fluctuations in consumption im ports  tended to  p reced e  those in 
investm ent im ports du rin g  the C yc le  I I I  years . Calcu lating th e ratio  
o f  investm ent to  consumption im ports, how ever, one o b se rv e s  th is 
ra tio  v a ry in g  accord in g  to  a c y c lic a l pattern , 1887(T )-1889(P )-1895(T ). 
F ig  V II-8  shows the fluctuations in  A rgen tin e  im ports from  th e fou r 
major in du str ia l cou n tr ies , accou n ting  fo r  nearly  70% o f  to ta l im ports 
in to  A rgen tin a  in 1885-94. Not on ly  did the im ports from  th e UK 
exceed  those from  the o th e r  th re e  coun tries  by  fa r ,  bu t also 
fluctuated  more w ide ly , which may be rela ted  to  th e c lose  linkage 
betw een th e cap ita l and m erchandise exports  from  Brita in . I t  is  also 
seen in  th e f igu re  that the im pact o f  the A rgen tin e  C yc le  I I I  v ia  
trade flow s  upon the investm ent economies, Germany and th e US, was 
fa r  w eaker than upon the o ld e r  in d u str ia l coun tries .
The A rgen tin e  trade  and c u r re n t  balance o f  paym ents moved in 
a con tracyc lica l way (F ig  V II-9 ), w h ich  is  con sisten t w ith  th e lead ing 
role  o f  home investm ent in th e A rgen tin e  C ycle I I I .  A s is  shown in 
th e f igu re , th e r is e  and fa ll o f  th e  cu rren t account d e fic it  d u r in g  the
12 On the oth er hand, as P ro fes so r  A. G. Ford(1962) p.151, 152 has 
shown, th e e f fe c t  o f  exchange ra te , i.e. go ld  premium, d id  not appear 
s ign ifican t.
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up- and downsw ing w ere  matched by th e cyc lica l pa ttern  in  th e  flow  
o f  fu nds into A rgen tin a . The two items, however, d id  no t seem  to 
balance p rec ise ly , resu lt in g  in the gold  flow s  as shown in  F ig  V II-1 0 . 
I t  appears that in  1886-88 Argen tine ove rseas  borrow ing exceeded  the 
cu rren t account d e fic it ,  whereas in  1889 the opposite  o c cu rred , 
la rge ly  as a resu lt o f  a rapid r ise  in  imports. As was a lread y  
mentioned in  the p reced in g  section, th e consequent g o ld  ou tflow  in 
1889 seemed to be th e  main reason behind the rapid r ise  in  th e  gold  
premium in th at y ea r . During the fo llow in g  downswing, th e  cu r re n t  
account im proved, w h ile cap ita l in flow  declined. T h e  n e t go ld
imports in to  A rgen tin a  in the ea r ly  1890s would su g ge s t  th a t the 
reduction in the cu r re n t  account d e fic it  outweighed th e fa ll  in  the 
flow  o f  fu nds in to  A rgen tina . The sw ift  improvement o f  th e  c u rren t 
account was mainly a ttribu tab le  both to  th e sharp d eclin e in  im ports 
re fle c tin g  the dow n turn  o f  the A rgen tin e  economy and, to  a smaller 
exten t, to  the fa ilu re  o f  exports  to collapse drastica lly , p e rh ap s  as a 
resu lt o f  the con tinued  r ise  in wheat exports . On the o th e r  hand, 
the Funding Loan Agreem ent o f  January 24, 1891, g ra n t in g  a
moratorium and a fu n d in g  loan amounting to £15m to  A rgen tin a 1’ , 
would have p re v en ted  the net cap ita l flow in to  A rgen tin a  from  
declin ing rap id ly  d u r in g  the downswing. 13
13 J. H. Williams! 192Ô) p.126, 127
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3. Governm ent1
D uring 1885-95, the A rgen tin e  national adm inistration spent 43 
million go ld  pesos on annual a v e ra ge . In  th e same p e rio d  A rgen tine 
annual a v e ra ge  exports  and ov e rsea s  borrow in g  reached 99 million 
and 67 million go ld  pesos*, res p e c t iv e ly ; i t  may be u se fu lly  recalled 
h e re  th at th e 67 million go ld  pesos is  estim ated to  h ave constitu ted  
betw een  one th ird  and one h a lf o f  A rg en tin e  net physica l investm ent. 
A rgen tin e  governm ent expend itu re v a r ied  cyc lica lly , r is in g  from the 
trou gh  in  1886 un til 1889, and fa ll in g  back  to the 1891 trou gh (F ig  
V II-1 1 ). The sizes  o f  th e c y c lic a l changes in  governm ent
expend itu re were the increase o f  17 m illion go ld  p esos and the 
decrease amounting to  22 m illion g o ld  pesos; th ese magnitudes 
compare w ith  the 54 million go ld  p esos  increase and 29 million gold  
pesos decrease in A rgen tin e  m erchandise exports  and a lso  with 209 
million go ld  pesos rise  and 248 m illion g o ld  pesos fa ll  in  Argen tine 
fo re ign  borrow ing. These com parisons would su g ges t that the
cyc lica l con tributions made by  A rg en tin e  governm ent expenditure 
w ere  o f  minor importance re la t iv e  to  home investm ent o r  merchandise 
exports.* 123
1 We are  unable to examine th e  ro le  o f  consumption expen d itu re  in 
the A rgen tin e  C ycle I I I ,  la r g e ly  due to  th e  un availab ility  o f  adequate 
data: consumption im ports s e r ie s  is  no t con sidered  as su itab le  
ind icator o f  consumption sp en d in g  in  th a t i t  is  heavily  in fluen ced  by 
th e fluctuations in  overseas  b orro w in g ; data  on the p rodu ction  o f  
major consumption goods, such as w heat, a re  not ava ilab le  un til a fte r  
1890.
2 Th e  annual ave ra ge  in flow  o f  fo r e ig n  cap ita l figu re  is  based  upon 
J. H. Williams' estimate and a lso upon th e  assumption th a t during 
1892-4, fo r  which Williams did  not p ro v id e  f igu res , A rgen tin a  did not 
borrow  from  abroad.
3 S ince, as  we see below, a con sid erab le  p a r t o f  the cyc lica l 
varia tion s  in  governm ent exp en d itu res  w as due to fo r e ign  d eb t 
s e rv ic e  and railw ay guaran tee paym ents, th e  e ffe c t  o f  govern m ent 
spen d ing  upon the A rgen tin e  economy would have been am aller than 
th e above f igu re s  suggest.
Source: E. Torcquirl A  Co. LHK1919). J. H. WUliinu(1920). L. Rende]«1977)
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On the o th e r  hand, the pa tte rn  o f  va r ia tion s  in A rgen tin e  
govern m en t reven u e  a g rees  less  c lo s e ly  with th e trade  cyc le  th an  
th a t found in  expen d itu re : the peak in  revenue w as reached as e a r ly  
as  in  1887, and reven u e  was maintained at approxim ately th e same 
le v e l  un til 1889, a f t e r  which it  ra p id ly  d ec lin ed (F ig  V II-1 1 ). A r e s u lt  
o f  th is  was th e c y c lic a l varia tion s  in  Argen tine govern m ent d e fic it :  
in  1886-89 th e d e fic it  increased  b y  9 million gold  pesos, and in 1889- 
93 a 18 million g o ld  pesos d eclin e was o b se rv ed (F ig  V II-11 ). The 
govern m en t sector  as a whole cou ld  thus be con sid ered  to  h a ve  
re in fo rced  th e s h o rt  term flu ctu ations o f  the A rgen tin e  econom y, 
a lth ough  its  c y c lic a l in flu en ces w ere oversh adow ed  b y  th ose  
associated  w ith  investm en t o r  exports .
c *
Fig  V II-12  shows that th e  variations in  ra ilw ay gu aran tee  
paym ents and in expend itu res, o th e r  than public d eb t serv ice* and 
gu aran tee paym ents, explain  most o f  th e cyclical ch an ges  in A rg en tin e  
govern m ent sp en d in g  during C yc le  I I I ;  o f  these tw o  spending item s, 
’other* expen d itu re  varied  more w idely  than gu aran tee paym ents. 
A lthough public d e b t  s e rv ic e  increased  during th e  upswing, i t  d id  
no t decline d u r in g  th e subsequent depression. On the oth er hand, 
a ccord in g  to  th e data showing th e  amount o f  expen d itu re  b y  m ajor 
m inistries o f  th e A rgen tin e  national adm inistration*, i t  was m ainly th e 
expend itu res b y  th e  In te r io r  M in is try  and T rea su ry  that accoun t fo r  
th e  cyc lica l m ovements in to tal govern m ent spen d in g . S in ce th e
4 Th is  item was ob ta ined  by  m u ltip ly in g  actual to ta l expend itu re b y  
th e  National Adm inistration , lis ted  on  E. Tornqu ist(1919 ) p.276,277, b y  
th e  percen tage  o f  pu b lic  deb t s e rv ic e  in voted  b u d ge t, p resen ted  on  
L . Randall(1977) p.211,212. Since actua l expend itu re d iffe red  from  
vo ted  budget, p u b lic  debt s e rv ic e  calculated in  th is  w ay could n o t be 
expected  to be equ a l to actual amount o f  public d eb t s e rv ice ; th e  
f ig u re s  o f  pub lic  d e b t  s e rv ic e , p resen ted  in F ig  V II-1 2 , how ever, 
co rrespon d  rou gh ly  w ith Williams’  estim ate o f  the in te r e s t  ch a rge  fo r  
national debt. J. H. Williams(1920) p.100
5 T h ey  w ere ob ta in ed  in  the same way as in foo tnote  2.
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T re a s u ry  was respon sib le  fo r  th e  paym ent o f  ra ilw ay  guarantees* and 
th e  s e rv ic e  o f  national debt*, and since the rem ain ing expend itu re 
item  b y  th e T reasu ry , adm in istra tive  expenses*, is  no t lik e ly  to  h ave 
v a r ie d  cyc lica lly , it  fo llow s th a t the cyc lica l v a r ia tion s  in 'o th e r ' 
exp en d itu re  re fle c ted  those in  th e spen d in g  b y  In te r io r  M in istry. 
Am ong th e In te r io r  M in istry  sp en d in g  items lis ted  b y  O. Schmitz*, it  
is  p ro b a b ly  the expend itu res fo r  w e lfa re  se rv ic e  and public w orks 
th a t changed  in  a cyc lica l way. In  sum, the c y c lic a l pattern  in  the
A rg en tin e  govern m ent exp en d itu re  du r in g  Cycle I I I  appeared to  be 
re la ted  mainly to both  ra ilw ay gu aran tee  paym ents and w elfare  and 
p u b lic  w orks spending.
In  P ig  V II-13  a re  shown th e  movements o f  im port du ty  and o th e r  
taxes. I t  is  in teres tin g  to  o b s e rv e  that the govern m ent reven u e  
fro m  taxes o th e r  than im port d u ty  remained r e la t iv e ly  stable, wh ile 
im port d u ty  showed c lea r  c y c lic a l movements. T h e  possib le cyc lica l 
e lem ents in govern m en t income from  o th e r  sources than im port d u ty  
in  term s o f  paper pesos, r e f le c t in g  th e  cyc lica l changes in home 
tra d e , may have been  w iped ou t by  th e  cyc lica l movements o f  the 
g o ld  premium (F ig  V I I-3 );  on th e  oth er hand the c y c lic a l varia tion s in 
im ports  seemed to be w ide enou gh  fo r  th e im port d u ty  to reta in  its  
c y c lic a l pa tte rn  even  a fte r  th e d e fla tion  fo r  the g o ld  premium.1*
6 S ee  the quote in C. M. L ew is ( 1983) p.102
7 O. Schm itz( 1895) p.222
8 O. Schmitz(1895) p.222
9 T h e y  a re  expend itu re fo r  th e p res id en cy , adm in istrative  expend itu re 
fo r  In te r io r  M in istry, expen d itu re  fo r  post and te legrap h , fo r  cap ita l 
p o lic e , and fo r  w e lfa re  fac ilit ies , adm in istrative  expen d itu re  fo r  state  
ra ilw ay , expend itu re fo r  the adm in istration  o f  national te r r ito ry  and 
fo r  pub lic  w orks. 0 . Schmitz(1895) p.221
10 T h e  fo llow in g  statem ent su g ge s ts  that im port d u ty  was payable 
w ith  paper pesoe: 'In  1890 15% su rch arge  on im port du ty  was 
im posed, in o rd e r  to balance th e  d eprec ia tion  o f p a p er  money.' O. 
Schm itz(1895) p.214,215
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Source: E. Tomquist & Co. Ltd(1919). O. Schmitz(1895)
358
Th erefo re , it  may be con clu ded  that the w iden in g  govern m en t 
d e fic it  du rin g  the C yc le  I I I  boom, which had n ega tiv e  e f fe c ts  upon 
the expectations o f  European in ves to rs , was exp licab le  b y  the 
fo llow ing factors : r is in g  ra ilw ay  gu aran tee payment and pu b lic  deb t 
serv ice ; expansion o f  govern m en t a c tiv it ie s  in  the areas o f  w e lfa re  
and public works; f in a lly ,  th e Boaring go ld  premium, w ith  th e e f fe c t  
o f  reducin g g overn m en t reven u e  in  go ld  term s.11
11 In  Argen tina , w h ere  a con siderab le  portion  o f  govern m en t 
spending was made in  g o ld , e .g . pu b lic  deb t s e rv ic e  and ra ilw ay 
guarantee payments, w h ils t most o f  govern m ent income is  r e c e iv ed  in 
paper pesos, not o n ly  d id  th e r is in g  go ld  premium tend  to  w iden  the 
gap  between gove rn m en t expen d itu re  and reven u e, bu t a lso  the 
increase in  g overn m en t spen d in g  in  g o ld  its e lf  would have had the 
e f fe c t  o f  ra is ing g o ld  premium, thus redu c in g  income in  go ld  term s; 
fo r  the r ise  in gove rn m en t spen d ing  in  go ld  would appear in  g o ld  
market as increased  demand fo r  gold.
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4. Money and Banking
A rgen tin a ’s  b r ie f  m em bership in  th e go ld  stan dard  club  came to 
an end at th e beg in n ing  o f  1885 in  the a fterm ath o f  th e balance o f 
payments c r is is , the o r ig in  o f  w h ich  could be tra ced  back to  the 
downswing o f  the w orld  economy fro m  1882/3 fo llo w in g  the term ination 
o f  the US railw ay investm en t boom.1 I t  was not un til the tu rn  o f  
the cen tu ry  that she re jo in ed  th e  in ternation al go ld  standard . 
Thus, th roughou t th e  y ea rs  o f  C yc le  I I I ,  the A rgen tin e  m onetary 
system , in  con trast w ith  those o f  the th ree  in d u s tr ia l economies 
d iscussed in  the p reced in g  ch a p te rs , lacked a m etallic basis: the
A rgen tine cu rren cy  in  th e period  con cern ed  con sis ted  o f  in co n ve rtib le  
paper money. While paper pesos w ere  good  enough fo r  th e pu rpose 
o f  dom estic transactions, go ld  o r  its  equ iva len t, i.e . s te r lin g , was 
needed fo r  external trad e , and it s  p r ic e , i.e . th e  g o ld  premium, was 
determ ined in  the go ld  m arket b y  th e demand fo r  and su pp ly  o f  it. 
Thus, as J. H. Williams has fou n d , the flu ctu ations in  th e gold  
premium w ere determ ined la rg e ly  b y  the state o f  externa l balances, 
ra th er than by the amount o f  p a p er  money in c ircu la tion 1, th e la tter  
being o n ly  one o f  va r iou s  fa c to r s  in flu en cin g  th e  demand fo r  gold. 
Through th e gold m arket the A rg en tin e  economy based upon paper 
cu rren cy  was connected w ith  th e  ou ts ide  w orld , w h ere go ld  was in 
use; the go ld  premium could b e  reg a rd ed  as th e f loa t in g  exchange 
rate o f  paper peso w ith  go ld  s tan da rd  currenc ies .
Only s ix  banks are  said to  h a ve  been in ex is ten ce  in A rgen tin a  
in 1884, but the number was in c reased  to  52 in  O ctober 1889.* The
1 See Section 1, this chapter.
2 J. H. Williams(1920) C hapter X
3 M. G. MulhalK 1892a) p.37,38
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expansion o f  the banking system  was mainly d u e  to  'the Law o f  
National Guaranteed Banks' o r  the 'F ree  Banking L aw ' put in fo r c e  
from  November 1887, under which, w ith some resem blances to the US 
National Banking System, any banking organ iza tion  w ith  a cap ita l o f  
a t  least 250,000 pesos could issue notes, p ro v id ed  th a t 'i t  purchase 
national gold  bonds to the fu ll amount o f  the n o te s  to  be emitted b y  
it»«. The s tru ctu re  o f  th e Argen tine b an k in g  sector appeared
o ligarch ic . In  1884, the Banco de la P rov incia  d e  Buenos A ires  and 
th e  Banco Nacional con tro lled  71.8% and 82.4X o f  th e total banking 
cap ita l and deposits  o f  the six banks in A rgen tin a  resp ec tiv e ly . A t 
th e  end o f  1888, th e  assets o f  th e two g rea t banka amounted to  57.5X 
o f  those o f  the 24 banks publish ing statements®. During th e
financia l c r is is  in 1890 and 1891, many o f  these ban k s , includ ing the 
tw o giants, collapsed : M. G. Mulhall lis ts  on ly  12 banks in Buenos 
A ires  as banks o f  any substance in A p ril 1892, s a y in g  that the banka 
in  other p rov inces  counted fo r  nothing.* As a  resu lt , a  somewhat 
less  concentrated and less domestic market s tru c tu re  em erged: the
4 J. H. Williams(1920) p.56. 'T h e  bonds w ere to  be p a id  fo r  w ith go ld  
a t  not less than 85'; and 'T h e  gold was to be d ep o s ited  in the 
Bureau o f  In spection  o f  Banks fo r  two yea rs , w h e re a fte r  it  was to  be 
app lied  to the payment o f  the national fo re ign  d eb t*(p .5 7 ) The 
fo llow ing d iffe ren ces  from th e US National Banking System  is  worth 
mentioning: in th e US the national banks w ere  r e q u ir e d  to deposit 
w ith  the T reasu ry , besides spec ified  govern m ent b o n d s  equal in fa ce  
va lue to 11IX  o f  th e value o f  th e notes issued, a sum  amounting to 
5X o f  th eir note issue in law fu l money, con sis tin g  n o t  on ly  o f  gold  
coin , but a lso o f  s ilv e r  dollars and lega l tender n o te s  e tc , and the 
la tte r  was to  s e rv e  on ly the purpose o f  the redem ption  o f  national 
bank notes. M. Friedman k  A. J. Schw artz( 1963b) p.21, 781. For the 
comparison w ith th e  US National Banking System, a e e  a lso A. M. 
Quintero-Ramos(1965) p.87.
5 The remaining 28 banks not making th eir  s ta tem ents public seemed 
to  be not o f  g rea t s ign ificance in the A rgen tin e  b a n k in g  system: 
accord ing  to  J. H. Williams(1920) p.58, 'Some o f  th e p ro v in c ia l banks 
w ere banks on ly  in name. S evera l "ban ks" th at w e r e  declared 
incorporated  into th e new system  "d id  not ex is t o n  th e  date o f  the 
d ecree  authorizing th e ir  incorporation , and w ere o n ly  p ro jects  th at 
w ere  hatching in the portfo lio  o f  some o f  th e p ro v in c ia l 
govern m ents"'.
6 M. G. Mulhall( 1892a) p.40. He also says th at 'th e r e  has been a loss  
o f  75X in the banking capital o f  the Republic, o r  £17,200,000 s te r lin g  
in  the last fou r yea rs .'
Lon don  and R iv e r  P la te Bank and the Banco de Ita lia  e R io d e  la 
P la ta , the tw o la rge s t banks in  the immediate p os t-c r is is  y ea rs , 
accou n ted  fo r  33.0% o f  the to ta l paid cap ita l o f  the 12 banks.7
As in the US National Banking system , A rgen tina  did  no t h a ve  a 
c e n tra l bank in  th e pre-WWI y ea rs , a lthough it  is  tru e  that th e  Banco 
d e  la  Nacion A rgen tin a , es tab lished  in 1891 ’ did attem pt some m easure 
o f  le a d e rsh ip ’ in  the e a r ly  tw en tieth  cen tu ry .* Whereas in  th e  US, 
th e  T rea su ry  con tro lled  the amount o f  h igh -pow ered  m oney  by 
m anipu lating th e  balance in th e  Treasury*, th ere  seems to  b e  no 
e v id e n ce  th a t th e A rgen tin e  cou n terp a rt assumed th e role  o f  a c en tra l 
bank  e v en  to  th is  lim ited exten t.
In  A rgen tin a , ’you are  no t allowed to d eposit in  any ban k  a 
ch eq u e  on an oth er; so th is p rec lu des  the establishm ent o f  a c le a r in g  
h ou se, fo r  w h ich  th ere  could b e  no use ’.10 And accord in g  to  L. 
Randall, in th e  case o f  the Banco de la  P rov incia  de Buenoa A ires, 
on e  o f  th e tw o g ian t banks, a fte r  1852 'deposits  no t pay in g  in t e r e s t ’ 
accou n ted  fo r  a  ’ n eg lig ib le  sh a re ’ o f  p riva te  deposits.11 T h u s , it 
w ou ld  appear th a t in A rgen tina  in  the yea rs  o f  C ycle I I I  c h e q u e s , i.e. 
th e  tra n s fe r  o f  deposit money, w ere  not in  wide use, and th a t  most 
tran sac tio n s  w ere  ca rried  ou t b y  the medium o f cash.
7 C . A . Jones d esc r ib es  such a  s ta te  o f  a ffa irs  a s  a ’tem pora ry  an d  
in vo lu n ta ry  dominance in  Latin  Am erican commercial cen tres ’ o f  
fo r e ig n  banks ’ in  the afterm ath o f  financial c r is es ’. C. A. 
Jones(1977)p.27. Th is  would appear an inev itab le  outcome in  v ie w  o f 
th e  fa c t  th a t th e  A rgen tin e  banks w ere ’ ill-m anaged ’ in  th e ir  
o p e ra tio n  as ’ too ls  o f  c o rru p t govern m en t’ , whereas the fo r e ig n  banks 
w e r e  in  a ’m ore stab le  and secu re  position ’. A. G. Ford(1962) p.99.
I t  is  in te re s tin g  in th is  con text th a t a chairman o f  the London and 
R iv e r  P la te Bank was ’wont to  com pare the position o f  the ... [b a n k ]
... w ith  that o f  the Bank o f  England, since both must hold h e a v y  gold  
r e s e r v e s ,  n o t rea lly  be ing ab le to  re ly  on oth ers  in  times o f  n e e d . ’
D. Joslin (1963) p.130
8 A. G. F ord (1962) p.98
9 C. A. E. G oodhart(1969) p.33-37
10 B a n k e rs ’  M agazine, 1889, p.49
11 L . Randall(1977) p.214
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T h ere fo re , w h ils t in  the case o f  in du str ia l economies, such as 
Britain, Germany and th e  US, the money stock  cou ld  app rop ria te ly  be 
defined  as the c u r re n c y  held by  th e pub lic  p lus deposits, such a 
concept cou ld  be le ss  u se fu l as a measure o f  the ex is tin g  amount o f  
money in the A rgen tin e  con text. In  A rgen tina , bank deposits  seemed 
to be rega rd ed  Large ly  as an investm ent, ra th er than as a medium o f  
the settlem ent o f  transactions , which is  revea led  b y  th e movements o f  
A rgen tine d eposits  d u r in g  C ycle I I I .  The depos its  held in  the Banco 
de la P rov in c ia  d e  Buenos A ires (F ig  V II-1 4 ), which con tro lled  12.9% 
and 42.5% o f  the to ta l deposits  held b y  the 24 rep o rtin g  banks in 
1888 and 1889, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  reached a peak in  1887, and then 
declined, whereas th e  expansion o f  the A rgen tin e  economy continued 
until 1889. Such m ovements o f  the d eposits  held in  the Banco de 1a 
P rov incia  de Buenos A ir e s  do not seem to  be inconsisten t w ith the 
varia tions d isp la yed  b y  the im perfec t to tal A rgen tin e  deposits 
data (F ig  V II-1 5 ).12 Th e  con traction  in  A rgen tin e  deposits  a fte r  as 
early  as 1887 cou ld  be explained b y  the r is e  o f  go ld  premium 
begin n ing in  th e same y ea r (F ig  V II-1 6 ): th e d eprec ia tion  o f  paper 
cu rren cy  ren d ered  bank deposits  less  a ttra c tiv e  as an investm ent. 
Thus it  would ap p ea r  rea listic  to rega rd  th e  money stock in 
A rgen tina  du rin g  th e  y ea rs  concerned  as con sis tin g  la rge ly  o f  paper 
cu rrency .
12 U n fortunately , f o r  th e  crit ica l y ea r  o f  1887 we have on ly  the 
deposit f ig u re  fo r  th e  14 banks, which had been in  ex istence b efo re
1887, w h ilst it  is  known th a t 12 new banks w ere  s ta rted  in  1887. 
Bankerm’ Magazine  1889, p.48. The fou rteen  banks held deposits 
amounting to  160 m illion go ld  pesos (B an k ers ' M agazine, 1888, p.381), 
s ligh tly  sm aller than  the deposits held b y  24 banks in  1888, 184.8 
million go ld  pesos. Thu s, it  does not appear u n like ly  that the 
deposits held b y  th e  same 24 banks w ere g rea te r  in 1887 than in
1888.
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R g  vn-14 Private Deposita Paying Interest in thè Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires
Source: L. Randall( 1977)
Fig VU-15 Argentine Deposits and Paper Currency in Circulation
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Fig VO-16 Argentine Gold Premium
Source: J. H. WilUams(1920)
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Fig  V II-15  shows th at Argen tine m oney stock, approxim ated  by 
the amount o f  paper pesos in circu la tion  in gold  term s1*, in c rea s ed  
during 1885-90. In  expanding th e ir  note issue in  th e la te  1880s, 
banks w ere req u ired  to  purchase national gold bonds w ith  g o ld ; 
since the needed go ld  could not be p rocu red  to the fu ll am ount in 
A rgen tina, many, p a rticu la r ly  p rov incia l, banks had to  ob ta in  g o ld  in 
Europe, at 'extrem ely  h igh in teres t ra tes  and by  p a y in g  h igh  
commission ch a rges ’13 4. M oreover, th e  law  concern ing no te  is su e  was 
not observed  s tr ic t ly , w ith  'less than 40% o f  the to tal va lu e  o f  the 
bonds' having been ac tua lly  paid fo r  in  g o ld .15 16 These c ircu m stan ces  
seem to su gges t th a t the cyc lica l increase in paper c u r r e n c y  
circulation had more to  do with th e increase in demand fo r  m oney 
than with the fa vou rab le  turn  in  th e  conditions g o v e rn in g  the 
cu rren cy  supply  b y  th e banking system . In  o th e r  w o rd s , the 
Argen tine banking s ec to r  seemed to  accommodate th e r is in g  demand 
fo r  money du rin g  th e upswing.
The w iden in g national govern m ent d e fic it  du rin g  th e u p sw in g  
appeared to  be an oth er important fa c to r  augm enting th e c irc u la t io n  o f  
paper money.15 I t  is  said that one o f  th e major m otives b eh in d  the 
Guaranteed Banks Law, to  which, aa J. H. Williams poin ts ou t, m uch o f  
the increase in p ap er pesos in c ircu la tion  during th e  u p s w in g  o f 
C ycle I I I  was attribu tab le , was to  p lace the 'Banco Nacional in  a 
position s tron g  enough to  be able to  assu re the govern m en t o f  ample,
13 T o  bis more p rec ise , A rgen tine money stock  should be d e fin e d  as 
the paper cu rren cy  in  th e  hands o f  th e non-bank public.
14 A. M. Quintero-Ramos(1965) p.88,89 On 29 Sept 1888, The S ta t is t  
reported , 'These la rg e  go ld  rem ittances from  Europe f in d  th e ir  d ire c t  
cause in M inister Pacheco 's  fre e  Banking A ct ... A ll the local 
governm ents a re  in  a h u rry  to ava il them selves o f  the a d v a n ta g e s  o f  
the Act ..., and hence th e motley a r ra y  o f  loans o f  A rgen tin e  s ta te s  
in the London and P aris  markets.'
15 J. H. Williams(1920) p.59
16 See Section 3, th is  chapter.
sh o rt term  fa c ilit ie s  from  th e bank in g  system '.,T I f  thus the
flu ctu ations in  national govern m en t d e fic it  a ffe c ted  to ta l paper 
cu rren cy  circu la tion  th rou gh  the ch an ges  in the amount o f  issue o f  
paper pesos b y  the Banco Nacional, a similar rela tion  seemed to exist 
betw een  the p rov in c ia l banks estab lish ed  under the F ree Banking Law 
and p ro v in c ia l govern m ents.*•
F ina lly , th ere  appeared  to  be a factor in flu en cin g  cu rren cy  
c ircu la tion  which may be un ique to  Argen tina : th e m alpractices in 
A rgen tin e  banking.1* The A rgen tin e  banks seemed to  com ply with 
co r ru p t politic ians ' demand fo r  ad van ces  at least to  some exten t, and 
it  is  poss ib le  that th is  con tribu ted  to  the expansion o f  cu rren cy  
c ircu la tion  du rin g  th e upsw ing fo r  th e  fo llow ing reasons: s ince with 
th e expansion o f  th e economy more exp lo itab le  opportu n ities  em erged, 
the po litica lly  pow erfu l would have fe l t  more need fo r  fu nds ; the 
increase in the p ro fits  accru in g  to  th e banking sector du r in g  the 
upsw ing would have enab led  it  to  accommodate political demands more 
eas ily .
A lthough the banking system  expanded  the supp ly  o f  cu rren cy  
fo r  th ree  yea rs  a fte r  1885 in  g o ld  terms in  response to  the 
in creas in g  demand fo r  money from  va r iou s  sectors  o f  th e economy, 
paper money in  c ircu la tion  declined  s lig h t ly  in go ld  terms in 1889(Fig 
V II—15), which was th e  peak yea r  as fa r  as the rea l economy was 
con cerned . The cu rren cy  in c ircu la tion  continuing to  expand from 
1884 un til 1893 in paper terms, the d ec lin e  in 1889 was c lo se ly  rela ted 
to th e  sharp  increase in  g o ld  premium in  that yea r. The soaring
17 cT a . Jones(1985) p.130
18 See the rep o rt by  The S tatist, qu o ted  in footnote 14, th is  section.
19 We find  ample ev iden ce  o f  th is  in  con tem porary repo rts . A  good 
example would be the a r tic le  by W.R. Lawson, titled  'Gaucho Banking', 
which appeared  in the B ankers ’ M agazine  in 1891.
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gold  premium was translated  into domestic p r ic e  in creases , under the 
condition  o f  the p ric es  o f  stap les  be ing fixed  in  the w orld  market.
Thus a t th e end o f  1889, in  sp ite  o f  th e con tinued increase in 
issue in  paper terms, s ca rc ity  o f  paper money and ’the extreme 
tigh tn ess  o f  the money m arket’  was rep o rted . The bank in g system , 
how ever, seemed unable to counterbalance th e r is in g  go ld  premium 
and the con sequ en t in fla tion  and th e  shortage o f  means o f  transaction 
by  expanding note issue at a fa s te r  rate , because i t  faced  increasing  
d ifficu lty  in borrow in g  go ld  in  Europe, w h ere th e  expecta tion s  on the 
investm ent in A rgen tin a  w ere bad’ y damaged b y  th e  r is in g  go ld  
premium. Thus, a lthough, as seen  above, th e F ree  Banking Law was 
g ro ss ly  v io la ted , i t  s till appeared  to  function  a t leas t to some exten t 
as a brake upon the expansion o f  note issue.
The money sh ortage had ad ve rs e  e f fe c ts  upon th e economy.*0 
I t ,  how ever, needs to  be em phasized that th e m onetary s tr in gen cy  
could not be con sidered  to  have in itia ted  the dow nturn  o f  the 
A rgen tin e  economy: con tractiona ry  fo rc es  began  to  be fe lt  in  th e 
economy as e a r ly  as in  the course o f  1888 w ith  the overcon stru ction  
o f  ra ilw ays*1, wh ile th e r is in g  go ld  premium, p a r tly  re la ted  to  the 
slowness o f  a g ricu ltu ra l developm ent around new ra ilw ays , b rou gh t 
abou t both th e downturn in land investm ent and the sca rc ity  o f  
money. The financial tension, superim posed upon the downswing 
a lread y  in p ro g re s s , culm inated in  th e banking c r is is  wh ich began in
20 ’The extreme tigh tn ess  o f  the money m arket ... was p lay in g  havoc 
am ongst the crow d  o f  new companies th at h ave been  c rea ted  during 
the past few  yea rs . Many o f  them had been fo rc ed  in to  liqu idation, 
and th e opin ion is  expressed  that i f  money con tinued as dear as it  
had been, "w e  may p rep a re  to w itn ess a w holesale liqu idation , 
especia lly  in the specu la tive  com panies". But th e  most dangerous 
fea tu re  o f  a ll was that a ll the in ter io r  p ro v in ces  had ru n  sh o rt o f  
m oney.’  The Economist, Jan 2S 1890, qu oting  The Buenos Airem 
S tandard  o f  21 December 1889.
21 See Section 1, th is  chap ter.
A pril 1890. The Argen tine govern m en t tried  to  s tave  o f f  the c r is is  
b y  the suspension o f  the Guaranteed Banks Law; a t the same time, it 
resorted  to  th e clandestine issue amounting to  around 35 million go ld  
pesos, w ith  the resu lt that th e no tes  in circu la tion  reached a peak in 
1890. As Sr. U riburu , the th en  Finance M inister, argu ed , d raw ing  a 
paralle l betw een  the suspension o f  P eel's  Act in  th e O verend C ris is  
and the A rgen tin e  govern m ent's  action in A p r il, th is may have 
re lie ved  th e  situation to some ex ten t, but could not stop  the c r is is , 
not to mention th e con traction o f  the economy, which had s tarted  
earlier.
Thus th e Banco Nacional su spended the payment o f  its  qu a rte r ly  
d iv iden d  in  June; in  July P e lle g r in i replaced Celman as the P res id en t 
o f  A rgen tina  a fte r  s tree t f ig h t in g  in  Buenos A ires; in Novem ber, the 
financial c r is is  was transm itted to  London in the form  o f  the Baring 
cr is is  in th e m iddle o f  the n egotia tion  fo r  a new loan in London**; 
con sequ en tly , A rgen tina  had to d e fau lt; in A p ril nex t yea r, 1891, the 
tw o dominant banks, the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la P rov in c ia  
de Buenos A ires  went into liqu idation ; fin a lly , in O ctober the 
declaration o f  a general m oratorium  came as a peak in th e lon g  
course o f  th e  c ris is . Thus, 1890 and 1891 w ere  cr is is  y ea rs  in 
Argen tina . As F ig  V I I-16 shows, desp ite th e  reve rsa l in  the
d irection  o f  gold  flow s from 1890, the gold  premium continued to  r ise  
in  1890 and 1891, re fle c tin g  th e  cr is is  situation and the loss o f  
con fidence. With the subsiden ce o f  panic, reconstruction  m easures 
began to  be taken: negotia tion w ith  cred ito r nations on the terms o f  
in teres t paym ent and the rep lacem ent o f  the F ree  Banking System  
w ith a scheme based upon 'fra n k ly  incon vertib le ' govern m ent paper,
22 The A rgen tin e  cria is  was transm itted  to the US v ia  London. The 
e f fe c ts  o f  th e  cr is is  upon the US economy, how ever, seemed to be o f  
limited na tu re. See O. M. W. S p ra gu e (1910) chap ter I I I .
the Caja de Conversion  and th e  new s ta te  bank, the Banco de la
Nacion A rgen tin a . Th is p rocess  o f  finan cia l recon stru ction  was 
accompanied by the fu r th e r  increase, though a t  a slow er ra te  in
com parison w ith the late 1880a, o f  paper money in  c ircu la tion  in
paper term s un til l893 (F ig  V II-1 5 ); the increase  waa due to the fac t 
that new govern m ent paper money waa pumped in to  th e economy in 
the cou rse  o f  the establishm ent o f  new banking system , while the old 
bank notes w ere  b e in g  cancelled  slow ly . On th e o th e r  hand, d esp ite  
the con tinued  r ise  in th e paper pesos in c ircu la tion , the gold  
premium began  to  fa ll a fte r  1891 as the c r is is  s ituation calmed down 
and th e net go ld  in flow  con tinued .**
T o  summarize the an a lys is  in th is  ch ap ter: th e r e v iv a l o f  the
Argen tin e  economy a fte r  1885 cou ld  b est be seen as the resum ption o f
the lon g  investm ent upsw ing s ta r t in g  from  around 1880, as a resu lt
o f  the im provem ent in the in ternation al economic climate which was
rela ted  to  th e b egin n ing o f  the US boom and led  to  th e increase in
the cap ita l flow s  into A rgen tin a . The investm en t upsw ing was led
b y  ra ilw ay bu ild ing , which induced  a land im provem ent boom. In
the m id-1888 overbu ild in g  o f  ra ilw ays began  to  be o b se rved , and as a
resu lt th e investm ent in ra ilw ays began to  con tract. The land boom,
how ever, appeared  to  con tinue un til th e mid-1889, when th e r ise  in
gold  premium began to  acce lera te , redu c in g  th e re tu rn  on cedulas,
due to  th e g o ld  ou tflow  which re fle c ted  th e rap id  r is e  in  im ports and
s lu ggish  g ro w th  o f  exports . While th e  flu ctu ations in home
investm ent a c t iv ity  p layed  a cen tra l ro le  in  the A rgen tin e  Cycle I II ,
cyc lica l s h ifts  in exports , re fle c t in g  th e  in ternational trade  cyc le ,
re in fo rced  th e cyc lica l varia tion s  in  the le v e l o f  dom estic a c tiv ity .
The A rgen tin e  banking sector, based upon in co n vertib le  pesos, by
23 Tha b r ie f  descrip tion  o f  th e p rocess  o f  th e c r is is  from  1890 in th is 
paragraph draw s la rge ly  upon J. H. Williams! 1920) C hapter V III.
and la rge  accommodated ch an g in g  demand fo r  m oney, although aevere  
m onetary a tr in gen cy  d eve lo ped  from  late  1889, a cce lera tin g  the 
dow nsw ing a lread y  in p ro g re s s .
370
371
V III
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CYCLE, 1885-1896
In  th is  chapter, we draw  a sk etch  o f  the trade  cyc le  betw een 
1885-1896 from  a global p o in t o f  v iew . Not on ly  w ill th e an a lyses  o f  
the national trade cyc les  in  th e  fou r lead in g  p layers (C h ap tera  IV -V II )  
form the basis o f  the p ic tu re , but a lso  we shall b r ie f ly  d iscu ss the 
cyc lica l experien ces o f  th e  o th e r  fo u r  b yp la y e rs : F rance, Australia , 
Canada and India. T h ey  w ere  'b y p la y e rs ' in  the sense that, w h ile 
France and Australia assumed similar p a rts  to  Brita in  and A rgen tin a , 
resp ec tiv e ly , in  the in tern a tion a l tra d e  c y c le  con cerned , th e ir  cyc lica l 
con tribu tion  was s ign ifica n tly  w eaker; Canada and Ind ia  seemed to 
remain la rg e ly  passive in  th e  course o f  the trade cyc le , in  th at th e 
fluctuations o f  these econom ies w e re  produced  b y  th e shocks 
transm itted to them from  th e  res t o f  th e  w orld  mainly th rou gh  trade  
flow s, as the trade cyc le s  in  many o th e r  prim ary p rodu cers  p robab ly
were.
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1. U psw ing
T h e  in ternational upsw ing in  the la tte r  ha lf o f  th e  1880s was 
in itia ted  and supported  by  the US home inves tm en t boom. 
Investm ent a c t iv ity  r e v iv e d  in the US in  the course o f  1885, as a 
resu lt o f  the b eg in n in g  o f  ra ilw ay b u ild in g  boom in  Kansas and 
Nebraska. The s ta rt o f  ra ilw ay expansion in  these a rea s  was la rge ly  
exp licab le  in term s o f  the breakdow n o f  the co llu s iv e  maximising 
po licy  o f  ra ilw ay companies which oc cu rred  due to  agricu ltu ra l 
developm ent around ra ilw ay lines b u ilt  during th e  p reced ing  
u p sw in g (la te  1860s -  e a r ly  1870s) and th e  consequ en t im provem ent in 
p ro fita b ility . The increase  in  railw ay investm ent, h o w ever , d id  not 
la s t v e r y  long: it  came to  a peak in  1887, w h en  s ign s o f
ov e rb u ild in g , includ ing the decline in  n et earn in gs  per m ile(F ig  IV -6 ), 
d eve lo ped , and declined  sh a rp ly  th erea fte r  (F ig  I I I - l ) .
Th u s  ended not on ly  the short term  ra ilw ay boom s ta rtin g  from 
1885, b u t a lso the th ird  and fina l lon g  ra ilw ay  u psw in g  in  the US 
h is to ry , which se t in in  the mid-18708.1 The US investm ent 
expansion, how ever, continued. For due to  its  e f fe c ts  on  settlement, 
the fin a l lon g  railw ay upsw ing(from  th e mid-1870 to 1887) g a ve  rise  
to  the lo n g  boom in construction  a c tiv itie s (fro m  the la te  1870s to 
1892, F ig  I I I - l ) .  T h e re fo re , i f  in 1885-1887 the lead ing  sector  o f  the 
US dom estic investm ent was the ra ilw ay  indu stry , construction  
rep laced  ra ilw ays in  1888-1892. During th e seven  y e a r  investm ent 
boom, US g ro ss  dom estic investm ent is  estim ated to  h a ve  risen  by  
around £262m.* 12
1 Th is a lso  marked the v ir tu a l end o f  th e US westward m ovement and 
th e extin c tion  o f  fro n tie r .
2 The US g ro ss  investm ent se ries  begin s from  1889. So, th e g ross 
investm en t a t the trou gh  o f  1885 was estim ated  by m u ltip ly in g  the
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The US ir o n  and s tee l in d u s try  be ing unable to s a t is fy  dom estic
needs, the ra ilw a y  bu ild ing boom was accompanied b y  increaa ing
imports o f  ra ilw a y  m aterial from  major in du str ia l cou n tr ies , inc lud in g
Germany. T h e  r e v iv a l o f  German exports  o f  iron  and s te e l from  the
1885 trou gh  (F ig  V -4 ), though not h igh ly  s ign ifica n t in  qu an tita tive
terms*, ap p ea red  to  a f fe c t  the expectations o f  German ir o n  and s tee l
in du str ia lis ts  and in ves tin g  public in  a fa vou rab le  way, and
consequ en tly  in ves tm en t in  German iron  and s tee l in d u s try  began to
expand in la te  1886. The boom in iron  and stee l p rod u ction  induced
expansion in  c o a l in d u s try : its  investm ent also rose  a f t e r  1885(Fig
I I I -4 ) .  The r e tu rn  o f  p ro sp e r ity  to Rhineland and W estphalia, w h ere
German h ea vy  in d u str ies  w ere  mainly located , a ttrac ted  w o rk e rs  from
the a g ricu ltu ra l eas tern  p a r t o f  Germany u n der the d e p re s s iv e  fo r c e s
o f  fa lling  p rim a ry  p rodu ct p rices . The in terna l m igration  and the
consequent p ro g r e s s  in  urban ization  c rea ted  p ro fita b le  investm en t
opportun ities  fo r  th e bu ild in g  indu stry : as we see in  F ig  V-3,
German con stru c tio n  investm ent picked up  from  the 1886 trou gh , i.e .
one year a f t e r  th e increase in  investm en t in  iron , s te e l and coal
industries. Th e  upsw ing in  con struction  in ves tm en t meant a
w idening home m arket fo r  th e iron and s tee l in d u s try : F ig  V-4
shows that home consumption o f  iron and s tee l a lso in creased  a fte r
1886, i.e. on e  y ea r  la te r  than the r e v iv a l in  iron and s te e l exports .
I t  was indeed  th e  booming home market th a t un derlay  th e  expansion
o f  p rodu ction  and investm en t in German iron , s te e l and coal
industries  a f t e r  1887, when overseas  sale o f  iron  and a tee l p rodu cts
peaked, fo llo w in g  the pa tte rn  o f  va r ia tion s  in  th e  US ra ilw ay
GNP in th at y e a r  b y  the ra tio  o f  g ross  investm ent to GNP du r in g  the 
ten years , 1889-1898. J. W. K endrick (1961), T. S. B e r r y (1968)
3 German e x p o r ts  o f  iron  and s tee l increased  by on ly  0.19 million tons 
during the u p sw in g , whereas th e rise  in  home iron  and atee l 
consumption am ounted to  1.15 million tons. T. H. Burnham k  G. O. 
Hoakins( 1943) A ppend ix  I, W. F e ldenk irchen ( 1982) Tab: 66 k  67.
build ing. German g ro ss  in ves tm en t is  estim ated to h ave risen  b y  
£127ro du rin g  the 1886-90 u psw in g .*
Britain was p ro b a b ly  more s tr o n g ly  a ffe c ted  b y  the US 
expansion th rough the t r a d e  channel than  any oth er cou n try : th e 
va lue o f  exports  from B r ita in  in to  th e US rose b y  £10.1m in  1885- 
1891. Th is compares w ith  the £50.8m increase in to ta l dom estic 
merchandise exports  from  B rita in  du rin g  th e  Cycle I I I  boom. Not 
on ly  d id  the expansion o f  th e  US m arket account fo r  a substantia l 
pa rt o f  the g row th  o f  B r it is h  exp orts  in  th e  late 1880s, bu t also it 
was the US market that r e c o v e r e d  ea r lie s t . (P ig  V I-5 )
A t the same tim e, th e  s ta rt o f  th e US economic upsw ing 
im proved the atmosphere o f  London cap ita l market, wh ich led  to  the 
r e v iv a l o f  British in ves tm en t not on ly  in  the US, bu t a lso in 
undeveloped  countries, p a r t ic u la r ly  in La tin  A m erica (F ig  V I-3 ).*  The 
cap ita l len t to  u n developed  areas seemed to stimulate UK exports . 
Thus, the US investm ent boom could be said to  have induced  the 
export-led  expansion o f  th e  B ritish  economy both d ire c t ly , Le. 
th rough th e increase in th e  US im ports from  Britain, and in d irec t ly , 
i.e . by  in fluencing fa v o u ra b ly  th e p rospects  o f  B ritish  fo re ign  
in ves tors , which was then tran s la ted  in to  increased  exp o rts  to  mainly 
undeveloped  capita l im portin g  areas.
4 Since on ly  net investm ent data  a re  ava ilab le  fo r  Germany, the size 
o f  the increase in German g r o s s  investm en t was calculated by 
m ultip lying the magnitude o f  th e r ise  in n e t investm ent b y  1.84, the 
ra tio  o f  g ro ss  to  net in ves tm en t in  the US du rin g  1885-95. W. G. 
Hoffmann(1965), S. Kuznets(1961)
5 T o  understand the im portan ce  o f  th e US secu rities  in  London 
capita l market, i t  may be u s e fu l to  note th s t not on ly  d id  th ey  
dominate the capita l issue in  London d u r in g  the C ycle I  A I I  
upsw ings, but also sb so rb ed  th e la rg e s t  sh are  o f  new B ritish  
portfo lio  investm ent d u r in g  1885-90, 24.6%, which is  com parable with 
16.2% and 16.5% fo r  A rgen tin a  and Australasia, resp ec tiv e ly . 14. 
Simon( 1968)&( 1970), I. S tone(1972) The w e igh t o f  B ritish  cap ita l in 
the US domestic capital fo rm a tion , h ow ever, was on ly  2.7% in  1885- 
1894. S. Kuznets( 1961), I .  Stone(1986)
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A rgen tin a  p robab ly  a ttrac ted  more a tten tion  from  B ritish  
in ves tors  than any oth er prim ary p ro d u cer .*  In  Argentina, in
con trast to  th e US, fo re ign , mostly B r it is h , capital o ccu p ied  a cen tra l 
position, fin an c in g  between one th ird  an d  one ha lf o f  Argen tine net 
physica l investm ent7. Thus, when in  1885 cap ita l in flow  declined 
due to  the w orld  wide depression  o r ig in a t in g  from  th e  termination o f  
the US ra ilw ay  boom in 1882/3, the hom e investm ent u psw in g  sta rtin g  
from  around 1880 came to a h a lt(F ig  V I I- 1 ) ,  a lth ough  the investm ent 
opportun ities  opened in around 1880 rem ained alm ost intact. The 
downturn, h ow ever, p roved  to  be m in or  and tem pora ry : with the
aforem entioned r ec o ve ry  o f  optimism in  the London cap ita l m arket 
fo llow ing the s ta r t o f  the US ra ilw a y  build ing boom , capital in flow  
and A rgen tin e  home investm ent resu m ed  th eir g ro w th , marking th e 
s ta rt o f  th e A rgen tin e  C ycle I I I .
The investm ent upsw ing in  th e  late 1880s u n derly in g  th e 
A rgen tine C yc le  I I I  boom took the fo rm  o f  ra ilw ay b u ild in g  and land 
improvement. O f the two, the fo r m e r  could b e  rega rd ed  as the 
lead ing sector, in  that i t  absorbed  a  g re a te r  p o r tio n  o f  total cap ita l 
than the la tte r , and also because t h e  land boom was induced b y  
railw ay con struction , which opened v a s t  areas fo r  cu ltivation  (Tab le  
V II-1 ). The investm ent boom, fo llo w in g  the 1885 tr o u g h , reached a 
peak in 1889, and during th e  fou r y e a r s  fo re ign  ca p ita l inflow rose 
b y  £41.6m.*
6 Australia was th e oth er m ajor ca p ita l im porting p rim a ry  producer in 
th e late 1880s: the d irec t estimate o f  B rit is h  in ves tm en t in Australia 
du r in g  1885-90 amounted to  £113.9m, w h ich  is com parable with
£141.3m, th e d irec t estimate o f  fo re ig n  cap ita l flow  in to  Argen tina  in 
the same yea rs. N. G. BuUin(1962), J . H. Williams(1920)
7 C. F. Diaz A le jan dro ( 1970) p.31
8 Th is f ig u re  was obtained on the b as in  o f  J. H. W illiam s' estimate 
lagged  b y  one yea r, fo r  reasons g iv e n  in  Section 1, C hapter V II. In  
com paring th is  f igu re  w ith the m agn itu des  o f  the in c rea s e  in the US 
and German home investm ent, £24lm  k. £127m, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  it  should
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The A rgen tine home investm ent boom led to a  £6.0m increase in 
h e r  imports from  Brita in, which accounted fo r  34 .2X o f  the to ta l 
in c rease  in A rgen tin e  m erchandise im ports d u r in g  the C ycle I I I
upsw ing. Comparing this amount w ith  both th e  aforem entioned 
£10.lm  increase in  B ritish exp orts  to th e US and th e  £50.8m increase 
in  to ta l British merchandise exports , and c o n s id e r in g  the fa c t th at 
B rit ish  exports to  Argen tina  p icked  up as early  a s  th ose to th e US, 
one sees the im portance o f  the expansion o f  the A rg e n t in e  m arket in 
th e  B ritish  exp ort boom. I t  is  worth repeatin g  th a t ,  in c on tra st to 
th e  exports  to  th e US, w iden in g o f  the A rgen tine m arket on such a 
sca le  was c lose ly  rela ted  to th e  increase in  the f lo w  o f  funds from  
B rita in .
The expansion o f  the US economy was also a n  im portant fa c to r
respon sib le  fo r  the French boom, which was led b y  exp o rts . I f  to ta l
m erchandise exports  from  France increased  by  £26.4m during 1885-90,
th e  expansion o f  th e US m arket was o f  the m agn itude o f  £3m( 1885-
91). While the d ire c t con tribu tion  o f th e US boom to  French e x p o r t
g ro w th  was moderate, the p ro sp er ity  in th e US had  more s ign ifica n t
in d ir e c t  e ffec ts : th e US investm ent boom induced a n  exp ort boom in
B rita in , as a resu lt o f  which F rench  exports  to B r ita in  rose by  £8.2m
d u r in g  the th ree  yea r boom, 1887-90. The boom in  the US had
fu r th e r  ind irect e f fe c ts  v ia  the r e v iv a l o f  B r it is h  investm ent in
A rgen tin a ; F rench exports  to  A rgen tina  rose b y  £3m in 1885-1889.*
W ith thus more than half o f  the cyc lica l in c re a s e  in F rench
m erchandise exports  is  exp licab le in terms o f  th e  expansionary
be born  in mind that imported cap ita l financed  on ly  a  part, though 
substantia l, o f  total A rgen tine home investm ent.
9 I t  is  also possib le th at the r e v iv a l o f  th e US econ om y stimulated 
n o t o n ly  British but a lso French capital exports  to  A rgen tin a , which 
con trib u ted  to the expansion o f  French m erchandise exp o r ts  to 
A rgen tina .
in flu en ces o r ig in a tin g  from  th e US10, th e impact o f  the a n teced en t 
r is e  in  F rench  overseas  len d in g  betw een  1883-1888 upon French  
m erchandise exp o rts , i f  th ere  was any, would appear o f  r e la t iv e ly  
m inor im portance.
I t  appears probab le th a t th e  US investm ent boom g a v e  r is e  to 
exp o rt- led  booms not on ly  in  B rita in  and France, but a lso in  many 
p rim ary  p rodu c in g  countries. While the US investm ent boom in  the 
la te  1880s resu lted  in the increase  in exp o rts  from  the r e s t  o f  the 
w orld  into the US amounting to  £59.2m betw een  1885-93, th e  US 
im ports from  non-European prim ary p rodu cing  countries ro s e  by 
£36.2m.(Table V I II -1 ):  most o f  th e  increase was due to th e  in crease  
in  im ports from  the American con tinen t, Latin  America in p a r t ic u la r .11 
I t  should be no ted  that the increase  in th e va lue o f  im ports fro m  the 
non-European p e r ip h e ry  re fle c ted  h igh er  p rices  as well as th e  r ise  in 
im port volume. On the o th e r  hand th e expansionary e f fe c ts  o f  the 
US boom upon agricu ltu ra l European cou n tr ies  through t r a d e  flows 
w e re  fa r  w eaker: in the la te  1880s the US im ports from th e European 
p e rip h e ry  g re w  b y  £8.4m.(Table V III -1 )
Since th e  domestic expansion  o f  the US economy e v en tu a lly  
b ro u gh t about th e international boom in th e  late 1880s, th e  increase  
in  US exports  cou ld  be expected  to fo llow : the US m erchandise
exp orts  rev iv e d  one year a fte r  im ports, and during the 1886—91 boom 
rose  by £72ra.(Fig IV-8, Tab le IV -1 ) Th is  magnitude com p ares  with 
th e  estimate o f  the size o f  th e increase in th e US g r o s s  home 
investm ent, £262m.
10 A s  we shall s e e  shortly , much o f  the increase in French e x p o r ts  to 
o th e r  reg ions than  these th ree  coun tries  could be con sidered  a s  
in d ire c t ly  re la ted  to  the expansion o f  the US economy.
11 The la rge s t increase  o f  £15.8m was reco rded  in  the US im ports  
from  Brazil.
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Table V III-1  S izes  o f  C yclica l Increase in Im ports, £m
US Germany UK France
total 59.2
(1885-93)
«7  Q
(1886-91)
85.5
(1886-91)
9Q 7
(1887-91)
from
periph ery
40.7
(1885-92)
66.0
(1886-91) (1886-91)
17.0
(1887-91)
from  non- 
European 
periphery
36.2
(1885-92)
30.8
(1885-91)
23.2
(1886-91)
from European 
p eriph ery
8.4
(1885-93)
38.8
(1886-90)
29.3
(1886-89)
Source: US Department o f  Commerce(1961), B. R. M itchell(1962), 
Statistical A b s tra c t fo r  P rin c ipa l and Other F ore ign  Countries
The international boom ap peared  a lso aa the £42.3m increase in 
B ritish exports  to  areas o f  th e  w orld  oth er than the US and 
Argen tina  in 1886-90, which g a v e  a fu r th e r  stimulus to  the export 
upswing in itiated b y  the r e v iv a l o f  exp o rts  to the US and Argen tina . 
The booming world  economy a lso induced  the expansion in B ritish 
domestic capita l formation: in  p a rticu la r , B rita in be ing the w orld 's  
fr e ig h te r , the r ise  o f  investm ent in  h e r  sh ipp ing and its  tw o rela ted  
industries, open -h earth  s tee l an d  coal mining, was prominent. 
A lthough the s ize  o f  the in crease  in  g ro ss  home investm ent, £29m, 
was fa r  in fe r io r  to  the m agn itude o f  the r ise  in  B ritish  domestic 
merchandise exports , £50.8m, th e r is e  in  investm ent a c t iv ity  led  to 
the fu rth e r  expansion o f  th e B ritish  economy. The upsw ing in 
Brita in resu lted  in the £85.5m in c rease  in  her im ports from  the res t 
o f  the w orld  in 1886-91.
As we have seen  above, th e expansion o f  th e B ritish  market was 
im portant in  the F rench e xp o rt boom in  the la te  1880s. A more 
s ign ifican t aspect o f  the p ro s p e r ity  in  B rita in was that th rou gh  the 
increase in B ritish im ports th e in it ia l expansionary shock from  the 
US was d iffu sed  o v e r  w id er p a rts  o f  th e  w orld , includ ing Asia and 
A frica : whilst US im ports from  Asia increased by  £4.1m and her
imports from  A fr ica  ha rd ly  expanded  in  the late 1880s, exp orts  from 
Asia and A fr ica  in to  B rita in  rose  b y  £8.3m & £2.3m, resp ec tiv e ly . 
Most o f  the increase in  B ritish  im ports  from  Asia was accounted fo r  
by  the increase in  h er im ports from  In d ia  amounting to fiS/Im.1* In  
addition to  th is, although in sp ite  o f  g eograph ica l proxim ity th e US 
upswing h a rd ly  a ffe c ted  Canada th ro u gh  trade flow s1*, i t  was almost
12 This may be compared w ith  th e to ta l increase in  Indian exports  
during th e upswing, £19m.
13 The increase in the US im ports from  Canada was on ly  £0.4m.
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e n t ir e ly  th rou gh  the r ise  in Canadian exporta  to  B rita in  amounting to 
£6.4m th at in ternational expansionary fo r c e s  w e re  transm itted to 
Canada v ia  trade  flow s .1*
A lthough th e r e v iv a l o f  th e US iron  and s te e l m arket p layed a 
c ru c ia l ro le  in  the beg in n ing  o f  the German boom in  th e  late 1880a, in 
q u a n tita tive  term s th e chan ges in  home in ves tm en t, the £127m 
increase, overw helm ed those in m erchandise ex p o r ts , which rose by  
o n ly  £24m. The booming German economy con stitu ted  another major
expan sionary  shock fo r  the w orld  economy b y  e n la rg in g  its  im ports 
b y  £87.9m in  1886-91. As shown in  Tab le  V I II -1 ,  th e  impact o f  the
German p ro sp e r ity  v ia  trade  flow s was fe lt ,  aa in the B ritish 
expansion, o v e r  variou s p arts  o f  the w orld . I t  was p eriphera l 
Europe th at was a ffe c ted  by  the German boom most s tron g ly : during 
th e upsw ing Germany increased  her im ports from  th e  area  by  £38.8m. 
I ts  impact upon non-European prim ary p ro d u cers , how ever, was 
s ca rce ly  w eaker: th e s ize  o f  th e r ise  in  German im ports from the 
reg io n  was £30.8m, exceed in g th e B ritish  in flu en ce  upon the same 
area , £23.3m. Although more than h a lf o f  the £30.8m increase was 
due to  th e  r is e  in  im ports from  Latin  Am erica, i t  was not so 
g eo grap h ica lly  con cen tra ted  as in the US: fo r  instance, Germany
expanded im ports from  Ind ia  by  £5.4m, from  A fr ica  and Australasia by  
around £2m each.
In  Section  2 o f  Chapter I I ,  it  was shown th a t betw een  the m id-
1880s and th e  mid-1890s home investm en t made g r e a te r  impact upon
th e  le v e l o f  a c t iv ity  in  Austra lia  than e x p o rts (s eco n d  chart. F ig I I -
11), which was re la ted  to the fa c t th at th ese y ea rs  witnessed the
dow n turn  o f  a lon g  Australian investm ent u p sw in g (F ig  V III -1 ). I f  we
14 ToUd increase  in Canadian exp orts  d u r in g  th e upsw in g  amounted 
to  £6.4m.

r ega rd , as in  A rgen tina , th e  d ip  in  1885 in the course o f  th e smooth 
lon g  upsw ing as the s ta r t in g  poin t o f  the Australian C ycle  I I I (F ig
V I II -1 ),  the post-1885 r e v iv a l  o f  Australian home investm ent seemed, 
in  con tra st to A rgen tin a , to  be to a g rea t ex ten t a ttribu tab le  to 
dom estic fac tors . The acce lera tion  o f  pastoral and ag ricu ltu ra l 
investm ent in  New South Wales a fte r  1885, which was respon sib le  fo r  
th e  r ev iv a l, was due to  th e  im provem ent in  seasons and wool 
p r ic e s1*; Australia  b e in g  a m ajor wool producer, her supply  o f  wool 
had a s ign ifica n t in flu en ce  upon the world wool prices1*. More
im portantly, as we see  in  F ig  V III-1 , in con tra st to the A rgen tin e  
case, the r e v iv a l o f  in ves tm en t from  th e dip in 1885 occu rred , w h ilst 
cap ita l im ports from B rita in , accou n ting  fo r  51.IX  o f  Australian g ro ss  
dom estic capita l form ation in  1885-90, w ere on th e decline.1*
I f  th e  upturn o f  inves tm en t from  the 1885 trough is  b y  no 
means exp licab le in term s o f  ex te rn a l fac tors  alone, the sh o rt upsw ing 
betw een  1885-88, du r in g  w h ich  Australian home investm ent increased  
b y  £8.5m, h a rd ly  had s ign if ica n t expansionary e f fe c ts  upon the res t 
o f  th e w orld : as F ig  V I I I—2 shows Australian imports remained
la rg e ly  stab le  in th e la tte r  h a lf  o f  the 1880s.1* Th erefo re , th e  mild 
and sh ort Australian u psw in g  in 1885-88 could be said to  have 
occu rred  la rge ly  in  iso la tion  from  the movements o f  th e world  
economy in the la tter  h a lf o f  th e  1880s.
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15 N. G. Butlin(1964) p.61
16 A. G. F o rd (1956) p.44
17 A ccord in g  to  A. R. Hall (1963) p.145, the decline in  the flow  o f  
B ritish  cap ita l into A ustra lia  w as  due to  the h eavy  demand fo r  fu nds 
from  South America, South A fr ic a  and the US.
18 The pa ttern  o f  varia tion s  in  Australian im ports re flec ted  th a t in 
Australian im ports from  her main supplier, B rita in, which in tu rn  
moved in c lose agreem ent w ith  th e  capita l in flow  from  Britain. See 
a lso W. A. S in c la ir (1957) p.523
F ig  V III -3 , showing th e d iffu s io n  o f  expansionary shocks 
g en era ted  b y  th e US, summarizes th e d iscu ssion  in th is  section. In 
Tab le  V III-1  k 2 a re  com pared th e  s ize s  o f  major expansionary 
in flu en ces. Despite the fa c t th a t th e la rg e s t  increase in  domestic 
in ves tm en t was ob se rved  in  the U S (Tab le  V I II -2 ),  the r ise  in  US 
im ports was con sid erab ly  sm aller than th ose in  German and British 
im ports (Tab le  V I I I -1 ) ;  the tab le  a lso shows th a t th e same can be said 
abou t th e increase  in th e im ports from  un developed  w orld . I t  
appears  that th e re la tiv e ly  s e lf-s u ff ic ie n t  na tu re o f  the US economy 
w ith  a s tron g  agricu ltu ra l s ector  goes  fa r  in  exp lain ing th is. In  the 
US, th e increase  in  im ports from  th e un deve loped  world was mostly 
accounted  fo r  b y  the expansion o f  im ports  from  the non-European 
prim ary  p rod u cers , whereas fo r  th e r is e  in  German and British 
im ports from  undeveloped  areas  both  the European and non-European 
p e r ip h e ry  w ere  more or less  equ a lly  respon s ib le .
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Tab le  V III-2  S izes  o f  Cyclical Chan ges in Gross In vestm ent, £m
US Germ any A rgen tin a *
in crease  262
(1885-92)
127.0
(1886-90)
41.6
(1885-89)
decrease 189.3
(1892-96)
117.8
(1890-91)
48.0
(1889-92)
Source: J. W. Kendrick(1961), W. G. Hoffmann(1965), J. H. 
Williams( 1920), N. G. Butlin(1964)
* F o re ig n  investm ent on ly.
2. Downswing
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O verbu ild ing  o f  ra ilw ays began to  be o b s e rv ed  in the course o f  
1888 in  A rgen tin a , as a resu lt o f  which ra ilw ay  p ro fita b ility  
d e te r io ra ted (T ab le  V I I-2 ),  and which led  to  th e  downturn o f  stock 
p ric es  in  June and July o f  that y ea r (F ig  V I I-3 ).  Thus the long 
ra ilw ay  expansion s ta r t in g  from  around 1880 came to  an end. This, 
h ow ever, did not mean th e end o f  the la r g e ly  fo re ign  financed 
A rgen tin e  home investm en t boom. Due to  th e e f fe c t  o f  new ra ilw ays 
on settlem ent, th e land im provem ent boom con tinued a fte r  the 
dow nturn  in  the ra ilw ay  sector, which was p ro b ab ly  behind the 
r e v iv a l o f  stock p r ic e s  from  the end o f  1888(Fig V II  -3 ).  The slow 
p ro g re s s  in  ag ricu ltu ra l developm ent around n ew ly  b u ilt ra ilw ays and 
th e  consequ en t fa ilu re  o f  A rgen tin e  exp orts  to  g ro w  rap id ly , which 
was at th e  bottom o f  the fa ll in ra ilw ay p ro fita b ility , led  in the 
con text o f  rap id ly  r is in g  im ports to  a go ld  ou tflow  and u psu rge  o f  
th e gold  premium in  1889.1 The r ise  in the g o ld  premium appeared  
a cru cia l blow to  th e  land im provem ent boom, as  is  e v id en t in the 
co in cidence o f  the a cce lera tion  o f  th e go ld  premium and the downturn 
o f  stock  p rices  in  m id-1889(Fig V II -3 ). F o r  the r ise  in  gold  
premium implied the reduction  in the ra te  o f  re tu rn  on cedu las, the 
in te re s t on  which w as payable in paper pesos. F ore ign  capita l 
in flow  thus declined  d rastica lly , and the A rgen tin e  long investm ent 
upsw ing  beg in n ing  from  around 1880 was b ro u gh t to  an end. The 
v ir tu a l cessation o f  cap ita l in flow  b ro u gh t abou t a balance o f  payment 
c r is is  in the p resen ce  o f  the burden  o f  in creased  fixed  in teres t
1 U n der th e A rgen tin e  governm ent guaran tee o f  f ix ed  retu rn  on 
ra ilw ay  investm ent, th e  w orsen ing ra te  o f  p ro fit  in  th e railw ay sector 
a lso con tribu ted  to  th e  r ise  in gold  premium by in creas in g  the 
govern m en t spen d ing , which being unable to be finan ced  b y  the 
increase  in taxation led  to  the r ise  in paper c u rren cy  circu lation .
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payments, and the c r is is  seemed to  b e  aggrava ted  b y  fa llin g  p rim ary 
product p rices . Th e  declin e o f  cap ita l in flow  in 1889-92 amounted to 
£48.0m.*
As th e US ra ilw ay  build ing an d  con sequ en tly  German iron  and 
steel exp o rts  declin ed  a fte r  1887, th e  expansion o f  investm en t in  the 
German iro n  and s tee l in du stry  came to  be ju s tified  b y  the booming 
home m arket, which was supported  b y  the expansion in the bu ild in g  
industry . Both th e continued con tra ction  o f  the ov e rsea s  m arket fo r  
iron and s tee l a fte r  1887 and th e em ergen ce o f  th e state  o f  partia l 
over in vestm en t in  bu ild in g  in d u stry  a t the end o f  1889, how ever, 
appeared to  r e v e rs e  th e  optimism re g a rd in g  the fu tu re  o f  German 
iron and s tee l and, con sequ en tly , coal indu str ies . With the
downturn o f  investm en t in  the h ea vy  in d u s tr ie s (F ig  I I I - 4 )  and the 
consequ en t de terio ra tion  o f  em ploym ent opportu n ities  in  Rhineland 
and Westphalia, in tern a l m igration declined  a fte r  the 1889 peak, 
d e live r in g  d ec is iv e  con tractionary  sh o ck s  to, and b r in g in g  abou t the 
even tual dow n turn  in , construction  in d u s try  a fte r  th e  peak in 1891. 
Thus investm en t a c tiv it ie s  in iron  and coal on th e  one hand and 
con struction  on th e o th e r  hand sh ifted  in opposite  d irec tio n s  du r in g  
1889-91, th e form er declin ing and th e la tter  expan din g. The
consequence was th e  1890 peak in ov e ra ll German dom estic 
investm ent. German g ro ss  dom estic investm ent is  estim ated to  h ave 
fa llen  by £117.8m in  1890-91.*
I t  was as late as in  1892 th at th e  US home investm en t reach ed  a 
peak. T h e  dow nturn  o f  home inves tm en t in  1892 la rg e ly  re fle c ted
2 This f ig u re  is  d e r iv e d  from  J. H. W illiams' estimate la g ged  b y  one 
year fo r  th e  reasons g iv e n  in Section  1, Chapter V II. We also 
assume th a t in 1893-95, fo r  which W illiams did  not p ro v id e  f igu re s , no 
fo re ign  cap ita l was in ves ted  in A rgen tin a .
3 For th e method o f  estimation, see foo tn o te  4 o f  Section  1, th is  
chapter.
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th e m ovem ents o f  US bu ild in g  a c t iv ity  (F ig  I I I—1). The expansion o f  
the U S build ing in d u s try  was d epen den t upon th e  p ro g re s s  in 
ra ilro ad iza tio n , which c rea ted  p ro fita b le  opportu n ities  fo r  bu ild ing by 
op en in g  up vast areas. With ra ilw a y  construction  in  depression  
since 1887, the expansion o f  US b u ild in g  a c tiv ity  had to  come to  an 
end, w h en  in 1892 the poss ib ilities  o f  p ro fitab le  con stru ction  opened 
un til 1887 were used up  and the s ta te  o f  ove rb u ild in g  d eve loped . 
During th e  fou r yea r downsw ing, 1892-96, US g ro ss  domestic capita l 
fo rm a tion  declined by £189.3m.
These various d e fla t ion a ry  fo r c e s , p a rticu la r ly  those from 
A rg e n t in a  and the US, w ere  d e liv e r e d  to  Britain v ia  both trade  and 
cap ita l flow s . In  th e f i r s t  p lace, the A rgen tin e  dow nsw ing was 
accom panied  by  the d ec lin e  in  B ritish  investm ent in  A rgen tin a , and as 
a con sequ en ce  merchandise exports  from  Britain to A rgen tin a  declined 
b y  £6.5m in  1889-91. P rob ab ly , th e  A rgen tin e  c r is is  was respon sib le  
fo r  th e  d ecrease in B ritish  investm en t in  the US a fte r  1890(Fig V I-3 ), 
in v ie w  o f  the fact th at th e  US in ves tm en t upsw ing was maintained 
un til 1892. On the o th er  hand, w h ils t to ta l m erchandise im ports into 
the U S reached an u pper tu rn in g  p o in t in 1893(Fig IV -8 ), B ritish 
m erchan d ise  exports to  th e  US p eaked  in  the same yea r as B ritish 
in ves tm en t in the US, i.e . in 1890.(F ig V I-5 ) T h e  downturn o f  
m erchan d ise  exports to th e  US, h o w ever , did not seem to  be c lose ly  
re la ted  to  that in cap ita l exp o rts , con sidering  the in s ign ifican t 
pos ition  o f  British cap ita l in  th e US domestic cap ita l formation. 
F u rth erm ore , it was not on ly  B ritish  but also German and French 
exp o rts  to  the US th a t peaked  in  1890, whereas th e exports  from 
prim ary  p roducers  to th e  US m ostly reco rded  peaks in 1892 o r  1893, 
more con s is ten tly  w ith th e pa tte rn  o f  the US C yc le  I I I .  The 
d is c rep a n cy  between the pa ttern  o f  th e  US Cycle I I I ,  1885(T )-1892(P )-
1894(T), and th e c yc lic a l pattern  found in  exports  from  the European 
coun tries  to the US, 1885 (T )-1890 (P )-1894 (T ), ap p ea rs  a ttribu tab le  to  
both the McKinley T a r i f f  A c t and the in du str ia l developm ent in  the 
US*. The con traction  o f  B ritish e x p o rts  to  the US continued from  
1890 until 1894, and am ounted to £13.3m, and the s iz e s  o f  decrease in 
B ritish  merchandise e x p o r ts  to A rgen tin a  and th e  US added up to 
£19.8m, which may be com pared with th e  £47.5m fa ll in  to tal B ritish 
domestic merchandise e x p o r ts  in 1890-94. Thus, as  in  th e beginn ing 
o f  the p reced in g  u p sw in g , the sh ifts  in  th e  leve l o f  a c tiv ity  in the 
two countriea could be sa id  to  have been  dec is ive  in  b rin g in g  an end 
to  th e British export boom*; however i t  n eeds to  b e  made clear that, 
in con trast to the u p tu rn  in  the mid-1880s, it was A rgen tina , ra th er 
than the US, which led  th e  downturn.
The con tra ction a ry  shocks gen era ted  b y  A rgen tin a , the US and 
B rita in  w ere transm itted to  Prance v ia  tra d e  flows: betw een 1889 and 
1895 French exports  to  A rgen tin a  con tra cted  by £5.0m; between 1890- 
94 French exports  to th e  US and B rita in  fe ll  b y  £5.7m and £4.5m, 
resp ec tiv e ly . These con tra ction s  add up to  £15.2m, w h ilst the to tal 
decline in French m erchandise exports  amounted to  £27m in  1890-94. 
As in the upswing, German in flu en ces  were m arginal in the 
downswing: French e x p o r ts  to Germany rose  b y  £2.6m in  1886-91, 
then fe ll  by  £1.6m in 1891-94. Thus, w ith  more than  ha lf o f  the 
decline in  F rench e x p o r ts  accounted fo r  w ith  the con traction  o f  the 
US, B ritish  and A rgen tin e  markets, th e con tribu tion  o f  the p reced ing  
con traction  in French o v e r s e a s  investm ent a fte r  th e  1888 peak to the 
decline in merchandise e x p o r ts  would no t seem s ign ifican t.*
V W. A. Sinclair(1957) p.95,96
5 The e f fe c t  o f  German d epress ion  was r e la tiv e ly  weak: merchandise 
exp orts  from  Britain to Germ any declined  b y  on ly  £1.7m.
6 As in  the upsw ing, th e  poss ib ility  cou ld  no t be p rec lu ded  that the 
decline in F rench inves tm en t in A rgen tina  acce lera ted  th e decline in 
French  merchandise e x p o r ts  to  Argentina.
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The depression  in th ese m a jo r  industria l econom ies w ere  
transm itted to  undeveloped  cou n tr ies  m ain ly  th rough th e d eclin e in  
the exports  from the la tter  in to  th e fo rm e r . I t  is  to  be noted th at
the decline in export value was due to  th e  fa ll in both  exp o rt volum e 
and prices . The exports  from  p e r ip h e r y  to the US decreased  b y  
£27.9m in 1892-98, and most o f  th e fa l l ,  £25.9m, occu rred  in  th e US 
im port trade  with non-European p r im a ry  p rodu cers (Tab le  V I II -3 ):  as 
in the upsw ing the con traction  in th e im po rts  from  prim ary  p ro d u cers  
ou ts ide Europe la rg e ly  re fle c ted  th e  US import tra d e  w ith  Latin  
American countries.’  In  con trast, th e  decline in  German im ports 
from  undeveloped  coun tries  du rin g  th e  downswing(£12.5m) is  more 
than accounted fo r  b y  the fa ll in  the im ports from  European 
agricu ltu ra l areas(£16.9m), because th e  increase in  th e exp orts  from  
non-European undeveloped  co u n tr ies  in to  Germany was not 
in terru p ted  by the dow nsw ing(Tab le  V I I I - 3 ) .  The absence o f  cyc lica l 
pattern  in  German im ports from  non -E u ropean  prim ary p ro d u cers  and 
the US appears to re fle c t  the em e rgen ce  o f  these a reas  as su p p liers  
o f  raw m aterial and foo ds tu ffs  to G erm an y, rep lac in g  th e European 
p e rip h ery , where industria lisation  was in  p rogress.
The downturn o f  the B ritish  econom y resu lted  in th e £30.7m 
decline in her total im ports from  1891 to  1893; • i f  more than h a lf o f  
th is  decline(£16.4m) was due to  the f a l l  in  imports from  u n developed  
countries, in  comparison with the US a n d  Germany th e  con traction  o f  
B ritish demand seemed to be s p re a d  in w ider p arts  o f  th e  
undeveloped  w orld (Tab le  V III -3 ),  d if fu s in g  in it ia l con tra ction a ry  
shocks in to  remoter parts  o f  the w o r ld . Thus, i t  was mainly th e 
con traction  o f  exports  to Brita in th at w as  responsib le fo r  th e  s ta r t  o f
7 The US imports from  Brazil alone d e c lin ed  by  £12.Sm.
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Table V III-3  S izes  o f  C yclica l Decrease in Im p orts , £m
US Germany UK France
total 51.4
(1893-98)
10.1
(1891-94)
30.7
(1891-93)
41.9
(1891-95)
from
p erip h ery f l 892-98)
12.5
(1891-92)
16.4
(1891-93) fl891-95)
from  non- 
European 
p e rip h ery
25.9
(1892-98)
n/a 10.0
(1891-93)
from  European 
p e rip h ery
6.6
(1893-94)
16.9
(1890-93)
13.0
(1889-92)
Source: same as Table VTTI-1
the Ind ian  export downswing*, which was bIbo th e  case fo r  Canada.* 
A ccord in g  to  Table V III-1  & 3, F rance, which had con tribu ted  t o  the 
expansion o f  prim ary producing cou n tr ies  to  a fa r  lesser e x ten t than 
th e o th e r  th ree  in du str ia l cou n tr ies , recorded  almost as la r g e  a 
d ecrease in her im ports from the p e r ip h e ry  as d id  th e US, w h e re  the 
la rge s t im port con traction  was ob se rved .
Now the international depression  not on ly acce lerated  the e x p o r t  
dow n sw ing in  Brita in and France, but also appeared a s  the 
con tra ction  o f  exports  from  the US and Germany. I f  in B rita in  the 
expansion o f  sh ipp ing  capacity  d u r in g  the boom and the c on seq u en t 
fa ll in f r e ig h ts  un derlay  the £4m decline in home investm ent, th is  was 
fa r  less  than the con traction o f  merchandise exp o rts  am ounting to 
£48m. In  con trast, in Germany and th e US the opposite w as  the 
case: in  the US the £46m fa ll in domestic exp o rts  com pares w ith
£189m declin e in home investm ent, w h ile German exports  and home 
investm en t recorded  decreases o f  £19m and £118m resp ec tiv e ly .
L e t  us fin a lly  examine the Australian case. In  fa c t,
con tra ction a ry  fo rces  em erged  earlies t in  Australia : Australian home 
investm en t reached a peak in 1888 and then declin ed  slow ly d u r in g  
the su bsequ en t th ree  yea rs , to be fo llow ed  by a sharper fa l l  u n til 
the trou gh  in  1897(Fig V III-1  ).*• The downturn in  Australian home 
inves tm en t was rela ted  to  the end o f  th e res id en tia l investm en t boom 
in  V ic tor ia , occu rrin g  in  the con text o f  the decline in the r a ta  o f  
annual population grow th  a fte r  1888, due mainly to  th e sharp  f a l l  in
8 While to ta l Indian merchandise exp orts  declined b y  £17m, B rit ish  
im ports from  India recorded  a £10m decrease.
9 Tota l Canadian exports  con tracted  d u r in g  the 1893-94 dow n sw ing  by  
£1.4m, wh ich is  equal to  the size  o f  th e  decline in  Canadian e x p o r ts  
to  B rita in.
10 Austra lian  g ross  domestic capita l form ation recorded  a fa ll o f  
£25.3m betw een  1888-97, most o f  which £24.lm, occu rred  a fte r  1891.
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net im m igration in to  V ictoria .11 I t  ia, how ever, not c lear to what 
ex ten t th e d eclin e in  im migration and th e ra te  o f  population grow th  
was the cause o r  th e e f fe c t  o f  th e con traction  o f  V ictorian  residentia l 
investm ent1*; and, in  so fa r  as th e dem ographic chan ges caused  the 
downturn, to  w hat ex ten t dom estic o r  externa l fac tors  w ere 
respon sib le  fo r  the sh ifts  in  V ictorian  population.1*
In  w h ich eve r  w ay th e con traction  o f  V ictorian  investm ent may be 
explained, th e  e f fe c ts  o f  th e Australian downturn upon the world 
economy w ere  h a rd ly  fe lt  un til a fte r  1891: as F ig  V III-2  shows,
Australian im ports  from  th e r e s t  o f  th e world  remained almost 
constant d u r in g  1888-91. Th is may be rela ted  to  both the
aforem entioned  m ildness o f  the decline o f  home investm ent in  the f ir s t  
th ree  y ea rs  and th e con tinued expansion o f  exp orts  u n til 1891: i f  the 
form er was exp licab le  b y  the h igh  le v e l o f  a c tiv ity  maintained until 
1891 in th e  o th e r  tw o major f ie ld s  o f  investm ent, i.e. pastoral and 
a g ricu ltu ra l in d u s try  and ra ilw ay, the la tte r  re fle c ted  the course o f  
the B ritish  tra d e  c y c le .1 234 The sharp  decline in Australian pastoral 
investm ent a fte r  1891 is  said to  have been connected w ith the 
decreas in g  y ie ld  on  new investm ent due to  the cos t r ise  resu lting  
from  the expansion  o f  pastora l in d u stry  in to  newer and more arid 
reg ion s; on  th e o th e r  hand, the ad ve rse  tu rn  in  th e attitude o f  
in ves to rs  in  London tow ards fo re ign  govern m en t secu rities  under the
11 B. A. Boehm(1971) p.148, Tab le  32
12 That ia, th e  fo llo w in g  tw o poss ib ilities  a re  con ceivab le : f ir s t  the 
exogenous dec lin e  in  immigration, say, due to  s tron ge r  pu ll o f  other 
coun tries  such as A rgen tin a  and th e US, w orsens p ro fita b ility  o f  
V ictorian  bu ild in g  in d u s try  and b r in gs  abou t the downturn in 
bu ild ing  a c t iv ity ;  second ly , boom in bu ild ing in d u stry , started  fo r  
some reason , a ttra c ts  im migrants, which re in fo rces  the boom, but 
even tu a lly  o v e rb u ild in g  d eve lops , and as a consequence build ing 
a c tiv ity  declin es, which causes th e fa ll in  immigration.
13 That is , ava ilab le  data do not d istingu ish  in terna l m igration into 
V ictoria from  o th e r  colon ies  and immigration from  abroad.
14 While to ta l Austra lian  m erchandise exp o rts  declined  b y  £4.7m in 
1891-94, th e  exp o rts  from  Austra lia  to B rita in  fe ll  b y  £3.9m.
shadow o f  the Baring c r is is  appeared  responsib le fo r  the end o f 
a c tiv e  ra ilw ay bu ild ing  in 1891.*•
T h ere fo re , it  could be con clu ded  th at although weak depress ive  
fo rc es  appeared  in Australia  a fte r  1888, perhaps at least pa rtly  due 
to  domestic causes, th ey  w ere  h a rd ly  fe l t  outside Australia; and that 
the beg in n ing  o f  a rea l dow nsw ing was postponed un til a fte r  1891, 
la rge ly  due to th e fa vou rab le  in terna tion al economic climate up to 
1890, such as th e optimism in  London capital market and the 
expansion o f  the B ritish  economy.
F ig  V III-4  summarizes w h ere con tractionary  shocks orig inated  
and how th ey  w ere transm itted to  th e r e s t  o f  the w orld. Comparing 
F ig  V III-3  k  4, one could eas ily  note th a t i f  the upsw ing was in itiated 
b y  an in du str ia l economy, th e US, a prim ary p roducer, A rgen tina, led 
th e  subsequent downswing. Com paring Table V III-3  w ith V I I I - 1, one 
o b se rves  th at while Germany and Brita in  w ere the major exp orters  o f 
p ro sp e r ity , the g rea te r  p a rt o f  d e fla tion ary  influences w ere sen t to 
the res t o f  th e w orld from  the US and France. The US depression  
a ffe c ted  mainly non-European prim ary p roducers, while the 
con traction  in  German im ports w ere  mainly rela ted to the decline o f 
h er im ports from  agricu ltu ra l Europe, w ith her im ports from  non- 
European undeveloped  reg ion s  con tin u in g  to -increase du rin g  the 
d epression  in  the e a r ly  1890s. A s aforem entioned, the con traction o f  
th e B ritish  economy a ffe c ted  both European and non-European 
prim ary p rodu cers  to  an almost equ a l ex ten t th rough trade flows.
I t  was in  Germany that th e d eclin e o f  national income was 
in terru p ted  earlies t, in 1891, which was rela ted  to  the resumption o f
15 N. G. Butlin(1964) Chapter VI
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Fig V III-4 International Downswing in the Early 1890s: Major Initial Shocks
grow th  o f  home investm ent due mainly to  the d eve lopm ent o f  the 
e le ctrica l in d u s try . A fte r  the trou gh  in 1893 and 1894, home
investm en t booms w ere  inaugu rated  in  B rita in  and F rance, 
res p e c t iv e ly , fo r  which was respon s ib le  the b eg in n in g  o f  Kuznets 
u psw ings in  the tw o coun tries . I t  was as late as a fte r  1896 th a t a 
home inves tm en t upsw ing  was sta rted  in  the US, wh ich re fle c ted  the 
g row th  o f  e le c tr ic ity -b a sed  indu str ies . Thus, in  con tra s t to  the 
Cycle I I I  upsw ing, th e C ycle IV upsw ing  was to be sustained  b y  the 
r is in g  le v e l  o f  dom estic investm ent in  the fou r  lead in g  in d u str ia l 
cou n tr ies , w h ile la r g e ly  pass ive  ro le s  w ere attribu ta b le  to  prim ary 
p rodu cers .
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3. The International Trade Cycle and the Gold Standard
In  th e ten-odd y ea rs  w ith  which we are con cerned , Ind ia  was a 
s ilv er  standard cou n try , in  A rgen tin a  th ere  c ircu la ted  inconvertib le  
cu rren cy , w h ilst the m onetary system s o f  the re s t  o f  ou r e igh t 
countries w ere  based, e n t ir e ly  o r  p a rtia lly , upon g o ld .1 Data on the 
quantity  o f  money and re la ted  financial series  a re  ava ilab le  fo r  the 
f iv e  o f  the e igh t cou n tr ies , exc lu d in g  France1, Au stra lia  and India. 
Here, an attem pt w ill be made to assess the role o f  money in the 
international trade c y c le  con cerned  mainly by  c la r ify in g  why the 
money stocks o f  the f i v e  cou n tr ies  fluctuated  p ro cyc lica lly . The 
cases o f  the fou r gold  s tan dard  cou n tr ies  -  B rita in, Germ any, the US 
and Canada -  w ill f i r s t  be examined, and then we tu rn  to  Argentina.
One could rea lis t ica lly  assume th at in pre-WWI y ea rs  the short 
term sh ifts  in national s tock s  o f  gold  occu rred  la rg e ly  aa a resu lt o f  
international gold  m ovements, ra th er than fluctuations in  gold  
production . Gold flow s  in to  and ou t o f  a cou n try  appeared  to be 
regu lated  b y  the state o f  its  o v e ra ll balance o f  paym ents, which was 
determ ined by cu rren t balance o f  paym ents and cap ita l flow s. While 
cu rren t balance and cap ita l flow s  tended to v a ry , b road ly  speaking, 
so as to cancel each o th e r  ou t in major coun tries , th ey  did not 
balance p rec ise ly , so th a t g o ld  m igrated to account fo r  th e residual 
d iffe ren ces  between cu r re n t  and cap ita l accounts. L e t us examine 
the examples o f  two go ld  standard  cou n tr ies  most a c t iv e ly  in vo lved  in 
the international cap ita l m ovements d u r in g  Cycle I I I .  12
1 For a summary o f  m onetary h isto ries  o f  these cou n tr ies , see 
footnote 1, Section 3, C hapter I I I  and Section  4, C hapter V II.
2 On the problem s o f  th e F rench  money stock se rie s  estim ated by 14. 
Saint Marc(1983), see foo tn o te  2, Section 3, Chapter I I I .
Th e  g o ld  outflow  from  Britain d u r in g  the e a r ly  yea rs  o f  the 
upsw ing w as connected w ith the e xcess  o f  lon g  term  fo re ign  
investm ent o v e r  cu rren t account su rp lu ses , w h ereas in the la ter 
years  o f  th e  upswing the r ise  in Lon don  sh ort term in teres t rates 
a ttracted  sh o rt-term  capita l and thus g o ld  to  B rita in . The continued 
net in flow  o f  gold  into Brita in d u r in g  the downsw ing may be 
explained b y  the sharper decline in  h e r  cap ita l exp orts  than in  her 
cu rren t accou n t su rp lu s(F ig  V I-6  k 7 ). A s  fa r  as th e Cycle I I I  
yea rs  w ere  concerned , when gold was flo w in g  in to  Brita in , the US 
tended to  b e  losing gold , and v ice  v e rs a . Thus, in th e early  yea rs  
o f  the C yc le  I I I  upsw ing gold  flow ed  in to  th e US, which was 
exp licable b y  the in flow  o f  lon g-term  and sh ort-term  capital 
su rpassin g th e  cu rren t account d e fic it. Then, th e ou tflow  o f  short 
term cap ita l to  London seemed to be m ainly respon sib le  fo r  the 
outflow  o f  go ld  from  the US in the la te  y ea rs  o f  th e expansion. 
Finally, con tinu ed  outflow  o f  gold  from  th e US du rin g  the subsequent 
depression  resu lted  from the fa ll in Lhe lon g  term  cap ita l inflow , 
which oversh ad ow ed  the im provem ent in  h e r  cu rren t accoun t(F ig  IV -  
11 k 12).
P a r t ly  due to govern m ent co n tro l o v e r  cap ita l exports, the 
German su rp lu s  on cu rren t account an d  fo r e ig n  lend ing moved in 
close a g reem en t during the Cycle I I I  y ea rs ; un in terru p ted  inflow  o f  
gold on a re la t iv e ly  small scale was th e re fo r e  o b s e rv e d (F ig  V-9 k  10). 
The p a tte rn s  o f  resu lting  varia tion s in  th e national stocks o f  gold o f  
these th re e  coun tries  w ere neither c y c lic a l nor con tracyc lica l: the 
US gold  s tock  increased du rin g  the e a r ly  y ea rs  o f  C ycle I I I  and then 
d ec lin ed (F ig  IV -12 ); almost exactly th e  op p os ite  pattern  is  observab le  
in the g o ld  stock held in B rila in (F ig  V I-7 ); fin a lly , German gold  
stock d isp la yed  continuous g ro w th (F ig  V -10 ). In  Canada, commercial
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banks a re  said to  have held  th e ir  re s e r v e s  not on ly  in the form  o f  
cash  in  Canada, but a lso in th e form  o f  sh o rt term  fo r e ig n  assets, 
wh ich w ere  called secon dary  rese rves . T h ere fo re , any d iscrepancy  
betw een  the cu rren t balance o f  paym ents and cap ita l flow s  would 
appear as varia tion  in g o ld  held in  Canada plus va r iou s  sh o rt term 
fo r e ig n  assets, i.e. Canadian in ternational m onetary assets , ra ther 
than  chan ges in gold  stock  alone. Canadian in terna tion al m onetary 
a ssets  v a r ied  in a c on tra cyc lica l w a y (F ig  V III -5 ).
Thus, w h ilst gold  s tock s  o r  international m onetary a ssets  o f  the 
fou r  go ld  standard flu c tu a ted  d isp la y in g  va r ied  pa ttern s , in  none o f  
th e fo u r  countries is o b s e rv ed  a p rocyc lica l pa ttern  in go ld  stock  or 
in ternation al m onetary asse ts . V arie ty  in th e pa tte rn  o f  fluctuations 
o f  national gold  stock o r  international m onetary a sse ts  led  to  the 
d iffe r e n c e  in the way in  which m onetary bases (h igh -p ow ered  money) 
o f  th ese  countries m oved: wh ile th e US and German monetary
b a se s (F ig  IV -18  and V -16 ) va r ied  in  a cyc lica l way, con tra cyc lica l and 
acyc lica l movements w ere  ob se rvab le  in  Canadian and B ritish  monetary 
bases, resp ec tiv e ly  (F ig  V I II -5  and 6). I t  is  fu r th e r  seen th at the 
cyc lica l fluctuations o f  th e  US and German HPM do not a g re e  w ith the 
pa tte rn  o f  varia tion s in  th e ir  go ld  stocks, wh ile the acyclica l 
m ovements o f  British HPM and con tracyc lica l chan ges in  Canadian HPM 
re fle c ted  th e sh ifts  in  th e ir  go ld  stock  o r  in terna tion a l monetary 
assets.
The p rec ise  correspon den ce  between th e movements o f  Canadian 
in ternation al monetary a ssets  and HPM probab ly  resu lted  from  the 
fa c t  th at from  1887 o n  Dominion notes issued b y  the Canadian
Fig VIII-5 Canadian International Monetary Assets. High-Powered Money and Money Stock
Fig VHI-6 UK High-Powered Money and National Stock of Gold
Source: B. R. MitcheU(1962), F. Capie A A. Webber(1985)
govern m en t, ’w ere  issued alm ost exc lu s ive ly  aga in st g o ld ’.* Thus 
the Canadian governm ent, assum ing a p a r t o f  th e  respon sib ilities  o f  a 
n on -ex is ten t c en tra l bank, cou ld  be said to  have 'fo llow ed  c lose ly  the 
so-ca lled  go ld  standard  "ru le a  o f  the gam e"’.3 4 5
T h e  B ritish  m onetary base in th e y ea rs  con cern ed  com prised i)  
ban kers ’  balances a t the Bank o f  England, as w ell as i i )  the cu rren cy  
in c ircu la tion . I t  was P ee l’ s  Act, r eq u ir in g  the volume o f  cu rren cy  
ou ts ide the Issu e Department o f  the Bank o f  England to  v a ry  in c lose 
agreem en t w ith th e national stock  o f  g o ld 4, th a t goes  fa r  to exp lain  
the agreem en t between th e fluctuations in  HPM and go ld  stock in  
B rita in . On th e o th e r  hand, i f  the parallelism  was not so close as in  
Canada, bu t on ly  broad, th is  was mainly due to  th e  cyc lica l elem ents 
in  th e o th e r  component o f  B ritish  HPM, Le. ban k ers ’ balances at th e 
Banking Department o f  the Bank o f  England. The cyc lica l pattern  in  
ban kers ’ balances at the B anking Department was mainly respon sib le  
fo r  th e cyc lica l varia tion s in  the Banking Departm ent deposits and 
the con sequ en t con tracyc lica l varia tion s in  the ’P ro p o rtion ’ , i.e. the 
res e rve/ d ep os it  ra tio  o f  th e  Banking D ep artm en t F ig  V I-15 ). 
P ro fes so r  C. A. E. Goodhart(1972) in te rp re ted  such movements in  th e 
Banking Department d eposits  and th e P ro p o rtion  as revea lin g  th e 
accommodating response on th e  part o f  th e Bank to the app lication  
fo r  liq u id ity  from  the b an k in g  system . T h e re fo re , i t  may be
concluded that th e ru les  o f  th e  gold  standard  game in  Nurkae’s  sense 
w ere n o t o b se rved  in  Britain as  r igo ro u s ly  as in  Canada.
3 Canadian HPM, estimated b y  G. Rich(1987), in c lu des  i )  Dominion 
notes in  c ircu la tion , ii) gold  r e s e rv e  o f  ch a rte red  banks, and iii) 
fo re ign  sh o rt term  assets  o f  ch a rte red  banks.
4 G. Rich(1977) p . 4,11. Dr. R ich is h ere  ob v iou s ly  in terp re tin g  the 
ru les  o f  th e  game in  Nurkse ’s  sense, a ccord in g  to  whom the ru les 
d ic ta te  cen tra l banks to ch an ges  th eir ho ld ings o f  dom estic assets in 
the same d irec tion  as ch an ges in  th eir ho ld ings o f  international 
assets.
5 See foo tn o te  5, Section 4, C hapter VI.
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The cyc lica l varia tion s  o f  German HPM, approxim ated b y  cu rren cy  
in  circu la tion  plus the Reichsbank g iro  depos its , su gges t (in  the 
absence o f  an y  cyc lica l e lem ents in German go ld  s tock ) th at the ru les  
o f  the game w ere  vio la ted  more fre q u en tly  in Germany. F ig  V-15 
shows th at th e Reichsbank notes in c ircu la tion  and th e go ld  and 
coin s held in  th e Reichsbank moved in  oppos ite  d irec tion s  in the 
y ea rs  around th e u pper tu rn in g  point: th e  form er moved cyc lica lly , 
whereas the la tte r  tended to  v a r y  in a ra th e r  con tracyc lica l way. I t  
would appear reasonable to  con sider th is  a s  the consequence o f  the 
Reichsbank ha vin g  va r ied  its  note issue acco rd in g  to  th e ch an ges in 
demand fo r  cu rren cy  w ith ou t much r e g a rd  to  th e state  o f  its  cash 
res e rve . Since on  the o th e r  hand the m etallic  cu rren cy  ou ts ide  the 
Reichsbank a lso moved cyc lica lly , r e fle c t in g  the sh ifts  in  demand and 
resu lting  in  th e aforem entioned  con tra cyc lica l pa ttern  in  the go ld  and 
coins in th e Reichsbank (F ig  V-14 ), th e  cu rren cy  in  circu la tion , 
consisting  rou gh ly  o f  the Reichsbank no tes  and coins in  circu la tion , 
a lso d isp layed  cyc lica l fluctuations.
The o th er  component o f  German m onetary  base, the Reichsbank 
g iro  deposits , a lso seemed to  revea l c y c lic a l varia tion s. S ince th is 
occu rred  in  th e fa ce  o f  con tracyc lica l v a r ia tion s  in  the Reichsbank 
cash r e s e rve , one could rea lis t ica lly  r e g a rd  the cyc lica l pa ttern  in 
th e Reichsbank g iro  depos its  as resu lt in g  from  the fa c t that the 
Reichsbank b y  and la rge  passive ly  s a tis fie d  chan gin g  le v e ls  o f  
demand fo r  cash from  the economy. T h e re fo re , i t  would fo llow  that 
the cyc lica l pa ttern  found in  the German m onetary base re fle c ted  the 
sh ifts  in  demand fo r  cu rren cy  in the c ou rse  o f  the trade  cyc le .
The US HPM under th e National Banking System is  d e fin ed  an 
the total s to c k  o f  currency in  th e US minus the cash held  in  the 
T reasury. T h e  volume o f  to ta l cash in  the US showed a d istinct 
r is in g  tren d , a long which mild and ir re g u la r  short term va r ia tion s  are 
o b se rva b le (F ig  IV-18). Such g ro w th  and fluctuations in  th e  total US 
stock o f  c u r r e n c y  were exp licab le  in  term s o f  not on ly  i )  in ternational 
gold flow s, b u t also i i) s i lv e r  laws and i i i )  budget balance and the 
Treasury opera tion s , a ffe c t in g  the p ro fita b ility  o f  th e  issue o f 
national ban k  notes.* On th e  o th e r  hand, the T reasu ry  cash  moved 
rou gh ly  in a con tracyclical w ay , which to g e th e r  with th e m ore o r  less 
linear r is in g  tren d  in total s tock  o f  cash in  the US p rod u ced  broad ly 
cyc lica l c h a n ges  in the US HPM (Fig IV -18 ). The con tra cyc lica l 
pattern in  th e  variations o f  cash  held in  th e  US T reasu ry  was close ly  
connected w ith  the fac t that pub lic  d eb t retirem en t tended  to  exceed 
the b u d ge t surplus du rin g  the C ycle  I I I  upsw ing, and that 
governm ent borrow ing  was g re a te r  than the budget d e fic it  in the 
follow ing d epress ion . I t  is  im portant to  s tress  that the T rea su ry 's  
decision on  th e  level o f  pu b lic  d eb t retirem ent o r  govern m ent 
borrow ing r e la t iv e  to govern m en t b u d ge t balances was a ffe c ted  by 
the con sid era tion s  as to the sta te  o f  th e US economy and demand fo r  
money.7 In  other words, in  th e US, as in  Germany, th e  cyc lica l 
pattern  fo u n d  in  monetary base at leas t p a rtly  re fle c ted  changing 
demand fo r  cu rren cy .
In  a ll o f  the fou r gold  standard  cou n tr ies , cu rren cy  held  b y  the 
public sh ow ed  cyc lica l fluctuations*, rega rd les s  o f  the pa tte rn  o f 
variations in  m onetary base. Th is  would su gges t that th e  movements 
o f  the c u r re n c y  held in the hands o f  th e  public were re la ted  to  the
6 See S ection  4, Chapter IV.
7 O. M. W. S p ra g u e (1910) Note F, Appendix.
8 For Canada, data on cu rren cy  held b y  th e  public a re  unavailab le; 
Dominion n o te s  held by the p u b lic  va r ied  cyc lica lly .
p ro cyc lica lly  changing le v e l  o f  demand fo r  cash. On the o th e r  hand, 
bank re s e rv e s  appeared  to be determ ined  la rge ly *  a s  residual 
d iffe ren ce s  between HPM and cu rren cy  held b y  the p u b lic , and 
consequ en tly  fluctuated  fo llow in g  va r iou s  patterns: the US bank
res e rve  moved con tra cyc lica lly , w h ile th e res e rve s  o f  German and 
B ritish  banking system  show ed acyclica l flu c tu ation s (F ig  IV -20 , F ig  V- 
16, F ig  V I-17 ); a lth ou gh  data on Canadian bank r e s e r v e s  are 
unavailable, con tracyc lica l chan ges in  m onetary base and th e  probable 
cyc lica l varia tion s  in  c u rren cy  held b y  the public wou ld  imply 
con tracyc lica l varia tion s in  Canadian bank rese rves .
Deposits built upon  these n o n -cyc lica lly  m oving bank rese rves  
v a r ied  in a cyc lica l w ay a long d is tin c t upward tren ds  in a ll o f  the 
fou r  go ld  standard cou n tr ies . S ince th e oth er com ponent o f  money 
stock , cu rren cy  held b y  the pub lic , a lso changed c y c lic a lly , the 
resu lt was the cyc lica l fluctuations o f  th e volume o f  m oney in  the 
fou r  coun tries  along s tro n g  r is in g  tren d s  in  the C ycle I I I  y ea rs (F ig  
IV-22, V-17, VI-18, V I I I - 5 ) .  The o th e r  consequence o f  cyclical 
fluctuations o f  d eposits  in  the fa ce  o f  non -cyclica lly  m ov in g  bank 
r e s e rve s  was the c on tra cy c lica l pa tte rn  in  rese rve/ d ep os it  ra tio  o f  
th e US and British b an k in g  sys tem s(F ig  IV-23 k  V I-19 ); th e  probable 
con tracyc lica l fluctuations in Canadian bank res e rve , cou p led  w ith the 
cyc lica l varia tions in  Canadian depos its , would have produced 
con tracyc lica l changes in  Canadian rese rve/ d ep os it ra tio , too. In  
con trast, re fle c tin g  th e  predom inance o f  r is in g  tren d s  in both 
deposits  and bank r e s e r v e s ,  German reserve/d ep os it ra tio  remained 
re la tiv e ly  stable in the C yc le  I I I  y ea rs (F ig  V-18). 9
9 As we see in the c y c lic a l elements in  th e fluctuations o f  th e  Bank 
o f  England Banking Departm ent depos its  and the Reichsbank g iro  
deposits, to  some ex ten t bank r e s e rv e s  w ere  a lso a ffe c ted  b y  cyc lica l 
changes in demand fo r  cash.
The con tracyc lica l varia tion s in  res e rve/ d ep o s it  ra tio  in th e US, 
Britain and Canada seem to  su gges t th a t the cyc lica l fluctuations in 
deposits o f  th e th ree  cou n tr ies  resu lted  mainly from  sim ilarly 
changing demand fo r  money, ra th er th an  from  the s h ifts  in conditions 
gove rn in g  c red it  creation  by  bank in g  system s: commercial banks o f 
the th ree  cou n tr ies  increased  th e s u p p ly  o f  deposit money in sp ite  o f  
d e terio ra tin g  re s e rv e  position du r in g  th e  upsw ing, and v ic e  versa . 
Cyclical pa ttern s  in  sh o rt term  in te r e s t  ra tes  in  B rita in , Germany and 
the U S (F ig  III-2 5 ) a re  con sisten t w ith  the d irec tio n  o f  causation 
running from  demand to  supp ly: i f  su p p ly  con d itions w ere  the main 
determ inant o f  th e cyc lica l pa tte rn  in  th e fluctuations o f  deposits, 
short term  in teres t rates would h a ve  moved con tracyc lica lly . 
Further ev id en ce  ex is ts  in d icatin g  th e cen tra l ro le  o f  demand in  the 
determ ination o f  the supp ly  o f  d ep o s its : d iv e rg in g  pa ttern s  o f
varia tion s in  bank r e s e rve s  betw een  ea s te rn  and w estern  s ta tes  o f 
the US1*; d iffe ren ce  in the pa tte rn  o f  movements o f  th e volume o f 
c red it  g iv e n  b y  means o f  variou s  m ethods in Germany, i.e. bill 
d iscount, len d in g  aga inst co lla tera l an d  cu rren t account c re d it11; 
cyc lica l pa tte rn  in  the ra tio  o f  a d va n ces  to d iscounts made b y  the 
British bank in g system .1*
Thus we are  led to  conclude th a t  in the fo u r  go ld  standard 
countries cyc lica l varia tion s in  m oney stock re fle c ted  la rge ly  
changing sta tes  o f  demand fo r  m oney, wh ich would imply that money 
played an accommodating ra th er than lead in g  role  in  th e trade cyc le  
o f  these coun tries . 102
10 See Section  4, Chapter IV.
11 See Section  4, Chapter V.
12 C. A. E. Goodhart( 1972) Chapter IS . On the accommodating 
behaviour o f  Canadian banking sec to r , aee  R. Rich(1984).
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In  Argen tina , w here the use o f  cheques is  sa id  no t to have been 
popu larized  in th e yea rs  concerned , money s to ck  could more 
rea listica lly  be defin ed  as the volume o f  cu rren cy  h e ld  by the public. 
While the data on the quantity  o f  paper pesos in  th e  hands o f  the 
A rgen tin e  public a re  unavailable, the va r ia tion s  in  the volume o f  
cu rren cy  in c ircu la tion  p robab ly  re flec ted  th ose in  th e quan tity  o f  
pesos held b y  the non-bank public. In  go ld  te rm s, paper pesos in 
circu la tion  increased  in  1885-1888, fe ll s ligh t ly  in  1889, and then 
reached a peak in 1890 to fa ll back to  the t r o u g h  in  the fo llow in g  
yea r  (F ig  V II-1 5 ). In  increasing the supp ly  o f  cu r re n c y , A rgen tin e  
banks w ere requ ired  to  purchase national gold  b on d s  w ith gold , most 
o f  which th ey  had to  borrow  from  Europe at 'e x trem e ly  high in tere s t 
ra tes  and b y  pay ing h igh commission ch a rges ’1*. Furtherm ore, the 
regu lations con cern in g note issue w ere o ften  v io la ted , with 'le ss  than 
40X o f  the to tal va lue o f  bonds’ having been  p a id  fo r  in g o ld .14 
These circum stances behind th e rise  in no te  is su e  during the 
upsw ing would su gges t that th e expansion o f  p a p e r  peso circu la tion  
in  gold  terms in 1885-88 had more to do w ith th e  increas in g  demand 
fo r  money than w ith  any favourab le  tu rn  in  cu rren cy  supp ly  
conditions o f  the banking system . Besides r is in g  demand, both 
corru p tion  and the w idening ga p  between go v e rn m en t income and 
expend itu re also appeared  to con tribu te to  th e  increase  in  paper 
cu rren cy  circu lation .
The decline in cu rren cy  circu lation  in g o ld  term s in 1889, in 
sp ite  o f  continued economic expansion, was e xp licab le  by  the r is e  in 
go ld  prem ium .(Fig V II-16 ) The soaring go ld  prem ium was c lose ly  
connected w ith the gold  ou tflow  in 1889, r e s u lt in g  from excess ive  
im ports re la tiv e ly  to  exports  and fo re ign  b o rro w in g , and b ro u gh t
13 A. M. Quintero-Ramosf 1965) p.88, 89
14 J. H. Williams(1920) p.59
about rapid domestic price rises, under the condition o f the prices of
im portant products  being fixed  in th e w orld market. T h u s , a t the 
end o f  1889, in spite o f  th e continued increase in issue in  paper 
terms, s ca rc ity  o f  money and finan cia l tension d eve loped . The
banking system , how ever, seemed unable to counterbalance th e  r is in g  
gold  premium and the consequen t in fla tion  and m onetary s tr in g en c y  
by expan din g  note issue a t a fa s te r  rate, because th e r is in g  gold  
premium, due to  its  e ffe c t  upon th e retu rn  on cedu las, a t th e  same 
time made it extrem ely d iffic u lt  to  borrow  go ld  in  Europe. The 
m onetary sho rtage  accelerated  the downsw ing a lready  in p ro g r e s s  and 
culm inated in the banking c r is is  b egin n ing in A p r il 1890. The 
A rgen tin e  governm ent tr ied  to s tave  o f f  th e c r is is  both  b y  the 
suspension o f  the Free Banking Law, lim iting, i f  on ly  in th e o ry ,  the 
issue o f  paper pesos, and by reso rtin g  to  the c lan d estin e  issue 
amounting to  around 35 million go ld  pesos. The con sequ en ce  was 
that in go ld  terms paper peso in c ircu la tion  reached a peak in  1890. 
The fa ll in  A rgen tine cu rren cy  in  c ircu la tion  in  1891 was p robab ly  
linked mainly w ith the collapse o f  most o f  major banks in c lu d in g  the 
two g ian ts , Banco Nacional and Banco de la  P rov inc ia l d e  Buenos 
A ires, d u r in g  th e c r is is .11 The r is e  in paper pesos in c ircu la tion  in 
1892 and 1893 seemed to  be connected w ith the finan cia l 
reconstru ction  a fte r  the cria ia , du r in g  which new govern m en t paper 
money was pumped into the economy, w ith  th e old  bank no tes  be ing 
cancelled  s low ly . In the varia tion s o f  paper pesos in c ircu la tion , 
th ere fo re , ro le  o f  demand fo r  money appeared  prom inent, a lo n g  with 
oth er fa c to rs  including the go ld  premium and financia l c r is is .
The short-term  in teres t rates in ou r fou r  industria l cou n tr ie s  -
B rita in, th e US, Germany and France -  moved b road ly  in a para lle l
15 While in  October 1889 the number o f  banks was 52, M. G. 
Mulhall(1892) lis ts  in A p ril 1892 on ly  12 banks as o f  any substance.
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and c yc lic a l fa sh io n (F ig  I I I -2 5 ),  while th ose in Canada appeared  to 
remain more o r  less  s tab le1*. As fa r  as the d eve loped  coun tries  are 
con cern ed , i t  appears f i r s t  o f  all that th e  expansion and contraction 
in  th e  demand fo r  money d u r in g  the u p - and downsw ing w orked  in 
th e d irec tio n  o f  p rodu c in g  cyc lica l chan ges in  short-term  in teres t 
rates , w h ich  induced banks to v a r y  th e ir  supp ly  o f  c red it 
a c co rd in g ly . A t  the same time, it  a lso seemed th e case that the rise 
in  sh o rt-te rm  in teres t ra tes  in London in  the la te  1880s had the 
e f fe c t  o f  a ttra c tin g  sh o rt-term  funds and gold  to  London from  the 
res t o f  th e  w orld . T h is  con tribu ted  to  the synchronous rise  o f 
sh o rt-term  ra tes  in o th er  finan cia l c en tres  in th e la te  y ea rs  o f  the 
C ycle  I I I  boom, fo r  th is  meant a reduced  supp ly  o f  sh o rt term  funds 
and indu ced  de fen sive  a ction  b y  cen tra l banks aga inst the loss o f 
go ld . Th e  r ise  in London rates d u r in g  the C ycle I I I  upswing 
appeared  to  be attribu tab le  both to  th e money m arket mechanism and 
to  the conscious action o f  th e Bank o f  England aga inst the ou tflow  o f 
go ld . The la tter  aspect, how ever, appeared  less  im portant than in 
la te r  trade  cyc les . F or i t  is  said th at in  the 1880s the Bank o f 
England had g rea t d iffic u lty  in making th e  Bank rate e f fe c t iv e  due 
both  to  th e  re la tiv e  d eclin e in  its  pos ition  in the money m arket and 
to  th e s u rv iv a l o f  th e  com petitive  fe e lin g  between the Bank o f 
England an d  the res t o f  th e banking system ; and that i t  was only 
a fte r  th e B arin g  c r is is  th a t th e Bank o f  England rega in ed  th e control 
o v e r  th e m oney market th rou gh  moral suasion.1* A ccord ing  to G. 
R ich, th e r e la t iv e  s tab ility  in  th e movements o f  th e sh o rt term  rates 
in  Canada is  rela ted  to  th e  simultaneous chan ges in  the demand fo r  
and su pp ly  o f  money in Canada.1*
16 G. Rich(1977)
17 W. T. C. King(1936) C hapter IX
18 G. Rich(1977)
i.10
Financial c r ia is  situations d eve lo ped  around the u p p er  tu rn in g  
poin t o f  Cycle I I I  in  fou r  o f  the f i v e  countries under consideration : 
in  A p ril 1890 in  A rgen tin a , in Novem ber 1890 in  B rita in, in A p ril 1893 
in Australia  and in  May 1893 in  th e  US. A fea tu re  common to the 
fou r c ris es  was th a t th ey  b roke  ou t well a fte r  the rea l economies 
passed upper tu rn in g  poin ts: th e  Australian c r is is  occu rred  almost 
f iv e  y ea rs  a fte r  th e  investm en t peak in 1888, whereas in  th e oth er 
th ree  cases, a one yea r  gap  is  o b s e rved . I t  appears that the 
deterio ration  in th e economic clim ate a fte r  the cyc lica l peak a ffected  
the liqu id ity  position  o f  commercial and financial firm s in  an  ad verse  
way th rough the u n sa leab ility  o f  goods and financial assets, bad 
d ebts  etc ., which culm inated in  th e  bankruptcy o f  one o r  more o f  
them, tr ig g e r in g  w idespread  c r is is  th rou gh  a financial chain . The 
ro le  o f  the cen tra l bank as len d er  o f  last reso rt appeared  im portant 
in determ ining th e s e v e r ity  o f  c r is e s : while in the o th er  th ree
countries lack ing cen tra l banks th e  finan cia l c ris e s  spread  o v e r  and 
a ffe cted  w ider p a rts  o f  the econom ies, the Baring c r is is  in Britain 
was d eprived  o f  much o f  its  d e s tru c tiv e  momentum, and was allowed 
to  a f fe c t  the C ity  o n ly  to  a lim ited ex ten t by  th e rescue operation  
organ ized  by th e Bank o f  England w ith  the assistance from  o th e r  C ity 
institu tions.1"
The fou r finan cia l c r is es  d id  no t appear to  be re la ted  to  one
another to  any s ign if ica n t ex ten t, excep t the B ritish  and A rgen tine
crises . While i t  appeared  tru e  th at the Baring c r is is  a ffe c ted  the
cap ita l flow  from  Brita in  to  th e US a d ve rse ly  a fte r  1890, it  hard ly
19 The Baring c r is is  seemed p o ten tia lly  o f  no less s e v e r ity  than the 
o th er  th ree crises : i f  le f t  to run its  course, it could have th reatened  
the status o f  th e b ills  on  London, and th ere fo re  the in v is ib le  and 
v is ib le  trade o f  B rita in . L. S. P ressnell(1986 ). R. A.
Batchelor(1986)p.71, how ever, is  o f  a  d iffe r e n t  opin ion: he says that 
in the case o f  the B aring c r is is  'ca tas troph e  p robab ly  did not 
th reaten , since th e system  was w ell in form ed about the r e la tiv e  risk s  
be ing run by the m ajor banks.’
had an yth in g  to do w ith the 1893 US cria ia . Aa was seen in  the
p re c ed in g  section, the Baring cria ia  a lso seemed to acce lerate
con tra ction  o f  British lend ing to  A u stra lia , which had begun a fte r  the 
1888 peak. Accord ing to  E. A. Boehm, h ow ever, 'th e  banking cria ia 
in  Au stra lia  in  1893 would have oc cu rred  la rg e ly  as it  d id  w hether 
B ritish  depositors had intended to  w ith draw  o r  n o t.’M In  sp ite  o f  
tem pora l proxim ity, th e US and Australian  c r is e s  appeared  two
iso la ted  even ts, in v iew  o f  th e  w eak lin kages  between th e  two
econom ies in terms o f  e ith er cap ita l o r  trade  flow s. The same may 
be said  o f  the A rgen tin e  and Austra lian  crises .
In  none o f  the f iv e  cou n tr ies  d id  a m onetary ceiling  em erge to 
ch oke  o f f  a boom. A state c lose  to  a m onetary ce ilin g  d id  deve lop , 
paradoxica lly , in A rgen tina , whose c u rren cy  was not tied d ire c t ly  to 
an y  k in d  o f  metal; in itia l and fundam ental con tractiona ry  fo rces , 
h o w eve r , appeared in  the rea l s e c to r  b e fo re  th e dearth  o f  money.
A ll in all, m onetary fo rces  ap peared  to  h a ve  remained passive 
d u r in g  the trade c y c le  under e ith e r  go ld  o r  paper standard regim es: 
m oney stocks va r ied  fo llow ing th e  sh ifts  in demand fo r  money; 
fin an c ia l c r ises  appeared  to  have resu lted  from  rea l con traction ; a 
m onetary  ceiling  is ha rd ly  ob se rv ed  to  have in it ia ted  a downswing.
20 E. A . Boehm(1971) p.303. He a lso  says  on p.271, 'The depression  
ita e lf  was fundam entally caused b y  th e  collapse o f  public investm ent 
in  communications and o f  p r iva te  inves tm en t boom in  the pastoral 
in d u a try  and bu ild ing. The end o f  th e  investm en t boom had in turn 
m eant th e fa ilure du rin g  1891-2 o f  a  la rge  number o f  land, bu ild ing  
and finan ce companion which had depen ded  h ea v ily  upon the 
in ves tm en t boom, have speculated ex c e s s iv e ly  on  its  continuance, and 
cou ld  a u rv ive  on ly  ao long as th e boom lasted . T h e  banking cr is is  
then fo llow ed  on th e fina l and moat c r it ica l phase o f  the major 
m onetary  readjustm ents which resu lted  from  th e collapse o f  th e 
in ves tm en t boom.' F or a detailed  account o f  th e  Australian c r is is , 
see  E. A. Boehm(1971) Chapter 10.
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CONCLUSIONS
IX
Railway bu ild in g  on th e  American con tinen t thus ap p ea red  to  lie 
a t the bottom o f  th e  g loba l expansion in  the la te  1880s and 
con traction  in the e a r ly  1890st g en era tin g  m ajor in it ia l cyc lica l 
shocks. Railways w ere  b y  no means new in  th e y ea rs  concerned : 
th ey  came in to  b e in g  in  1825 and w ere f i r s t  in trodu ced  in  th e US in 
th e 1830s and in  A rgen tin a  in the 1850s. In  1885, h o w ever , they 
w ere  s till ’new ' on  the American con tinent, in  th e  sense that 
ra ilroad ization  was not y e t  com pleted. The p ro c es s  o f  the
in trodu ction  o f  ra ilw ays  in to  the US and A rgen tina  w as character ized  
b y  cyc lica l flu c tu ation s  o f  variou s durations, o f  w h ich  th e sh ifts  in 
ra ilw ay  bu ild ing in  1885-1896 form  a part. Th is wbb mainly because 
in  th ese fro n t ie r - ty p e  economies w ith  va s t land mass railw ays 
assumed a p ion ee r in g  role: th ey  w ere  usually b u ilt  ahead o f
settlem ent to induce agricu ltu ra l developm ent a roun d  them, which 
crea ted  conditions fo r  fu r th e r  expansion o f  ra ilw ays . With a
favou rab le  en vironm ent fo r  the s ta r t o f  a ra ilw ay boom res to red  in 
the mid-1880s, i.e . im provem ent in  th e US ra ilw ay p ro f ita b il ity  and 
th e consequen t r e flu x  o f  fo re ign  cap ita l in to  A rgen tin a , th e  upsw ings 
in  railway inves tm en t w ere begun. Thus, exp ecta tion s  o f
en trep ren eu rs  d id  n o t seem as exogenous as Keyn es th ou gh t, but, as 
in  Robertson, w ere  a ffe c ted  by both the ava ilab ility  o f  innovations 
and the p resence o f  con d itions fac ilita tin g  th e ir  app lication . 
Bu ild ing ahead o f  demand could not continue in d e fin ite ly  w ithout
seriou sly  w orsen ing the p ro fita b il ity  o f  ra ilw ay companies, which 
explains the A rgen tin e  dow n turn . On the oth er hand, th e
con traction  o f  the US ra ilw ay  bu ild in g  a fte r  1887 m arked the 
com pletion o f  the US ra ilroad ization .
Innovations d id  not appear such a dominant fo rce  in th e c yc lic a l 
fluctuations in Germany, B rita in  and many undeveloped  cou n tr ies  in 
the yea rs  concerned . The German C ycle  I I I  appeared  to  be v e r y  
much in fluenced  by the s ta te  o f  US ra ilw ay bu ild ing th rou gh  
psycho log ica l channels: a lth ough  the m agnitude o f  the ch an ges  in 
German iron  and s tee l exports  to  th e US did  no t amount to  v e r y  
much, th ey  seemed to  have s ign if ica n t e f fe c ts  upon the p rospects  
p e rce ived  b y  German iron and s tee l indu str ia lis ts . Thus, again , the 
sh ifts  in  expectations would no t ap p ea r  p u re ly  autonomous.
In  the B ritish trade c y c le , shocks from  the US and A rgen tin a  
w ere o f  cen tra l importance. T h e y  w ere transm itted v ia  both trade 
flow s  and expectations o f ov e rsea s  in ves to rs ; the impact th rou gh  th e 
la tte r  channel was then translated  in to  trade  flow  e ffe c ts , p a r ticu la r ly  
in B rita in ’ s rela tion  with A rgen tin a , w here B ritish  cap ita l finan ced  a 
substantia l part o f  domestic in vestm en t. These externa l shocks set 
the acce lerator-m u ltip lier mechanism in motion. Thus, the weak 
acce lera tor-m u ltip lier  model k ep t a liv e  by  e rra tic  shocks would appear 
rea listic  approxim ation to the B ritish  cyc lica l experiences.
In  none o f  the four c ou n tr ies , how ever, d id  we fin d  ev iden ce  
con gru en t with H icks’ exp los ive  acce lera to r-m u ltip lie r  model w ith a 
fu ll employment ce iling . N eith er was a m onetary ce ilin g  ob se rv ed  to 
deve lop  around upper tu rn in g  p o in ts  to  in it ia te  downsw ings. By 
and la rge , m onetary fo rces  ap p ea red  to remain passive  under e ith er
gold  o r  p a p er  standards: m oney supply  v a r ied  la r g e ly  in  response to 
changing demand fo r  money, ra th e r  than due to  th e sh ifts  in go ld  
stock or o th e r  conditions re la ted  to  money su p p ly ; externa l go ld  
flows had th e  nature o f  a res idual in th e con tex t o f  b road ly
equ ilib ra tin g  movements b e tw een  balances on c u r re n t  account and 
capital flow s , and in  con sequ en ce did not appear to  be an  e ffe c t iv e  
channel th ro u gh  which cyc lica l in fluen ces cou ld  b e  transm itted from  
one economy to  another; f in an c ia l c ris es  tend in g  to  occur a fte r  the 
downturn o f  rea l economy w e re  not c lose ly  re la ted  w ith  each o th er  
except fo r  th e  connection be tw een  the B ritish  and A rgen tin e  cr is es , 
which su g ge s ts  that in tern a tion a l transm ission o f  financial c r is es  
could no t be con sidered  as respon sib le  fo r  international
syn chron ization  o f  the trade c yc les .
T h e re fo re , trade and cap ita l flow s  and, to  a smaller exten t, 
p sycho logy  appeared  major channels o f  transm ission o f  cyc lica l
shocks. F ina lly , inn ovation  and inven tion  seem ed to  go  fa r  to
explain how investm ent booms cou ld  s ta rt more o r  less  simultaneously 
in two o r  m ore coun tries  w ith ou t close economic lin k ages : in a w orld  
with w e ll-d eve lo ped  means o f  communication th e em ergen ce o f  a new 
set o f  tech n o logy  would im ply  the open in g  up  o f  investm ent
opportu n ities  in seve ra l cou n tr ies  on sim ilar s ta g es  o f  economic 
developm ent a t rou gh ly  the same time. Thus, th e term ination o f  
depression  and the b eg in n in g  o f  new investm en t upsw ings in the
mid-1890s in  the US and Germ any w ere in the main attribu tab le  to 
the deve lopm ent o f  in d u s tr ie s  based upon new techn ology: 
e le ctric ity .
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